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THE

WORKS OF PLATO.

VOL. III.

MENO, EUTHYDEMUS, THE SOPHIST, THE STATESMAN, CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, AND THE BANQUET.

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE BURGES, M.A.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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PREFACE.

The present portion of the works of Plato having been placed in my hands for translation, I undertook the task the more readily, as it enabled me to renew my acquaintance with an author to whose writings I formerly paid considerable attention.

It is now more than five and twenty years since I prepared for the press, for Mr. Priestley, his variorum edition of Plato, published in 1826; for which object I carefully examined whatever had been contributed by my predecessors, especially Routh, Fischer, Wyttenbach, Heusde, Heindorf, Buttman, Bekker, Ast, Schneider, and Stallbaum. Since then I have from time to time read or looked into the more recent publications illustrative of my author, and therefore feel myself competent to pronounce an opinion on their labours.

The seven Dialogues contained in the present volume are confessedly among the most difficult, and this chiefly because, with the exception of the Parmenides, they are the most corrupt. Hence I have found myself compelled to write longer and more frequent notes than would otherwise have been requisite; and sometimes, with the view of arriving at the probable meaning of the author, to suggest new readings.

G. B.

November, 1850.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO.

OR

RESPECTING VIRTUE.

The object of this dialogue is to inquire into the nature of Virtue in the abstract; to ascertain whether it can or cannot be taught; and to show that the knowledge we now possess is but the recollection of what the mind was conversant with at some former period.

On the first of these points Plato, as usual, arrives at no conclusion. For Socrates, who is merely Plato's mouth-piece, and not, as many imagine, the exponent of his own opinions, never pretended to know any thing in the abstract. He was therefore content to show, that for the development of Virtue a correct moral conduct, founded on prudence, temperance, and justice, is all that is requisite.

With regard to the question, whether Virtue can or cannot be taught, we are told that, as Virtue is not a science, it cannot, like a science, be made the subject of teaching; and that the virtuous person is such, rather by an act of the deity than by any efforts made by man.

Of the speakers, the principal is Meno, a Thessalian, who had been a pupil of Gorgias, and is supposed to be the person mentioned by Xenophon in the Anabasis, where his character is drawn in the darkest colours, and reflecting to the life the conduct of those, who had been taught by the Sophists of Greece:—

> "quærenda pecunia primum;
> Virtus post nummos."
>
> Seek money first; and virtue after coin.

Towards the latter part of the dialogue, Anytus, best known as one of the accusers of Socrates, is introduced, as taking accidentally a share in the conversation; partly because he was Meno's host;

but more, perhaps, with the view of enabling Plato to show, that the answers which Anytus gives to questions on political subjects, were less sensible than those, given by his own slave on geometrical problems; and this too, although the former had been under the cleverest masters, and the latter was merely self-taught.

MENO.

MENO, SOCRATES

[1.] *Meno.* Can[1] you tell me, Socrates, is virtue to be taught? or is it to be not taught, but acquired by (mental) exercise?[2] or does it come to man neither by (mental) exercise, nor teaching, but by nature, or some other means?

Socrates. The Thessalians, Meno, have been of old in great repute among the Grecians, and admired for their skill in horsemanship,[3] and for their wealth; and now, I think, (they are) no less so for their wisdom.[4] And not the least so, are the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. Now of this Gorgias is the cause. For when he came to the city (of Larissa), he so captivated the chiefs of the Aleuadæ,[5] one of whom is your friend Aristippus, and those of the other Thessalian families, that they fell in love with him for his wisdom.[6] And in truth this custom has habituated you to answer fearlessly and with a high bearing, if any one asks a question; as indeed becomes those who know a subject

[1] From the very abrupt opening of the dialogue, some persons have supposed that the original commencement has been lost. But something similar occurs in the Cratylus and Philebus.

[2] The same question is touched upon in the Protagoras.

[3] See Plato's Hipp. Maj. Suidas in Ἱππεῖς λευκοθώρακες, and the Ζεύξις and the Ἔρωτες of Lucian. S.

[4] This is ironical. For Plutarch relates that, when Simonides was asked why he had not deceived the Thessalians, he replied, "They are too ignorant to be deceived by me." Gedike.

[5] This was the noblest family in Larissa. They were descended from Aleuas, one of the kings of Thessaly, of the race of Hercules.

[6] Hence Philostratus, in the Proeme to his Lives of the Sophists, says, ἦρξε τῆς ἀρχαιο-έρας [sc. σοφιστικῆς] Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐν Θετταλοῖς.

thoroughly. Since he[7] too offered himself for any of the Greeks to interrogate him on any matter he might think proper; and there was not one, to whom he did not give an answer. But here, friend Meno, the very reverse has occurred. There is, as it were, a dearth of wisdom; and there is a danger, that wisdom has departed from this country, and has fled to yours. Should you then be willing to put this question to any one here, there is not a man who would not laugh and say, "I run the risk, stranger, of seeming to you to be one of the blessed,[8] in knowing whether virtue is to be taught, or comes by any other means whatever; since I am so far from knowing whether it is to be taught or not, that I happen not to know what virtue is at all." Now this, Meno, is my own case. [2.] I am in the same poverty of knowledge as my fellow-citizens in this affair; and I blame myself for being totally ignorant of virtue. How then can I know the quality of that, of which I know nothing? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant, who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a handsome, or rich, or generous spirit, or the reverse of all these characters? [Do you think it possible?][9]

Meno. I do not. But in good sooth, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and shall I send home this report of you?

Soc. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met any where with any person who, as I think, (did know).

Meno. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, when he was here?

Soc. I did.

Meno. And did he not seem to you to know?

Soc. I do not perfectly remember, Meno; so that I am not able to say at present what I then thought of him. But perhaps both he knew himself, and you too, what he said. Do you then bring to my recollection what he said; or, if you

[7] On this boldness of Gorgias thus challenging persons to try his powers as a sophist, see Plato Gorg. p. 447, D., and Cicero De Finib., from which it would appear that he was the admirable Creighton of his day.

[8] By μακάριος is meant not simply blessed, but blessed as a god. So Cicero in Tuscul. i. 11, "Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, deus aliquis viderit." GEDIKE.

[9] This clause, properly rejected as a needless repetition by Gedike, is vainly defended by Heindorf on Charmid. § 33.

would rather, tell it in your own words; for surely you agree with him in opinion.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Let us then put him aside; especially as he is absent. But, by the gods, do you, Meno, tell me yourself what you assert virtue to be; and do not grudge me (the knowledge of it), in order that I may have uttered a most fortunate untruth, should both you and Gorgias appear (to know), what I said I had never met with a person (who did know).

[3.] *Meno.* Nay, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell. In the first place, if you wish (me to tell) the virtue of a man, it is easy (to say) that a man's virtue consists in his being competent to manage the affairs of the state, and, managing them, to do good to its friends, evil to its enemies, and to take care that he suffers himself nothing of that kind. Then, if you wish to know the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to go through (the particulars): that it is to manage well the affairs of her family, to keep safe the things in the house, and to hearken to her husband. Another kind of virtue is that of a child, either a girl or boy; and of a man advanced in years; and, if you choose (to go on), of a free-man and of a slave. Many more virtues are there, of all kinds; so that there is no want of power to tell concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, and for every kind of business, there is (a peculiar) virtue to each person: and similarly, Socrates, I think, there is (a peculiar) vice.

Soc. I think myself greatly indeed favoured by fortune, Meno. For, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving with you. But with regard to this simile, taken from bees, had I, Meno, asked you respecting the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what answer would you have given me, had I demanded of you further—Do you call them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees; or do they differ not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or any other thing of a like kind? Tell me, what answer would you have made, had you been so questioned?

Meno. I (would have answered) thus; that so far as they are bees, they differ not at all one from another.

Soc. Had I then afterwards said—Tell me now Meno con-

cerning this very thing, in respect of which they do not differ, but are all the same; what say you is this? Would you have had any thing to say?

Meno. I should.

[4.] *Soc.* Just so it is with the virtues. Although they are many indeed, and of various kinds, yet they all agree in one and the same idea, through which they are virtues; and to which it is well for him to look, who by his answer would point out to the inquirer what virtue happens to be. Do you not comprehend what I am saying?

Meno. I think I do. But I do not grasp, as I could wish, the question.

Soc. Do you think only after this manner concerning virtue, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of the other virtues, (that they are all different)? or have you the same way (of thinking) as regards health, size, and strength? Do you consider the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be another? or is the same kind (of health) every where, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in any other subject whatever?

Meno. The health of a man and of a woman, I think, is the same thing.

Soc. (The same then applies to) size and strength. A woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, (as applies to a strong man). By the same strength I mean this. That whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, as regards the existence of strength, there is no difference; or do you think there is a difference?

Meno. I think there is not.

Soc. Will there be any difference in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno. This case, Socrates, seems to me somehow to be not quite similar to the other.

Soc. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well managing a state, and that of a woman, in well managing a household?

Meno. I did.

Soc. Is it, then, possible to manage well a state or household, or any thing else whatever, without justice and prudence.

Meno. By no means.

Soc. If then the management be just and prudent, will not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

Meno. They will of necessity.

Soc. Both of them, therefore, the woman and the man, have need of the same things, (namely,) justice and prudence, if they are about to be good (managers).

Meno. It appears so.[10]

Soc. What then, can a child, or an old man, ever be good, if dissolute and dishonest?

Meno. By no means.

Soc. But only if sober and honest?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. All persons, surely, are good in the same way; for they are good by possessing the same qualities.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Now, if virtue were not the same in them (all), they surely would not be good in the same way.

Meno. They would not.

[5.] *Soc.* Since then the virtue is the same in them all, endeavour to recollect and tell[11] me, what says Gorgias of it, and you with him.

Meno. What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of one thing, applicable to all (persons).

Soc. It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the same virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave, to be able[12] to govern their master? Do you think that he who rules would be still a slave?

Meno. I do not think he would, Socrates, at all.

Soc. For it is not reasonable, my very good (friend). Consider this again.[13] You say (it is virtue) to be able to govern. Shall we not subjoin the (word) justly, but not, unjustly.

Meno. I think so. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Soc. Is it, Meno, virtue, or some virtue?

[10] Instead of *φαίνονται*, one MS. has correctly *φαίνεται*. The other reading would be at variance with the sense.

[11] Sydenham has thus tacitly corrected the collocation of the words *εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι*

[12] The common text offers some difficulties, which no critic has successfully overcome.

[13] Ficin. "rursus," from whence Stalb and Buttm would read *δ' αὖ* for *γὰρ*.

Meno. How say you this?

Soc. As respecting any thing else whatever. For instance, if you please, respecting roundness, I would say that it is a figure, and not thus absolutely that it is figure. And I should say so for this reason, because there are other figures.

Meno. You would thus speak rightly. Since I too myself not only say that justice is a virtue, but that there are other virtues.

Soc. Say what these other (virtues) are; as I would, were you to bid me, tell you other figures beside the round. Do you then likewise mention to me other virtues beside justice.

Meno. Well then, courage, I think, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and a lofty bearing, and a great many other (qualities).

Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the same thing as before. We have again found many virtues, while in search of only one, but in a different way from that just now: but the one virtue, which pervades all these, we are not able to find.

[6.] *Meno.* For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to lay hold of one such virtue as you are seeking, applicable to all, as in the other instances.

Soc. Probably so; but I will show a readiness to urge ourselves onward, if I can. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus matters stand as regards every thing. For had any person asked you, what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness, had he then said to you, as I did, Is roundness figure, or a figure? you would surely have said, It is a figure.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason, because there are other figures?

Meno. For that very reason.

Soc. And had he asked you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would have told them.

Meno. I should.

Soc. And had he asked you in the same manner concerning colour, what it is? If you had answered, It is whiteness; would not the interrogator have taken you immediately up with this question—Is whiteness colour, or a colour? and you would have said, A colour; because there happen to be other colours

Meno. I should.

Soc. And if he had bidden you to enumerate such other

colours, you would have mentioned those, which happen to be colours no less than white.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. If then he had pursued the argument as I do, and said—We are always getting into a multitude. Do not (speak) thus to me. But since you call all this multitude by one name, and assert that there is none of them which is not figure; and this too, notwithstanding they are contrary to one another;[14] what[15] is this thing which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this to which you give the name of figure; and yet you say that the round is figure not more than the straight? or do you not say this?

Meno. I do.

Soc. When you speak thus, do you mean that the round is not more round than is the straight? and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

Meno. I do not mean this, Socrates.

Soc. But you mean that the round is not more a figure than is the straight, nor is this than the other.

Meno. You say what is true.

[7.] *Soc.* Endeavour then to tell me—What is that thing which is called by the name of figure? Now if to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or colour, you had said, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man, nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would have wondered, and said, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring what is the same in all these? Would you have had nothing to say even after this, Meno, had one inquired—What is that applicable to the round, and to the straight, and to the other things which you call figures, being the same for all? Endeavour to tell me what it is, in order that you may be ready, by practice, to give a reply to the question respecting virtue.

Meno. Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

Soc. Would you have me oblige you in this point?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

Meno. I shall.

[14] Since rectilinear figures are contrary to circles. S.

[15] So Gedike; who reads τί for ὅ, τι. But the whole passage is scarcely intelligible; and so, I suspect, is Stalbaum's German version of it.

Soc. Let me then show my readiness; for the cause is worthy of it.

Meno. Without all doubt.

Soc. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept it, as being this. Let then figure be that which of all things is the only one, that always happens to accompany colour. Does this suffice you? or do you seek for any thing further? For I should be thus content, if you would tell me virtue.[15]

Meno. But, Socrates, this surely is silly.

Soc. How so?

Meno. According to your account, figure is that which always accompanies colour.

Soc. Be it so.[16]

[8.] *Meno.* But should any person assert, that he knew not what colour was, and was equally at a loss concerning colour and concerning figure, what answer do you think you would have given him?

Soc. That I had answered with truth. And if the questioner happened to be one of the wise men, fond of dispute and contention, I would tell him—"I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was your business to take up the discourse, and to refute me." But if two parties, such as you and I here, were inclined to have a discourse together, as friends, they ought to answer each other in a milder and more conversational manner. Now it is perhaps more conversational to answer not only truthfully, but in terms which the party questioned confesses he understands.[17] Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For tell me; do you call a certain thing by the name of end? I mean such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these

[15] From Sydenham's translation, "I should be well contented, if you would give me but as good an account of virtue," it is easy to see, that he wished to read, *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῴην, εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν οὕτως εἴποις*: which would make a far better sense than the received text, *ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην, εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις*.

[16] Heusde and Heindorf on Cratyl. p. 410, C., throw the Greek word *εἶεν*, commonly given to Socrates, into the speech of Meno. For *εἶεν* is similarly introduced in Alcib. i. p. 106, A., where see Buttmann.

[17] Instead of *ἐρωτώμενος*, "questioned," Cornari suggested *ἐρόμενος*, "questioning," which, though approved of by Schleiermacher and Buttmann, is rejected by Stalbaum.

words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly differ from us; but you at least would say, that a thing has been bounded, or, has had an end. This is what I mean to say; nothing many-coloured.

Meno. Well, I do call (something end): and I think I understand what you mean.

Soc. And do you not call something a superficies? and another thing a solid? such as are in geometry.

Meno. Yes, I do.

Soc. Now then, from these (premises) you can understand what I mean by figure. For in every figure, that which bounds the solid, I say, is figure; which (idea) I would concisely express by saying that figure is the bound of solid.

[9.] *Meno.* And what say you colour is?

Soc. You are a saucy fellow, Meno. You impose upon an old man the task of answering; yet are unwilling yourself to recollect and tell (me) what Gorgias said that virtue was.

Meno. But I will tell, after you have told me this, (what colour is).

Soc. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

Meno. How so?

Soc. Because you do nothing but command in conversation; as foppish[18] fellows do, as being lordlings, so long as they are in the prime of beauty; and at the same time you have perhaps convicted me, as being subdued by beauty. I will therefore gratify you and give an answer.

Meno. By all means do gratify me.

Soc. Do you wish me to answer like Gorgias,[19] so that you may most easily follow me?

Meno. I do wish it. How not?

Soc. Do not you and Gorgias say, according to Empedocles,[20] that certain effluvia proceed from bodies?

[18] The French "petit-maîtres" is perhaps the best modern version of τρυφῶντες applied to young men.

[19] Gorgias asserted that the qualities of things were perceived by the five outward senses, through small and invisible bodies, continually flowing from the larger and visible. Thus odours, whether fragrant or fœtid, were held to be the effluvia of bodies odoriferous, affecting agreeably or disagreeably the olfactory nerves. S.

[20] Empedocles, a Pythagorean philosopher of Agrigentum in Sicily,

Meno. We do so firmly.

Soc. And that there are certain pores, to which and through which those effluvia pass?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And that of those effluvia, some are fitted to some of these pores, but that others are less or greater?

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And do you not call something sight?

Meno. I do.

Soc. From these (premises) "Understand," as Pindar has said, "what I am saying." Colour then is the flowing off from figures, agreeing with the sight, and by it perceived.[21]

Meno. In this answer, Socrates, I think you have spoken as well as possible.

Soc. (You say so) perhaps because this has been said according to your habits; and because at the same time you perceive, I imagine, that you are able from thence to state what is sound,[22] and smell, and many other things of the like kind.

Meno. It really is so.

Soc. The answer, Meno, was tragical;[23] and so it was more agreeable to you than that relating to figure.

wrote a poem in three books concerning nature, on the principles of Pythagoras. His theory was that the four elements of the universe, fire, water, earth, and air, were not irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and Atheistic philosophers imagined, but formed by rule in number and in measure, as being the work of mind. His poetry [the fragments of which have been collected by Sturz] was deemed by the ancients in point of versification equal to that of Homer. On the publication of his poem, the Pythagoreans expelled him from their society, and at the same time made a law, that from henceforth no poet should be admitted a member of their body. S.

[21] Aristotle in his treatise Περὶ Αἰσθήσεως καὶ Αἰσθητῶν, says that Empedocles held the eye, that is, the sight of the eye, to be fire; and vision to be produced by the emission of light from the eye, as from a lantern. S. Plato in Tim. p. 67, B., describes colour, as *φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὄψει σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν*: from whence one would read here *σωμάτων* in lieu of *σχημάτων*.

[22] Thus sound was said to be air, violently forced out of some body stricken, and propagating its motion by strokes continually repeated along the air, until it reached the ear; that odours were the subtle effluvia of bodies, conveyed along the air to the organ of smell; and that from bodies applied to the palate, juices were expressed, insinuating themselves into the pores of the organ of taste. S.

[23] The commentators explain *τραγικὴ* by saying that the language of

Meno. To me it was.

Soc. And yet, son of Alexidemus, I persuade myself, that not this,[24] but that, was the better answer. I conceive too, that you would not have thought thus, unless, as you said yesterday, there was necessity for you to go away before the mysteries. But if you could stay and be initiated, * * *[25]

Meno. But if you would tell me many such things, I would certainly stay.

Soc. In my best endeavours to say such things I shall not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But (I fear) I shall not be able to say much in that way. [10.] But come now, and try yourself to perform your promise, by speaking of virtue, what it is in general: and cease making many out of one; as persons say perpetually, when bantering those, who pound any thing to pieces;[26] but leaving virtue whole and entire, tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

Meno. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says

> In what is fair, to feel a joy,
> And (o'er it) to have power——

and this, I say, is virtue—for him who has a desire for beautiful things, to be able to obtain them.

Soc. Do you mean that the person, who desires beautiful things, has a desire for good things?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. Is it that there are some who have a desire for evil things, and others, who have a desire for good things? Do you not think, my good (friend), that all men desire good things?

Meno. I do not.

Soc. But that some desire evil things?

Meno. I do.

Empedocles was inflated like that of tragedy. But as there is nothing of that kind in the answer given by Socrates, the real meaning of τραγικὴ remains still to be discovered.

[24] There is nothing in the Greek to answer to "this." Hence Buttmann was led to read Οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ—He should have suggested Οὐχ ἐστιν αὕτη, ὦ παῖ—For thus αὕτη might easily have dropt out before ὦ παῖ.

[25] Here is a lacuna. The sense to be supplied is evidently "you would learn something perhaps not far from the truth;" as Gedike was the first to remark.

[26] On this saying Stalbaum refers to Erasm. Adag. p. 266, ed. Steph.

Soc. Say you that these men desire evil things, conceiving them to be good? or, knowing them to be evil, do they still desire them?

Meno. Both these events, I think, occur.

Soc. Is there any man, think you, who, knowing evil things to be evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

Meno. Without doubt.

Soc. What do you mean, by desiring them? Is it not that he may have them?

Meno. To have them. For what else (can I mean)?

Soc. Does he imagine that evil things profit the person who has them, or does he know that evil things are hurtful, to whomsoever they are present?

Meno. There are those who think that evil things are profitable; and those who know them to be hurtful.

Soc. Do you think that they know evil things to be evil, who imagine such evil things to be profitable?

Meno. By no means do I think that.

Soc. Is it not then evident, that those who do not desire evil things know not the nature of the things (they desire); but (rather), that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which are in reality evil? So that they, who are ignorant of them, and imagine them to be good, do, it is plain, desire good things. Do they not?

Meno. They seem to be.

Soc. But they who desire evil things, as you say, conceiving at the same time that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, surely know that they will be harmed by those (evil things).

Meno. This must be.

Soc. But do they not think, that such as are harmed are in an evil plight, so far as they are harmed?

Meno. This also must be.

Soc. And that those in evil plight are unhappy?

Meno. Assuredly.

Soc. Is there a man, then, who wishes to be in evil plight,[27] and to be unhappy?

Meno. I think not any, Socrates.

[27] Aristotle, in Nicomach. Eth. iii. 5, quotes, probably from Euripides, a similar sentiment: Οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ: "None willingly is pained, nor gainst his will Blessed." S

Soc. No man then, Meno, wishes for evils; unless he wishes to be such. For what else is it to be unhappy, than to desire evil things, and to possess them?

Meno. You are saying, Socrates, what is nearly true. For[28] no man wishes evil things.

[11.] *Soc.* Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the wishing for, and having a power over, good things?

Meno. I did say so.

Soc. From what has been said,[29] is not this a wish to all men? and in this respect one man is not better than another?

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. But it is clear, that if one man is better than another, he would be so in respect of his power.

Meno. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This then, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of obtaining good things.

Meno. The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now understand it.

Soc. Let us see then if this too you say truly: for perhaps you will say well. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Do you not call good things such as health and wealth? And I say,[30] to possess gold and silver, and honours in the state, and magistracies? You do not speak of any other things as good, except things of this kind?

Meno. No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Soc. Well then, to get money is virtue; as Meno says, the hereditary guest of the great king.[31] But do you add to this (idea of) getting, (the ideas of) honesty and holiness? or is

[28] Ficin. "Nemo enim vult mala:" which leads to *καὶ γὰρ* in lieu of *καὶ* alone.

[29] Ficinus has "ex eo quod dictum est." His manuscript therefore read *ἐκ τοῦ λεχθέντος*,—what the sense requires, not *τούτου λεχθέντος*. S. Hence Schleiermacher was led to — *τούτου τοῦ λεχθέντος*.—Perhaps Plato wrote—*ἀπὸ τοῦ λεχθέντος*. For *απο του* differs by only one letter from *τουτου*.

[30] The introduction of the verb *λέγω* is so perfectly useless, that it has been neglected by Ficinus; unless it be said, that it was omitted in his Greek MS., as it is in another collated by Bekker.

[31] This was the title of the king of Persia. So the king of France used to be called "Le Grand Monarque."

this a matter of indifference to you; but that, even if a person acquires them unjustly, you call the act[32] equally virtue?

Meno. By no means, Socrates; but (I call the act) wickedness.

Soc. By all means then there ought, as it appears, to be added to the act of acquisition justice, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue; for otherwise, it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

Meno. For without those how could it be virtue?

Soc. And to not obtain gold and silver, whether for himself or others, when the act is not just, is not this non-attainment likewise virtue?

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. The attainment then of these good things, is not more virtue than the non-attainment; but, as it seems, that which is combined with honesty, is virtue; and that which is separated from all such things, is wickedness.

Meno. I think it must of necessity be as you say.

[12.] *Soc.* Did we not say a little while since, that honesty, and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of virtue?

Meno. We did.

Soc. Then, Meno, you are playing with me.

Meno. How so, Socrates?

Soc. Because, when I just now desired you not to break down nor split virtue into fractions, and gave you patterns, by which you ought to answer, you have paid no regard to them, but you tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

Meno. I do.

Soc. It follows then, from what you confess yourself, that to do whatever one does with a part of virtue, this is virtue. For you say that justice, and each of those things (above-mentioned) is a part of virtue.

Meno. What then? granting that I say this.[33]

[32] In lieu of *αὐτὰ*, which is without regimen, Schneider correctly reads *αὐτὸ*, i. e. *τὸ πορίζεσθαι*. Stalbaum however vainly attempts, as usual, to defend the common text.

[33] The common text has ΜΕ. *τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω*; ΣΩ. *ὅ, τι ἐμοῦ*.—Schleiermacher would read *τί οὖν δὴ*; *εἰ τοῦτο λεγω*—similar to Sydenham's "granting that I say this." Stalbaum first suggested ΜΕ. **Τί *οὖν δὴ*;**

Soc. (Truly) that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from stating what it is; but you say, that every act is virtue, if it is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should now know it, when you split it into fractions. You have need therefore, as it seems to me, of the same question again from the beginning, friend Meno—What is virtue? Or[34] can every act, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is to say this, when one says that every act accompanied with justice is virtue. Or do you think there is no need to you of the same question; but do you think that one may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing virtue itself?

Meno. I think he cannot.

Soc. For, if you remember, when I gave an answer just now respecting figure, we rejected such a kind of answer, as attempted to reply by terms still the subject of inquiry, and not as yet confessedly understood.

Meno. And we did rightly reject, Socrates.

Soc. Do not then imagine, my very good (friend), while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is in the whole, that, by answering in terms relating to its parts, you will show clearly to any one virtue itself; or, by speaking of any thing else in this very same manner; but that there will be still need again of the same question—Respecting virtue—as being what,[35] do you speak, what you speak? Or do you think that I am saying nothing (to the purpose)?

Meno. I think you are speaking correctly.

[13.] *Soc.* Answer then again, (as) from the beginning,—What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno. I heard, Socrates, before I came together with you, that you (do) nothing else than doubt yourself, and cause others to doubt. And you seem to be now playing a wizard's tricks, and to drug me, and really use incantations so as to fill

ΣΩΚ. Τοῦτο λέγω—understanding λέγεις after Τί οὖν δή;—and so after him Buttman.

[34] Instead of ἢ Bekker has edited εἰ from one MS., answering to "si quidem" in Ficinus. Stalbaum defends ἤ, and renders it "alter, aliquin," a meaning that ἤ never has.

[35] The neuter ὄντος is here applied to the feminine ἀρετῆς, as in Rep. p. 336, A., οὐδ' ἐτοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη: quoted by Heindorf on Hipp. Maj. § 43. BUTTM.

me with doubts. And, if I too must banter a little, I think you resemble exactly, both in form and in other respects also, that broad sea-fish, called the torpedo; for that too produces a numbness in the person whoever approaches and touches it.[36] You seem to have done some such thing at present to me, [to benumb[37] me]. For in very truth I am benumbed, both in mind and mouth,[38] and I have not what reply to give you. And yet I have spoken very many discourses ten thousand times about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought myself; but now I have it not in my power at all to tell what (virtue) is. I think that you have consulted well for yourself in never sailing out from hence nor travelling abroad. For if you were as a stranger to act in this manner in another city, you would perhaps be driven thence[39] as a wizard.

Soc. You are full of craftiness, Meno, and you have nearly put a cheat upon me.

Meno. How particularly so, Socrates?

Soc. I know why you brought a simile against me.

Meno. Why think you?

Soc. That I might bring a simile against you in return. For this I know respecting all handsome persons, that they love to have likenesses made of them. For it is to their interest; since of handsome persons the pictures too are handsome. But I will not draw your likeness in return. As to myself, if the torpedo be thus numb itself, and produces a numbness in others also, then am I like to it; but if otherwise, I am not. For I do not, when not doubting myself, cause others to doubt; but rather when I am in doubt myself, I in like manner cause others to doubt. And now respecting virtue, what it is, I know not: you, however, knew it formerly; perhaps, before you had touched me. But now

[36] On the benumbing faculty of this fish, see Aristotle in Hist. of Animal. ix. 37. Oppian. Halieut. ii. 56—85; iii. 149. Plutarch. Solert. Animal. ss. Plin. H. iv., xxxii. 1; and Ælian N. A. i. 36; ix. 14. GEDIKE.

[37] The word *ναρκᾷν* is evidently an explanation of *τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι*.

[38] The reading *στόμα*, found in the best MSS., answers to "os" in Ficinus. BUTTMANN.

[39] Buttm. and Stalb, explain *ἀπαχθείης* by "you would be led off to prison." But it does not appear that wizards were so treated; although they might be expelled from a city, as Plato wished the Sophists to be in § 29. See Euthydem. § 2.

you are like one,[40] who knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of looking into the matter with you, and of searching out jointly, what (virtue) is.

[14.] *Meno.* But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing, which you do not know at all, what it is? For by placing before you what of the things, which you do not know, will you seek it? Or, if you should fall in with it, how will you know that this is the thing, of which you were ignorant?

Soc. I understand, Meno, what you mean to say. See you, how captious a method of reasoning you introduce? That it is impossible for a man to seek, either what he does know, or does not know. For no man would seek what he knows; because he knows it already; and for such a person there is no need of seeking. Nor (would any man seek) what he knows not; because he does not know what he would seek.

Meno. Do you then, Socrates, think that this way of reasoning is not fair?

Soc. I think it not (fair).

Meno. Can you say in what way?

Soc. I can. For I have heard men and women wise in divine matters—

Meno. Saying what?

Soc. Things, I think, true and fair.

Meno. What were they? and who said them?

Soc. They, who said them, were belonging to the priests and priestesses; whose business it is, and who are able to give a reason for the things to which they put their hands. Pindar, too, and many other of the poets, such as are divine, say them; and what they say is this. But do you consider whether you think they speak the truth. For they say that the soul of man is immortal; and at one time it ends, which they call dying; and that another it exists again; but is never destroyed; and that for this reason we ought to live throughout our lives as holy as possible. "To them, from whom has Proserpine received the payment for an ancient act of grief,

[40] From the words of Ficinus, "ignoranti mihi assimilis," Sydenham fancied the translator found in his MS. ἐμοὶ ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι; which he says is a sense suited to the mask of ignorance, worn by Socrates throughout the dialogue.

she in the ninth year does give back their souls to the upper sun; and from them[41] kings in splendour, and through their strength swift-footed, and in wisdom men mightiest increase, and heroes are called holy by mankind in future times."

[15.] The soul then, as being immortal, and born frequently, and having seen both the things here, and those in Hades, and[42] all things, there is nothing it has not learned; so that it is no wonder that it is able to recollect, with regard to virtue and other things, what it formerly knew. For the whole of nature being of one kindred, and the soul having heretofore known all things, there is nothing to prevent a person, who remembers—what men call learning—only one thing, from discovering again all the rest; if he has but courage, and seeking faints not. For to search and to learn is reminiscence all. We must not, therefore, submit to that captious way of reasoning, for it would make us idle; since to persons of a soft nature it is pleasant to hear it; whereas this makes men active and inquiring; and which I believing to be true, I am willing with you to seek out what virtue is.

Meno. With all my heart, Socrates. But how[43] say you this, that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is reminiscence? Have you it in your power to teach me that this is so?

Soc. Even just now I said, Meno, that you are very crafty. Since now you ask me, if I have the power to teach you; I, who say there is not teaching, but (only) reminiscence; so that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

Meno. Not so, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not say so with an eye to this; but (merely) from habit. But if any way you can prove to me that things are as you assert, prove it.

Soc. This is no easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to show my readiness. Call hither to me then one of

[41] Instead of ἐκ τᾶν Steph. suggested, what Sydenh. has adopted, ἔστ' ἂν—αὖξωνται—similar to "quousque—evadant" in Ficin.; while to support ἐκ τᾶν Boeckh. alters ψυχὰν into ψυχάς.

[42] Struve and Buttman would expunge καὶ before πάντα—Stalbaum renders καὶ by "denique," i. e. summatim; and refers to Schœfer on Demosth. Appar. i. p. 305. Fritzsche in Quæst. Lucian. p. 67. Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 291, D. and his own note on Gorg. p. 465, B.

[43] Instead of ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς Stalb. has edited ἀλλα πῶς from two MSS. and Stobæus.

your numerous attendants here, whomever you please, that through him I may give you the proof.

Meno. Most readily. Come hither, you.

Soc. Is he a Greek, and speaks he Greek?[44]

Meno. Perfectly well, as he was born in the family.

Soc. Now then pay attention, and (mark) whether he appears to recollect himself, or to learn from me.

Meno. I will be attentive.

[16.] *Soc.* Tell me, boy, do you know that a four-angled space is such as this?[45]

Boy. I do.

Soc. A four-angled space then has all these lines, being four equal.

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. Has it not also these lines through the middle of it equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Could there be a space like this, larger and less?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. Now if this side were two feet, and this two, how many feet would there be in the whole? Consider it in this manner. If, on[46] this (side) the space were two feet, and on this only one foot, would the space be other than[47] of two feet once (told)?

Boy. It would (not).[48]

Soc. But since it is two feet on this side likewise, is it any other space than of twice two feet?

Boy. No.

Soc. It is then (a space) of twice two feet?

[44] This question is put, because slaves were frequently brought from foreign countries, where Greek was not spoken, just as they now are from Africa to America.

[45] During this conversation Socrates is supposed to draw on the ground the geometric figures to which he alludes.

[46] All the MSS. read *ἐν*: but as Ficin. has "si latus hoc duorum esset pedum," Wolf suggested *ἢν*—adopted by Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb.

[47] After *ἄλλο τι* Bekker constantly rejects, to the detriment of the sense, the particle *ἤ*, which is here correctly found in three MSS. and supported by "quam" in Ficin. Stalbaum too, although he follows Bekker here, yet in p. 83, B. justly objects to the practice of Bekker, misled, it would seem, by Hermann on Viger. n. 110.

[48] To the question asked by *ἄλλο τι*, Buttm. says the answer in Greek is by the affirmative *ναί*, not the negative *οὔ*.

Boy. Yes.

Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon, and tell me.

Boy. Four feet, Socrates.

Soc. Cannot there be another space, the double of this (in size), but of the same kind, having, like this, all its sides equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Of how many feet will it be?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Come now, endeavour to tell me, how long will each line of this (space) be? Now of this (space) the line is two feet. What (will be) the length of the line of (the space) double the size?

Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that it (will be) double (the length).

Soc. You see, Meno, that I teach this (boy)[49] nothing, but only question him about all. And now this boy thinks he knows of what length is the line from which a space of eight feet is produced. Do you not think he does?

Meno. I do.

Soc. And does he (really) know?

Meno. Certainly not.

Soc. But he thinks he does from (the idea of) a doubled (quantity).

Meno. Yes.

Soc. View him now recollecting in order (things) as he should recollect. [17.] Now speak to me, (boy). You say that from a line, double in length, there is produced a space double in size: I mean a space of this kind; not one side long, the other short; but let it be equal on every side, like this, but twice the size, of eight feet. See now, whether you still think this will be from the doubled (line).

Boy. I do.

Soc. Does not this become the double of that, if we add another from this point?

Boy. Yes, surely.

Soc. Now, from this (line), you say that there will be a space of eight feet, if there be four such lines?

[49] Instead of *τούτων* Schliermacher suggested *τοῦτον*, found subsequently in four MSS., and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. Buttmann however prefers *οὐδὲν τούτων*, read in one MS. and acknowledged by Ficin "nihil ex his." Either will do.

Boy. I do.

Soc. Let us then draw from it four equal lines. Would this space be any other than that which you say is of eight feet?

Boy. Not at all.

Soc. Are there not in this space these four spaces, each of which is equal to that of four feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. How large is become the whole space? Is it not four times as large?

Boy. How not?

Soc. Is that two-fold which is taken four times?

Boy. No, by Jupiter.

Soc. How many fold?

Boy. Four-fold.

Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, there is produced a space, not two-fold, but four-fold.

Boy. You say true.

Soc. Four times four is sixteen: is it not?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. But from what line is (to be drawn) a space of eight (square) feet? Is it not from this, four-fold?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And from the half of this line (there is drawn) this space of four feet[50] (square).

Boy. There is.

Soc. Well; but is not that (square of) eight feet twice as large as this, and half as large as that?

Boy. Certainly.[51]

Soc. Will it not be from a line longer than this, and shorter than that?

Boy. So at least it appears to me.

Soc. (You say) correctly; for answer only what appears to you. And tell me this too. Was not this line two feet, and that four?

Boy. Yes.

[50] In lieu of *τέταρτον* Cornarius suggested *τετράπουν*, adopted by Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb. To meet the difficulty, Sydenham translated *τέταρτον* "the fourth part." But *τέταρτος* has never such a meaning.

[51] This answer is omitted in all the best MSS. Ficin. however has "Ita"—the Latin for *Ναί*—found in one MS. from a correction.

Soc. The line therefore of the eight-foot space must be greater than this of two feet, but less than that of four feet.

Boy. It must be.

Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy. Three feet long.

Soc. If then it be three feet, we will add the half of this (line), and now this will be three feet. For these are two (feet), and this is one foot: and in the same manner, these are two (feet), and this is one; and this space becomes such as you say.

Boy. It is so.

Soc. If then this line here be three feet, and that here three feet, the whole space becomes thrice three feet.

Boy. It appears so.

Soc. And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. But how many feet ought the doubled space (above mentioned) to be?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Hence from a line three feet (long) there is not (to be drawn) the space (above mentioned) of eight feet.

Boy. There is not.

Soc. But from how long a line? Endeavour to tell me exactly. Or, if you do not like to give it in numbers,[52] at least point out from what line (it may be drawn)

Boy. By Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

[18.] *Soc.* Do you observe again, Meno, whither[53] this boy is proceeding in (the road to) recollection? since at first he knew not what is the line of the (above-mentioned) space of eight feet; as, indeed, he does not yet know; but he then fancied he knew it, and answered boldly, as a knowing person would, nor did he think he should be at a loss. But he now deems himself at a loss, and, as he knows not, does not even think he knows.

[52] Had Socrates not added this, he would have put the boy on telling how long is the side of a square, the superficies of which contains eight square feet. Now the number of feet in the side of such a square cannot be expressed except by decimals, of which the boy could not be supposed to know any thing. S.

[53] Instead of *οὗ*, Beck suggested *οἷ*, which, though praised by Buttm. is rejected by Stalb., who should have remembered that *οὗ* is "where," but *οἷ* "whither," which alone can be united to a verb of motion.

Meno. You say what is true.

Soc. Is he not then in a better state now as regards the matter of which he was ignorant?

Meno. This too appears to me.

Soc. In causing him then to be at a loss, and to be benumbed, as is the torpedo, have we done him any harm?

Meno. None, I think.

Soc. We have at least made some progress, as it seems, towards his finding out where he is. For now, knowing nothing, he would readily search. But he then fancied he could readily, before many persons and often, say respecting the (above-mentioned) doubled space, that it ought to have a line twice as long.

Meno. So it seemed.

Soc. Think you, then, that he would have attempted to seek or learn that, of which, though ignorant, he fancied he knew it, before he had fallen into a difficulty,[54] by conceiving he did not know, and had felt a desire to know?

Meno. I do not think, Socrates, he would.

Soc. He was benefited, then, by being benumbed.

Meno. I think so.

Soc. Now mark what, after this difficulty, he will discover by searching with me, (doing) nothing else but asking questions, and not teaching. And watch me, if any where you can discover me teaching or telling him any thing, and not asking him rather his own opinions. [19.] Now, boy, tell me, is not this space four feet? Do you comprehend?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Now we will apply to it this other (space) equal to it.

Boy. Well.

Soc. And this a third (space) equal to either of these?

Boy. Very well.

Soc. What if we add this (space), likewise (equal),[55] to fill up the corner here.

Boy. Very well.

Soc. Will these be any thing else than these four equal spaces?

[54] From the words of Ficin., "potius quam," it would seem that he found in his MS. *μᾶλλον ἢ* instead of *ἀλλὰ μή*.

[55] To make all clear, there should be in the Greek some word answering to "equal." Hence, instead of *οὐκοῦν* we might perhaps read *καινὸν*—

Boy. No.

Soc. Well then, how much larger is this whole space than that?

Boy. Four times.

Soc. But we wanted one only twice as large. Or do you not remember?

Boy. (I remember it) very well.

Soc. Does not this line from corner to some[56] corner, cut each of these spaces in half?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Are not therefore these four lines equal, which enclose this space?

Boy. They are.

Soc. Consider then, how large is this space.

Boy. I do not comprehend.

Soc. Has not each (line) of each (space) cut off within it half of these four (spaces)? or not?

Boy. They have.

Soc. How many such (spaces) then are there in this (figure)?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many in this (figure)?

Boy. Two.

Soc. How much of two is four?

Boy. Twice as much.[57]

Soc. How many feet then does this (space) become?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Drawn from what line?

Boy. From this here.

Soc. From the line reaching from corner to corner of the space of four feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Now the sophists call such a line the diameter; so that, if the diameter be its name,[58] from the diameter, as you,

[56] The common text has *εἰς γωνίαν τινα τέμνουσα*, which Wolf corrected into *εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα τέμνει.*

[57] Between this answer and the following question, Schleiermacher suspected there was a lacuna, to be thus supplied,—"*Soc.* How much again as that is this? *Boy.* Twice as much. *Soc.* And of what length is this space? *Boy.* Four feet."

[58] This seems a rather strange supposition. For of the name of the diameter there could be no doubt. Besides the truth of the proposition

Meno's boy, assert, there can be produced a space twice as large

Boy. Assuredly, Socrates.

[20.] *Soc.* Well, what think you, Meno? Is there an opinion, which he has given in his answers, that is not his own?

Meno. None, but his own.

Soc. And yet, as we said a little before, he knew nothing.

Meno. True.

Soc. Yet these very opinions existed in him. Or did they not?

Meno. They did.

Soc. In a man, therefore, who is ignorant, there exist true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.[59]

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. These very opinions then have been lately stirred up afresh in him, as if it were a dream. And should any one put questions to him respecting these same matters at many times and in many places, be assured he will at length know them not less accurately than any man.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Will he not then, without any one having taught him, and by some one putting questions, recover, himself through himself, his (former) knowledge?

Meno. He will.

Soc. Now for a person to recover knowledge, himself through himself, is not this to recollect?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And this knowledge, which he now possesses, he has either at some time acquired, or has possessed it always?

Meno. Yes.

Soc. If then he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if he acquired it at any time, he would not have got it in the present life; or has some one taught him geometry? For he will act in the very same manner with regard to the whole of geometry, and all other

depends not upon the name of the diameter, but upon the existence of such a line. There is an error here, which it would be easy to correct.

[59] The words *περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε*, which Schleiermacher and Bekker reject as spurious, were not found in the MS. of Ficinus. They ought to be inserted after *δόξαι*, just above. They were, strange to say, defended by Heindorf.

matters of learning. Is there any one then who has taught the boy all this? (I ask you); for you ought to know, especially since he was born and bred up in your family.

Meno. I know well that no person has ever taught him.

Soc. And yet he entertains these very opinions; does he not?

[21.] *Meno.* There appears, Socrates, the necessity.[60]

Soc. If, having got (this knowledge), not in this present life, he did not know this,[60] it is plain that he possessed it in some other time and had learnt it.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. And is not then that the time, when he was not a man?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. If then, during the time when he is, and during the time when he is not a man, true opinions exist in him, which, roused up by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learnt through eternity? for it is plain, that during all time he either is, or is not a man.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. If then the truth of things, that are, exists always in the soul, the soul would be immortal; so that, whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to attempt with confidence to seek, and to recollect.

Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, I know not how, to speak rightly.

Soc. And I (seem) to myself too, Meno. And yet in other respects I would not contend very strenuously in defence of my argument; but that, in thinking we ought to seek the things which one does not know, we should become better and more manly, and less idle, than if we supposed it impossible for us to find out, and that it did not behove us to inquire into what we know not; for this I would, if I were able, violently contest both by word and deed.

Meno. In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

[22.] *Soc.* Since then we are of one mind, that a person

[60] Bekk., Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβὼν οὐκ ᾔδει τοῦτο. Sydenham wished to omit *οὐκ*, and so did Buttm. once; but he afterwards retained it for reasons that failed to convince even Stalbaum, who has edited Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβὼν, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον. But *ἤδη* could not be thus inserted between *οὐ* and *τοῦτο*. He should have suggested Εἰ δὲ μὴ—λαβὼν ἦν δή, ᾗ τοῦτο δῆλον—

ought to inquire after what he does not know, are you willing for us to attempt jointly to inquire what is virtue?

Meno. By all means. Not but that I should with the greatest pleasure take into consideration, and hear you on the question I first asked you, whether we must put our hand to the inquiry about virtue as a thing to be taught, or as coming by nature, or by some other means to man.

Soc. Had I been master not only of myself, but of you too, Meno, we would not have considered whether virtue is a thing to be taught or not, before we had ascertained what is the first inquiry, what virtue is. But since you do not even attempt to master yourself in order that you may be a free-man, and yet undertake to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For what must I do? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to a certain thing, whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But do you relax if not some,[61] yet a little, the strictness of your rule, and agree to consider hypothetically, whether virtue can be taught to a man, or how otherwise (it is to be attained). I say hypothetically as geometricians often do in treating a question; when one asks them, as it were, about a space,[62] whether it is possible for this space to be placed[63] triangularly[64] within this, a (geometrician) would answer,—I know not as yet, of what kind[65] the triangle is; but I think I have, as it were,[66] an hypothesis, that may be of use for the matter (in hand) of this kind.—If the space be of such a kind, as that by stretching[67] along the line given there, it would be deficient by such a space as would be the

[61] The Greek is *εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γε*. But as *τι* and *σμικρόν* are synonymous, they could not be thus opposed to each other. Besides *οὖν* could not be thus inserted between *τι* and *ἀλλά*.—The train of ideas manifestly leads to *εἰ μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ' οὖν σμικρόν γε*, "if not entirely at least a little."

[62] The word *χωρίον* was used by the Greek mathematicians to signify the space comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure. S.

[63] In lieu of *ἐνταθῆναι*, which is applied only to a straight line, the sense requires here *ἐνσταθῆναι*; and similarly *ἐνστάσεως*, found in three MSS. a little below, instead of *ἐντάσεως*.

[64] This is the interpretation of Stalbaum.

[65] Whether right-angled, obtuse, or acute-angled. S.

[66] In the Greek *ὥσπερ μὲν* there is evidently some error.

[67] Vulg., *παρα τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν*. But as there is nothing to which *παρατείναντα* can be referred, Stalbaum suggested *παρατεῖναν*, i. e. *χωρίον*. To complete, however, the correction, he should have proposed *ἔτι ἐλλίποι ἄν*. For the infinitive *ἐλλείπειν* is without regimen.

space itself stretched along, there would, I think, be one result ;[68] but another, if this (hypothesis) were impossible to occur. Laying down then an hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what will happen respecting the placing of it (the space) within the circle, whether it be impossible or not.—[23.] And thus too concerning virtue, since we know not, either what it is, or what is its quality, we will lay down an hypothesis, and consider whether it is to be taught or not, by stating the question thus. If virtue be in its quality one of things, which belongs to the soul, is it to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, if it is either different from knowledge, or of the same kind with it, is virtue or is it not to be taught, or (as we said just now) to be recollected; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. Is then virtue to be taught? Now is it not evident to every one, that a man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

Meno. To me it seems so.

Soc. If then virtue be a kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

Meno. For how not?

Soc. From this question then we have been quickly relieved, that, if virtue be such a kind of thing (as knowledge), it is to be taught; but not, if it be not such a kind of thing.

Meno. Very true.

Soc. Next after this, it seems, we must consider whether virtue be knowledge or apart from knowledge.

Meno. We must, I think, consider this in the next place.

Soc. Well now; say we that virtue is any thing else but a good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, that virtue is a good?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Now if there be also any other good apart from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a kind of knowledge. But if there be no good which knowledge does not comprehend, then in suspecting virtue to be a kind of knowledge we should suspect justly.

[68] Of the problem to which Plato alludes, solutions have been suggested by Sydenham, Grou, Gedike, Anonymous, J. W. Müller, Schleiermacher, Mollweide, Klügel, Tremble, Nickel, Buttmann, Wex, Dobree, and Stallbaum. But as all of them have supposed the existence of literal errors, or the omission of some words, or else attributed new meanings to well-known geometrical terms, it is evident that the passage must be left to exercise, as before, the ingenuity of critics, conversant alike with Geometry and Greek.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And yet through virtue at least we are good.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. And if good, then useful. For all things that are good are useful: are they not?

Meno. They are.

Soc. Virtue then is a thing useful.

Meno. It must needs be, from what has been admitted.

[24.] *Soc.* Now let us consider what sort of things, taking each by itself, are useful to us: health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth. These things and others of a like kind we call useful: do we not?

Meno. We do.

Soc. And say we not that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you say otherwise? or thus?

Meno. Not (otherwise); but thus.

Soc. Consider now, at what time is any one of each of these things, when it leads, useful to us; and at what time is it hurtful. Is it not, when a right use (leads), it is useful to us, but when not, it is hurtful?

Meno. Certainly so.

Soc. Further then let us consider the things belonging to the soul. You call something by the name of temperance, and of justice, and of fortitude, and of docility, and of memory, and of high bearing, and of all such things.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Now consider such of these things, as you think to be not knowledge, but apart from knowledge, whether they are not sometimes hurtful, and sometimes useful? for instance, unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of boldness. Is not a man hurt, when he is bold without reason? but when he is bold with reason, is he not benefited?[69]

Meno. Yes.

Soc. Is it not so with temperance, and docility? Are not things learnt and prepared (for use) with understanding useful, but without understanding hurtful?

Meno. Very much so.

Soc. In a word, do not all the endeavours and enduring

[69] So Horace—"Vis consilii expers, mole ruit suâ.

of the soul, when prudence leads, tend to happiness; but if imprudence leads, to the reverse?

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it is necessary, as you say, for it to be useful, it must be prudence: since all the things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither useful nor hurtful; but imprudence or prudence being added, they become hurtful or useful. Now according to this reasoning it must needs be that virtue, being useful, is a kind of prudence.

Meno. So it seems to me.

[25.] *Soc.* Now then as to the other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, both wealth and the things of that kind: does not prudence, when leading the rest of the soul, make the things belonging to the soul useful, but imprudence hurtful? and in like manner does not the soul, by rightly using and leading them, render them useful, but by (using) wrongly, hurtful?

Meno. Most certainly.

Soc. And does not a prudent soul rightly lead, but an imprudent one, incorrectly?

Meno. Such is the fact.

Soc. Thus then we may say universally, that in the case of man all the other things[70] depend on his soul; but the things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence, if they are to be beneficial. And by this reasoning prudence would be the useful. But we said that virtue was useful.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. We assert therefore that prudence is virtue, either wholly, or in part.

Meno. What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

Soc. If then it be so, the good are not good[71] by nature.

Meno. It seems to me, they are not.

Soc. For then this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have some where persons, who

[70] By the words τὰ ἄλλα πάντα are meant all the things which are not within the soul. The Stoics described such things by τὰ ἔξω. S.

[71] Vulg., οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. But Sydenham's tacit emendation οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ, which Struve has likewise suggested, and Buttmann approved, and is found in the best MS. Flor. x., Stalb. rejects as unnecessary.

knew of our youths the naturally good; over whom, when those had shown them to us, we should place a guard in the citadel, putting a seal on them, rather than on gold, so that no person might corrupt them, and that, when they arrived at manhood, they might become useful to the state.

Meno. It were reasonable (to do so), Socrates.

[26.] *Soc.* Since then the good are not good by nature, are they by learning?

Meno. I think this is of necessity so. And it is plain, Socrates, that if, according to the hypothesis, virtue is a science, it is to be taught.

Soc. Perhaps so, by Jove. But did we admit that correctly?

Meno. And yet it lately seemed to be fairly said.

Soc. But I suspect, it ought not only to have seemed lately to be said fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be any thing sound in it.

Meno. What is the matter now? looking to what are you dissatisfied with it? and why doubt that virtue is a science?

Soc. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, if it be a science, is a position I do not retract,[72] (so to say) that it has not been correctly asserted. But consider whether I appear to reasonably doubt, that virtue is a science. For tell me this. If any thing is to be taught, not virtue only, must there not be of necessity both teachers and scholars?

Meno. I think there must.

Soc. Hence, on the contrary, that, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, should we conjecture rightly, in conjecturing it is not to be taught?

Meno. Such is the fact. But do you not think that there are teachers of virtue?

Soc. After a lengthened inquiry, whether there were any teachers of virtue, I cannot, with all my efforts, discover any. And yet do I make the search with many, and those, too, whom I think would be the most skilled in the matter. And just now, Meno, in happy time has Anytus[73] sat down here

[72] In the verb *ἀνατίθεμαι*, (I put back for myself,) there is an allusion to a game, similar to draughts or backgammon. Stalb. refers to Gorg. p 461, D. 462, A., Protag. p. 354, F., Phædon. p. 87, A., and Charmid. p. 164, D.

[73] Steph. *αὐτὸς*, for which Struve proposed to read *Ἄνυτος*, suggested perhaps by the note of Sydenham, who says that "Anytus had probably now seated himself close to Socrates." The reading, now happily con-

by us, to whom we can give a share in the search. And with reason should we give him a share. For, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who has become rich, not by accident, nor yet by a gift from any one, as Ismenias[74] of Thebes has done, who has lately obtained the property of Polycrates, but having acquired his wealth by his own wisdom and carefulness; and secondly, as regards his other qualities, he is a citizen deemed to be neither haughty nor puffed up, nor overbearing, but to conduct himself like a decent and well-behaved man; and then, he has brought up and educated his son here very well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. With such men it is right then to make a search after teachers of virtue, whether there are any or not, and who they are. [27.] Do you then, Anytus, unite with me, and Meno here, your guest, in our search after this very thing, as to who are the teachers of it. Now consider the matter in this way. If we wished this Meno to become a good physician, to what teachers should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus. By all means.

Soc. And if we wished to make him a good currier, should we not send him to the curriers?

Any. To be sure.

Soc. And so as regards the rest of subjects?

Any. Without doubt.

Soc. But concerning the same things tell me again this. In sending him to the physicians we say we should do well, if we wished to make him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence in sending him to those, who make that art their profession, rather than to those who do not; and who making for themselves a remuneration for this very thing, put themselves forth as the teachers of any one willing to go and learn. Is it not from looking to these matters that we should do well in sending him?

Any. Yes.

firmed by the best MS. Flor. x., even Stalbaum is disposed to adopt; although he has left *αὐτὸς* in the text, misled by the subtleties of Buttmann's defence of *αὐτός*.

[74] Both Buttmann and Stalbaum confess that nothing can be said for certain of the person to whom Plato alludes

Soc. Hence in the case of music, and the other (arts), the same things (take place). And it is a great folly for us, if we wish to make any one a flute-player, to be willing to send him not to such as profess to teach the art, and to make money by it; but, to give trouble to some other persons, and to look for his learning from those, who do not profess to be teachers, and have not one pupil in that branch of instruction, which we think proper that the person, whom we send, should learn. Does not this seem to you to be very unreasonable?

Any. Yes, by Jupiter, and ignorance to boot.

[28.] *Soc.* You say well. Now then you may consult in common with me about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he told me some while ago, Anytus, that he had a longing for that wisdom and virtue, through which men govern well both their household and the state, and pay attention to their parents, and know how to receive both their countrymen and foreigners, and to send them away in a manner worthy of a good man. Consider then, to what persons (about to teach)[75] this virtue, should we in sending him correctly send. Is it not clear that, according to the reasons (detailed) just now, (we should send him) to those who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly proffer themselves common to any one of the Greeks desirous to learn; after fixing the price, and making it a matter of business.

Any. Of what persons, Socrates, are you speaking?

Soc. You surely know that these are they whom men call sophists.

Any. O Hercules! speak fair words, Socrates. On none of my relations, or family, or friends, or fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, may ever such a madness seize, as to go and be spoiled by them. For those fellows are clearly the bane and corruption of their associates.

Soc. How say you, Anytus? Are they the only men among those who, so widely different from all the rest, profess the knowledge of doing something beneficial, and yet do not only not improve, as others do, what one puts into their hands, but

[75] Bekk. *ταύτην οὖν τήν ἀρετὴν σκόπει.* Stephens was the first to remark a defect here, pointed out by the version of Ficinus—"ad quem potissimum hujus comparandæ virtutis gratiâ hunc mittere deceat." Hence he would read *Διὰ ταύτην οὖν*—Sydenham suggested the insertion of *διδάξοντας* or *μαθησόμενον* after *ἀρετὴν*.—Biester, whom Stalbaum follows, considers the accusative to be used absolutely.

on the contrary, spoil it? and do they think fit openly to make money for themselves for this? [29.] For my part, I know not how to believe you. For I know that one man, Protagoras (by name), has acquired singly more wealth from this wisdom, than both[76] Phidias, who has produced works so conspicuously beautiful, and ten other statuaries besides. Indeed it is a prodigy you are telling me; if when the menders of old shoes and the patchers of old clothes could not escape for thirty days from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them, and if they did so, they would soon perish by hunger; yet, that Protagoras should undiscovered corrupt the whole of Greece by sending away his associates even worse men than he received them, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of age when he died, after having passed forty in his profession. And during all that time he never ceased being in high repute, even to this day; and not only Protagoras (met with this success), but very many others, some born prior to him, and some still living. Shall we then say, according to your account, that they knowingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem those to be so much out of their senses, who, some say, were the wisest of mankind?

Any. They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates. Much rather so are those youths, who give them money; and still more so than the youths are their relations in committing them to such men; but most so of all are the states that suffer them to come thither, and do not drive out a person, whether foreigner or citizen, who endeavours to do any such thing.

[30.] *Soc.* Has any of the sophists done you, Anytus, any injury? or why are you so hard upon them?

Any. I have never, by Jupiter, associated with one of them myself; nor would I suffer any person who belonged to me to do so.

Soc. You have no experience at all then of those men.

Any. And never may I have.

Soc. How then should you know, O happy man, respecting this matter, whether it has any good or harm, when you have no experience of it at all?

[76] Bekk. Φειδίαν γε. Heindorf suggested τε, and so Stalbaum from the best MS. Flor. x.

Any. Easily enough. For I know what sort [77] of fellows they are, whether I have any experience or not of them.

Soc. Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus. Since how otherwise you could know respecting them, I should, from what you say yourself, much wonder. But we were not inquiring, what the persons are, to whom Meno might go, and become a bad man. For let these, if you will, be the sophists. But now speak to us of those others; and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, by telling him to what persons in this great city he may go and become worthy of note for that virtue which I was just now detailing.

Any. But why did you not tell him yourself?

Soc. What persons I conceived to be the teachers of these things I have told already. But I happen to have said nothing (to the purpose), as you inform me. [78] And perhaps there is something in what you say. [78] Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Mention the name of whomsoever you like.

[31.] *Any.* What need is there of hearing the name of any one man? For whomsoever of the men of honour and virtue among the Athenians he may meet, there is not one of them who would not make him a better man, than the sophists would, if he will be but persuaded.

Soc. But did these men of honour and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man (to be so)? and are they able to teach others, what they were never taught themselves?

Any. They, I presume, learnt from their predecessors, being men of honour and virtue. Or think you that many excellent men have not been produced in this city?

Soc. I think, Anytus, that there are in this city men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been still not less so than there are. But were they good teachers of their own virtue? For it is this, about which our present discourse happens to be; not whether good men are at present here or not; nor whether such have been produced formerly; but

[77] Steph. οἵ. Wolf would read οἷοι, found subsequently in the two best MSS. Flor. x. and Coisl. He got the idea from Ficinus' "quales sunt." Buttm. and Stalb. are content with οἵ.

[78]—[78] These words were, before the time of Bekker, assigned to Anytus. But he gave them to Socrates, on the faith of Ficinus' version.

whether virtue is to be taught or not, we have been for a long time considering: and in considering that question, we are come to consider this, whether those excellent men, either of the present or former (day), knew how to hand over to another that virtue, by which they themselves were good; or whether this cannot be handed over to, or received by, one man from another. This it is, which we have been long examining, I and Meno. [32.] Consider then the question in this manner, according to your own argument. Would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

Any. Yes, the best of all.

Soc. And would you not then (say), that, if ever any other man was the teacher of his own virtue, he was one?

Any. I suppose so, if he wished it.

Soc. But would he not have wished, think you, for some others to become men of honour and virtue, and especially his own son? Or do you think that he envied his son, and did designedly not hand over to him that virtue, in which he himself was excellent? Have you not heard that Themistocles caused[79] his son Cleophantus to be taught to be[80] a good horseman? For example, he remained standing upright upon horses, and upright (too) upon horses he threw a javelin, and performed many other surprising feats, in which his father had caused him to be instructed; and that he made him skilled in such accomplishments as are connected with the having good teachers? Have you not heard this from the elderly people?

Any. I have heard it.

Soc. No one then would have accused his son of being of an evil nature.

Any. Perhaps not.

Soc. But what is this? That Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and a wise man, as did his father, have you ever heard this from any person, either young or old?

[79] On the difference between διδάσκειν, "to teach," and διδάσκεσθαι, (middle,) "to cause to be taught," see Porson on Med. 297, who might have said the same of παιδεύειν and παιδεύεσθαι, as shown here. But, as Porson confesses, the difference is sometimes neglected.

[80] Bekk. ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο. But μὲν has no meaning here. Sydenham was the first to see that μὲν is an error for εἶναι, found correctly in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Περὶ Ἀρετῆς, § 3, where this part of the Meno is copied almost verbatim. Stalbaum indeed refers to ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν here, in § 33. But there too εἶναι has dropt out after μὲν.

Any. No indeed.

Soc. Do we imagine then that he wished to bring up his own son in such studies, and yet, in the wisdom where he himself was wise, not to make his son at all better than his neighbours, if virtue could be taught?

Any. By Jove, perhaps not.

[33.] *Soc.* Such a teacher of virtue then is this one of yours, whom you yourself acknowledge to have been amongst the best men of former times. And now let us consider another, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not confess that he was a good man?

Any. I do entirely.

Soc. And did not he too give his son Lysimachus[81] the best education at Athens, so far as depended on teachers? and do you think he made him a better man than any one whatsoever? For you have associated with him, and you see what sort of a man he is.[82] But if you wish (another), you know that Pericles, a man of such lofty bearing and wisdom, bred up his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Any. I do.

Soc. These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen not inferior to any of the Athenians; and he instructed them in music and gymnastics, and the rest of accomplishments that depend on art, so as to be inferior to none. But had he no wish to make them good men? I believe he had the wish; but I suspect it to be impossible (to teach virtue). And that you may not think that a few persons, and the most humble in means[83] of the Athenians, were incompetent for

[81] It was common amongst the Athenians to give the eldest son the name of his grandfather; so that two names were continued alternately in the same family. S.

[82] We find nothing more of this Lysimachus, than what Plutarch states, that the Athenians, out of respect for the memory of his father, who died poor, gave him a small landed estate, a sum of money in hand, and a trifling pension. He is one of the speakers, however, in Plato's Laches, where he complains that his father, Aristides, had too much indulged him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, by giving himself up wholly to state affairs, had neglected his son's education. S.

[83] By *φαυλοτάτους* Sydenham, Gedike, and Schleiermacher understand meanness of birth; which, though applicable to Themistocles, and perhaps to Aristides, could not be said of Pericles, who was on his mother's side of a high family. By comparing however a little below *Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι*, it would seem that *φαυλοτάτους* is here "the most humble in means."

such an affair, consider that Thucydides[84] likewise brought up his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and educated them well in other respects, and particularly in wrestling the best of the Athenians. For he intrusted one to Xanthias, and the other to Eudorus; and these (two) were thought to be the best wrestlers of that time. Do you not remember this?

Any. I do by hearsay.

[34]. *Soc.* Is it not plain then, that he would never have taught his children those things, in the teaching of which he must have been put to expense, and not have taught them to be good men, which would have required him to spend nothing, if such a thing could be taught? But Thucydides perhaps was of very humble means, and had not very many friends among the Athenians and their allies. (It was not so.) For he was of a noble family, and had great influence in the city and in the other Grecian states; so that if this could be taught, he might have found out a person, either one of his own countrymen or a foreigner, who might have made his sons virtuous, if, through his superintendence of the state, he had no leisure himself. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing not to be taught.

Any. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak ill of persons with great facility. But I would advise you, if you are willing to hearken to me, to be on your guard. For in another city too it is perhaps more easy to do a man mischief than good; but in this it is especially so; and I think you are sensible of it yourself.

[35.] *Soc.* Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he thinks I am speaking ill of those very persons; and then he considers himself to be one of them. But if he should ever know what it is to speak ill (of others), he will cease to be angry; but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you then tell me, are there not amongst us men of honour and virtue?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And are these men willing to offer themselves to youths as teachers? and to confess both that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

[84] This Thucydides was not the historian, but a politician of the aristocratical party at Athens, and the opponent of Pericles, who favoured the democratic. S

Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. But you may hear them (saying) at one time that it is to be taught, at another, not.

Soc. Shall we say then that these men are teachers of that thing, about which they are not agreed?

Meno. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. Well; but do those sophists, who alone proclaim themselves teachers, appear to you to be so?

Meno. It is for this, Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias, because you would never hear him making such professions. On the contrary, he laughs at the others, whenever he hears them making such a promise; and conceives that he ought to make men powerful in speaking.

Soc. Do not then the sophists seem to you to be teachers (of virtue)?

Meno. I know not, Socrates, what to say. For I have suffered myself, what the many do. Sometimes I think they are, and sometimes, not.

Soc. But you know, that not only to yourself and the others versed in civil affairs, it seems at one time that this is to be taught, and at another, not; and you know that the poet Theognis says the very same thing.

Meno. In what verses?

[36.] *Soc.* In his Elegiacs;[85] where he says,

> With some drink thou and eat, and with some sit,
> And pleasant be to those, whose power's far known:
> Good from the good thou'lt learn; but with the bad
> Mixing, thou'lt lose the good thoughts once thine own.

Do you perceive that in these (verses) he speaks of virtue as a thing to be taught?

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. And yet in other verses he says, passing on a little further, that

> If wisdom could be made and placed in man,

they, who could accomplish this,

> Many and great rewards would carry off;

and

[85] V. 33 and foll., ed. Bekker. They are quoted likewise by Xenophon in M. S. i. 2, 20.

From a good sire no bad son e'er would come,
To words of wisdom listening; but thou'lt ne'er
By teaching make the bad a virtuous man.

Do you observe, that in speaking upon the same subjects, he contradicts himself?

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. Can you tell me then of any other thing whatever, of which they, who profess to be teachers, are not only not held by others to be teachers, but who (confess) to be ignorant of it themselves, and who act like knaves in that very thing, which they profess to teach; and where they, who are allowed to be men of honour and virtue themselves, at one time say it is to be taught, and at another, it is not? Those then, who are so tossed about in mind about any subject whatever, would you say are the master-teachers of it?

[37.] *Meno.* By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. If then neither the sophists, nor they who are men of honour and virtue themselves, are teachers of this thing, it is plain there can be no others beside.

Meno. I think there can be none.

Soc. But if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno. I think the matter is as you say.

Soc. But we have agreed that the thing, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, is not to be taught.

Meno. We have agreed.

Soc. Of virtue then there appear no where any teachers.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. Virtue therefore cannot be taught.

Meno. It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly; so that, Socrates, I am led to wonder whether there are any men really good; and if there are, what can be the manner of producing good men.

Soc. We are in danger, O Meno! of being, both you and I, men of no mark; and that Gorgias has not taught you sufficiently, nor Prodicus me. Above all things therefore we ought to apply our minds to ourselves, and to seek a person, who by one way at least would make us better men. I say this with an eye to the inquiry lately made; since it has escaped us ridiculously, that it is not only under the guidance

of science, that affairs are administered by men rightly and well; or, [if we should not grant that, (namely,) that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also,][86] perhaps the knowledge of the means, by which men become good, has escaped us.

Meno. How, Socrates, say you this?

[38.] *Soc.* In this way. Because, since we have rightly agreed that good men must be useful to us, this[87] cannot be otherwise. Is it not so?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And that they will be useful, should they conduct affairs rightly, did we not well admit this?

Meno. Yes.

Soc. But are we like persons that have not rightly agreed, (in saying) that unless one is prudent, it is not possible to conduct (affairs) rightly?

Meno. How say you rightly?

Soc. I will tell you. If a man, who knew the way to Larissa,[88] or wherever else you please, were to walk, and act as a guide to others, would he not conduct them well and rightly?

Meno. Without doubt.

Soc. What if one had only a correct opinion about the way, but had never gone it himself, nor had any certain knowledge of it, would not he also conduct (others) rightly?

Meno. To be sure.

Soc. And so long as he had anyhow a correct opinion of things, of which the other man had a certain knowledge, he would not be at all a worse guide, though (only) surmising justly, and not knowing (clearly), than the other with his (perfect) knowledge?

Meno. Not at all (worse).

Soc. Correct opinion, therefore, with regard to correct action, is not at all a worse guide than (perfect) knowledge.

[86] The Greek words for the English within brackets are omitted by all the MSS. but the one used by Aldus; nor were they read by Ficinus.

[87] Instead of *τοῦτό γε, ὅτι*, the sense requires *τοῦτό γ' ἔτι*—

[88] The road to Larissa is taken as an illustration, because it was most familiar to Meno, who came from Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, near Larissa. S.

And this it is, which we omitted just now in considering of what kind is the nature of virtue, when we said that prudence only led to right action; now this is correct opinion.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Correct opinion therefore is not at all less beneficial to man than (certain) knowledge.

Meno. In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; because he, who has a (perfect) knowledge, would always attain his object; but he, who had only a correct opinion, would sometimes attain it, and sometimes not.

[39.] *Soc.* How say you? would not the man who has always a correct opinion, always attain (his object) so long as he had a correct opinion?

Meno. It appears to me that he must; so that, this being the case, I wonder, Socrates, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than correct opinion; and in what respect it is that one is this thing, and the other another.

Soc. Do you know why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

Meno. By all means tell me.

Soc. It is because you never directed your mind to the images[89] made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them amongst you.

Meno. With what view do you say this?

Soc. Because, if they are not fastened, they run away and become fugitives; but if they are fastened, they stay.

Meno. And what then?

Soc. To possess one of his works unfastened, is, like the possessing a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because it does not remain. But fastened, it is of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But why do I thus speak of them? It is with reference to true opinions. For true opinions likewise, so long as they abide by us, are a valuable possession, and procure for us all good things; but they are not willing to abide a long time, for they run away from the soul of a man; so that they are of little value, until one has

[89] To these automaton figures of Dædalus there is an allusion in Euthyphr. p. 11, B. Suid. in *Δαιδάλου ποιήματα*. Schol. in Eurip. Hec. 828. Diodor. Sic. iv. 76. Pausan. ii. 4, ix. 40. Palæphatus c 22. Tzetz. Chil. i. 19. GEDIKE.

fastened them down by the reasoning respecting their cause.[90] And this, friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are fastened down, in the first place they become (perfect) knowledge, and subsequently abiding. Now it is on this very account that (perfect) knowledge is a thing more valuable than correct opinion; and it is by this binding that (perfect) knowledge differs from correct opinion.

Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, it seems like to some such thing.[91]

[40.] *Soc.* And yet I speak thus, not as one knowing, but only from conjecture. But that correct opinion and science are two different things, this I seem to myself not to conjecture; but if I should say I knew any thing else, (and there are but few things I would say I know,) I would set down this as one of those I do know.

Meno. And you say rightly, Socrates.

Soc. What then, (say I) not rightly this too, that correct opinion, having the conduct of any work of action[92] whatever, executes (her office) not at all worse than (perfect) knowledge?

Meno. And this too I think you say rightly.

Soc. Correct opinion therefore is a thing not at all inferior to (perfect) knowledge, nor less beneficial with regard to action: nor is the man, who has a correct opinion, (inferior) to the man of (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And it has been agreed, that a good man is useful.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. Since then it is not through (perfect) knowledge alone that men can be good and useful to their country, (if there are any such men,) but by correct opinion likewise; and since neither of these exists to men by nature, [neither science nor

[90] The Greek is *αἰτίας λογισμῷ, by a rational account of the cause;* or by proving, how and from what cause it is that they are true. For the cause of every truth is some other truth, higher and more general, in which it is included. S.

[91] In the words, *ἔοικε τοιούτῳ τινι*, there is nothing to which *ἔοικε* can be referred. Ficinus has, "congrua comparatio."

[92] In the Greek text *τὸ ἔργον τῆς πράξεως* is a combination of words not to be found elsewhere; moreover as *ἡγεῖσθαι* governs a genitive or dative, but not an accusative, perhaps Plato wrote *ἡγουμένη ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως—ἀπεργάζεται τὸ ἔργον*: and we shall thus recover the accusative required by *ἀπεργάζεται*

correct opinion];[93] or[94] do you think that either of them comes by nature?

Meno. Not I.

Soc. Since then they are not by nature, neither is it by nature that men could have been virtuous.

Meno. Certainly not.

Soc. Since then (virtue comes) not by nature, we inquired, in the next place, whether it is to be taught.

Meno. Just so.

Soc. Did it not appear to us both, that it was to be taught, if virtue were wisdom?

Meno. It did.

Soc. And that if it were to be taught, then (virtue) would be wisdom?

Meno. Very true.

Soc. And that, if there were any teachers, it could be a thing to be taught; otherwise, not?

Meno. Just so.

Soc. But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. We are agreed, therefore, that it is not to be taught, nor is it wisdom.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. But we agreed besides, that it was something good.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing beneficial.

Meno. We did clearly.

Soc. And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, correct opinion and (perfect) knowledge; by possessing which a man is a good guide. For what comes from fortune is not the effect of human guidance. But where a man is the guide to right, there are these two, correct opinion and (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. I think so.

[93] The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of the preceding "neither of these," a fact passed over by every commentator.

[94] After ἢ in the Greek, follow two words, οὐδ' ἐπίκτητα, which Cornari was the first to expunge; and though Sydenham, and even the more recent editors, have adopted the idea, they have failed to show how they could be found here. There is here evidently some deep-seated corruption.

[41.] *Soc.* Now since (virtue) is not to be taught, it is not the effect of (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. It appears it is not.

Soc. Of the two things then, good and serviceable, one has been set loose, nor can (perfect) knowledge be a guide in the administration of civil affairs.

Meno. I think it cannot.

Soc. Not therefore as being wise in any wisdom, did such men take the lead in the state, as Themistocles, and the rest, of whom Anytus here has just now spoken. And for this very reason they were not able to make others such as themselves; because it was not through (perfect) knowledge they were such.

Meno. The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Soc. If then it is not by (perfect) knowledge, it follows it is by correct opinion; of which politicians making an use, regulate states, being men not at all superior in wisdom to oracle-singers and divine prophets; for these also utter many true sayings, but know nothing of what they utter.

Meno. This seem to be very near the fact.

Soc. Is it not meet then, O Meno, to call these men divine who, without possessing a mind concerning what they do and say, direct many and great things aright?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle-singers and the prophets, and all poetical persons. And not the least divine of such persons should we say that statesmen are, and no less enthusiasts, being inspired divinely, and possessed by the divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without knowing any thing of what they are saying.

Meno. Certainly we should.

Soc. And even women, Meno, call good men divine; and the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any brave man, say, "This is a divine man."[95]

Meno. And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

Soc. I care not. [42.] With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, during all this

[95] On this expression, Casaubon on Athenæus, viii. p. 631, refers to Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vii. 1, where it appears that Lacedæmonians said Θεῖος ἀνὴρ in their own dialect.

conversation, have inquired and spoken correctly, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet be taught, but by a divine fate is present to those, with whom it is present, without intelligence; unless amongst statesmen there be such a person as is able to make another man a statesman; and if there be, he might almost be said to be such among the living, as Homer tells us Tiresias is among the dead; where, speaking of him, he says, [Od. x. 495,] that he alone, of those in Hades, was intelligent; but (the rest), like shadows, flitted. The same thing would forthwith[96] such a man be, with respect to virtue, as a true thing is compared with shadows.

Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak most beautifully.

Soc. From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us that to whom virtue is present, it is present by a divine fate. But on this point we shall then know the truth, when, previous to our inquiries by what means is virtue present to men, we set about searching first, what virtue is by itself. But it is now time for me to go some where else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself on these points, persuade also your guest Anytus here, in order that he may thus become more miid; so that, should you persuade him, it is possible for you to do some service to the Athenians likewise.

[96] None have as yet satisfactorily explained, nor could they explain, the meaning of εὐθὺς, "forthwith." Buttmann says that εὐθὺς ἂν εἴη is to be rendered "would immediately appear to be," as if εὐθὺς were meant merely to draw an inference.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, having proved in the Meno the impossibility of teaching virtue, in opposition to Gorgias, who boasted he could do it, has in this dialogue shown how equally incompetent were the Sophists of the schools of Protagoras and Prodicus to teach any of the arts and sciences, which they not only said they knew, but the knowledge of which they proclaimed they had the power to impart. For, like some of the schoolmen of the middle ages, they were wont to speak "de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis," with the view of showing, as Horace has recorded, that a Sophist could with equal readiness become a cobbler or a king; while to their vaunted universality of attainments may be applied the well-known lines of Juvenal in S. iii. 73—77, who drew his information partly from personal observation, and partly probably from the perusal of this dialogue of Plato, or the Clouds of Aristophanes; between which there is a curious coincidence, as remarked by Winckelmann in the Prolegomena to the Euthydemus, p. xlv.

> Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
> Promptus et Isæo torrentior. Ede, quid illum
> Esse putes? Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos,
> Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aleiptes,
> Augur, Schœnobates, Medicus, Magus. Omnia novit.
>
> In genius quick, of desperate impudence,
> Ready in speech, and than Isæus dashing
> More torrent-like, what think you is he? say.
> He with himself brings whomsoe'er you will,
> Grammarian, Orator, Geometrician,
> Painter, oiled Wrestler, Soothsayer, Ropedancer,
> Physician, Conjurer. All things he knows.

With regard to the matter of the dialogue, its object is to show that the subtleties, on which the Sophists relied to prove and disprove the same propositions, were in their hands only a play upon words; and that, like all such displays of misplaced ingenuity, they could lead to no practical and useful results on questions relating to

intellectual wisdom or political well-being; on both of which conjoined depends the happiness of man.

With respect, however, to the manner in which the subject is treated, Plato has here, as in the Hippias Major, given up occasionally the character of the serious philosopher and assumed that of the laughing one. For, as Horace says—

> Ridiculum acri
> Fortius ac melius plerumque secat res—
>
> A knotty point oft ridicule assails
> Strongest and best, where reason nought prevails—

a doctrine derived, it would seem, from Socrates, who says in Plato Legg. vii. p. 816, D., that without the aid of ridicule one cannot even in serious matters arrive at the truth.

Did, however, the ridiculous specimens of the subleties of the Sophists rest upon the testimony of Plato alone, we might perhaps have fancied, that to heighten the effect, he chose to draw rather a caricature than a portrait of the persons, whose pursuits he believed to be worse than useless, absolutely mischievous. But we have the evidence of Aristotle to show that the picture is not overcharged. For in his treatise "On the Disproofs of Sophists," he has alluded to some of the instances produced by Plato; which he would scarcely have done, had they not been known as facts rather than as fictions. In truth, it may be said of the Sophists of Greece, in whose schools the orators learnt the rudiments of their art, what Gay has sung in his Fables respecting the barristers of more recent times—

> I know you lawyers can with ease
> Twist words and meanings as you please;
> And language, by your skill made pliant,
> Can bend to favour every client.

They, however, who wish to see even a greater abuse of the Sophists of Greece than is to be found in the dialogues of Plato, may turn to Mitchell's Preliminary Dissertation to his translation, or transformation rather, of Aristophanes; where the writer's zeal has, as is often the case, outstripped his discretion.

EUTHYDEMUS

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO, SOCRATES, EUTHYDEMUS,[1] DIONYSODORUS, CLINIAS, CTESIPPUS.

CRITO.

[1.] WHO was he, Socrates, with whom you were conversing yesterday in the Lyceum? where[2] so great a crowd stood around you, that though I approached, desirous to hear, I could hear nothing clearly. However, leaning over[3] I looked down, and it seemed to me that it was a stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was he?

Soc. About which of them, Crito, are you inquiring? for there was not one, but two.

Cri. He whom I mean, sate the third from you on your right hand; but in the midst of you was a youth,[4] the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great progress,[5] and does not differ much in age from our Crito-

[1] Although Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus do not actually speak, yet their names are given here, as they are reported to have taken a part in the conversation.

[2] The MSS. vary between ἠ and ᾗ. Heindorf, after showing that ἠ could not be used here, wished to read πολὺς γάρ. He should have adopted ᾗ, found in many MSS., "where," which Stalbaum without reason rejects.

[3] Budæus explains ὑπερκύψας by "standing on tiptoe and leaning over." But the word ἀκροβατήσας, or something like it, answering to "standing on tip-toe," could hardly be omitted.

[4] His name was Clinias. See § 10.

[5] The verb ἐπιδεδωκέναι, is generally applied to "having made a progress in art," but here it refers to statur

bulus;[6] though that one[7] is weazen-faced,[8] but this one lanky but of a fair and engaging aspect.

Soc. This is Euthydemus, Crito, about whom you are inquiring: but he who sate by me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

[2.][9] *Cri.* I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are some new wisdom-mongers, as it appears.

Cri. Whence do they come; and what is their wisdom?

Soc. They are of a race some where hence, I think of Chius; but they migrated to Thurii,[10] and having fled from thence, are dwelling for many years about these parts. But as to your inquiry (respecting) their wisdom, it is wonderful, Crito; they are indeed all-wise.[11] Since even I have not hitherto known they were pancratiasts:[12] for they are skilled in every kind of contest; not after the manner of the brother pancratiasts of Acarnania;[13] for these are able to contend with their body alone; but those, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in the contest, which consists in vanquishing all men. For they are very skilful themselves in contending

[6] Who, as stated in § 81, was now an adult.

[7] By ἐκεῖνος, "that one," Stalbaum understands Clinias, and by οὗτος, "this one," Critobulus: but Heindorf, by ἐκεῖνος, Critobulus; while Winckelmann refers οὗτος to Euthydemus. For the reasons that led those scholars to such different conclusions, the inquisitive reader must turn to their respective notes.

[8] The Greek words σκληφρὸς and προφερὴς, I have translated "weazen-faced" and "lanky," as being perhaps the nearest meanings in English. From the conflicting statements of Greek lexicographers and scholiasts it is evident that the words have never been thoroughly understood. Ficinus has "ille aridioris quodam corporis habitu, iste grandioris specimen præ se ferre videtur."

[9] On the reading and arrangement of the words, spoken by Crito and Socrates respectively, Heindorf, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum all differ.

[10] Thurii, or Thurium, was a town in the southern part of Italy, to which the Athenians sent a colony, and with which a communication was long kept up by the mother country.

[11] Here, too, critics differ. I have followed Stalbaum, although the passage is not even now correct.

[12] The contest called παγκράτιον is described by Lucian as the union of boxing and wrestling, during the latter of which the combatants were on the ground; but by A. Gellius as simply a stand-up pugilistic encounter. Lucian's account is the more correct, as may be inferred from Aristoph. Εἰρ. 863.

[13] Of these brother pancratiasts nothing, says Heindorf, is known elsewhere.

with their weapons, and they know how to impart their skill to any other person who will pay them. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to speak and write speeches suited for courts of justice. [3.] Formerly they were terrible in these things alone; but now they have put a finish to their pancratiastic art; for the kind of contest, which was left by them undone, they have now completed, so that no one is able to lift (a hand) against them; so skilful have they become in verbal contests, and in confuting whatever happens to be said, whether it be true or false. I have a mind therefore, Crito, to put myself under these men; for they say that in a short time they can make any other person whatever skilled in the very same things.

Cri. But fear you not, Socrates, for your age, that you are already too old?

Soc. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and consolation against fear. For these very men, so to say,[14] have, though old, begun the study of this wisdom, which I am longing for, in the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not wise in the least. [4.] But of one thing only I am afraid, lest I should bring disgrace upon these strangers, as I do upon the harper Connus, the son of Metrobius, who teaches me even now to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my school-fellows, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the teacher of old men. Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the very same thing, and they, dreading this, should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other old men to go thither as my school-fellows; and here also I will endeavour to persuade others; and do you frequent the school with us.[15] Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may

[14] The words "so to say," have no meaning here, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 219, where I proposed to read *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὡμογέροντε*, in allusion to the Homeric word found in Ιλ. Ψ. 793, and explained by *γήραϊ ὠμῷ* in Οδ. Ο. 356. Others would prefer perhaps *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, Νέστορε ὄντε*, as coming nearer to *εἰπεῖν γέροντε*.

[15] Bekk. *καὶ σὺ τί που συμφοίτα*: where Heindorf correctly objected to *που*, thus united to an imperative. But he did not see that Plato probably wrote *καὶ σύ γ', ὦ παῖ, συμφοίτα*, for thus Socrates would facetiously address Crito, who was, like himself, an old man, as a boy. Stalbaum seems to approve of Winckelmann's *καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφοιτᾷς*. For Ficinus has "Sed cur non et tu venis?" Or we might read *καὶ σὺ (τί δ' οὔ;) συμφοίτα*. "And do you, (why not?) come along with me."

bring your sons to them; for having a hankering after them, they will, I know, instruct even us.

Cri. There is nothing to hinder us, Socrates, if it seems good to you. But first tell me what is the wisdom of these men, that I may know what it is we shall learn.

Soc. You shall quickly hear, since I cannot say that I did not attend to them; for I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said; and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. [5.] For, by some act of a god, I had seated myself alone in the Apodyterium[16] where you saw me: and I had it just in my mind to rise up; but as I was rising up, there was the accustomed signal of my Genius. I therefore sat down again; and soon after those two, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, entered, and with them many others, disciples, it seemed to me; and having entered, they sauntered about in the covered course (of the gymnasium). But they had not yet gone two or three rounds, when Clinias entered, who you say, and say truly, has made a great progress. Behind him there were many others his lovers, and Ctesippus too, a youth of the district of Pæanea,[17] very beautiful and good naturally, except that he was saucy in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, seeing me from the entrance sitting alone, came straight towards me, and sate down on my right hand, as you say. [6.] And Dionysodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, looking at us on this side and on that —for I beheld them very attentively—and then advancing, they sate down, Euthydemus by the youth, and the other (Dionysodorus) by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as each happened to do. These therefore I embraced, not having seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are wise not in small but in great things. For they know every thing pertaining to war, (and) whatever he, who would be a good general, ought (to know), the arrangement and management of encampments,[18] and whatever is to be taught for engaging with weapons;[18] and they know too how

[16] That part of the gymnasium, in which those who bathed or exercised put off their clothes.

[17] One of the districts into which Athens was divided.

[18] From the omission of these words, not found in the version of

to render a person able to assist himself in courts of justice, when any one injures him. [7.] For thus speaking, however, I was held in contempt by them; and both therefore laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus said, We no longer engage in these matters as being serious, Socrates, but as of secondary moment. And I being astonished said, Your (serious) studies must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are of secondary moment with you. Now by the gods inform me, what is this beautiful study (of yours).—We think, Socrates, said he, that we are able of all men to teach virtue in the best and quickest manner.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing are you telling! From whence did you get this windfall?[19] I had hitherto conceived of you, for the most part, as I just now said, that you were very skilful in this,[20] to fight in arms; and this I have said respecting you. For when you first tarried here, I remember, you publicly boasted of this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, may you be propitious. For I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon[21] what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have boasted truly: for it is by no means wonderful, from the magnitude of the boast, that a person should disbelieve.—[8.] Rest assured, Socrates, that it is so, they replied.—I therefore consider you (said I) much more blessed in this possession, than is the great king[22] in his empire. But tell me thus much, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom? or how have you determined?—We are here, Socrates, for this very purpose, as being about to exhibit and to teach, if any one is willing to learn. But that all, who do not possess (wisdom), will be willing to learn, I am a guarantee: first, I myself (am willing), and next, Clinias here; and in addition to us, Ctesippus and all the rest here—and I pointed out to him the

Ficinus, it is evident that Taylor made his English translation not from the Greek, but the Latin merely.

[19] The word ἑρμαῖον was applied to any thing of value found in the road, over which Ἑρμῆς was the presiding deity.

[20] So Routh, whom Heindorf and Stalbaum, strange to say, follow But to me the words are perfectly unintelligible. For it is absurd to suppose that the speaker would himself explain τοῦτο by ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.

[21] It is evident that Socrates is speaking ironically. For otherwise he need not have prayed for pardon.

[22] Of Persia: see Meno, § 11.

lovers of Clinias, who happened to be standing round us: for Ctesippus at that time was sitting at a distance from Clinias. And as it seemed to me,[23] Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, did by his stooping forward darken Ctesippus's view of Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. [9.] Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his boy-love, and at the same time curious to hear, was the first to leap up, and stood directly opposite to me. Thus too the rest, when they saw him do so, stood around us, both the lovers of Clinias, and the friends of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore, pointing them out to Euthydemus, informed him they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus and the rest very readily assented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, Do, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, by all means gratify these persons, and exhibit your wisdom for my sake. Now to demonstrate the most of the things pertaining to this subject will, it is evident, be no small labour; but tell me this, whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded, through his not believing that virtue is a thing to be learnt, or that you are the teachers of it. Come then, (say,) is it the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are the persons from whom one could learn it the best; or is it of another?—[10.] It is (the business), Socrates, said Dionysodorus, of the very same (art).—You therefore, Dionysodorus, said I, can, the best of all men now existing, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue.—We think we can, Socrates. —Of other things put off, I said, for another time the exhibition, but show us this now. Persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and gratify me, and all these here. For this has happened to him, that both I, and all these, are desirous for him to become the best (of men). He is the son of Axiochus, who is descended from the Alcibiades of olden times, and the cousin of now-living

[23] Vulg. *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡς*, words which have puzzled not a little the modern editors; and so perhaps they did Ficinus, who has omitted *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*. Taylor's version, which leads to *ὡς δ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*, will seem perhaps to some to solve the difficulty. Stalbaum translates *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*, "as far as I remember," a meaning those words never have and could not have.

Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is still young, and we have a fear about him, as is reasonable in the case of a youth, lest some one should anticipate us, and by turning his mind to some other pursuit, corrupt it. [11.] You are therefore come most opportunely; and, if it makes no difference to you, make a trial of the youth and converse with him before us.—When I had thus spoken nearly these very words, Euthydemus replied with courage, and even with confidence, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the youth is but willing to answer.—Nay, I replied, he is accustomed to do this. For frequently do these coming ask many questions of, and discourse much with him, so that he is sufficiently bold to answer.[24]

But how, O Crito, shall I narrate to you correctly what occurred after this? For it is no trifling labour to be able to take up and go through wisdom so boundless. So that I am compelled, as poets are, in beginning the tale, to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, then, began, I think, after some such manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are the men who learn, the wise or the unwise? [12.] But the youth, through the greatness of the question, blushed, and being at a loss, looked at me. And I, perceiving he was flurried, said, Cheer up, Clinias, and answer boldly whatever seems good to you; for perhaps you will be benefited[25] to the greatest extent. Whereupon Dionysodorus, bending a little towards my ear, and with a smile on his countenance, said, I tell you beforehand, Socrates, that in whatever manner the youth may answer, he will be confuted. While he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to give an answer, so that it was not possible for me to exhort the youth to be on his guard. And he answered, that the wise are those who learn. Euthydemus, therefore, said, Do you call certain persons teachers, or not?—He admitted he did.—[13.] Are not then teachers the teachers of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian were the teachers of you and other boys, and you were their disciples.—He assented.—When you

[24] The Greek is at present, *ὥστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι* But since Ficinus translates, "quocirca consentaneum est, ut respondere audeat," he probably found in his MS. *ὥστε ἔστιν εἰκὸς θαρρεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνεσθαι*, "So that it is likely he will have the boldness to reply."

[25] The Greek is *ὠφελεῖ*. Ficin. "juvabit." From whence Buttmann suggested *ὠφελήσει*, the fut middle in the sense of the fut. passive, *ὠφεληθήσει*.

learned, therefore, you did not know what you were learning. —I did not.—Were you then wise, when you were ignorant of these things?—By no means.—If then you were not wise, you were ignorant?—Entirely.—You then, when learning what you did not know, learned them as being ignorant?—The youth nodded assent.—The ignorant therefore learn,[26] O Clinias, and not the wise, as you think.—On his saying this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, just like a chorus on a signal given by the ballet-master, made a great uproar and laughed. And before the youth could recover his breath, Dionysodorus, taking him up, said well and cleverly [27] —But, Clinias, when the grammarian says any thing by word of mouth, are the boys who learn what he so gives out, the wise or the unwise?—The wise, said Clinias.—[14.] The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.—On this, the admirers of these men laughed very loudly and made an uproar, struck with their wisdom; but the rest of us were amazed and remained silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our amazement, that we might yet still more wonder at him, did not let the lad go, but kept interrogating him; and, like skilful dancers, twisted his inquiries about the same thing in a double (maze),[28] and said, Whether do learners learn what they know, or what they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me in a whisper, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.—O Jupiter, said I, even the former question appeared to be honourable to you.—We always ask, said he, Socrates, such-like questions, from which there is no escape.—[15.] Hence you appear to me, said I, to be in high repute amongst your disciples. In the mean time Clinias gave an answer to Euthydemus, that learners learn what they do not know. And Euthydemus interrogated him in the same manner as before. —Do you not, said he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you

[26] Bekk. *οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσι.* But after *ἄρα* two MSS. insert *σοφοί*, which Winckelmann first adopted, and after him Stalbaum. Why they did so is beyond my comprehension.

[27] These words Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Stalbaum refer to *ἀναπνεῦσαι.* But Winckelmann more correctly, with Ficinus, to *ἐκδεξάμενος.*

[28] Winckelmann was the first to remark, that in *διπλᾶ* there is an allusion to a so-called kind of dance, mentioned by Hesychius. Perhaps it was something like the modern waltz.

not then know all?—He acknowledged it.—When therefore any one recites any thing, does he not recite letters?—He confessed it.—Hence he recites, said he, something of what you know, if you know all (the letters).—This also he acknowledged.—What then, said he, do you not learn that, which some one recites?—He assented.[29]—But do you learn,[30] not knowing your letters?—I do not, (said he,) but I learn, having known them.[31]—Do you not therefore learn what you know, if you know all the letters?—He acknowledged it.—Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—This had been spoken not violently[32] by Euthydemus, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as at a mark, and said, Euthydemus is deceiving you, Clinias. [16.] For tell me, is it not to learn, to receive the science of that which any one learns?—Clinias assented.—But, to know, said he, is it any thing else than to possess science?—He acknowledged (it was nothing else).—To know not, then, is to not possess science.—He assented to this.—Whether then are the receivers of a thing, they who possess it already, or they who do not possess it?—They who do not possess it.—Have you not then confessed that they who do not know, are among those who do not possess?—He nodded assent.—They that learn, then, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—They therefore, Clinias, he said, learn, who know not; and not they who know. After this Euthydemus rushed to the third, as it were, wrestler-fall, being about to throw[33] down the youth. But I, seeing the lad just sinking, and wishing to give him a respite, lest he should exhibit cowardice before us,[34] said, in order

[29] This answer is wanting in all the MSS. except the one used by Ficin, who translates "Assensus est."

[30] The Greek MSS. read, *ὁ δὲ—μανθάνει.* Ficinus' version is "discis," i. e. *σὺ δὲ—μανθάνεις.*

[31] The word *εἰδὼς* was altered by Routh into *ἢ δ' ὅς*, but both seem to be required, or rather, what Plato perhaps wrote, *ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰδὼς τὸ εἶδος, μανθάνω*, "I learn, said he, having known their shape."

[32] I cannot understand *σφόδρα τι.* Ficinus has "Vix autem—"

[33] Steph. *καταλαβὼν.* Heindorf suggested *καταβαλῶν*, adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum. But Winckelmann prefers the old reading. For he saw that Heindorf's conjecture would make the collocation of the words very disjointed.

[34] This seems to be the meaning of *ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε.* But the passage is probably corrupt.

to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual.[35] [17.] For perhaps you do not perceive what the two strangers are doing about you. They are doing the same, that persons do in the initiation of the Corybantes, when they make an enthronement for him whom they are about to initiate; for there takes place the leading out to dance and sports, (as I think you would understand)[36] if you had been initiated in these mysteries. And now these do nothing else but dance, and, as it were, sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of the sacred rites of sophists. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of words; which these strangers exhibit to you, because you have not perceived that men apply "to learn" to a thing of this kind, when any one, having at first no knowledge respecting a thing, afterwards receives the knowledge of it; and when any one, having this knowledge, does by this very knowledge look into the very same thing, either while being done or being said. But they rather call this "to comprehend" than "to learn;" although sometimes they call it "to learn." But this, as they show, has lain hid from you, that the same word is applied to persons affected in a contrary manner, both to him who knows, and to him who does not know. [18.] Similar to this is that which was in the second question; in which they asked you, whether men learn what they know, or what they do not. These indeed are the playthings of learning. Hence I say that these men are playing with you. But I call these a plaything on this account; because, although some one may learn many, or even all such particulars as these, yet he would not in any respect know better how things exist. However, by the difference of words he may play with men, tripping up and overturning what they assert; just as they do, who, drawing away the stools from under those, who are going to

[35] There is evidently something wrong here. For the reasonings of the two sophists more than seemed to be unusual. They were really so. Hence Winckelmann adopted from five MSS. ἀληθεῖς for ἀηθεῖς, to which Stalbaum objects; for he did not see that the train of thought required—"Do not wonder if these unusual reasons appear to be true."—In Greek, Μὴ θαύμαζε, εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀληθεῖς ἀηθεῖς οἱ λόγοι.

[36] There is nothing in the Greek to answer to the version of Ficinus, "Intelligere hæc te arbitror," words absolutely necessary for the sense.

sit down, are delighted and laugh, when they see him whom they have overturned lying on his back. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as fun. But what is to follow, it is clear, they will exhibit to you as serious concerns; and I will be their guide, that they may give what they promised me. For they said they would exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to play with you.

[19.] Thus far therefore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let it have been made a sport by you; and there is perhaps enough of it. But in the next place exhort the lad, and show how he must pay attention to wisdom and virtue. But first I will point out to you how I understand the matter, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, then, I shall appear to you to do this in a simple and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me; for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you off-hand. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question one of the ridiculous, of which I was just now afraid? For surely it is stupid to ask questions of this kind; for who is there that does not wish to do well?—There is no one that does not, said Clinias.—[20.] Be it so, said I.—But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we do well? Shall we say, if we have many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? for it is evident that this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what are the things, of those that exist, good for us? Or does it appear to be a thing neither difficult, nor belonging to a solemn person,[37] to be at no loss[38] in this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich; will they not?—Certainly, said he.—And is it not also (good) to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power, and honours, in one's own country are plainly good.—He ad-

[37] Ficinus translates σεμνοῦ by "eleganti ingenio. Stalbaum, by "excellentis." Heindorf says it is the same as οὐ φαύλου. I suspect there is some error here.

[38] Stalbaum, with Winckelmann, prefers εὐπορεῖν, found in two MSS., to ἀπορεῖν.

mitted it.—What then, said I, yet remains for us among things good? Is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that we shall put down these things properly, if we consider them as good? or if we do not? for perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But how does it appear to you?—That they are good, said Clinias. —[21.] Be it so, said I; but in what part of the chorus shall we place wisdom? among things good? or how say you?—Among things good.—But consider lest among things good we omit what is worthy of mention.—But, said Clinias, we appear (to have omitted) nothing.—However, I recollecting said, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have nearly omitted the greatest of things good.—What is that? said he.—Felicity, Clinias; which all men, and even the very bad, say is the greatest good. —What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, both I and thou, son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—How so? said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things we before enumerated, we now again speak of it.—But why is this (improper)?—It is surely ridiculous to adduce that again, which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.—[22.] How do you mean? said he. Wisdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—And he indeed was astonished, so young and simple is he. And I, perceiving his astonishment, said, Do you not know, Clinias, that as regards the felicity of flute-playing, flute-players are the most happy?—He admitted it.—Are not then, said I, grammarians also (most happy) as regards (the felicity of) writing and reading?—Certainly.—But what, as regards the dangers of the sea, do you think that any one, so to say generally, are more happy than wise pilots?—Certainly not.—Again, With whom would you, when in the army, more readily share in danger and fortune? with a clever, or ignorant general? —With a wise one.—And under whom would you, when you are dangerously ill, more readily be? under a clever or ignorant physician?—Under a clever one.—Is it not therefore, said I, because you think that you would do better, by acting with a wise person than an ignorant one?—He granted it.—Wisdom, then, every where renders men happy; for surely no one can ever err through wisdom; but through this he must act rightly, and obtain (his end): for otherwise it

would not be wisdom.—[23.] At length, I know not how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; that, to whom wisdom is present, to him nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed on this point, I again asked him, how with regard to us would be what had been previously admitted? For, said I, we admitted that if many good things were present with us, we should be happy and do well.—He assented to this.—Should we then be happy through present good, if it did not benefit us, or if it did?—If it benefited us, said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we only possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it; or drink, but did not drink it; could we be benefited at all?—Certainly not, said he.—But if all artificers had every thing requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them, when thus procured, would they do well [through the possession][39] merely, because they possessed every thing which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him in sufficiency, but yet should fashion nothing, would he be benefited at all from the possession?—By no means, said he.—[24.] But what, should any one possess wealth, and all such things as we now denominate good, and should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is necessary then, said I, as it seems, that he, who is to be happy, should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.—You speak truly.—Is not then, Clinias, the possession and the use of good sufficient to make any one happy?—It appears so to me.—Whether, said I, if any one uses good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uses them properly.—You say correctly, said I, for I think the evil is greater if a person uses any thing whatever not correctly, than if he lets it alone. For the former is wrong; but the latter is neither right nor wrong; or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the workmanship and use of things pertaining to wood, is there any thing else that produces a right use than the science of

[39] These words are evidently a needless repetition; or else we must adopt what Ficinus found in his MS., and thus translated into Latin, "Num bene agent propter ipsam duntaxat possessionem eorum, quæ ad perfectionem operis requiruntur."

a carpenter?—Certainly not, said he.—So too, in the workmanship relating to vases, it is science which causes for them a right (use).[40]—He admitted it.—[25.] Whether then, said I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, wealth, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and directing properly action, which enables us to use every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing else?—It is science, said he.—Science, then, imparts to men in possession and action, not only happiness, but, as it seems, likewise the well-doing.—He confessed it.

Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Will a man be benefited, who, without intellect, possesses many things, and performs many actions? or, with intellect, possesses and performs a few? Consider it thus. Will he not, by doing less, err less? and erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether then will he perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, said he.—And whether being weak or strong?—Being weak.—Whether also, being honoured or dishonoured?—Being dishonoured.—And whether, being brave and temperate,[41] will he do less, or being timid?—Being timid?—[26.] (Will not then this happen) if he is indolent rather than active?—He admitted it.—And if he is slow, rather than quick? and if he sees and hears dully, rather than quickly?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—And to crown all, I said, it very nearly appears, Clinias, that, with respect to all the things which we first asserted to be good, the conclusion is not about this, that they are, taken by themselves, good naturally, but, as it seems, that they exist in this manner; that if ignorance guides them, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of ministering to that evil leader; but that if prudence and wisdom lead them, they are greater goods; but that taken by themselves, neither of them is of any worth.—It appears,

[40] In the Greek, after τὸ ὀρθῶς, Stalbaum thinks χρῆσθαι, found just above, is to be supplied. So Ficinus has "rectum usum scientia præstat."

[41] As there is nothing in the reply of Clinias corresponding to "and temperate," it is evident there are either too many words in the question or too few in the answer.

said he, to be as you say.—What then, from what has been said, takes place to us? Is it any thing else than this, that not one of the other things is either good or evil, but that of these, being two, wisdom is a good but ignorance an ill?—He assented.

Let us then, said I, consider further, what still remains. Since we all of us are eager to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, and science affords the correctness (of use)[42] and felicity, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavour to become most wise; or is it not so?—It is so, said he.—[27.] And he ought to think[43] that he receives this from his father, guardians, friends, and the rest, who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth; and to beg and pray strangers and fellow-citizens to impart wisdom, is in no respect base; nor is it reprehensible, Clinias, for the sake of this, to act the minister and slave to a lover and to every man, and to willingly serve him in any honourable service whatever, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You appear, said he, to me to speak very well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom can indeed be taught, and does not exist of its own accord among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, said, you speak beautifully, O best of men; and you have done well in liberating me from a long inquiry about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught.[44] [28.] Now therefore since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, would you say that any thing else is necessary than to philosophize? And have you a mind to do this?—Entirely so, Socrates, said he, as much as possible.—

[42] The words "of use," have been inserted from Ficinus, "rectitudinem—usus." They are absolutely necessary to preserve the train of ideas.

[43] To explain this difficult passage, which he says is perfectly sound, Stalbaum, after Heindorf, gives a version of what is not in the Greek text.

[44] As the object of the Meno is to inquire whether virtue can or cannot be taught, it is probable that this dialogue was written about the same time as that.

And I, delighted to hear this, said, My pattern, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired them to be, is of this kind, like a common person's perhaps, and stated at length with difficulty: but let whichever of you is willing, do this very thing according to art, and exhibit it to us. But if you are not willing to do this, show to the lad in order, from the point where I left off, whether he ought to get every science, or whether there is one, which, when he gets it, he will necessarily be a happy and good man; and what that science is. For, as I said in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wise and good.

[29.] This then, Crito, did I say; and I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would handle the discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to study wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference; and all of us looked at him, as about to hear immediately some wonderful reasons; which indeed happened to us. For the man, Crito, commenced an admirable discourse, which it is proper for you to hear, as being an exhortation to virtue.

Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you, who express a desire for this youth to become wise, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire it?—It was then I perceived, that they thought we had been previously jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they too had been jesting, and had not been acting seriously by him. Perceiving this, I said still more strongly, that we were serious in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates that you do not (hereafter) deny what you now assert.—I have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny it.—[30.] What is it then, said he? Say you that you wish him to become wise?—Certainly.—But, said he, is Clinias now wise or not?—He says, not yet at all, and he is no braggart.—But do you, said he, wish him to become wise, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged it.—Do you not then wish him to become what he is not; and to be no longer what he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was confused. But he, on my being confused, taking up the discourse, said, Since you wish him

to be no longer what he now is, you wish, as it seems, for him to perish. And yet such friends and lovers would certainly be of much worth,[45] who should consider it a thing of great moment for their boy-loves to perish. Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his love for the youth; and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not rather rude to say so, I would say, On your head be the evil;[46] for knowing what do you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is unholy to assert, that I should be willing for this youth to perish.

[31.] But, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you, Ctesippus, that it is possible to speak falsely?—By Jupiter, said he, it does, unless I am mad.—Whether, when a person is asserting a thing about which there is a discourse, or when not asserting it.—When asserting it.—If then he asserts it, he does not say any thing else of things existing than what he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said Ctesippus?—But of existing things that, of which he speaks, is one apart from the rest.—Certainly.—Does he then, when he speaks of that thing, not speak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of existing beings, speaks the truth; so that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks the truth, and utters nothing false against you.—He does so, said he; but he, who says this, added Ctesippus, does not speak, Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus (replied), Are non-entities any thing else than things which are not?—They are not.—Therefore, non-entities are beings no where.—No where.—Is it possible then for any one to do any thing about non-entities, so as to make them to exist no where?[47]—It does not appear to me, said Ctesippus, that he can.—[32.] What then? When orators speak to

[45] Unless this is said ironically, the sense would require, as Taylor translated, "of little worth"—in Greek, not *καίτοι πολλοῦ*, but *καίτοι οὐ πολλοῦ*.

[46] That is, "to perish."

[47] This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus. The Greek is a mass of corruption, as Winckelmann has the honesty to confess. Stalbaum adopts the reading found in three MSS., *ὥστ' ἐκεῖνά γε Κλεινίᾳ ποιήσειεν ἄν*—and renders the passage thus: "Is it possible for any one to do any thing about non-beings, so that any person whatever may do to Clinias what does not exist?" But why there should be any allusion to Clinias he does not state. Besides, after *ποιεῖν* correct Greek requires not the dative but accusative.

the people, do they nothing?—They do something, he replied.—If, then, they do something, do they not also make something? Yes.—To speak, then, is to do and to make.[48]—He assented.—But no one, said he, speaks of non-entities: for he would make something; but you have acknowledged that no one can make non-entities: so that, according to your reasoning, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of entities.—By Jupiter, said Ctesippus, (it is so,) Euthydemus. Yet he speaks of entities after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.—How say you, Ctesippus? said Dionysodorus. Are there some who speak of things as they are?—There are indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.—What then? said he; are not good things, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—[33.] He conceded.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, Ctesippus, said he, speak ill of evil things, if they speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they do very much so of bad men, for example; among whom, if you are persuaded by me, you will be careful not to be numbered, lest the good should speak ill of you; because you well know that the good speak ill of the bad.—Do they not also, said Euthydemus, speak in high terms of great men, and in warm terms of the fervent?—Very much so indeed, said Ctesippus; of cold men therefore they speak coldly, and assert that they converse (frigidly).[49]—You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive.—Not I, by Jupiter, said he; for, Dionysodorus, I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, never in my presence to so rudely assert, that I wish for the destruction of those on whom I set a great value.

[34.] I then, since they seemed to me to conduct themselves in a rather rude manner towards each other, had some fun

[48] On the difference between πράττειν and ποιεῖν, see Heindorf in Charmid. § 23, p. 163, A.

[49] This word Ficinus has alone preserved in his version,—"aiuntque disserere frigide." How strange that the recent editors should have failed to remark that ψυχρῶς was evidently wanting after διαλέγεσθαι. With the passage of Plato may be compared that of Aristoph. in Thesm. 168.

with Ctesippus, and said, It appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive from the strangers what they assert, if they are willing to give, and not to contend about a word. For if they can destroy men in such a manner, as to make them, from being wicked and senseless, good and wise, and this too whether they have discovered themselves, or learnt from some other person a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is wicked, they might afterwards exhibit him an honest man,—if they know how to effect this, and it is evident that they do know; for they say that their newly discovered art does make men good after being wicked,—we must therefore[50] consent to this. Let them destroy the lad, and make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid, let the trial be made on me, as if I were a Carian;[51] since, though an elderly man, I am prepared to run the risk; and I deliver myself up to this Dionysodorus, as (Pelias[52]) did to [Medea] the Colchian (woman). Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever (else) he pleases with me if he does but render me a good man. [35.] And Ctesippus said, I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, if they wish, for them to flay me more than they flay at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder, like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Dionysodorus indeed here thinks that I am angry with him. I am not, however, angry; but I contradict what I think he has not well said against me. But do not, said he, my noble Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionysodorus replied, Do you, Ctesippus, compose your discourse, as if contradiction existed?—[53]Entirely, and very much so, said he; or do you, Dionysodorus, think that there is not contradiction? You could not, said he, prove that at any

[50] This "therefore" is manifestly absurd. After *εἰ ἐπίστασθον* we must write not *συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν*, but *συγχωρήσομεν* with two MSS. and omit *οὖν* with one. Stalbaum vainly defends *οὖν*.

[51] As if I were a person of no value, as the Carians were said to be in war, and hence frequently captured and sold as slaves; when they were sometimes put to the torture, for the benefit of their masters.

[52] From the mention of Medea, it is evident that in the words "boil me" Plato alluded to Pelias; who suffered himself to be cut up and boiled in a magic cauldron, in the vain hope of being made young again. The same story Cicero had in mind, De Senectut. § 23, "nec me, tamquam Peliam, recoxent."

time, since you have heard no one contradicting another.[53]—True, said he; but let us now hear, whether I can prove it to you by Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus. Could you give a reason for this?[54]—By all means, said he.—What then? said he; are there words[55] for each of the things that exist?—Certainly, said he.—Whether, then, as each thing is, or as it is not?—As it is. [36.] For if you remember, Ctesippus, said he, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one is seen to speak of that which is not. But why this? said Ctesippus. Do you and I contradict the less?—Whether then, said he, shall we contradict, if we both of us pronounce[56] the word for the same thing, or shall we thus assert the same thing?—He admitted (we should).—But, said he, when neither of us gives the word for that thing, shall we then contradict? Or, (will it not follow,) that thus neither will have made any mention at all of the thing?—And this too he granted.—But, said he, when I pronounce the word for that thing, and you for some other thing, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever? And how can he, who does not speak of a thing, contradict him who does?

And Ctesippus indeed was then silent. But I, wondering at the reasoning, said, How say you, Dionysodorus? For, though I have heard this reasoning often, and from many, yet I have always wondered at it. For Protagoras and others still more ancient have made much use of it. But to me it always appears to be wonderful, through its subverting the reasoning of others and itself too. I think, however, that I

[53]—[53] Such is the literal translation of this passage; out of which none of the editors have, either with or without alterations, been able to elicit an atom of sense.

[54] So Stalbaum translates. But *παρέχειν λόγον* is "to give a reason," while *ὑπέχειν λόγον* is "to bear with a reason," or "a speech," as in Protag. p. 338, D., and Gorg. p. 465, A., quoted by Stalbaum himself. More correctly then did Taylor translate, "Can you bear a discourse." Routh explains the words *Ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον*—"Would you answer me on this point?" and attributes the whole question to Dionysodorus, in which he is followed by Winckelmann and Stalb.

[55] Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λόγοι*, has rendered it "sermones rationesque."

[56] Heindorf's conjecture, *λέγοντες* for *γνόντες*, has been confirmed by two MSS. The fact is, that if *λόγος* be translated "word," the sense requires *λέγοντες*: if "reason," then *γνόντες* must be retained.

shall learn its truth the best from you. [37.][57] Is the reasoning then other (than this), that it is not possible to assert things which are false? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that the speaker asserts things which are true, or does not assert?[57] He admitted it. Whether, then, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but possible to form a false opinion?—It is not possible, said he, to form even a false opinion.—There is then, said I, no such thing as a false opinion at all.—There is not, said he.—Neither then is there ignorance, nor are there ignorant persons. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were the power to speak falsely of things?—Certainly, said he.—But, said I, this is not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion, Dionysodorus, for the sake of talking, that you may say what is strange? or do you really think that no man is ignorant? —Confute, said he, the assertion. Is it possible, according to your assertion, to confute when no man speaks falsely?—It is not, said Euthydemus.—Neither did I, said Dionysodorus, order you to confute.[58] For how can any one order that, which does not exist?—O Euthydemus, I said, I do not clearly understand these clever and coherent assertions; but I have somehow a muddled perception of them. Perhaps then I shall ask something rather unpleasant; but do you pardon me. See then. [38.] For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain a false opinion, nor to be ignorant, neither is it possible for any one to err, when he does any thing. For

[57]—[57] Here too is another passage, which Heusde was the first to confess had become confused. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "Num sibi id vult sermo, ut falsa dicere impossibile sit, oporteatque illum, qui loquitur, vera proferre, vel omnino non loqui."

[58] Heusde was the first to notice the difficulty here. For Dionysodorus had just before bid Socrates to confute. He, therefore, proposed to read. *Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ὡς νῦν δὴ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι,* "Nor did I bid you, said he, as did Dionysodorus just now, to confute." This emendation so simple has been rejected by Winckelmann, who fancies there is some nice distinction, which, however, he does not point out, between *ἐλέγξαι* and *ἐξελέγξαι*: while Stalbaum, after asserting that the learned have vainly tortured their brains about the meaning, adds, not very wisely, that no one will easily discover, by conjecture, what Plato really wrote. He was then not aware, that there is a lacuna here, supplied in part by three MSS.: "And do you not order me now, Euthydemus, said I.—(No.) For how, said he, can one order that which does not exist?" In Greek, *Οὐδὲ κελεύεις ἔτι νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν πῶς ἂν τις, ἢ ὃ' ὅς, κελεύσαι;*

the doer cannot err in what he does. Do you not say so?—Just so, said he.—This then, said I, is the unpleasant question. For if we do not err, either acting, or speaking, or thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Jupiter, are ye come as the teachers? Did you not just now say, that you could, the best of all men, impart virtue to a person willing to learn?—Then said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, Are you such a crone,[59] Socrates, as to remember now what we first said, and would even now remember any thing I said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?—For (the words), said I, are difficult (to understand), and very reasonably so; for they are spoken by wise men; since it is very difficult to make use of the last words you are saying. For what do you mean, Dionysodorus, by the expression, "I know not how to use"? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Since,[60] tell me, what other conception do you form of these words, "I do not know how to use the words."—[39.] But what you say, said he, this is very difficult to use. Since[60] answer.—(What,) before you have answered Dionysodorus? said I.—Will you not answer? said he.—Is it just? (said I).—It is certainly just, said he.—For what reason? said I. Or is it plain that it is for this; because you, a very wise person in words, have now come to us, and know when you ought to answer, and when not; and now you will not answer a jot, as knowing that you ought not.—You are a babbler, said he, and are careless in answering. But, my good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.—I must yield then, said I, and, as it seems, to necessity; for you are the ruler. Ask, then.—Whether then do things that have a soul understand? or soul-less things also?—Those that have a soul.—Do you know then, said he, any word that has a soul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—[40.] Why then did you just now ask me, what my word understood?[61]—For what else, said I, than because

[59] The English "crone" is evidently derived from the Greek κρόνος, by which was meant "an old fool," as shown by Aristoph. Νεφ. 926, Σφηκ. 1458. Winckelmann, however, still sticks to κενὸς, found in all the MSS. but two.

[60—60] In these two places, "since" is perfectly absurd, although not noticed by any editor. In fact, the whole passage is a mass of corruption, arising chiefly from interpolations.

[61] In the original, ὅ, τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα, literally, "what my word

I have erred through my stupidity: or, did I not err, but rightly said this too, when I asserted that my words understood? Whether then will you say that I did err, or I did not? For if I have not erred, neither will you confute, although you are a wise man; nor have you the power to make use of my assertion; but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say this not in opposition to what you asserted last year. But this discourse, said I, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same state, and still, as of old, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor for this not to happen has it been discovered even by your art, and this too so wonderful for the accuracy of reasoning.—Ctesippus then said, You certainly say wonderful things, O men of Thurii or Chios, or from whatever place you are, and by whatever name you delight to be called; as you care not to talk wildly. —[41.] And I, fearing lest reviling should take place, again softened down Ctesippus, and said, What I told Clinias just now, I say also, Ctesippus, to you, that you do not know the wisdom of these strangers how wonderful it is. They are, however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously; but are imitating Proteus the Egyptian[62] sophist, and deceive us by their sorcery. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus,[62] and not separate ourselves from the men, till they have thoroughly shown us on what point they are serious; for I think that something of theirs very beautiful will appear, when they begin to be serious; and let us beg and exhort and pray them to exhibit themselves thoroughly.

It seems then good to me to again point out in what manner I prayed them to appear to me; for I will endeavour, as far as I can, to go through all in order[63] from where I then left off, that I may call them out to pity me; and that commiserating me on a tenter-hook and acting seriously, they may act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable me to recollect from what point we broke off. [42.] As I

UNDERSTOOD for me," the words of Socrates are perverted by the sophist, that he might play on the verb "understand." TAYLOR.

[62]—[62] Plato here, and in Euthyphr. p. 15, and Pseudo-Plato in Ion, p. 541, E., refer to Hom. Od. iv. 354.

[63] The word πᾶν, which is required by ἑξῆς and διελθεῖν, has been luckily preserved in three MSS.

think, we broke off some where there, when we acknowledged at last that we ought to philosophize; did we not?—Yes, said he.—But philosophy is a possession of knowledge; is it not so? said I.—Yes, said he.—By possessing then what knowledge, shall we rightly possess it? Is not this the simple fact, that (it is by possessing) that (knowledge) which will benefit us?—Certainly, said he.—Would it then benefit us at all, if we knew to know[64] by going about in what part of the earth the most gold had been dug?—Perhaps so, said he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though, without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold (that exists) should be ours. So that if we knew how to make the rocks of gold,[65] even this knowledge would be nothing worth: for if we knew not how to use the gold, (its possession) would appear to be of no advantage. Or do you not remember? said I.—I remember very well, said he.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, either relating to money matters or to medicine, or to any other, by which a person knows how to make any thing, but does not (know) how to use what he makes. Is it not so?—He assented.—Nor even if there were a science to make men immortal, without their knowing how to make use of such immortality, would there be, it seems, any advantage from it, if it is fair to infer any thing from what has been previously admitted.—In all these points we both agreed.

[43.] There is a need then, O handsome youth, of some science of such a kind, said I, as that there may concur in it both the power to make, and the knowledge how to use that which

[64] Not a single editor has seen the absurdity of the expression, *ἐπισταίμεθα γιγνώσκειν*, and still less that the sense requires *ἐπισταίμεθα γεγωνίσκειν*, i. e. "knew to proclaim;" for the two words are constantly confounded, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 314, and I could now add not a few places more. Ficinus has merely "si sciremus, quibus in terris aurum multum effodiatur."

[65] From this passage it would seem that in Plato's time some attempts had been made to discover the philosopher's stone; unless it be said that there is an allusion to the circumstance mentioned in the fragment of a comedy by Eubulus, called Glaucus, who, like Proteus, was a marine deity, and was feigned to say—"We once the sons of Cecrops did persuade To march out to Hymettus, and with arms In hand and three days' food against the ants; Since grains of molten gold had there appeared."

one makes.—It appears so, said he.—[66] We are far then, it seems, from being skilful lyre-makers, or from possessing any knowledge of that kind; for there the art that makes is on one side, and on the other the art that uses, (and there is a division about the same thing).[66] For the lyre-making and the harp-making (arts) differ very much from each other. Is it not so?—He assented.—Nor shall we, it is plain, require the flute-making art: for this is another such-like art.[67]—He was of that opinion.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should learn the art of composing speeches, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?—I think not, said Clinias, taking up the (discourse).[68]—Of what proof, said I, do you make use?—I see, said he, some speech-makers, who do not know how to use their own speeches that they make themselves, just as lyre-makers do with their lyres;[69] but here are others able to use the speeches which those have made, although unable to make speeches themselves. It is plain, then, that with respect to speeches, the art of making is separate from the art of using them.—[44.] You appear to me, said I, to give a sufficient proof that the art of speech-makers is not that art, by the possession of which a person would be happy; and yet I thought that here would appear the science, of which for a long time we have been in search. For to me those very speech-makers, Clinias, appear to be vastly wise, when I am in their company; and this very art

[66] After all the efforts of scholars to recover what Plato wrote, I confess my inability to understand a word of what is found in Stalbaum's text. Ficinus has, "Permultum igitur abest, ut lyrarum fabros esse nos oporteat; talemque scientiam assequi. In his enim ars efficiens ab arte, quæ utitur, circa idem distinguitur:" which is precisely what the train of ideas requires.

[67] Instead of the sense contained in these words, Ficinus has more to the purpose—"Ea siquidem ab illa, quæ utitur, discrepat."

[68] Taylor omitted "taking up (the discourse)" answering to the Greek ὑπολαβών, because he found in the Latin of Ficinus no translation of that word, while all the more recent editors have failed to observe that ὑπολαβών is never, and could be never, introduced into a reply. There is some error here, which I will leave for others to correct. The remedy, I suspect, is not far off.

[69] Ficinus has, what is much more clear than the Greek, "perinde uti nesciunt, ac lyris fabri ipsi lyrarum, qui ad aliorum usus lyras construxerunt, quas et, qui illis utuntur, facere nesciunt," i. e. "just as lyre-makers themselves, who make lyres for the use of others, cannot use the lyres, which those, who use them, cannot make."

of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This, however, is by no means wonderful. For it is a portion of the art of charming, and is but a little inferior to it; for the art of charming is that by which vipers,[70] and phalangia,[71] and scorpions, and other wild animals, and even diseases are charmed; but this happens to be the charming and soothing of judges, and of persons assembling at public meetings, and of other mobs. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you say.—Where then, said I, shall we yet turn ourselves? to what art?—I do not well see the way, said he.—But I think, said I, that I have discovered (the art).—What is it? said Clinias.—The art of a general, said I, appears to me, more than any other, to be that, by possessing which a person would be happy.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said I.—This is certainly a man-hunting art.—What then? said I.—[45.] No (part), said he, of the hunting art itself[72] extends beyond hunting and getting into the hand; but when persons have got into their hands what they have hunted, they are not able to use it; but hunters and fishermen assign it to cooks. But on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in arithmetic—for these also are of the hunting art—for each of these[73] do not make diagrams, but find out things existing. As then not knowing how to use them, but only to hunt for them, they deliver up their inventions for those to make a bad use[74] of in dialectics—such at least of them as are not very stupid.—Be it so, I said, O most beautiful and most wise Clinias. But is such the case?—Certainly. And thus in the same manner, said he, generals, when they have taken a city or camp, deliver it over to statesmen; for they know not how to use the things they have taken; just as, I

[70] Routh quotes from Virgil, Æn. vii. 755, "Vipereo generi et graviter spirantibus hydris Spargere qui somnos cantuque manuque solebat Mulcebatque iras et morsus arte levabat."

[71] The phalangia were a kind of venomous animal, with many legs like a spider.

[72] Out of this corrupt passage no editor has yet been able to make any thing satisfactorily.

[73] Here too is another corrupt passage; where a future editor of Plato will find not a little to try his sagacity.

[74] This is the proper meaning of *καταχρῆσθαι*. Hence it is evident that Plato is speaking ironically; otherwise he would have said *χρῆσθαι*.

think, the catchers of quails deliver them up to quail-feeders. [46.] If then, he said, we are in want of that art which, whether making or hunting, knows itself how to use what it possesses, and is such an art as will render us happy, we must, said he, instead of the general's seek out some other art.

Cri. What say you, Socrates? Did that lad talk thus?

Soc. Do you not think he did, Crito?

Cri. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had spoken thus, he would not have wanted either Euthydemus or any other man for his instruction.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, was it not Ctesippus that spoke thus? for I do not remember.

Cri. What, Ctesippus?

Soc. This, however, I well know, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who spoke thus. But, good Crito, was it not some divinity, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

Cri. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and to me it appears very much so indeed, to have been some divinity. But after this, did you still search out any art? And have you discovered or not that, for the sake of which you made the search?

[47.] *Soc.* Whence, blessed man, did we discover it? But we were altogether a subject of laughter, like children that run after larks; for we continually thought we should immediately catch each of the sciences, but they were always flying secretly away. Why therefore should I speak to you about the majority? But when we came to the regal art, and thoroughly considered whether it is that, which imparts and works out happiness, here falling, as it were, into a labyrinth, when we thought we were now at the end, we again turned round in our course, and appeared to be at the beginning of our inquiry, and we wanted just as much (of the mark), as when we were first making the search.

Cri. But how did this happen, Socrates, to you?

Soc. I will tell you. For the art of the statesman and that of the king it has been determined by us are the same.

[48.] *Cri.* What then?[75]

Soc. To this art then, as alone knowing how to make a proper use of things, have the general's art and the other arts

[75] This question is omitted by Ficinus.

(determined)[76] to give dominion over those works of which they are the mere artisans. This then clearly appeared to us to be the art we were seeking, and the cause of good conduct in a city; and really, according to the Iambic verse of Æschylus,[77] that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, directing, as by the rudder, all things, and commanding all persons to do all things useful.

Cri. Does not this then appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after this happened to us. For we were considering again somehow thus. Does that regal art, which rules over all, effect any thing for us or nothing? We said to each other that it certainly will. For would not you too assert this, Crito?

Cri. I would.

Soc. What then would you say is its effect? Just as if I should ask you, what effect does the physician's art produce in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

Cri. I should.

[49.] *Soc.* And what does agriculture, your art, effect in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

Cri. I would.

Soc. And what does the regal art effect, while it commands every thing over which it rules? Perhaps you do not very well see your way.

Cri. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much at least you know that if it is that art, which we are seeking, it ought to be useful.

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

Cri. Necessarily so, Socrates.

[76] Heindorf says that *ἔδοξαν* may easily be supplied from the preceding *ἔδοξε*. He got the idea from Ficinus, who has inserted the verb "viderentur." But the arts could not be said to come to any determination. Plato wrote, I suspect, *παραδιδόασι*, corrupted subsequently into *παραδιδόναι*.

[77] The passage alluded to is in S. Th. 2.

Soc. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

Cri. Yes, you did say so.

Soc. The other works then, which one may say belong to the statesman s art—but these would be many—for example, to make the citizens rich, free, and free from sedition—do not they all appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary for this art to make men wise, and to impart knowledge, if it is to be that, which benefits and renders men happy.

[50.] *Cri.* It is so: and thus it was agreed upon by you, as you have narrated the discourse.

Soc. Does then the regal art make men wise and good?

Cri. What prevents it, Socrates?

Soc. Does it then make all men so, and good in all respects? And is it the art which furnishes every science, that of the currier, of the carpenter, and all the other crafts?

Cri. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. But what science (does it furnish)? To what purpose do we employ it? For of no works, either good or evil, ought it to be the artificer, but to impart no other science than itself. Let us then say what it is; to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that, by which we make others good?

Cri. Entirely so.

Soc. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we still say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others so? However, they no where appear to us in what way they are good; because we have held in no honour the works, which are said to belong to the statesman's science. But in reality, there is, according to the proverb,[78] Corinthus the son of Jupiter; and as I have said, we are still equally, or even more, wanting towards knowing what the science is, which will make us happy.

Cri. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have come, it seems, to a great difficulty.

[51.] *Soc.* I myself then, Crito, since I had fallen into this difficulty, sent forth every kind of cry and entreated the

[78] By this proverb is meant a weariness from words repeated vainly. Its origin is rather obscure: see the Scholia here, and on Pindar Nem. vii. 154.

strangers, and called upon them, as if they were the Dioscuri,[79] to save us, both me and the lad, from the triple waves of the discourse; to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass well through the remainder of life.

Cri. And was then Euthydemus willing to show you any thing?

Soc. How not? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus. Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly were at a loss, or show you that you possess it?—O blessed man, said I, are you able to effect this?—Certainly, said he.—Show me, then, by Jupiter, said I, that I possess it; for this is much easier than for a man so old to learn.—Come then, said he, answer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, said I; many[80] things, but trifling.—[52.] It is sufficient, said he. Does it then appear to you to be possible, that any thing which exists should not be what it is?—It does not, by Jupiter. —Did you not say that you knew something?—I did.—Are you not then knowing, if you know?—Certainly, in that very thing.—It makes no difference. But is it not necessary that you, being knowing, should know all things?—It is not, by Jupiter, said I, since there are many other things which I do not know.—If then you do not know a thing, you are not knowing?—Of that thing, friend, said I.—Are you not then, said he, less knowing? But you just now said, that you were knowing; and thus you are the very same person that you are,[81] and again not the same person, according to the same things, (and)[82] at the same time.—Be it so, I said, Euthydemus: for, according to the saying, "You rattle indeed very pretty."[83]

[79] The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Leda by Jupiter, who were invoked by sailors when in danger during a storm. See the commentators on Horace, Od. I. 3. 2.

[80] As Socrates professed to know only that he knew nothing, Serranus justly found fault with *καὶ πολλά*. Nor has a single scholar, as far as I can learn, been able to get rid of the objection; although it were easy to do so by a very slight alteration.

[81] Instead of "that you are," the train of ideas seems to require "that you were," in Greek, ὃς ἦσθα, not ὃς εἶ.

[82] This "and" Taylor found in Ficinus "simul et secundum eadem:" which leads to *ἅμα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά*. And thus the difficulty is overcome, at which Schleiermacher and others had stumbled, in *κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἅμα*.

[83] In lieu of *καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις*, Stalbaum has edited *καλὰ δὴ πα*

How then do I know that science which we were seeking? since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. If I know one thing, do I know all things? For I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time. And since I know all things, do I possess that knowledge likewise? Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?—You are, Socrates, said he, confuting yourself.—[53.] But what, said I, Euthydemus, are you not suffering the very same thing? For whatever I may suffer together with you and Dionysodorus here, O beloved head, I shall not take much to heart. Tell me, do you not know some things, and know not others?—By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How say you? said I. Do you then know nothing?—Certainly,[84] said he.—Do you then know all things, said I, since you know any thing whatever?—All things, said he.—And you too, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, how wonderful and mighty a good you tell me has appeared. Do then all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?—They surely, said he, do not know some things, but do not know others;[85] and are at the same time knowing, and not knowing.—But how is this? said I.—All men, he said, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus,—for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty invoked you to be so,—do you in reality know all things? For instance, the art of a carpenter and a cobbler?—Certainly, said he.—And are you also able to stitch shoes?—I am, by Jupiter, said he, and also to mend them.—Do you also know

ταγεῖς, the conjecture of Abresch, who refers the gl. in Hesych. and Photius, Καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς, to this passage; where Plato seems from the Scholia to have alluded to the Γεωργοὶ of Aristophanes.

[84] This answer ought to be, as Taylor translated it, "Far from it." But such is not the meaning of Καὶ μάλα. Instead then of οὐδὲν in the preceding question one would prefer εὖ γ' ἓν.

[85] To get rid of the tautology in the two portions of this answer, Stalbaum supposes that Dionysodorus speaks ironically; as if a direct answer could be ironical, as well as an indirect question. Ficinus has "Non enim dicendum videtur scire eos aliqua, nescire alia:" which seems to lead to Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστανται. But a Sophist should assert something decisive; not say merely οὐ δεῖ εἰπεῖν. Winckelmann preserves δήπου but reads ἔφην, and gives all the words down to "All men, he said," to Socrates. But Stalbaum correctly observes that ἔφην—ἔφην—ἦν δ' ἐγώ, could not be thus applied to the same person; nor could ἀλλὰ τί be found except in the speech of another party. Perhaps Plato wrote,—ἔφη, οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν—

such things as these, the number of the stars and the sands?[86] —[54.] Perfectly so, said he. Think you, we should not confess that we do?—And Ctesippus then, taking up (the discourse), said, By Jupiter, Dionysodorus, show me some proof of these things, that I may know that you are speaking the truth.—What proof shall I show? said he.—Do you know how many teeth[87] Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?—Is it not enough, said he, for you, to hear that we know all things?—By no means, said he; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you appear on our counting them to have known this, we will then believe you in other things likewise. They then, thinking they were mocked at, were unwilling (to comply), but acknowledged they knew all things, while they were questioned on each point singly by Ctesippus. For there was nothing which Ctesippus did not ask them without concealment, and at last even if they knew the most indecent things. And they, confessing that they did know, advanced most bravely against the questions, like wild boars pressing on against the blow; [55.] so that I too, Crito, was at length compelled myself through my incredulity to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? and he said, Perfectly so.—However, said I, he surely does not know how to act the tumbler upon swords,[88] and to be whirled on a wheel,[88] being so old. (Or,)[89] so far (towards) wisdom has he come?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know. —But whether, said I, do you only now know all things, or have you always (known them)?—Always, said he.—And when you were children, and as soon as you were born, did you know?—All things, said both of them together.—To us

[86] Here seems to be an allusion to a philosopher, like Archytas, whom Horace addresses "Te maris et terræ numeroque carentis arenæ Mensorem."

[87] Porson on Aristoph. Plut. 1057, was the first to point out the similarity in the jokes of the comic poet and the philosopher; and Dobree the fragment of Lysias, quoted by Athenæus, to which he might have added Pseudo-Demetr. de Elocut. § 275.

[88] Feats, like those mentioned in the text, are said to be performed even now in the East. Routh refers to Xenoph. Sympos. 2, and Winckelmann to Anabas. v. 9.

[89] Heusde and Heind. insert ἢ, "or," which Stalb. incorrectly rejects.

the thing appeared to be incredible. But said Euthydemus, Do you disbelieve, Socrates?—Except, I said, that it is likely you are wise men.[90]—But, said he, if you are willing to give me answers, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.—Indeed, I shall[91] most gladly, said I, be confuted on these points. For if I am wise, not knowing it, and you demonstrate this that I know all things, and have always (known), what greater wind-fall than this could I find in all my life?—Answer then, said he.—[56.] Ask me, as one that will answer.—Whether, then, Socrates, said he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing, through which you are knowing, or by any thing else?—By that by which I am knowing: for I suppose you mean the soul. Or do you not mean it?—Are you not ashamed of yourself, Socrates? said he. You ask a question when you are asked one.—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? For I will do as you bid me. (But) when I know not what it is you ask me, you nevertheless order me to answer and not to ask a question.—You, doubtless, said he, understand what I say.—I do, said I.—Now then answer to that which you do understand.—What then, said I, if you ask a question, thinking in one way, and I understand it in another, and then I give an answer to it, is it enough for you, if I answer nothing to the purpose?—To me it would, said he, but not to you, I think.—I will not, by Jupiter, answer, said I, before I hear.[92]—You will not answer, said he, to what you may happen to understand, because you are a trifler, and more of a silly old man than is becoming.—And I then perceived he was annoyed at me for defining precisely what was said, as he was desirous to make me his prey by placing his words around me (as a net). I recollected, therefore,[93] that Connus was always annoyed at me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid

[90] On this passage see Heind., Winckelm., Stalb., who all differ, without any of them being able to discover what Plato wrote.

[91] Ficinus has "redargutio erit," which leads to *ἐξελέγξομαι*, fut. med., for *ἐξελεγχθήσομαι*, in lieu of *ἐξελέγχομαι*.

[92] After "I hear," there is evidently an omission of some words, which Ficinus supplies by his version, "non prius respondebo, quam quomodo respondendum sit, intellexero," i. e. "I will not answer, before I understand how I am to answer."

[93] This "therefore" is without meaning. One MS. has *γὰρ* for *οὖν*. Plato wrote *δ' εὖ*—

less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. [57.] But since I had determined to go as a scholar to those men, I thought I ought to yield, lest they should consider me a stupid fellow, and not receive me as a scholar. Hence I said, If it seems good for you to act thus, Euthydemus, let it be done: for perhaps in every respect you, who possess the art, know better how to converse than I do, who am an unskilled individual. Question me then again from the beginning.—Answer then again, said he, whether you know what you know by something or not.—I do, said I, by the soul.—Again, said he, this man in his answer adds to the questions he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again I said, I have answered more than was necessary, through my want of instruction; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply, that I know always by something, what I know.—But, said he, whether do you always know by the same thing? Or is it at one time by this thing and at another time by another?—Always by this, said I, when I know. —Again, said he, will you not cease to speak beside (the question)?—But (I fear, said I,) lest this "always" should trip us up.—It will not us, said he; but, if at all, it will you. But answer me, Do you always know by this?—Always, I said; since I must take away the "when."—[58.] You therefore always know by this. And always knowing, whether do you know some things by that, by which you know, and other things by something else? or do you know all things by that?—All things, said I, which I know, by that.—This has come, said he, the same by-answer.—I take away then, said I, the words "which I know."—Take not away, said he, even one word; for I make you no request.[94]—But answer me, Would you be able to know all things, unless you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, said I.—Add now, said he, whatever you like; for you confess that you know all things.—I appear to have done so, said I; since the expression, "the things which I know," possess no power whatever; [but I know all things].[95]—Have you not then confessed that

[94] After "request" understand, "to take away any thing," as shown by Phædon. p. 95, E., quoted appositely by Winckelmann, *οὐδὲν—οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι.*

[95] Heindorf correctly wished to expunge the words *πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι*, which Winckelmann and Stalbaum vainly attempt to preserve. For they plainly interfere with the whole train of thought.

you always know by that thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please· for you have confessed that you know always, and all things at the same time. It is evident, therefore, that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begotten, and when you was born; and even before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge; and you,[96] by Jupiter, said he, will know always, and all things, if I wish it.—[59.] And may you wish it, much-honoured Euthydemus, said I, if you speak the truth in reality. But I do not quite believe that you are sufficient for this, unless this your brother here, Dionysodorus, assist you with his counsel: and thus perhaps you would be (sufficient).[97] But tell me, said I—for in other things I cannot contend against you, men of such portentous wisdom, (nor say) that I do not know all things, since you assert it—how, Euthydemus, shall I say that I know that good men are unjust? Come, tell me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, said he.—What, said I, (do I know)?—That good men are not unjust.—This, I said, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I am not asking this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—I do not therefore, said I, know it.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus, You are destroying the reasoning; and this man will appear to be not knowing, that he is at the same time both knowing and not knowing. [60.] And Dionysodorus blushed. But, Euthydemus, said I, how say you? Does not your brother, who knows all things, appear to you to speak correctly?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse.—And I said, Leave me alone, my good man, till Euthydemus shall have taught me how I know that good men are unjust; and do not begrudge me the lesson.

[96] Bekker has *καὶ ναὶ μα Δί', ἔφη, αὐτὸς ἀεὶ*—Heindorf was the first to object to *αὐτὸς*, and to suggest *εὐθὺς ἀεὶ αὖ*.—Stalbaum prefers *αὖθις ἀεί*.—Winckelmann unites *αὐτὸς* with *καὶ*, "and even you yourself—"

[97] Stalbaum omits the words *οὕτω δὲ τάχ' ἄν*. He should have read, *οὕτω γὰρ τάχ' ἂν εἴης·* scil. *ἱκανός*, by the aid of Ficinus, "Sic enim forte valebis." The ellipse, however, seems to be defended by *τάχ' ἄν· ἀλλ'*—in Sophist. p. 257, D., and *τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν*—in Phileb. p. 23, E., quoted by Winckelmann

—You are flying away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are unwilling to answer.—And reasonably so, said I: for I am inferior even to either one[98] of you; so that I have a great need to fly from the two. For I am somehow far weaker than Hercules; who was not able to contend with the Hydra—a sophist that did by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, send up again many instead of one—and at the same time with the Crab,[99] a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, had come recently from the sea; and when it was annoying Hercules on the left hand by speaking to and biting him, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to aid him; and he gave him sufficient aid. But if my Iolaus, Patrocles,[100] were to come, he would rather produce mischief.

[61.] Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since this tale has been sung by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is then best for me, Dionysodorus, said I, to answer you. For you will not desist—of this I am pretty well certain—from asking questions, and grudging me (to learn), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.—Answer, however, said he.—I will answer then, said I, that Iolaus was the nephew of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, mine not at all. For my brother, Patrocles, was not his father; but Iphicles, who nearly resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your brother?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with myself.—He is then your brother, and not your brother.—I said, He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.—But, said he, Sophroniscus was a father, and Chæredemus (likewise).—Certainly, said I; the former was my father, and the latter his.—Was not then, said he, Chæredemus different from a father?—From my father, said I.—

[98] Instead of ἑτέρου Ficinus found in his MS. ἑκατέρου, as shown by his "alterutro."

[99] This contest of Hercules with the Crab is mentioned by Apollodorus in Biblioth. II. 5. 2, and Palæphatus Incredibil. fab. 39.

[100] To this brother of Socrates Winckelmann thinks there is an allusion in Aristoph. Plut. 84, where he is described as a person who had never washed himself from the time of his birth.

Was he then (said he) a father, different from a father? Or are you the same thing as the[101] stone?—[62.] I fear, said I, lest under you I shall appear to be the same; but I do not think so myself.—Are you then, said he, different from the[101] stone?—Different, certainly.—Being then something different from a stone, you are not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—It is so.—Will not Chæredemus then, since he is different from a father, be not a father?—It seems, said I, he is not a father.—For certainly, said Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, if Chæredemus is a father, and Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from a father, is not a father, so that[2] you, Socrates, are without a father.—And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Is not your father in the very same predicament? for he is different from my father. —Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same? he replied.—Yes, the same.—I would not wish this. But whether, Euthydemus, is he my father alone, or the father of other men likewise?—Of other men likewise, said he. Or do you think that the same person, being a father, is not a father?—So I thought indeed, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he, (do you think) that a thing being gold is not gold? or (a person) being a man is not a man?—[63.] Say not so,[3] said Ctesippus. According to the proverb, you do not, Euthydemus, join thread with thread.[4] For you speak of a dreadful thing, if your father is the father of all.—But he is, said he.—Whether of men, said Ctesippus, or of horses too? or of all other animals likewise?—Of all (animals), said he.—Is your mother too the mother (of all)?[5] —Yes, the mother.—Your mother then, said he, is the mother

[101]—[101] The article has no meaning here. The passage is corrupt, and may be corrected without much difficulty.

[2] This "so that," in Greek ὥστε, plainly proves that the hypothesis of the proposition is without its conclusion. There is another error too in εἰ γὰρ δήπου. For δήπου never follows εἰ, only οὐ. And hence Ficin. has "Haud—"

[3] So Stalbaum renders μὴ γὰρ, as if λέγε were understood. But in this ellipse γὰρ never is, for it never could be, found.

[4] This proverb was applied to those who say or do the same things through the same means, as remarked by the Scholiast; who quotes Aristotle, Φυσικ. Ἀκροασ. iii. 6, 9.

[5] Ficinus alone has preserved, what no editor has yet remarked, the true readings here, as shown by his version, "An et mater tua mater omnium." The Greek is ἦ καὶ μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ.

of sea-urchins.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, and puppies, and little pigs.—And so are you, said he.—And besides this, your father is a dog too.—And so is yours, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if you would answer me, you would forthwith acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?—Yes, a very bad one, said Ctesippus.—Has he then puppies?—He has indeed, said he, others very much of the same kind (as himself).—Is not the dog then their father?—At least, I saw him having connexion with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, said he.—Being a father then, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of puppies.—[64.] And Dionysodorus again, quickly taking up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not get a word in before him, said, Answer me still in a small matter. Do you strike this dog?—And Ctesippus said, laughing, By the gods, I do; for I cannot (strike) you.—You strike your father then, said he.—Much more justly, said he, should I strike your father, who, having endured what, has begotten such wise sons. But surely, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the father of the puppies has enjoyed many good things from this your wisdom. But neither is he in want of many good things, Ctesippus, nor are you.—Nor are you, Euthydemus, said he. —Nor is any other man (said he) in want of them. For tell me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or unarmed?—To me, said he, (it appears);[6] although I think that you are about to say some of your beautiful things.—[65.] You shall know the best, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink medicine when it is requisite, is it not meet to drink as much as possible of this good, and will it not in this case be well there,[7] if some one, bruising it, should mingle with it a cart-load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed,

[6] Here is evidently some omission. For to a double question there could not be a single answer.

[7] Bekk. has ἐκεῖ, which, omitted by Ficinus, and Schleiermacher and Heindorf could not understand, is absurdly explained by Winckelmann, whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2.

Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.[8]—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not meet to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, Euthydemus; for you think that one (shield)[9] and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you, said he, arm Geryones too and Briareus in this manner? But I thought you were more skilful (than to do so), as being one who fights with a soldier's arms, and so too was this your friend.—And Euthydemus indeed was silent. But Dionysodorus asked, in reference to what had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it not then appear to you to be good likewise to possess gold?—Certainly, said Ctesippus, and this too in plenty.—[66.] What then, does it not appear to you to be a good thing to possess riches always, and every where?—Very much so, said he.—Do you not then acknowledge gold likewise to be a good thing?—I have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then meet to possess it always, and every where, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?—They say indeed, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, that those amongst the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their own skulls, just as you lately spoke of the dog being your own father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and look within them, having their own head in their hands.—[67.] Whether, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which can be seen, or things which cannot be seen?—Things, surely, which can be seen.—Do you then (do so) likewise? said he.—I do.—Do you then see our garments?—Yes.—Can then these things see?—Beyond all measure, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he.—Nothing. But perhaps you think you do not see them, so facetious are you; but to me you appear, Euthydemus, not sleeping to be asleep, and, if it were possible for a man, when speaking, to say nothing, to do this likewise.—Is it not then possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who

[8] Of the statue alluded to it appears that nothing is told elsewhere.

[9] The Greek word *ἀσπίδα* is wanting in the text. Taylor supplied "shield" from the context. Ficinus has "unum duntaxat jaculum."

is silent to speak?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also impossible for him, who speaks, to be silent?—Still less so, said he.—When therefore you speak of stones, and woods, and things of iron, do you not speak of things silent?—I do not, said he, if I am walking in braziers' shops; but the pieces of iron are speaking, and make the greatest noise, if any one touches them. So that you know not that with (all) your wisdom you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.[10]—And Ctesippus appeared to me to be in great agony on account of his boy-love.—[68.] When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things?—I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent as to things which speak, if things which speak[11] are among the number of all things?—But what, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do then, thou best of men, all things speak?—The speaking things do.—But, said he, I do not ask this; but whether all things are silent, or speak?—They do neither, and they do both, said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I well knew, that you would not have any thing to say to this answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, said, Your brother, Euthydemus, has put his argument on both sides, and he has perished and is vanquished.[12] And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times as great (as he was before). But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have heard these things on the sly from these very men. For such kind of wisdom is not now possessed by any other persons. [69.] And I said, Why do you laugh, Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?—What, Socrates, have

[10] From the want of connexion it is evident that something has been lost here.

[11] Here Ficinus and a single MS. acknowledge λέγοντα in lieu of λεγόμενα, which Winckelmann has alone the hardihood to defend, at variance with the whole tenor of the passage.

[12] In the words "he has perished and is vanquished," there is either a tautology, or the cart is put before the horse. For the vanquishing ought to precede the perishing. The passage, as shown by the variations of MSS., is evidently corrupt, and may be easily mended by a critic of the least ingenuity. Heindorf would read ἀπολώλεκε καὶ ἥττηται, i. e. "it has destroyed and been vanquished," from the version of Ficinus "eum que disperdidit, et ratio vestra succubuit"

you ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have, said I, and many such, Dionysodorus.—Were they then, said he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having grunted out a word. I said, however, they are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present with each of them.[13]—If, then, said he, an ox is present with you, are you an ox? and because I now am present with you, are you Dionysodorus?—Say words of good omen, said I.—But after what manner, said he, if even one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, said I, in a difficulty respecting this? For I have just now endeavoured to imitate the wisdom of the men,[14] as being desirous of it.—How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, of that which is not?—What do you say, said I, Dionysodorus? Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?—Provided, said he, it appears so to me.—Does it then appear so to you?—Entirely so, said he.—Is not likewise the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. And I thought that not even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. [70.] But this, Dionysodorus, you have willingly passed by;[15] since in other respects, like the artists, on whom it is incumbent to work out each part in detail, you seem to me to work out a discourse in a thoroughly beautiful manner.—Do you know then, said he, what is proper for each artist? In the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in copper?—I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.—And to whom does it belong to fashion things in clay?—To a potter.—And whose business is it to cut a throat, to flay, and, cutting off small pieces of flesh, to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a

[13] Respecting the notion that things are beautiful not in themselves but according to their adjuncts, see Hipp. Maj.

[14] In "the men" the article has nothing to which it can be referred. Hence, since three good MSS. read *τῶν ἀνδρῶν*, Plato probably wrote *τινῶν ἀνδρῶν*, in allusion to the Sophists.

[15] Heindorf perceiving that *παρῆκας* could not mean here "passed by," renders it, "You have spoken rather carelessly." But no Sophist ever did or would speak carelessly. Plato wrote *ἠπόρηκας*, "you have doubted," an emendation so obvious, that even Winckelmann and Stalbaum, who have adopted Heindorf's translation, ought to have hit upon it.

cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Perfectly.—But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut a throat and flay. Have you assented to this or not?—I have assented, I said; but pardon me.[16]—It is evident, then, said he, that should any one cut the throat of the cook and chop him into small pieces, and boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and should any one work like a brazier on the copper-smith himself,[17] and like a potter on the potter, he too would do what is proper.—[71.] O Neptune, said I, now you put the Colophon[18] on your wisdom. Will it then ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—This, said I, is evident, if you wish it.—But what, said he, do you think you know your own things?—Unless you say something else. For I must begin from you, and end with Euthydemus here.—Do you then, said he, consider those things yours, over which you have a power, and which you can use as you please, such as oxen and sheep? do you think that those are yours which it is lawful for you to sell, and to give away, and to sacrifice to whatever god you please; but that those, which are not so circumstanced, are not yours?—And I, for I knew that from the questions something beautiful would peep out, and at the same time I was desirous to hear as quickly as possible, said, It is perfectly so; things of this kind alone are mine.—But what, said he, do you not call those things animals, which possess a soul?—Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that those alone among animals are yours, to which you have the liberty of doing what I have just now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—[72.] And he, pausing a while, as if reflecting upon something of great consequence, said with an assumed gravity, Tell me, Socrates, is there with you a paternal Ju-

[16] Why Socrates should thus request pardon of the Sophist for asserting, it is difficult to explain; unless the clause be introduced a little below, after "your wisdom."

[17] Stalbaum properly objects to this "himself;" which ought to be added to the cook and potter likewise, or else omitted entirely.

[18] The origin of this proverb is explained by Strabo, xiv. p. 643, who says that the troops of the Colophonians were so excellent both by land and sea that a war always terminated in favour of the party on whose side they fought. See Erasmus on Adag. Chiliad, p. 570, and Ruhnken in Heusd. Specim. Crit. p. 33, on Theætet. p. 153, C.

piter?—And I suspecting that the discourse would come to the place where it ended, endeavoured to fly from a certain crafty turn, and now twisted myself,[19] as if caught in a net; and I said, There is not,[20] Dionysodorus.—You are therefore a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither paternal gods, nor sacred rites, nor any thing else beautiful and good.—Hold, said I, Dionysodorus; speak words of good omen, and do not instruct me harshly. For there are to me altars and sacred rites, both domestic and belonging to my country, and the rest of the things of this kind as appertain to the Athenians.—Then, said he, is there not a paternal Jupiter to the rest of the Athenians?—There is not, said I. This appellation exists not to any one of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is (our) paternal (god),[21] through the race of Ion; and Jupiter is not called by us Paternal, but Herceus[22] and Phratrius;[23] and Minerva too is called Phratria.—[73.] This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and

[19] This is the interpretation given by Heindorf to the words, *ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην*. But he did not perceive that *στροφὴ* would be applied not to the Sophist but to Socrates; and that the endeavour to escape would follow, not precede, the act of twisting oneself. Had he remembered the passage quoted by Winckelmann from Rep. iii. p. 405, C., *ἱκανὸς πάσας στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι*, he would have seen perhaps that Plato wrote *ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν τοῦ φεύγειν ἕνεκα διεστρεφόμην*, "I twisted myself into some intricate turn, for the sake of escaping."

[20] This assertion has given rise to no little difficulty. For it is said, that, contrary to the express testimony of Plato, there was at Athens a paternal Jupiter. But the passages quoted from Soph. Trach. 764, Eurip. Electr. 675, and Æschyl. Niob. Fr. 1., prove only that Jupiter was the paternal deity of Hercules, Orestes, and Tantalus, not one of whom was an Athenian. We find indeed in Aristoph. Νεφ. 1468, *Ναὶ ναὶ καταιδέσθητι πατρῶον Δία*. But if that verse were, as Porson supposed on Med. 1314, taken from a play of Euripides, it was probably spoken by some person not an Athenian, as remarked by Lobeck in Aglaophamus, p. 772, or else Aristophanes wrote, I suspect, *Ναί, ναί, καταιδέσθητι πατέρ', οἷον Δία*, i. e. "Respect a father, as thou shouldst e'en Jove."

[21] Apollo having had a connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Erectheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and he himself was worshipped as Paternal Apollo.

[22] The Athenians called the enclosure round a house, ἕρκος, *Herkos*, and hence Jupiter was called Herkeus, as the guardian of the Herkos.

[23] This name is derived from *φρατρία*, by which was meant a third part of the *φυλή*, "tribe."

Minerva.—Certainly, said I.—Will not these then, said he, be your gods?—Progenitors, said I, and masters.—To you then, said he, they will be so. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what could I do?—Are not then, said he, these gods animals likewise? For you have acknowledged that whatever have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?—They have, said I.—Are they not therefore also animals?—Animals, said I.—But of animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For there is no backing out, Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, and straightway tell me, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods likewise, are you permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any way you please, as you would do other animals? I then, O Crito, as if struck down by the argument, lay speechless; but Ctesippus, coming as it were to the rescue, Pyppax Hercules, said he, a beautiful discourse! And then said Dionysodorus, Whether is Hercules Pyppax, or Pyppax Hercules?—[74.] And Ctesippus said, O Neptune, what words of wisdom! I retire; the men are unconquerable.

Here indeed, friend Crito, there was not one of those present who did not exceedingly praise the discourse; and the two men were almost stretched at their length,[24] laughing, clapping, and exulting. For upon each (and[25]) all of the things (said) previously in a very beautiful manner, the admirers alone of Euthydemus made an uproar; but here, al-

[24] Stalbaum has preferred παρετάθησαν to παρείθησαν, found in the best Vatican MS., which Abresch. had already conjectured, and confirmed by the gl. in Hesych. Παρείθη· παρελύθη. He has, however, the good sense to add that he is unwilling to assert what is the true reading. For he probably perceived, that though παρετάθησαν would by itself be intelligible, it would not be so when united to ὀλίγον. For a person may be said to be stretched out positively or not; but he cannot be said to be nearly so. He may however be said to be dead or nearly so. Winckelmann has correctly edited παρείθησαν, and he might have referred to Petronius, "Gyton risu dissolvebat ilia sua." Porson too on Med. 585, ἐν γαρ ἐκτενεῖ σ' ἔπος, defends παρετάθησαν, not aware that Euripides wrote, what is partly found in some MSS., ἐν γὰρ εὖ κτενεῖ σ' ἔπος.

[25] Although πᾶς τις ἕκαστος is found in good Greek, yet here one would expect an antithesis between "each" and "all."

most the pillars in the Lyceum made a clattering in favour of the two men, and were delighted. I too felt disposed myself to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I turned myself to praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your wondrous genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! [75.] Your arguments indeed, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you care nothing for the mass of mankind, nor for persons of solemn mien, and who think themselves something, but only for those who are like yourselves. For I know well, that very few men similar to yourselves, would delight in these arguments; while the rest are so ignorant of them, that, I am sure, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such arguments, than to be confuted themselves. This too again is another popular and gentle character in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as indeed you assert you do; and not only the mouths of others, but ye would appear (to sew up) your own. (Now) this is a very gracious act, and removes whatever is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and have been discovered by you with such skill, that any one may learn them in a very short time. (For) I have perceived, by directing my attention to Ctesippus, how rapidly on the instant he has been able to imitate you. [76.] The (wisdom) then of your practice, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful; but it is not adapted for discussion before men.[26] But, if you will be persuaded by me, be careful not to speak before many, lest through their learning rapidly, they should give you no thanks for your instruction. But especially con-

[26] This is a strange expression. Did Socrates then wish the Sophists to converse in the presence of animals? Ficinus has "coram multis hominibus" more correctly. But as πολλῶν would thus interfere with the same expression in the next sentence, instead of ἀνῶν, (for so ἀνθρώπων is generally written in MSS.,) perhaps the true reading is ἔννων, "sensible." For thus Socrates would give vent to a bitter sarcasm against the Sophists.

verse amongst yourselves alone: and if not, should you discourse in the presence of another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. The same advice, if you are wise, you will give to your disciples likewise, never to discourse with any man, except with you and themselves. For that which is rare, Euthydemus, is valuable; but water, although the best of things, as Pindar says, may be bought very cheap. But lead on, said I, and receive Clinias here and myself (as your scholars) on the sly.

Having, Crito, spoken these words and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men; for they say they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any natural disposition or age; and, what is especially proper for you to hear, they say that an attention to money-making does not hinder any one from easily receiving their wisdom.

[77.] *Cri.* In good truth, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; although I almost appear to be one of those, not like to Euthydemus, but to those who, as you have just said, would more willingly be confuted by such arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to give you advice; nevertheless, I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Know[27] then, that as I was taking a walk, a man came to me from among those that had left you, and thinking himself to be very wise, as being one of those who are skilled in speeches suited for courts of justice, said to me—Crito, have you heard[28] nothing of these wise men?—By Jupiter, I have not, said I. For, on account of the crowd, I was unable to stand close and hear.—And yet, said he, it was worth while to hear them.—Why? said I.—Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such-like arguments.—And I said, What then

[27] Instead of οἶσθα, Heindorf suggests ἴσθι. Winckelmann and Stalbaum, however, still stick to οἶσθα, which they take interrogatively; as if a question would be thus asked at the commencement of a narrative. It was then either from his MS. or own good sense that Ficinus omitted οἶσθα. Taylor translated, "Do you not know?" but the negative is not found in the Greek.

[28] Instead of ἀκροᾷ, Heindorf suggested ἠκροάσω, from "audivisti" in Ficinus.

did they appear to you?—What else, said he, than that they are such as one will always hear from such-like triflers, who bestow unworthy attention on things of no worth. For so did he say in very words.—[78.] And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think you would have been ashamed of your associate. He was so absurd, as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but lay hold of every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are worthless and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates, neither he appears to blame the thing with justice, nor would any one else blame it.[29] To be willing, however, to discourse with these men in the presence of many appears to me to be an act that may be justly blamed.

Soc. Wonderful, Crito, are the men of this kind. But I do not yet know what I am about to say.[30] Of what class of men was he, who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he some pleader among those who are skilful in contending in courts of justice; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, (and) a maker of the speeches with which orators contend?

[79.] *Cri.* The least of all was he, by Jupiter, an orator; nor do I think that he ever ascended the platform in a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Jupiter, and likewise that he is a person of power and composes powerful speeches.

Soc. I now understand; and I was myself just now about to speak of those men. For they are those, Crito, whom Prodicus says are on the confines of a philosopher and politician; and think themselves to be the wisest of all men; and in addition to their being such, they (fancy) they seem so to the many; so that none others but the persons engaged

[29] The formula *εἴ τις ἄλλος* has no meaning here. The version of Ficinus, "vel quisquis alius improbet," leads at once to *οὔτ' ἄν τις ἄλλος ψέγοι*.

[30] This is rather strange language in the mouth of Socrates. The passage is no doubt corrupt; nor can it be compared with Theætet. § 109.

in philosophy are an impediment to their gaining a reputation amongst all. They think therefore, that if they can establish an opinion that philosophers are nothing worth, they shall, without a contest, carry off the prize of a reputation for wisdom amongst all mankind. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that they are lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted[31] in their private discourses. And yet they very reasonably think themselves wise men: for to possess philosophy in moderation, and with moderation to engage in political concerns, is very much according to reason; for (this is) to partake of both, as far as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

[80.] *Cri.* What then, do they appear to you, Socrates, to say any thing (of consequence)?

Soc. By no means.[32]

Cri. Yet the discourse of the men possesses a certain speciousness.

Soc. It has in reality, Crito, speciousness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that in the case of men and all other things, which subsist between two certain things, and partake of both, such as (are) from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as (are) from two goods, not (tending)[33] to the same point, are worse than both, with respect to that, for which each of the things, of which they are composed, is useful; and that such things as are composed of two evils, not tending to the same, are in the middle, these taken alone are better than each of those things, in both of which they take a part. If then philosophy and political action are good, but each (tends) to something else, and these men, while they partake of both,

[31] Instead of *ἀπολῃφθῶσι*, Ast on Sympos. p. 363, suggests *ἀπολειφθῶσι*, "are deficient."

[32] This answer is found in Ficinus alone, "Nequaquam." Hence probably Heindorf wished to read, *Οὐ μέντοι*, or *Οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε*. He should have suggested *Οὐ γάρ τι*. For thus *τι* would answer to *τι* in the question of Crito. Routh, however, whom Heindorf, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum have followed, continues the speech, without any answer, in the mouth of Crito.

[33] Heindorf, perceiving that something was wanting after *πρὸς ταὐτὸν*, wished to insert *ὄντοιν*, as we find just after *πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοιν*. Ficinus supplies in the first sentence, "conducentibus," and in the second, "spectant."

are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if (philosophy and political action) are both good and bad,[34] these men are better than some and worse than others. But if both are bad, they will thus assert something which is true; but otherwise, not at all.[35] [81.] I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad and the other good; but partaking of both, they are in reality inferior to both, with respect to (the performing of) either, with a view to which both political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they are the third, they endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant at them; but we should consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite to be content with whatever man says any thing bordering on intellect, and who courageously labours in going through[36] (his task).

Cri. And indeed, Socrates, I too, as I am always saying to you, am in a difficulty respecting my children, how I ought to treat them. The one indeed is still rather young, and little; but Critobulus is already an adult, and requires some one to be a benefit to him. When therefore I am associating with you, I feel disposed to think that it is madness to be, for the sake of children, so much concerned about many other things, such as marriage, that they may be born of a mother of high family, and about wealth, that they may become very rich, and yet to neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those, who profess to instruct men, I am amazed; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me, on reflection, to be unfit for the purpose; so that I know not how to give the youth a turn for philosophy.

[82.] *Soc.* Know you not, friend Crito, that in every pur-

[34] Ficinus has, "sin autem unum quidem horum bonum, malum verc alterum, hoc quidem meliores, illo deteriores," i. e. "But if one of these is good, and the other bad, they are better than the latter, worse than the former." This is at least intelligible, which the Greek is not.

[35] In the whole of this passage I candidly confess my inability to dis cover a particle of meaning. Heindorf has recourse to the figure of speech called Chiasmus.

[36] Instead of *ἐπεξιων* the two best MSS. read *ἐπὶ δεξιῶν*: from which it were perhaps not difficult to elicit what Plato wrote. Ficinus has "viriliter peragit," as if his MS. read neither *ἐπεξιὼν* nor *ἐπὶ δεξιῶν*.

suit, the bad are many and of no worth, but the good are few and worthy of all regard?[37] For does not the art of the gymnast, that of the money-scrivener, that of the rhetorician, and that of the general, appear to you to be beautiful?

Cri. To me in every respect.

Soc. What then, in each of these do you not see that the many are to be ridiculed with respect to each of their doings?

Cri. Yes, by Jupiter; and you speak with great truth.

Soc. Would you then on this account avoid all those pursuits yourself, and not impose them on your son?

Cri. This surely, Socrates, would not be just.

Soc. Do not then, Crito, do what you ought not; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, examine the thing itself, well and properly; and if it appear to you to be a vile thing, turn aside every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it appear to you such as I think it is, boldly pursue and practise it, according to the saying, 'both you and your children'.[38]

[37] By comparing the language of Socrates just after, it is clear that Plato wrote, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ φαῦλοι—οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι σπουδαῖοι, not οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ—οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι,—and so Taylor translated, led rather by the sense than syntax.

[38] On this saying see the commentators on Aristoph. Ὄρν, 132. Ran. 586. Plato Politic, p. 307, E. Rep. ii. p. 372, B.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST.

After producing in the Euthydemus some specimens of the apparently clever but really absurd subtleties of which the Sophists of Greece were wont to make a display, and to gain the admiration of those, who could not detect a fallacy, and the contempt of those, who could, Plato has in this dialogue pointed out in what class of persons those must be placed, who professed to be on all questions of philosophy, politics, and science, equally competent to raise a doubt or to solve one.

In pursuing this inquiry, Plato has, like a keen sportsman, followed the track of the animal, to which he compares the Sophist, until he arrives at the long-sought-for lair; and he then discovers that, instead of the Sophist being the purveyor of intellectual food, he is occupied merely in the art of catching the many, and thus gaining a credit for talents which are not only of no use to himself and others, but are the bane of both.

During the course of the dialogue, he is led to examine the theory respecting the first element of all things, called τὸ ὂν or οὐσία, which I have rendered "the existing" and "existence" respectively, and not, as others have done, "the being" and "essence." Of this existence, identified by some philosophers with "the one," and by others with "the whole," there were said to be an infinite number of parts, or species, all differing from each other, and yet producing what Horace calls "rerum concordia discors," through the properties of existence, connected respectively with the ideas of identity and difference, motion and rest.

From the fact of finding the same speakers in the Theætetus and Sophist, some have considered the latter dialogue to be only a continuation of the former; while its similarity in the manner of subdividing a genus into different species, proves its still greater

affinity with the Statesman—for such is the best English translation of the Greek Πολιτικὸς—and with the Cratylus, in its touching upon the phænomena of language, and with the Parmenides, as regards the doctrine of "the existing," and the forms it assumes in the mind of "the one"

THE SOPHIST.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS, SOCRATES, A GUEST FROM ELEA, THEÆTETUS.

[1.] ACCORDING to our agreement yesterday, both we ourselves are come, Socrates, in due order, and we bring this our guest,[1] an Elean by birth, and a friend of Parmenides and Zeno, and a great philosopher.

Soc. Are you not, Theodorus, unconsciously bringing not a guest but some god, according to the language of Homer,[2] who says in behalf of such mortals, as have a portion of due respect, both other gods, and especially the deity who presides over guests, become a follower and survey the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he, who now follows you, may be one of the better beings about to survey and confute us, when ill-conducting ourselves in a strife of words, through his being a kind of a disproving god.

Theo. Such is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates; but he is more moderate than those that are studious of contention; and the man appears to me, not to be a deity, but divine: for such I denominate all philosophers.

[2.] *Soc.* And you do well, my friend. Although I fear this race (of philosophers) is scarcely more easy to distinguish, I may say, than that of the divinity. For they, who are philosophers, not made up, but in reality, appear, through the

[1] This Theodorus was a geometrician of Cyrene, and Plato's preceptor in that science.

[2] Plato here brings together two different passages of Homer; one from Od. I. 770, Ξείνιος (Ζεὺς) ὃς ξείνοισιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ: and the other from Od. P. 485, Θεοὶ—ἐπιστροφῶσι πόληας Ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

ignorance of others, to be of a multiform kind, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of those below them; and to some they seem to be worthy of no honour, but to others of all; and now they appear to be politicians; and now sophists; and sometimes there are those, to whom they give the idea that they are altogether mad. I would, however, gladly hear from this our guest, if it is agreeable to him, what the people about the place there think of these things, and how they denominate them.

Theo. What things?

Soc. The sophist, statesman, and philosopher.

[3.] *Theo.* What, and of what kind, is the doubt about them, respecting which you have it in your mind to make an inquiry?

Soc. It is this. Whether they consider all these as one or two? Or as there are three names, whether they distribute them into three kinds likewise, and attach to each singly a name?

Theo. He will not, I think, grudge to go through them. Or how shall we say, guest?

Guest. Thus, Theodorus. For I do not grudge, nor is it difficult to say, that they think them three kinds. But to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy task.

Theo. You have by accident, Socrates, laid hold of questions similar to those, which we were asking this our guest, before we came hither. But he then made the same pretence to us, as he just now did to you: since he says that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget.

[4.] *Soc.* Do not then, stranger, deny us the first favour we ask. But tell us thus much; whether you are wont more readily to go through by yourself and to state in a long discourse whatever you wish to show forth, or by interrogations? such as I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time going through very beautiful arguments, when I was a young man and he very old at that time.

Guest. With him who converses by answers, Socrates, without pain, and (as it were) with a light rein, it is more easy thus with another; but if not, by oneself.[3]

[3] Such is the literal translation of the nonsensical Greck, *ῥᾷον οὕτω το πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ καθ' αὑτόν*; in lieu of which Ficinus has what

Soc. You are at liberty then to select whom you please of those present here: for we shall all of us readily obey you. You will however, if you take my advice, select some of the young men, either Theætetus here, or any of the rest, if such is your mind.

[5.] *Guest.* A kind of shame has come upon me, Socrates, in that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not carried on the intercourse in detail, word for word, but by drawing out a discourse to a great extent, either by myself or to another, I have as it were made a display. For in reality, that which is now said is not (such) as a person would expect it to be, when interrogated about it;[4] for it requires a very long discussion. But on the other hand, not to gratify you and these, especially since you have spoken as you have spoken,[5] would, as it appears to me, be unlike a guest and boorish; since, from what I have before said, and from what you now urge me, I receive Theætetus here to be the respondent.

[6.] *Theæ.* Will you then, stranger, as Socrates said, gratify us all?[6]

Guest. It nearly appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said on this point. And as it seems, the discourse must hereafter be addressed to you. But if, wearied by the length of the discourse, you shall be somewhat annoyed, blame not me, but these your companions, as the cause.

Theæ. But I think I shall not faint in this way for the present. If, however, such a thing should take place, then I will take to myself as an ally Socrates, the namesake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and my

is at least intelligible, "facilius est cum alio interrogando disserere; sin contra, per se ipsum quisque facilius disputat," i. e. "it is more easy to dispute with another by interrogations; otherwise, every one converses more easily (by talking) himself."

[4] So Stalbaum would have us translate the words *τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναί τις*, out of which Stephens could make no sense, nor can I. Some error lies in *οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε—εἶναι*, which it were not difficult perhaps for a conjectural critic to correct.

[5] On this formula see Blomf. on Agam. 66. Matth. Gr. Gr. § 558.

[6] Strange to say even Heindorf, who once saw correctly that *Ἆρα τοίνυν* could not be here used interrogatively, afterwards vainly attempted to defend the reading; nor did he perceive, what is evident at a glance, that Plato wrote *Ἀρὰ τοίνυν*, "Do so then, stranger, and you will gratify us all, as Socrates said." Stalbaum follows, as usual, Heindorf blindfold.

associate in gymnastic exercises, and not unaccustomed to labour in many things with me.[7]

Guest. You say well. Deliberate then about these things by yourself, as the discourse proceeds. But now you must consider in common with me, beginning in the first place, as it appears to me, from the sophist; and searching out and showing forth by a reason, what thing he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing; but as regards the thing by what name we call it, perhaps each of us have one peculiar to ourselves. But it is always requisite respecting every thing, to agree rather through reasons as to the thing itself, than to the name alone without a reason. [7.] However, with respect to the tribe which we now have it in our mind to investigate, it is not the easiest of all things to comprehend what a sophist is. But whatever things of moment ought to be well and thoroughly laboured at, respecting these it has been decreed by all of old that we must practise them first in small and more easy matters, previous to those in the greatest. Now then, Theætetus, I too recommend, since we conceive the genus of a sophist is difficult to hunt out, that we should in like manner practise the method in something more easy; unless you are able to show some other and easier road.

Theæ. But I am not able.

Guest. Are you willing then to go after something of little value, and to endeavour to put it as the pattern of a greater?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. What then if we propose a thing well known, and of trifling value, but possessing a subject for discourse not less than things greater? as, for instance, a fisherman. Is not this thing known to every one, and worthy of not very great and serious thought?

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And I suspect it has a method and reasoning not unsuited for us.

[8.] *Theæ.* It would then answer well.

Guest. Come then, let us begin from it thus; and tell me, whether we shall put down a fisherman as skilled in some art, or unskilled in some art, but possessing another power.

Theæ. By no means as unskilled in some art.

[7] As shown in the Politic. p. 257, C., where this same Socrates takes up the discourse, after Theætetus had ceased speaking.

Guest. But of all arts there are nearly two species.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Agriculture, and the care respecting every thing mortal, and that relating to the putting together and moulding what we call an utensil, and the imitative power, all these may be justly called by one name.

Theæ. How so? and by what name?

Guest. When any one leads subsequently into existence that which was previously not in existence, then we say that he who leads, makes, and that the thing led, is made.

Theæ. Right.

Guest. But all which we just now mentioned are wont to possess their own power (suited) to this.

Theæ. They do.

Guest. This then let us summarily call the making power.

Theæ. Be it so.

[9.] *Guest.* After this the whole species of discipline and knowledge, and the species relating to money-making, and contending, and hunting, may be said to be clearly a certain acquiring power, through all their details; since not one of these makes any thing, but gets hold of some things, which are and have been, through words and deeds, and does not give up to others who attempt to get hold[8] of them.

Theæ. Truly so; for it would be proper.

Guest. Since then all arts consist either in acquiring or in making, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing?

Theæ. Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

Guest. But are there not two species of the art of acquiring? the one being an interchange between those that are willing, through the medium of gifts, wages, and purchase? but the other would be a getting hold, effected entirely either by deeds or words.

Theæ. So it appears from what has been said.

Guest. But must not the getting hold likewise receive a two-fold division?

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. The one being openly done, and wholly from a contest; but the other secretly, and consisting wholly in hunting.

[8] So Stalbaum translates χειρουμένοις.

Theæ. Yes.

[10.] *Guest.* It is likewise irrational not to give hunting a two-fold division.

Theæ. Say how.

Guest. By making one relate to a race inanimate, and the other to an animated one.

Theæ. How not? if there are both these.

Guest. How should there not be? But we may pass by (the hunting of) inanimate things as being without a name, except as regards some portions of the art of diving, and other trifling things of this kind; but call the other part, relating to the hunting of an animated race, animal-hunting.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. But is it not justly said, that of animal-hunting there is a twofold kind? one being the hunting of walking animals, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of swimming animals, and which is hunting in a liquid.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But of the swimming division, we see that one kind is winged and the other aquatic.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called bird-catching.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. But that of nearly all the aquatic, sea-fishing.

Theæ. Yes.

[11.] *Guest.* But shall we not divide this hunting into two chief parts?

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. According as the one makes for itself a catch with nets, the other by a blow.

Theæ. How say you? And how do you divide each?

Guest. Whatever by enclosing on all sides restrains any thing for the sake of an hinderance, it is reasonable to call a net.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But do you call a net of twigs, of twine, of reeds, and a casting-net, any thing else than nets?[9]

[9] On the different kind of nets Heindorf refers to Oppian iii. 81, and Pollux v. 28.

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. We must therefore say that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. But that which takes place with hooks and three-forked harpoons, by a blow,[10] and which is different from the other kind, it will be requisite for us now to call by one word, by-a-blow-hunting.[11] Or what would any one, Theætetus, say better?

Theæ. Let us disregard the name; for this is sufficient.

[12.] *Guest.* Of by-a-blow-hunting then one kind is, I think, at night effected by the light of fire; and it happens to be called the fire-kind[12] by those engaged in the hunting.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But the other kind is by day, and is effected with rods[13] and harpoons, having hooks at their extremities, and is wholly hook-fishing.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. Of hook-fishing, and by a blow, that which takes place (by darting) downwards the harpoons from on high, is I think called harpoon-fishing, on account of persons using the harpoons in that way.

Theæ. So some persons say.

Guest. There remains then only one kind, so to say.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That which is with a blow contrary to this, and effected with a hook, but not striking, as it may happen, upon any part of the body of fishes, as in the case of harpoons, but about the head and mouth of the fish caught on each occasion, and drawing it from below to the contrary up[14] by rods and

[10] The Greek word πληγῇ is correctly omitted by Ficinus.

[11] I have been compelled to coin this uncouth compound in English, "by-a-blow-hunting," to suit the Greek.

[12] Of this fishing by the aid of fire an elegant description is given by Oppian iv. 640, and something is said to be done even to this day by the fishermen in the Straits of Messina. See too Casaubon on Athen. xv. p. 700, D.

[13] Bekk. ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἄγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων. But καὶ is without meaning here. Ficinus has "in extremo virgæ cujusdam ferentes uncum, tridentibus usi."

[14] Bekk. τοὐναντίον ἄνω. But ἄνω is an explanation of τοὐναντίον, or else there is some more deeply-seated disorder.

reeds; to which fishing what name, Theætetus, shall we say ought to be given?

Theæ. [That of hook-fishing with rods];[15] and we now appear to have arrived at the end of that, which we proposed as being necessary to find out.

[13.] *Guest.* Now then, you and I have not only agreed about a name for the fishing art, but we have likewise sufficiently accepted the reason respecting the thing itself. For of the whole art, a half was in the acquiring; and of the acquiring, a half was in the getting hold; and of the getting hold, a half was in the hunting; and of the hunting, (a half) was in the animal-hunting; and of the animal-hunting, (a half) was in the hunting in a liquid; and of the hunting in a liquid, the downward division was wholly sea-fishing; and of the sea-fishing, (a half) was the fishing by a blow; and of the fishing by a blow, (a half) was by a hook; and of this (a half) was about the blow drawing from below upwards;[16] and that from the act itself (to which) the name has been made to resemble the fisherman's art, having been now discovered, is called by that appellation.

Theæ. This, then, has been shown in every respect sufficiently.

Guest. Come then, let us endeavour according to this example to discover what a sophist is.

Theæ. By all means.

[14.] *Guest.* Now this was the first search in the pattern just adduced, whether we must put down a fisherman as an untaught individual, or as possessing some art.

Theæ. It was.

Guest. And now, Theætetus, shall we put down this person as an untaught individual, or as truly a sophist in all things?[17]

[15] This answer, plainly required by the question, Taylor ventured to insert, without saying a word of its being not found in the original.

[16] Such is the literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text, which Heusde partially corrected by reading *ἀνασπώμενον* for *ἀνασπωμένην*. He probably got the idea from Ficinus, whose version is at least intelligible, and probably true to the Greek found in his MS. "Hujus denique percussio; quæ sursum versus ab inferiori parte conficitur retrahendo, et inde nomen sortita, 'retrahens,' et hamatoria piscatio dicitur." For it would be thus seen that *ἀσπαλιευτὴς* was supposed to have some affinity with *ἀνασπᾶσθαι*.

[17] Here again is a mass of rubbish, which Stalbaum vainly endeavours

Theæ. By no means as an untaught individual. For I understand what you mean,[18] that he who possesses the name, ought to be such. But we must put him down as possessing some art.

Guest. What is then the art? By the gods, are we ignorant that one of these men is a relation of the other?

Theæ. Whom of whom?

Guest. The fisherman of the sophist.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

Theæ. Of what prey is this (the hunter)? for we have spoken of the other,

Guest. We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the walking.

Theæ. We did.

Guest. And we went through such a portion as related to the swimming part of the aquatic kind? but we left the walking undivided, having said that it was multiform.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[15.] *Guest.* Thus far then the sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

Theæ. They appear so.

Guest. But they turn themselves from the animal hunting, one to the sea, and rivers, and lakes, and he catches animals in these.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But another (turns himself) to the land, and some other rivers, as if they were meadows of wealth and youth without stint, with the view of getting hold of the animals nourished in them.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. Of the hunting on foot, there are two chief parts.

Theæ. Of what kind is each?

Guest. One is the hunting of tame animals, and the other of wild.

to explain by saying that Plato is playing on the word σοφιστὴν, by which he meant not a sophist, in a bad sense, but in a good one, as being σοφόν. But such a play would in a serious inquiry be quite out of character Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "Et nunc quidem sophistam rudemne an callidum appellabimus?"

[18] By the aid of Ficinus Heindorf was enabled to restore the arrangement of the speeches, and to correct some literal errors, found in all the Greek MSS

Theæ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

Guest. If indeed man is a tame animal. But lay down in whatsoever way you like, either that no animal is tame, or that some other is tame, but that man is a wild one; or you say [19] that man indeed is a tame animal, but you think [19] that there is no hunting of men. Whichever of these suppositions you deem it agreeable to you to be stated, this do you define.

Theæ. I think, stranger, we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

[16.] *Guest.* Let us say then that tame-animal hunting is of two kinds.

Theæ. Speaking according to what manner?

Guest. By defining the hunting by robbers, and that which makes slaves, and that by tyrants, to be one and all a hunting by force.

Theæ. Very well.

Guest. But by calling that which pertains to law-courts, popular assemblies, and (private) discourse, one and all a certain single persuasive art.

Theæ. Right.

Guest. Now of this persuasive art let us say there are two kinds

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. One is private, and the other public.

Theæ. There are then these two species.

Guest. Again, with respect to private hunting, one kind is (connected with) wages, and the other with gifts.

Theæ. I do not understand.

Guest. It seems you have never given your mind to the hunting of lovers.

Theæ. Why say you so?

Guest. Because persons bestow even gifts in addition upon the caught.

Theæ. You speak most truly.

[19] After θὲς—τιθεῖς, by no process could λέγεις and ἡγεῖ be introduced, as is evident from the nonsense of a literal translation; which is generally the best test of some error in the Greek. Plato might have written λέγοις ἂν for λέγεις αὖ, and ἡγοῖο for ἡγεῖ, taken interrogatively. But I suspect that he omitted, as Ficinus does, both the verbs. Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows as usual, saw there was some difficulty here, but failed to surmount it.

Guest. Let this then be a kind of the amatory art.

Theæ. By all means.

[17.] *Guest.* But as regards that connected with wages, that part of it which keeps up an intercourse through favour, and has in every way made a bait through pleasure, and bargains for food for itself as its wages, this, I think, we should all of us call adulation, or[20] a certain pleasure-giving art.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But the other part of it, which professes to keep up an intercourse for the sake of virtue, and bargains for coin as its wages, is it not worthy to call by another name?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But with what (name)? Try to tell me.

Theæ. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found the sophist; and thus calling him, I think I should call him by a fitting name.

Guest. According to the present reasoning, it seems, Theætetus, the art of a sophist must be called [21]domestic hold-getting, [acquiring,] hunting, animal-hunting, [land-hunting], on land, [tame-animal-hunting,] man-hunting, (by-persuasion-hunting,) individual-hunting, [wages-hunting,] coin-selling, and insnaring rich and noble young men, through a false reputation for erudition, as the present reasoning now goes with us.[21]

[18.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. Let us consider further still in this way. For the

[20] Taylor had anticipated Heindorf in supplying ἢ before ἡδυντικήν.

[21]—[21] In lieu of this mass of corruption, Ficinus has what is not indeed unworthy of Plato, but what he probably made out, not so much from the text found in his MS., as from his own good sense: "Ut ex hac disputatione colligitur, constat, O Theætete, sophisticam facultatem appellandam esse artem, quæ in conciliando comparandoque versatur, animaliumque gressibilium et terrenorum domesticorumque venatio est, hominum videlicet privata captura ob nummorum mercedum et juvenum divitum atque nobilium opinione virtutis disciplinæque irretitio." With regard to the words within brackets [ ] and lunes ( ), the former have been rejected, and the latter inserted, by Schleiermacher, whom Heindorf and Stalbaum have followed. They failed, however, to perceive that in this enumeration, which is intended to be a summary of the preceding subdivisions, only such words would be introduced as had been mentioned already; and that consequently we must reject all the rest, with the exception of *νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομενη θήρα*, which evidently belong to another place; for they could not occur here for the first time, as nothing had been said on that subject previously.

object of our present search does not participate in some contemptible art, but in a very clever one. For from what has been before stated, an idea presents itself that it is not that kind of art, which we just now said, but some other kind.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Of the art of acquiring, there was a two-fold kind, one consisting in the catching, and the other in the exchanging.

Theæ. There was.

Guest. Let us say then, that of the exchanging there are two kinds, the one consisting in giving, and the other in selling.

Theæ. Let it be so said.

Guest. And again, we will say that the selling must have a two-fold division.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. [22]He who exposes his own works for sale is called a seller of his own (property); but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.[22]

Theæ. Entirely so.

[19.] *Guest.* But is not the exchange, which takes place in (the same) city, and which is nearly a half of the whole of the trade, called capelic?[23]

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And is not that which effects an exchange from one city to another, by buying and selling, (called) emporic?[23]

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And do we not perceive, in the case of the emporic,[23] that the sale of the articles by which the body and soul are nourished, and which they use (respectively), becomes barter by means of coin?

[22]—[22] Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "Qui opera sua venalia facit, propriorum venditor nominatur; qui aliena vendit, commutator." The Greek at present is, *Τὴν μὲν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην, μεταβλητικήν.* This Stephens could not understand, nor can I; even if we read, with seven MSS., *διαιρούμενοι* in lieu of *διαιρουμένην*, which Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows as usual, renders, "ex partitione orientem," a meaning that *διαιρεῖσθαι* never has nor could have. What Plato really wrote, might be elicited perhaps in part from Themistius Orat. xxiii. p. 297.

[23] I have preserved the Greek words in English letters, because we have none answering exactly to the original. Perhaps *κάπηλος* is huckster, chapman, or retail home tradesman, and *ἔμπορος*, trafficker, or wholesale foreign merchant.

Theæ. How say you this?

Guest. Of that part, which relates to the soul, we are perhaps ignorant: but the other we understand.

Theæ. We do.

Guest. [24]Let us say then as regards music in general, which is constantly purchased at one place, and, carried from city to city, is sold at another; and as regards painting, wonder-working, and other things pertaining to the soul, which are imported and sold, some for the sake of amusement, others for graver pursuits, that the person, who imports and sells them, would give a handle to be called a merchant no less than by the sale of meats and drinks.[24]

[20.] *Theæ.* You speak most true.

Guest. Will you not, then, call by the same name him who goes about from city to city to buy learning for money?

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. But of this soul-trafficking, would not one part be most justly called an exhibition; but the other part, although no less ridiculous [25] than the former,[26] still as being a selling of learning, there is a necessity to call it by a name the brother to the act.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. But in this learning-selling, the trade which relates to other arts must be called by one name, and that which relates to virtue by another.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. For as regards the others, the name "art-seller" would be fitting; but as regards this, do you consider what name to call it.

Theæ. And what other name, except that sought out now for the sophistic race, could one mention without an error?

Guest. No other. Now then let us collect it together, by saying that by a second (search), the sophistic art appeared to consist in the acquiring, exchanging, buying, trafficking,

[24]—[24] The whole of this most corrupt passage is found in the version of Ficinus in apparently an abridged and certainly altered form.

[25] Heindorf says that *τό γέλοιον* agrees with *ὄνομα* understood. To this Stalbaum objects, and would receive what Heind. rejects *γελοίῳ*—I cannot understand either, and still less the common text.

[26] By "the former" Heindorf understands "the name, *ψυχεμπορικὴ*," which he says was ridiculous, as being not a Greek word.

soul-trafficking respecting discourses, and the selling the learning of virtue.

[21.] *Theæ.* Just so.

Guest. By a third (search), I think that you will call by no other name, than (we have done) just now, the person who, being settled in a city, partly buys and partly fabricates himself learning respecting these very same subjects, and by selling determines for himself to live by such a plan.

Theæ. Why, indeed, should I not?

Guest. And that part too of the acquiring art, which consists in exchanging, purchasing, and selling in both ways, either one's own inventions, or those of others, you will ever call, as you seem, a sophistic kind, whatever may be the learning-selling respecting such things.[27]

Theæ. Necessarily so. For it is necessary to be the follower of reason.

Guest. Let us still further consider, whether the kind, which has been now pursued, is similar to some such thing as this.

Theæ. To what?

Guest. Of the art of acquiring a certain part consisted in contesting.

Theæ. It did.

Guest. It will not then be from the purpose to divide it into two.

Theæ. Say into what parts?

Guest. By laying down one part as a contest (of friends), and the other as the fight of (foes).

Theæ. It is so.

[22.] *Guest.* Of the fighting part then, when a body comes in conflict with a body, it is nearly reasonable and becoming for persons, laying down[28] a name, to pronounce it, as it were, violent.

Theæ. It may.

[27] This is the literal translation of the mass of nonsense in the text, which Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by a more elegant but less faithful version. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible, by omitting the very words in which the chief difficulty lies, and by rendering *καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικὸν*, "sive sua inventa sive aliena—vendat," a version which Heindorf and Stalbaum have thought proper to adopt rather than confess, as they should have done, their inability to understand fairly the passage.

[28] Instead of the circumlocution found in the Greek text, which it is not easy to explain grammatically, Ficinus has merely, "Pugna utique corporis ad corpus violentia congrue nuncupatur."

Guest. But in the case of reasons (coming in conflict) with reasons, what else, Theætetus, would any one call it but contention?

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. But as to contentions, we must lay down a twofold division.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. So far as (contention) takes place through prolix arguments against prolix arguments and about things just and unjust in a public matter it is judicial.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But when it takes place in a private one, and is broken to minute parts, by questions to answers,[29] are we accustomed to call it any thing else than contradiction.

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. But of contradiction, that part which respects (private) contracts is made the subject of dispute, and is carried on carelessly and without art, we must place as a separate (kind); since reason distinguishes it as being something different; but it has neither obtained an appellation from any of those of a former period, nor does it deserve to obtain one now from us.

Theæ. True, for it is divided into parts extremely small and very various.

[23.] *Guest.* But that which is according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, in the abstract, and universally about other matters, we are accustomed to call contentious.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But of the contentious, one part destroys wealth, and the other makes it.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Let us then endeavour to state by what name it is needful to call each of these.

Theæ. It is proper to do so.

Guest. I think then that the neglect of private affairs, which takes place through the delight in the practice of contention, and through the telling to the majority of listeners

[29] To avoid the ὕστερον πρότερον in the words "by questions to answers" Ficinus has "interrogando respondendoque," which makes at least an intelligible sense.

what is not heard with pleasure, may be called, according to my notion, something not different from babbling.[30]

Theæ. It is indeed called so.

Guest. But do you now in your turn endeavour to tell the contrary name of him, who makes money through private quarrels.

Theæ. Would not any one err, in calling him by any other name than that of the wonderful sophist, who, after being pursued by us, has now come again for the fourth time (in our view)?

Guest. The sophist then, as it seems, is nothing else but that money-making genus, which is a part of the arts of quarrelling, contradiction, controversy, (hostile) fighting, (friendly) contest, and acquisition, as our reasoning has pointed out.

Theæ. He is altogether so.

[24.] *Guest.* You see, then, it is truly said, that this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the left hand.

Theæ. It is necessary then (to use) both hands.

Guest. It is necessary; and we must to the utmost of our power do something of this kind, by running after its footmarks. But tell me, have we not words relating to household affairs?

Theæ. Yes, many. But about which of the many are you inquiring?

Guest. Such as when we say to pass through a cullender, to bolt through a bag, to pass through a sieve, [to separate.][31]

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And besides these, we know the words, to card (wool), to draw it down, to weave it, and ten thousand others of a like kind existing in the arts. Do we not?

Theæ. What being desirous to point out respecting them, and to bring forward as a pattern, have you made this inquiry in general terms?

[30] In his translation of this passage Ficinus has introduced the words "quæstiunculas semper aucupatur," of which there is no vestige at present in the Greek text; where to restore the syntax we must read, *περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῦ τοῖς πολλοῖς—ἀκουομένου* in lieu of—*λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς —ἀκουόμενον*.

[31] With his usual want of judgment Stalbaum defends *διακρίνειν*, which Heindorf had correctly expelled as an interpretation. For a verb descriptive of some specific act, not a general one, is required here.

Guest. All the names that have been mentioned, are in a certain respect divisive.

Theæ. They are.

Guest. According to my reasoning then we will think worthy of one name the art, which as regards them is one in them all.

[25.] *Theæ.* What name calling it?

Guest. Discriminative.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. Consider again, whether we are able to perceive two kinds of it?

Theæ. You are imposing, for a person like me, a rapid consideration.

Guest. In the discriminations mentioned above it was our business to separate the worse from the better, and the similar from the similar.

Theæ. It appears that it was nearly so said.

Guest. Of the latter (discrimination) I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

Theæ. Inform me what it is.

Guest. The whole of this discrimination, as I understand it, is called by all men a certain purification.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. Would not then every one see that the purification is in kind twofold?

Theæ. Yes, (looking at it) at leisure perhaps; but I do not see it at present.

[26.] *Guest.* It is proper then to comprehend in one name the many kinds of purifications appertaining to the body.

Theæ. What (are they)? and by what name (do you call them)?

Guest. Whatever within the bodies of living animals is, after being properly separated by the arts of exercise and of medicine, purified, and whatever the bath-art supplies, relating to things outside (the body) very vile to mention, and the things relating to inanimate bodies, of which the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, have the care in trifling matters, possess many and seemingly ridiculous names.[32]

[32] Such is the literal version of this perplexed passage, where something is evidently wanting to complete the sense. Ficinus could, I suspect, do no more than guess at the meaning of the Greek text, which he

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. Entirely so,[33] Theætetus. But the method of reasoning cares not either much or little about the art of wiping with a sponge or the drinking a medicine, whether the one benefits us little and the other much, by a purification. Since for the sake of the mind possessing something correctly,[34] (science)[35] endeavours to understand what is allied and what is not allied to all arts, and it honours all equally on this account; and does not consider that some things are more ridiculous than others as regards their similitude; nor has it held that he, who exhibits the hunting art in the character of a general, is at all more respectable than (he who does so) in that of a louse-catcher, but is for the most part more vain.[36] [27.] And now, indeed, which was what you asked, by what name shall we speak of all the powers together which are allotted for the purifying a body either animate or inanimate? But it makes no difference what name may appear to be more becoming. Let it be only separate from the purgations of the soul, and include (in itself) all such things as purify any thing else. For (the method of reasoning) has just now endeavoured to separate the intellect from the rest of things, if we understand what it means.

has thus translated:—"Purgatio animati corporis, intrinsecus operans per gymnasticam et medicinam et quæ extrinsecus balneis, quod dictu vile est mundat, item quæ inanimata corpora fullonum ministerio abstergendo colorat, et universa, ornandi corporis curatura, sigillatim varia viliaque nomina sortiuntur?

[33] Stephens saw correctly, that after Theætetus had said, "Very much so," the Guest could not subjoin, "Entirely so." And hence he suspected that something was wanting. Heindorf however, who takes every opportunity of finding fault with Stephens, attempts to support the integrity of the text by a solitary passage, which he should have seen was not in point.

[34] I have translated this passage as if the original were, τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκ' εὖ νοῦν τι, πασῶν—not ἕνεκεν νοῦν, πασῶν—For ἕνεκεν is never found in prose; nor could κτήσασθαι dispense with its object; while τι has been lost through π.

[35] I have introduced the noun, which is wanting at present, to agree with πειρωμένη. But the prosopopœia is rather violent.

[36] Here is evidently a lacuna. For some reason should be given for an assertion that admits of dispute. Respecting the meaning of χαῦνος, I have written something on Prom. 979, and I could now add a great deal more. The word answers exactly to Shakspeare's "A thing of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

Theæ. But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and separate from that respecting the body.

Guest. (You speak) in the most beautiful manner. Listen then to me in what follows, and endeavour to give a two-fold division to what has been said.

Theæ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to make a division with you.

Guest. We say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue.

[28.] *Theæ.* How not?

Guest. And that to leave the one, and to cast out as far as may be the bad, was a purification.

Theæ. It was so.

Guest. Of the soul then, as far as we can discover a taking away of depravity, we shall, in calling it a purification, speak harmoniously.

Theæ. Yes, very much so.

Guest. As regards the soul, then, we must speak of two kinds of depravity.

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. The one is like a disease in the body, but the other is like an inherent baseness.

Theæ. I do not understand.

Guest. Perhaps you have not thought that disease is the same with sedition.

Theæ. Nor, again, have I what I ought to answer to this.

Guest. Whether do you think sedition is any thing else than the difference from a natural alliance through a certain corruption.

Theæ. It is nothing else.

Guest. And is baseness any thing else than that kind of dissonance which exists[37] every where disagreeable?

Theæ. It is nothing else.

[29.] *Guest.* What then, have we not perceived in the soul of those who conduct themselves ill, opinions at variance

[37] Heindorf adopted correctly Schleiermacher's *ἐνὸν* for *ἓν ὂν*, which is however defended by Creuzer on Plotinus, *Περὶ Κάλλους*, p. 174, while Stalbaum reads *ὂν*, with four MSS. and Galen de Dogm. Hippocrat. et Platon. T. v. p. 288, ed. Bas.

with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pain, and all these with each other?

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. And yet all (these) are necessarily allied to each other.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. In calling then depravity a sedition and disease of the soul, we shall speak correctly.

Theæ. Most correctly.

Guest. But when such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, are, in attempting to reach it, carried according to each impulse beside it, and miss it, shall we say that they are affected thus through a congruity towards each other, or, on the contrary, through an incongruity?

Theæ. It is evident through an incongruity.

Guest. But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, is carried away from a (correct) perception.[38]

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. We must consider, therefore, a soul without intelligence as base and incongruous.

Theæ. So it appears.

[30.] *Guest.* It seems then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul; one, which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently its disease—

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But the other (the multitude) call ignorance; but they are unwilling to confess that it alone[39] is a vice in the soul.

Theæ. It must be readily granted, what, when you just now spoke of it, I doubted, that there are two kinds of vice in

[38] To obtain this sense, and to preserve the syntax, we must read *παραφόρου δ' ἐκ ξυνέσεως*, in lieu of *παραφόρου ξυνέσεως*.

[39] I cannot understand the words *αὐτὸ—μόνον*, which Ficinus has omitted. Stalbaum renders *μόνον* "eximie," and refers to his note on Sympos. p. 215, C. and p. 222, A. But *αὐτὸ—μόνον*, never does and never could mean any thing else but "itself—alone."

the soul; and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, injustice, all taken together as a disease in us; but we must lay down the accident of ignorance great and of various kinds as a baseness.

Guest. In the body then are there not two arts relating to these two accidents?

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. Relating to baseness, the gymnastic; but to disease, the medical.

Theæ. They seem so.

Guest. As regards insolence, injustice, and cowardice, is not the chastising [justice][40] naturally the most fitting of all arts?

Theæ. It is likely, as I may say,[41] according to human opinion.

Guest. But can any one say that there is a more proper (remedy)[42] for all ignorance than the teaching art.

Theæ. There is none.

[31.] *Guest.* Come then, must we say there is only one kind of the teaching art, or more? But take notice, that there are two greatest kinds of it.[43]

Theæ. I do take notice.

Guest. And it appears to me that we shall very quickly discover this.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. By perceiving whether ignorance has a division in the middle of it. For being twofold, it is evident that it

[40] The word *δίκη*, as remarked by Stalbaum, is evidently an interpretation of *ἡ κολαστική*, which agrees with *τέχνη* understood.

[41] Stalbaum says that *ὡς εἰπεῖν* is added to give an excuse for the modest assent in the words, *τὸ γοῦν εἰκός*. But an excuse is required, not for a modest expression, but an hyperbolical one, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 217. From whence it will be seen that *ὡς εἰπεῖν* must follow either *ξύμπασαν* in the next question of the Guest, or *οὐδεμίαν* in the next reply of Theætetus.

[42] This word Taylor introduced from the version of Ficinus—"quid aliud præter doctrinam remedium invenitur," which leads to *ἄλλην τιν' ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εὕροι τις ἴαμα ἄν;*

[43] There is evidently some error here. For after the Guest had asked whether there were one or more kinds of the teaching art, he could not immediately bid Thætetus to consider that there are two greatest kinds of it. Plato probably wrote, *ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον εἶναι ἢ, εἰ πλείω, δύο γε*—"Must we say there is only one kind, or, if more, that there are at least two kinds."

compels the teaching art to have two parts, one for each one of its own.

Theæ. What then? Has the thing sought become visible?

Guest. I seem to see set apart a great and difficult kind of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

Theæ. Of what kind is it?

Guest. When he, who does not know a thing, thinks he knows it; through which it nearly happens that all those things, in which we are deceived by the imagination, take their rise in the case of all persons.

Theæ. True.

Guest. And I think that to this (division) of ignorance alone the name of non-erudition should be given.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[32.] *Guest.* By what name then is to be mentioned that part of the teaching art which frees (a person) from this (ignorance)?

Theæ. I think, Guest, that the other part is called handicraft teaching, but that this is called here through us discipline.[44]

Guest. It is so called, Theætetus, by nearly all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division worthy a name.

Theæ. It is requisite to consider this.

Guest. It appears then to me, that this may in some way be still further divided.

Theæ. In what?

Guest. Of the teaching art relating to discourses, one way appears to be more rough, but another part of it more smooth.

Theæ. Of what kind shall we call each of these?

Guest. One, the old-fashioned, paternal, which persons formerly adopted, especially towards their children, and many use even now, when children do wrong, partly by severely re-

[44] In this passage, easy as it seems to be, there are some difficulties which none of the editors have noticed. In the first place, the words "through us" are perfectly unintelligible, and are properly omitted by Ficinus; although less dependence is to be placed on his testimony than it would otherwise deserve, as he omits "here" likewise. Secondly, as the διδασκαλία is called δημιουργική, so ought the παιδεία to have its distinguishing epithet; and lastly, to preserve the climax in "here"—and, afterwards, "nearly all the Greeks"—the name of a place should be given or alluded to.

reproving, and partly by mildly admonishing them. Now the whole of this one may call most correctly admonition.

Theæ. It is so.

[33.] *Guest.* But the other[45]—since some seem, after giving themselves to reflection, to hold that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one, who thinks himself wise, is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself skilled, and that the admonitory kind of instruction, even with great labour, effects but little.

Theæ. And they think right.

Guest. They therefore direct their course to an outlet for their opinion by another mode.

Theæ. By what mode?

Guest. They inquire into those matters, about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when he is saying nothing. They then easily examine the opinions of persons as if they were in error, and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they place them by the side of each other; and by so placing, they show that the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same premises. And they seeing[46] are indignant with themselves, and become milder towards others; and in this way are liberated from strong and harsh opinions; a liberation of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to the party suffering. [34.] For they, my dear boy, who purify these, think as physicians do with respect to the body—that the body cannot enjoy food, which is brought to it, until some one casts out the impediments in it; and in like manner the others think that the soul can derive no advantage from the learning brought to it, until some one, by confuting, places the party confuted in a state of shame, and by taking away the opinions, which are the impediments to learning, exhibits him purified, and thinking that he knows those things alone which he does know, and nothing more.

Theæ. This is the best and the most temperate of habits.

Guest. For all these reasons then, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications;

[45] After "the other," there is an interruption in the definition.

[46] After "seeing," the editors understand "this," answering to "hoc" in Ficinus.

and we must think that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, would be unpurified to the greatest degree, and become uninstructed and ugly with respect to those things, in which it is fit that he should be most pure and beautiful, who is to be in reality happy.

[35.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. But whom shall we say employ this art? For I fear to say the sophists.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. Lest we should place on them a greater honour than is fitting.

Theæ. But yet what has been just now said appears to be suited to some such character.

Guest. So does a wolf (resemble) a dog, a most savage animal one the most mild. But he who wishes to be most of all free from stumbling, ought to keep ever a guard on similitudes; for it is a most slippery race. Let them however stand, for I think there will not be a dispute about trifling definitions, at a time when persons are watching them sufficiently.

Theæ. It is not likely at least.

Guest. Let then there be of the separating art one portion, the purifying; of the purifying, let the part relating to the soul be divided off; and of this let (a part) be the teaching art; and of the teaching art, let instruction (be a part); and of instruction, let that confutation, which takes place respecting a vain opinion of wisdom, be called, through the reason now exhibited, nothing else than the sophistic art of a noble race.

[36.] *Theæ.* Let it be so called. But in consequence of so many things having just now presented themselves, I am doubtful what, as speaking the truth and urging it strenuously, I ought to say the sophist really is.

Guest. You are very properly in doubt. And indeed one ought to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt by what means he shall slip through the argument. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all (traps). Now therefore let us attack him with all our might.

Theæ. You speak well.

Guest. But, in the first place, let us stand and as it were take breath; and while stopping let us reason among ourselves.

Come then, in how many forms has the sophist appeared? For I think, he was found at first a hunter for wages of the youthful and rich.

Theæ. He was.

Guest. Secondly, a certain trafficker in the learning of the soul.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Thirdly, did he not appear as a chapman in the very same articles?

Theæ. He did. And fourthly, he was the seller of his own inventions.

Guest. You have properly reminded me of this; and of the fifth (form) I will endeavour to remind you. For he was a combatant in the contests of words, having been (so) defined from the art of contention.[47]

[37.] *Theæ.* He was so.

Guest. The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but nevertheless we laid it down and conceded to him,[48] that a sophist is a purifier, as regards the soul, of such opinions as are an impediment to learning.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Do you then perceive, that, when any one seems to know many things, and is called by the name of one art, this it is not a healthful seeming; but that he, who is thus affected with respect to any art, evidently cannot see that part of it to which all this learning tends? and hence he[49] calls the person possessing them by many names, instead of one.

Theæ. This almost appears to be very natural.

[47] In the Greek words, *τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος*, Heindorf not only gives to the perf. pass. an active syntax, but takes it in a middle sense, by rendering *ἀφωρισμένος* "sibi seorsim assumpsit." So too does Stalbaum. But neither of them have been able to produce a single passage in support of their views. I have followed Taylor, conceiving *κατὰ* to be understood. Ficinus has most loosely, "artificiosus nimium litigator."

[48] So Stalbaum translates *αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες*. But *αὐτῷ* has no meaning here. Ficinus has "in præsentia," which leads to *τέως*, a purely Attic word for "previously," as shown by Suidas.

[49] Fischer says, the nominative to *προσαγορεύει* is *ὁ πάσχων*. But it is not the person who is so circumstanced that gives the name, but something else. There is an error here which it would not be difficult, perhaps, to correct.

Guest. Let us not then suffer the same[50] thing in this search through indolence; but let us in the first place take up again one of the things stated of the sophist; for one of them appeared to me especially to indicate him.

Theæ. Which of them?

Guest. We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

Theæ. We did.

Guest. And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

Theæ. How not?

[38.] *Guest.* Let us then consider about what such persons say they make contradictions. And let our consideration be from the beginning in this way. With respect to divine things, which are non-apparent to the many, do sophists make them able to do this, (viz. to contradict)?

Theæ. This is indeed asserted of them.

Guest. But with respect to the apparent things of earth and heaven, and what pertains to these?

Theæ. Why not?

Guest. In private meetings at least, when any thing is asserted of generation and existence in general, we are conscious that the sophists are powerful in contradicting, and that they make others as powerful as themselves.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But with respect to laws, and all political matters, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

Theæ. Not one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

Guest. But writings relating to all the arts, and to each art singly, are made public and deposited by him, who wishes to learn what he ought to say against each handicraftsman.

Theæ. You appear to me to speak of the writings of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts.

Guest. And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But does not the art of contradicting seem to be a power sufficient for controversy about all things, (to speak) summarily?

Theæ. It appears that scarcely not a thing would be wanting.

[50] Instead of γε *αὐτὸ*, Ficinus found in his MS. γε *ταὐτὸ*, as is evident from his version, "Ne—nobis idem—contingat."

[39.] *Guest.* But by the gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men see more acutely, but we more dully, this thing.

Theæ. What thing? and at what are you particularly talking? For I do not understand at all the present question.

Guest. (Consider,) if it be possible for any one man to know all things.

Theæ. If it were possible our race, O guest, would indeed be blessed.

Guest. How then can any one without knowledge himself be able to urge any thing sound against him who possesses knowledge?

Theæ. Not at all.

Guest. What then would be the wonder in the sophistic power?

Theæ. About what?

Guest. The manner by which sophists are able to get up an opinion amongst the young, that they are the wisest of all men in all things. For it is evident that, if they neither contradicted rightly, nor appeared to the young to do so, and, when appearing to do so, unless they seemed to be more wise through their contentions, no one would, as far as your business is concerned, even at leisure,[51] give them money, or be willing to become their scholar.

Theæ. Not even at leisure indeed.

Guest. But now persons are willing.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. For the sophists appear I think to have a knowledge themselves of that against which they speak.

Theæ. How should they not?

Guest. But do they act so in all things? Say we it?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. They appear, then, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But not being so in reality; for this appeared to be impossible.

Theæ. For how is it not impossible?

[51] On the use of the word σχολῇ see the commentators on Soph. Œd. T. 434.

Guest. The sophist, then, has been shown to us to possess a certain kind of a reputation for knowledge about all things, but not according to the truth.

Theæ. Entirely so. And what has been now said respecting sophists seems very nearly to be most rightly said.

[40.] *Guest.* Let us therefore take a clearer pattern respecting them.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. This. But endeavour to answer by giving your mind very closely to what I am saying.

Theæ. Of what kind is the pattern?

Guest. As if any one should say, that he knows not (the art of) asserting and contradicting, but of making and causing all things by one art.

Theæ. How said you all?

Guest. Of the commencement of the discourse you are straightway ignorant; for, as it seems, you do not understand the "all."

Theæ. I do not.

Guest. I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, there are other animals and trees.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. If any one should assert that he would make you and me, and all the rest of productions—

Theæ. Of what making do you speak? For you are not speaking of a husbandman; because you mentioned him as a maker of animals.

Guest. I say, moreover, that he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the gods, and all other things; and rapidly making each of these, he sells them for a small sum.

Theæ. You are speaking in jest.

Guest. What! must we not consider that as a jest, when a man asserts that he knows all things, and can teach another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

Theæ. Entirely so.

[41.] *Guest.* But have you any kind of jesting more artificial or agreeable than the imitative?

Theæ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very large kind, and comprehended all things in one, and that one nearly the most varied.

Guest. Do we not then know that he who undertakes to

be able to make all things by one art, will, by fabricating imitations and homonyms[52] of things, through the art of painting, be able, by showing the pictures at a distance, to lie concealed from the stupid amongst young men (and) boys, as being a person most competent to do whatever he pleased?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. [53] But as to discourses, do we not expect that there is such another art? or is it not possible to bewitch the young men, and those still standing far off from the truth of things, through words (spoken) in their ears, and by showing them images, as they are called, of every thing, so as to cause them to be said to seem true, and for the speaker to be the wisest of all men in all things?[53]

[42.] *Theæ.* Why should there not be another such art?

Guest. Is it not then necessary, Theætetus, that the majority of those, who were then hearing, should, after a sufficient time has passed and they have themselves arrived at manhood, come near to things as they are, and be compelled through accidental circumstances to handle realities clearly, and to change their former opinions, so that things (once) great appear small, those (once) difficult, easy, and all the mere appearances produced by discourses, are entirely overthrown through works which occur in practice?

Theæ. It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging; for I think that I too am one of those who are far distant (from the truth).

Guest. All we then, who are present, will endeavour, and let us now endeavour,[54] free from all accidental circumstances,

[52] What can be the meaning of *ὁμώνυμα*, I confess my inability to explain. Ficinus has "picturam fingentem equivoca simulacra," which is equally unintelligible. The commentators, according to custom, are silent. Perhaps Plato wrote, what the train of thought evidently requires, *ὁμοιώματα*, "likenesses."

[53]—[53] In the place of this mass of nonsense, it will be sufficient to give the English reader a translation of what it were easy to show Plato did actually write: "But as regards discourses, may we not expect that there is such another art, by which it is possible for a person to lie concealed from simpletons and those standing still further off from the truth of things, and to bewitch them by words (spoken) in their ears, while he is showing the images of things, so as to cause what is spoken to seem to be true, and the speaker on all subjects to be talked of as the wisest of all men upon all points?"

[54] Here is evidently some error, which it would require no great talent to correct.

to bring you as near as possible (to the truth). With respect to a sophist then tell me this. Is it clear, that he is one of enchanters, as being an imitator of things? or do we yet doubt, whether in the matters, respecting which he appears able to contradict, he possesses in reality the requisite science?

Theæ. But how, Guest, can we (doubt of this)? For it is nearly evident from what has been said, that he is one of those who take a part in jesting.

Guest. We must put him down then as some enchanter and mimic.

[43.] *Theæ.* How must we not so put him?

Guest. Come then, it is now our business not to let go the wild beast, for we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a casting net, one of the instruments used in discourses about things of this kind,[55] so that he cannot any longer escape from this.

Theæ. From what?

Guest. That he is one of the wonder-workers.

Theæ. This also is my opinion respecting him.

Guest. It is decreed then, that we divide as quickly as possible the image-producing art, and, going down against it, seize upon the sophist, should he forthwith[56] wait for us, according to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to him (the king). But if he creeps into the parts of the imitative art, we are to follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, until he is caught. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever boast to escape the method of those, who are able to follow thus the points singly and universally.

Theæ. You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

[55] All the edd. have, *ἐν' ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων*, which is evidently an explanation of a lost technical word. Ficinus translates, "veluti funda quadam irretitum, ratiocinando comprehendimus," as if he had found in his MS., *ὥσπερ σφενδόνῃ, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*. But no person could be said to enclose an animal with a sling. Plato wrote, I suspect, *περιειλήφαμεν νεφέλῃ*. For such was the name of a kind of net, as we learn from Aristoph. Ὄρν. 194, *Μὰ γῆν, μὰ παγίδας, μὰ νεφέλας, μα δίκτυα*.

[56] This "forthwith" has no meaning here. In lieu of *εὐθὺς*, Plato evidently wrote *οἷα θὼς*, similar to *θῆρα* a little above. The *θὼς*, says Hesychius, was a hybrid animal, the produce of a wolf and hyæna. The word has been corrupted elsewhere, as I have shown on Euripid. Tro. 602, and Soph. Phil. 760, and I could now add many more passages.

[44.] *Guest.* According to the preceding method of division, I now seem to see two kinds of the imitative art; but in which of these happens to be the idea of which we are in search, I do not now seem to be able to perceive.

Theæ. But first tell me, and divide the two kinds of which you are speaking.

Guest. I see that one is the assimilative art. And this especially takes place, when any one according to the proportions of the original, in length, breadth, and depth, and moreover by adding fitting colours, works out the production of an imitation.

Theæ. What then, do not all imitators endeavour to do this?

Guest. Not such as mould or paint any great work. For, if they would give the true proportion of beautiful things, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fitting, and the lower parts larger, through the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter close at hand.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[45.] *Guest.* Do not then the artists, bidding farewell to truth, now work out not real proportions, but such as will seem to be beautiful in their representations?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Is it not then just, as being at least probable,[57] to call one an image?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And we must call the part of the imitative art, subsequent to this, as we said above, assimilative.

Theæ. We must so call it.

Guest. But what shall we call that, which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, [58]through the view taken from a favourable point,[58] but which, (when seen by him[59]) who has the power to look on such things sufficiently,[60] is not like that to which it professes to be like? Must we not (call it) an appearance, since it appears to be, but is not like?

[57] I confess I do not understand the words εἰκός γε ὄν.

[58-58] These words were omitted by Taylor, because he did not know what to make of the version of Ficinus, "ex eo quod haud pulchrum respiciat," who found in his MS. the οὐκ before ἐκ καλοῦ, which three MSS. omit, as Schleiermacher conjectured.

[59] The words within the lunes were properly added by Taylor to complete the sense.

[60] This "sufficiently" is scarcely intelligible.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. Is not this part to be found abundantly in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But may we not most correctly call that art, which produces an appearance, but not an image, phantastic?

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. Now I have already said that these were the two kinds of the image-producing art, the assimilative and phantastic.

Theæ. Correctly so.

[46.] *Guest.* But that of which I doubted then, viz. in which of these kinds we must put the sophist, I am not at all able even now to see clearly. For the man is truly wonderful; and it is extremely difficult to get a view of him; since even now, very well and cleverly, he has fled into a species, where it is hard to track him out.

Theæ. So it seems.

Guest. Do you then assent to this through understanding it? or has a certain rush of reasoning carried you away to giving a rapid assent according to custom?[61]

Theæ. How and for what do you say this?

Guest. We are, O blessed man, truly engaged in a speculation thoroughly difficult. For that this thing should appear both to seem to be, and yet not be; and that a man should assert certain things, and yet not true,—all these things (were) always full of difficulty formerly, and are now. For he, who thus[62] speaks, must either say or think that false things truly exist; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to be hampered by a self-contradiction.

[47.] *Theæ.* Why so?

Guest. (Because) such a mode of speaking dares to suggest that a nonentity exists; for otherwise there would not be a falsehood, which exists. And the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, did from the first to the last testify to this. For, both in prose and verse, he on every occasion

[61] But so far was Theætetus from being accustomed to give a rapid assent, that he previously complained of the Stranger being too fast for a man so slow. Hence we must insert *οὐ* between *λόγον* and *συνειθισμένον*.

[62] Had Heindorf seen Taylor's translation, he would perhaps have suggested *οὕτως*, and have thus obviated all the difficulty now found in *ὅπως*.

thus speaks, "You must not (think)," says he, "non-entities exist; but keep thy thoughts when searching from this road." This then is both testified by him, and this discourse will the most of all point it out, if examined with moderation. Let us then, if it makes no difference to you, consider this in the first place.

Theæ. Put my business where you like. But in what way the discourse will best proceed, do you consider yourself, and lead me along in that path.

Guest. It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then. Dare we pronounce that which in no respect is?

Theæ. How not?

[48.] *Guest.* If then, not for the sake of contention nor of jesting, but in seriousness, it were necessary for any of the hearers to join with us in considering and stating to what point one ought to carry the word "non-entity," for what thing and of what kind do we think he would be able[63] to use it himself, and to show (its use) to a person inquiring?

Theæ. You ask a difficult question, and to a person like myself utterly insurmountable.

Guest. This however is evident, that to any one of entities the expression of non-entity cannot be referred.

Theæ. For how could it?

Guest. Since then it cannot be referred to an entity, one cannot rightly refer it to any thing.

Theæ. How could he?

Guest. And this too is evident to us, that we pronounce on each occasion this word "something" respecting an entity. For it is impossible to pronounce it alone, as if it were naked and placed in a desert from all entities.

Theæ. It is impossible.

Guest. Thus considering, do you then agree with me, that he who pronounces the word "something," must necessarily mean some one thing?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. For you will say, that the word "something" is a sign of one thing, and that "somethings" is a sign of many things.

[63] Stalbaum omits ἔχειν and admits τι with MSS. which he considers the best; but which here and elsewhere frequently offer the worst readings.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that, which is not something, must speak entirely of nothing.

Theæ. This is most necessary.

Guest. Is not then this to be granted, that such a person speaks indeed, but speaks of nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks, who endeavours to enunciate non-entity?[64]

Theæ. The discourse would have then an end of doubt.

[49.] *Guest.* Do not as yet speak any big word. For, O blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remain as regards these things: for it happens to be about the very commencement of it (the discourse).

Theæ. How say you? Speak, and do not hesitate.

Guest. To that, which is, something else may be added of things that are.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But to that, which is not, shall we say that something can be added of things that are?

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Now we place number universally among things that are.

Theæ. If indeed any thing else is to be placed as a thing that is.

Guest. Let us then not attempt to attribute "the many," nor "the one," to a non-entity.

Theæ. We cannot it seems[65] with propriety attempt it, as reason says.

Guest. How then can any one enunciate by the mouth, or comprehend at all by intellect, non-entities, or a non-entity, apart from number?

Theæ. Tell me why not.

Guest. When we speak of non-entities, do we not endeavour to add "the many" of number?

[64] I confess my inability to see what the speaker is aiming at. Ficinus too seems to have been equally in the dark. For he thus renders the whole passage: "*Ho.* Neque id concedendum hominem talem dicere quidem aliquid, sed non unum quid, id est nihil dicere. *The.* Atqui neque loqui dicendus est ille, qui conatur non-ens proferre. Unde sermo extremum dubitationis haberet."

[65] The words ὡς ἔοικεν are correctly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently superfluous on account of ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And (when we speak of) a non-entity, (do we) not (endeavour to adjoin) "the one" (of number)?

Theæ. Yes, most clearly.

Guest. And yet we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavour to add an entity to a non-entity.

Theæ. You speak most truly.

Guest. You perceive then, that it is not possible correctly to enunciate, or speak of, or think of, a non-entity itself by itself; but that it is incomprehensible, unspeakable, unpronounceable, and irrational?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Did I, then, just now speak falsely, when I said, that I would tell of the greatest doubt respecting it?

Theæ. What then, can we mention any (doubt) greater than this?

Guest. Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-entity leads him, who confutes it, into such a perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it, he is compelled to contradict himself?

Theæ. How say you? Speak yet clearer.

Guest. For me there is no occasion to consider any thing clearer. For, when I laid down the proposition, that non-entity ought to participate neither of "the one," nor of "the many," both a little before and now, I said "the one" abstractedly. For I was speaking of a non-entity; you perceived this?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And again, a little before, I said that a non-entity was unspeakable, ineffable, and irrational. Do you follow me?

Theæ. I do follow in a certain way.

Guest. When, therefore, I endeavoured to fit entity (to non-entity), did I not say what is contrary to former (assertions)?

Theæ. You appear so.

Guest. What then, did I not, when attributing this to it, speak to it[66] as to one thing?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And yet, while calling it irrational, ineffable, and unspeakable, did I not make the assertion as pertaining to one thing?

[66] So Stalbaum from many MSS., which I cannot understand. Heindorf would read οὐχ ὡς ἓν ὂν, in lieu of ὡς ἓν.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. For we say, that if any one correctly speaks of non-entity, he ought to define it neither as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever; for it would be called already one thing, according to this appellation.[67]

[51.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. What then will some one say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me overthrown respecting the proof of a non-entity. So that, as I have already said, let us not think, in my speaking at least, of logical precision respecting a non-entity. But come, let us now consider this affair in your speaking.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. Come, endeavour in a becoming and noble manner, as being a young man, and exerting yourself with all your might, pronounce something about non-entity, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either existence, or the one or the many of number.

Theæ. The readiness of my attempt would be vastly absurd, were I, after seeing you suffer thus, to make it.

Guest. But, if it seems good, let us dismiss both you and myself with a farewell; and until we meet with some one who is able to do this, let us say that the sophist has, with a knavery greater than all, let himself down into a place from which there is no outlet.

[52.] *Theæ.* So indeed it appears.

Guest. If then we should say that he possessed a certain fancy-effecting art, he would, from his use of words, easily lay hold of us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary point. For when we call him a maker of images, he will immediately ask us, What do we assert an image to be universally. It is meet then, Theætetus, to consider what answer to this question should one give to the young man.

Theæ. It is evident that we shall say that things seen in water and mirrors are images, and moreover such things as are painted and fashioned and the rest of other things of this kind.

Guest. It is evident, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

Theæ. Why so?

[67] This is the translation of Stalbaum's text after a correction by Heindorf. I cannot understand it.

Guest. He will appear to you to wink, or to have no eyes at all.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. When you give him this answer,[68] should you speak of any thing (seen) in mirrors or mouldings, he will laugh at your reasons; when you speak to him as being able to see, he will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors, or water or of sight at all, but will ask you of that, which depends on reason alone.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That, which in all those things you have mentioned, you, speaking of as many, think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image as being in them all one thing. Speak then and defend yourself, and yield nothing to the man.

[53.] *Theæ.* What then, O guest, can we say an image is, except that it is made to resemble the truth, being another thing the counterpart?

Guest. Do you say that such other thing is truly so, or to what do you apply the expression, such other?

Theæ. It is by no means truly a such other, but only seems to be.

Guest. Do you then call a truth a real entity?

Theæ. I do.

Guest. But is not that, which is not true, contrary to truth?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. [69] You say then that the seeming is not an entity, if you assert that it is not a truth. It is however an entity.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Do you not say then truly?

Theæ. Certainly not, except a likeness in reality.

[68] Taylor, translating, as usual, from the Latin instead of the Greek, left out the words, "When you give him this answer," omitted by Ficinus; nor did even Heindorf perceive that they ought to commence the preceding speech of the Guest; and though he was offended at the double protasis, he did not see that Plato wrote Ὅταν μὲν ἐν κατόπτροις ——Ὅταν δ' ὡς βλέποντι—

[69]—[69] I cannot understand either this text, given by Stalbaum, or the corrections proposed by Schleiermacher and Heindorf. Ficinus has, "*Ho.* Si ergo id, quod simile vocas, verum esse negas, ens quoque existere negas; est tamen. *The.* Quo pacto? *Ho.* Esse quidem, sed vere esse non fateris? *The.* Certe non verum ens, sed imaginem veram. *Ho.* Ergo non vere et ens id, quod vere esse imaginem dicimus; et non vere ens est vere"

Guest. That then which is not really a non-entity, is really that which we call a likeness.[69]

Theæ. It nearly appears that non-entity is entwined by a certain connexion of this kind with entity; and it is very strange.

Guest. How is it possible it should not be strange? You now therefore perceive that through this alternation, the many-headed sophist compels us unwillingly to confess that non-entity does somehow exist.

Theæ. I see it, and very much so.

[54.] *Guest.* How, then, shall we define his art, and yet be able to be consistent with ourselves?

Theæ. Why do you speak thus, and of what are you afraid?

Guest. When we say that he is a deceiver about an appearance, and that his is a certain deceptive art, whether shall we say that our soul then has a false opinion, through his art? or what shall we say?

Theæ. This very thing. For what else can we say?

Guest. But will false opinion be fancying things contrary to those that are?

Theæ. Contrary.

Guest. You say then that false opinion fancies things that are not.

Theæ. It does so of necessity.

Guest. Whether does it fancy that non-entities do not exist, or that non-entities do exist in a certain way?

Theæ. If any one is ever deceived even a little, he must (fancy)[70] that non-entities do exist in a certain way.

Guest. And will not entities entirely be likewise fancied not to exist at all?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And this too falsely?

Theæ. Yes, this too.

Guest. And false reasoning will, I think, be deemed, in the same way, to assert that entities do not exist, and non-entities do exist.

[55]. *Theæ.* For how can it otherwise become such (viz. false)?

[70] Ficinus has, "Si quis unquam quoquomodo opinando mentitur necesse est ut, quæ non sunt, esse quodammodo judicet"—as if he had found in his MS. δεῖ δοξάζειν instead of δεῖ γε.

Guest. Nearly not at all. But the sophist will not say so. Or what device is there for any one of a sound mind to concede; when [71]the things that have been granted before these[71] have been admitted to be unspeakable, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible? Do we understand what (the sophist) says, Theætetus?

Theæ. How is it possible we should not? For he will assert that we are saying things contrary to the present, in having dared to assert that falsehoods exist in opinions and reasons;[72] for that having been often compelled to unite entity to non-entity, we have just now acknowledged, that this is somehow the most impossible of all things.

Guest. You have rightly recalled (me to the argument). But it is now time to consult about what we ought to do respecting the sophist. For, if we should attempt to search him out, by placing him in the art of falsehood-workers and enchanters, you see that his counter-graspings will be easy and (our) difficulties many.

Theæ. Very.

Guest. We have then gone through only a small part of them; since they are, as I may say, boundless.

Theæ. If such is the case, it would be impossible, it seems, to catch the sophist.

[56.] *Guest.* What then, shall we now stand cowardly aloof?

Theæ. I say we ought not, if we are able by ever so little to lay hold in some way of the man.

Guest. You will then grant me pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we can draw by some means even a little for ourselves out of such powerful reasoning.

Theæ. How shall I not?

Guest. This too I beg of you still further.

Theæ. What?

Guest. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a parricide.

Theæ. Why so?

[71]—[71] These words Heindorf fancied to be elegantly introduced by Plato, to avoid the repetition of *τὰ μὴ ὄντα*.

[72] Ficinus has "cum nunc non ens in opinione et locutione ponamus," as if his MS. omitted *ψευδῆ* and read *ὡς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂν*—instead of *ὡς ἔστιν*.

Guest. Because it will be necessary for us, in self-defence, to put to the torture the reasoning of my father Parmenides, and to compel a nonentity to exist in some way, and again an entity in some way not to exist.

Theæ. It appears that we must battle in our reasonings for a thing of this kind.

Guest. For how should this not be evident, as it is said, even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted nor confessed, any one will be able to speak at leisure about false assertions, or opinions respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous through his being compelled to contradict himself.

Theæ. Most true.

Guest. Hence we must dare to oppose my father's reasoning, or we must dismiss it altogether, if any sluggishness restrains us from doing so (viz. opposing it).

Theæ. But let nothing by any means restrain us.

Guest. I will now beg of you still a third and trifling request.

Theæ. Only mention it.

Guest. I just now stated that I was always faint-hearted about the confutation of these points, and so I am now.

Theæ. You did say so.

Guest. I fear as regards what has been said, lest I seem to you to be insane, through my changing myself on the instant, up and down. For we will throw ourselves on the confutation of the reasoning, for your sake, if indeed we happen to confute it.

Theæ. As you will not then by any means appear to me to act improperly by advancing to the confutation and demonstration, on this account at least advance boldly.

Guest. Come then, what beginning shall we make to this very danger-bringing discourse? Now it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to turn to this road.

[58.] *Theæ.* What?

Guest. [73] To consider first those things which now seem to be clear, lest we become flurried about them; and that we without difficulty assent to each other, as if we were in a position to judge correctly.[73]

[73]—[73] In the whole of this passage Taylor merely put into English the Latin version of Ficinus, which differs so widely from the Greek, as to

Theæ. State more clearly what you mean.

Guest. Both Parmenides and whoever else has rushed forward to the trial respecting the defining the quantity and quality of entities, seems to me to have discussed the question loosely.[74]

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Each seem to me to have told a tale to us, as if we were boys. One of them said that the entities are three;[75] but that some of them at one time are at war with each other in some manner; and at another, becoming friends, are married, bring forth, and furnish food to their offspring. But another[76] said that the entities are only two, the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he unites in one house and gives them (in marriage) to each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Xenophanes, and from others still prior to him, details in fables that what is called the all is really one. But the Ionian,[77] and subsequently some Sicilian[78] muses have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that entity is both many and one, but held together by enmity and friendship. For that, which is separated, always comes together, say the

make one believe, that he supplied from his own head what was either wanting entirely, or only partially legible, in the MS. he had before him.

[74] So Heindorf understands *εὐκόλως*, which is literally, "of easy temper." But no philosopher would reason loosely. He might argue in a circle. Hence Plato wrote, perhaps, *ἐγκυκλίως*.

[75] Of the ancient philosophers, some said that the first principles were three in number, the hot and the cold as extremes, but the moist as the medium; which sometimes conciliated the extremes, and sometimes not; but they did not place the dry in the rank of a principle at all, because they thought it subsisted either from the absence or evaporation of moisture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras asserted that there were four elements, heat and cold being the active powers, and dryness and moisture the passive. Heraclitus and Empedocles asserted that the matter of the universe was one, but its qualities many; with which the matter sometimes agreed, and at others disagreed. Heraclitus, however, conceived that the particles of the world were, through some discordant concord, always similar, though not the same; for all things were in a continual flux. But Empedocles asserted that the substance of the world remained the same; and that at one time all things were separated into chaos through discord, and in another were out of chaos reunited through concord. T.

[76] This was Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras. See Heindorf.

[77] This alludes to Heraclitus of Ephesus.

[78] This refers to Empedocles of Agrigentum.

more energetic[79] of the Muses. But the more gentle[79] relax[79] (the doctrine by saying)[80] that this takes place always as regards (the whole),[80] but that the whole is in turn now one, and friendly (to itself),[80] through Venus; and now many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. [59.] But whether any one has asserted all this truly or not,[81] it is difficult and wrong to bring so great a reproach upon illustrious and ancient men.[81] This, however, I may without envy show forth.

Theæ. What?

Guest. That they greatly looked down upon, and held in little esteem, us the many. For each of them finish their own work, without caring at all whether we follow them when speaking, or desert them.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. When any one of them asserts in his speech that—many, or one or two, exist, or have been, or are in the course of production, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, (and) elsewhere lays down somehow discretions and concretions,—by the gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they are on each occasion asserting? Indeed, when I was younger, I thought that when any one spoke of a non-entity I accurately understood that, which is now doubtful; but now you see where we are in a difficulty respecting it.

Theæ. I do see.

[60.] *Guest.* Perhaps then, receiving in no less a degree the same feeling in our soul respecting an entity, we say we can easily understand it, when it is enunciated by any one; but not so, as regards the other, though similarly affected with respect to both.

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. And let this very same thing be said by us respecting the other things before mentioned.

[79] In the words *συντονώτεραι*, *μαλακωτεραι*, and *ἐχάλασαν* there is, as Boeckh was the first to remark, an allusion to musical terms; which would now be called—"forte," "piano," and "the letting down a string" to effect a sharp into a flat.

[80] The words within lunes have been inserted to complete the sense.

[81]—[81] The whole of this passage is in the original a mass of corruption; which I could easily correct. The sense evidently required is something to this effect—But whether any one has asserted all this truly or not, it is difficult to say; and it would be improper for me at least, if for any one to bring a great reproach upon men of celebrity and of the olden time.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. We will speculate then, after this, about the many things, if it seems good; but let us now speculate about the greatest and first leading thing.

Theæ. Of what are you speaking? Or is it plain that you assert that we ought in the first place to search after entity, and (see) what they, who speak of it, think they show.

Guest. You understand me, Theætetus, on the instant. For I say that we ought to adopt the same method, as if we were inquiring of them here present in this way. Come, ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things, are the whole, what is it you affirm to subsist in both of these, when you say that both and each exist? What are we to understand by this term of yours "to exist"? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to lay down three things as the whole, and no longer two things, according to you? For, while you call one of the two an entity, you cannot surely say that both are similarly an entity. For in both ways there would nearly be one thing, and not two.

Theæ. You speak the truth.

Guest. Are you then willing to call both of them an entity?

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. But, O friends, we shall say, you would thus most clearly call even the two things one.

Theæ. You speak most correctly.

[61.] *Guest.* Since then we are thus in doubt, do you sufficiently explain to us what you wish to signify, when you pronounce (the word) entity? For it is evident that you are conversant with these things long ago; and we formerly thought (we knew them), but now we are in doubt. Instruct us then, first in this very thing, that we may not fancy we understand what is asserted by you, when what is entirely contrary to this is taking place. In speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that the all is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, do any wrong?

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But ought we not to inquire, to the utmost of our power, of those who assert that the all is one, what they call entity?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. To this question then let them answer, Do you assert there is one thing alone? They will say, We do assert it. Will they not?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. What then, do you call entity a thing?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. Do you say, it is that which the one is, employing two names respecting the same thing? or how?

[62.] *Theæ.* What answer will they have after this, O stranger?

Guest. It is evident, Theætetus, that to him who lays down this hypothesis, it will not be the easiest thing of all to give an answer respecting the present question, or any other whatever.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. To acknowledge that there are two names, while laying down that there is not but one thing, is surely ridiculous.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And to receive (the assertion) altogether from him, who says that a name is a thing possessing no value—[82]

Theæ. In what manner?

Guest. He who lays down a name as different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

Theæ. He does.

Guest. And yet, if he lays down that the name is the same with the thing, he will be compelled to say, it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it will result that a name is only the name of a name, but of nothing else.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And the one must be one entity alone of one, and not[83] itself the entity of a name.

[82] To complete the sentence, Ficinus adds, "temerarium," i. e. it is rash; who omits, however, the words, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον, in which all the difficulty lies. Taylor translates, "of which no account can be given." Stephens, "rationi consentaneum haud fuerit," and reads ἔχοι. Heindorf and Stalbaum retain ἔχον; but they do not condescend to tell us how they understand the words.

[83] This is the emendation of Ast and Stalbaum, who read καὶ οὐ τοῦ ὀνόματος, in lieu of καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος in some MSS., and καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος in others.

Theæ. It is necessary.

Guest. But do they say that the whole is different from the one entity, or the same with it?

[63.] *Theæ.* How will they not say it, and do say it?[84]

Guest. If, then, a whole is, as Parmenides says, "Like the bulk of a sphere that is a perfect circle on all sides, and possessing equal powers on every part from the middle;[85] for there must needs be nothing greater or less on this side or on that;" it is necessary for entity, being of such a kind, to have a middle and extremities; and having these, there is every necessity for it to have parts. Or how shall we say?

Theæ. Just so.

Guest. But nothing prevents the divided from having in all its parts the accident of the one; and in this way every entity and a whole would be one.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But is it not impossible that what suffers such accidents should itself be the very one?

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Surely according to right reason, that, which is truly the one, must be said to be entirely without parts.

Theæ. It must indeed.

Guest. But such a thing as consists of many parts would not harmonize with the one.[86]

Theæ. I understand you.

Guest. But whether will entity, having the accident of the one, be thus one, and whole? or must we by no means say that entity is a whole?

Theæ. You have proposed a difficult choice.

[84] Here is some error. To a double question there could not be a single answer. Ficinus has "Cur non dixerint? Dicunt enim."

[85] Ficinus, perceiving doubtless that the definition given by Parmenides of a sphere was geometrically incorrect, added, I suspect, out of his own head, between "a medio," and "penitus æque distans," the words "ad circumferentiam." Had he been still living, I would have told him what, I suspect, the philosophic poet did really write. As it is, I will leave the truth to be discovered by future geometers and Greek scholars united.

[86] So Taylor translated, it would seem, from finding that the Greek τῷ ὅλῳ (or τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ in some MSS., or τῷ λόγῳ ὅλῳ in others) was at variance with the chain of reasoning. Heindorf indeed asserts that τῷ λόγῳ is to be referred to τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, mentioned just before. But in that case ὀρθῷ would not have been omitted here. Perhaps Plato wrote τῷ ἐνί γε ὅλῳ.

Guest. You speak however most truly. For entity having the accident to be in some way one, it does not appear to be the same as the one; and the all will be more than one. Is it not so?

Theæ. Yes.

[64.] *Guest.* But yet if entity is not a whole, on accoun. of its being subject to the accident belonging[87] to the whole, and yet is the whole itself, it follows that entity is in want of itself.[88]

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. And entity, according to this reasoning, being deprived of itself, will be a non-entity.

Theæ. Just so.

Guest. And thus again the all becomes more than one; since both entity and the whole have obtained each their proper nature, apart from the other.

Theæ. True.

Guest. And if the whole has not an existence at all, the very same things will take place with respect to entity; and in addition to its not having an existence, it would at no time have been produced.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. Whatever is produced is always produced as a whole. So that he, who does not place amongst entities [the one or][89] the whole, ought to speak neither of existence or production as an entity.

Theæ. It appears that such is wholly the case.

Guest. Moreover, that, which is not a whole, must not have the accident of any quantity whatever. For, while it has the accident of quantity, whatever that may be, it must necessarily be a whole.

[65.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. Each (view) then will appear to have taken up ten thousand other endless doubts for him, who says that entity is either two or only one.

Theæ. The light which is just now breaking almost shows

[87] This is the only intelligible rendering I can give to ὑπ' ἐκείνου. Heindorf refers to his note on Phædon. § 110.

[88] How entity can be said to be in want of itself, I confess I do not understand; unless it be said that by "itself" is meant "being" or "existence."

[89] Schleiermacher was the first to expunge the words within brackets as interfering with the chain of reasoning.

(this). For one thing is linked with another and brings with it a wandering (of the mind) greater and more dangerous respecting what has been from time to time asserted before.

Guest. But we have not yet gone through the whole[90] of those, who have accurately discoursed about entity and non-entity. Let, however, (this) suffice. And let us consider again those who speak inaccurately on these subjects, that we may perceive from all quarters, that it is in no respect more easy to say what entity is, than what non-entity is.

Theæ. We must therefore march against them.

Guest. Now, in truth, there appears to be among them, as it were, a kind of giants' war, through their conflicts with each other respecting existence.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Some of them draw down to earth all things from heaven and the unseen region, unskilfully[91] laying hold for this purpose of rocks and oaks. For through their touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone exists, which affords impact and touch; and they define body and existence to be the same. But if any one says that of other things some have not a body, they thoroughly despise (the assertion), and are unwilling to hear another (word).

Theæ. You have spoken of terrible men. For I also have met with many such.

[66.] *Guest.* Wherefore the opponents[92] of these men very carefully defend themselves from on high, from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal forms to be the true existence; and breaking into small pieces the bodies of the others, and that, which is called by them truth, they do in their own discourses, instead of existence, talk of some production carried on. But between these, Theætetus, an immense contest has always existed respecting these matters.

Theæ. True.

Guest. Let us now, therefore, receive from both these

[90] The reading of *πάντως*, preserved by Eusebius alone, has been adopted in lieu of *πάνυ*, by Stalbaum at Heindorf's suggestion. The whole passage is, however, far from being correct.

[91] I have translated *ἀτέχνως* "unskilfully," to show what Plato thought of the Materialists of his day. Stalbaum has unskilfully preferred its ordinary meaning "really."

[92] These, says Schleiermacher, were the philosophers of Megara; of whom the principal was Euclid.

races[93] an account in detail of the existence which they lay down.

Theæ. But how shall we receive it?

Guest. From those that place existence in forms we may easily receive it; for they are more mild; but from those who violently draw all things to body, with more difficulty. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible. It appears to me, however, that we ought to act with respect to them in this way

Theæ. In what?

Guest. Most of all to render them, if possible, better in deed; but if we make no progress in this, let us render them so in word, by supposing them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that, which is assented to by better persons, possesses more authority than that (which is assented to) by worse. However, we pay no attention to these things, but are seeking out the truth.

Theæ. Most right.

[67.] *Guest.* Order therefore those that have become better to answer you, and to interpret what they assert.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. Let them say then whether they call a mortal animal a thing?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. Laying down that the soul is one of the things that exist.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. But do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust; and one prudent, and another imprudent?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But does not each soul become such through the habit and presence of justice, and the contrary (through the habit and presence) of the contraries?

Theæ. Yes; to this likewise they assent.

Guest. But will they say that what is able to be present to, and absent from, any thing, is something?

[93] I cannot believe that Plato wrote here τοῖν γενοῖν. One would prefer τοῖν γηγενοῖν, as in § 71, where there is an allusion to the giants mentioned in § 65

Theæ They say it.

Guest. Since then justice and prudence, and the other virtues, and their contraries, together with the soul in which they are implanted, exist, whether will they say that each of these is invisible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible?

Theæ. They will assert that nearly not one of them is visible.

[68.] *Guest.* But what? Do they say that any one of such things has a body?

Theæ. They do not give the same answer to the whole of this question; but that the soul itself appears to them to possess a certain body; but with respect to prudence, and each of the other things about which you just now inquired, they are ashamed to dare either to confess that they are not one of existing things, or to strenuously assert that all of them are bodies.

Guest. The men, Theætetus, have clearly become better. For such of them as are seed-sown,[94] or earth-sprung,[95] would not be ashamed to assert one of these points, but would contend that whatever they cannot squeeze together with their hands, is altogether nothing.

Theæ. You state very nearly what they think.

Guest. Let us then again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For they must say, with respect to these (incorporeal) and those (corporeal), which have a body born with them, what it is they look to, when they assert that both exist.

[69.] [96] *Theæ.* Perhaps, however, they would be in a difficulty.

[96] *Guest.* But if they suffer any thing of this kind, consider whether, on our proposing the question, they would be willing to admit and confess that existence is a thing of this kind.

Theæ. Of what kind? Speak, and we shall quickly know.

Guest. I say then, that what possesses any power soever, whether of doing any thing naturally to another, or of suffering

[94] In the expression "seed-sown," there is an allusion to the Thebans, who were said to be the descendants of the men, who sprung up from the teeth of the serpent, which Cadmus had scattered as seed.

[95] So too in "earth-sprung," there is a reference to the Athenians, who boasted that, like grasshoppers, they had sprung from the earth.

[96]—[96] I have followed, what common sense requires, the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Cornarius, and adopted by Taylor.

even the least thing from the vilest thing, although only once,—every thing of this kind does really exist. For I lay down a definition by defining that existences are nothing else but power.

Theæ. But since they cannot at present say any thing better than this, they receive it.

Guest. It is well; for perhaps hereafter both to us and them something different will appear. Let this then here remain acknowledged by us on their account.

Theæ. It shall remain.

[70.] *Guest.* Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you interpret to us what is said by them.

Theæ. It shall be so.

Guest. Do you then say that generation is one thing,[97] and existence another, separating them in some way?

Theæ. We do.

Guest. And that by body we communicate with generation, through sensation, but through reason by our soul with real existence, which you say is found for ever under the same circumstance in a similar manner, but that generation exists differently at different times?

Theæ. We do.

Guest. But, ye best of men, what shall we say you mean by the communion between both? Is it not that which we just now mentioned?

Theæ. What was that?

Guest. Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps, Theætetus, you have not heard their answer to this question; but I have, through my familiarity with them.

Theæ. What answer then do they give?

[71.] *Guest.* They do not admit with us, what was just now said against the earth-born[98] respecting existence.

Theæ. What was that?

Guest. We laid down as a sufficient definition of existence, (that it is) when the power is present to any thing, either of suffering or doing in the smallest point.

Ficinus has, "Aliud essentiam, aliud generationem dicitis." He found therefore in his MS., *τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν*, as Cornarius partly saw.

[98] By the "earth-born" are meant the "seed-sown" and "earth-sprung" mentioned in § 68, or the giants alluded to in § 65.

Theæ. We did.

Guest. To this they say, that a power of doing and suffering has a share with generation; but that neither of these powers is adapted to existence.

Theæ. Do they then not speak to the purpose?

Guest. To this we must say that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that existence is known.

Theæ. They certainly say this.

Guest. But do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or that passion is one thing, and (action)[99] another? Or that neither of these has a share in any respect with the other?

Theæ. It is evident that neither (has a share) with the other. For, (if they admitted this,)[100] they would contradict what they before asserted.

Guest. I understand this at least, that if to know were to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would become passive. And according to this reasoning, existence being known by knowledge, would, as far as it is known, be, through becoming passive, moved; which we say cannot take place about the act of resting.

Theæ. Rightly so.

[72.] *Guest.* What then, by Zeus, shall we be easily persuaded that motion, life, soul, and prudence, are not truly present to that which is existing in perfection, and that it neither lives, nor thinks, but stands immovable, not possessing an intellect as an object of respect and holy?

Theæ. It would be a dreadful thing, O guest, to admit this.

Guest. Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

Theæ. And how?

Guest. But say we that both these reside in it, but shall we say that it does not possess these in soul at least?

Theæ. But after what other manner can it possess?

[99] Taylor found in his copy of Ficinus, as Fischer did in his, "aut aliud quidem pati, aliud autem agere." But in the ed. pr. the whole clause is omitted, as it is in many MSS. And so it should be; or else we must insert with Heindorf *ποίημα* to balance *πάθημα*, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary.

[100] Ficinus has "Alioquin contraria illorum, quæ supra concesserant, nunc admitterent.

Guest. That it (possesses)[1] then at least intellect, life, and soul; but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

Theæ. All this appears to me at least to be irrational.

Guest. We must therefore grant that both the moved and motion are existences.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. It follows then, Theætetus, that intellect is never on any account in any way present to any one of things immovable.

[73.] *Theæ.* It (follows) easily.

Guest. And yet, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away this sameness from existences.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Does it appear to you that what exists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever exist without a standing?

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But do you perceive that intellect ever is or would be without these?

Theæ. Least (of all).

Guest. And truly we should contend with every argument against him, who, causing science, or prudence, or intellect to disappear, strenuously insists in behalf of any thing in any way whatever.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. But there is every necessity, as it appears, for the philosopher, and him who honours these things the most on this account, not to listen at all to those, who, asserting that there is either one or many forms, admit that the whole stands still; nor on the other hand, to those who are putting existence into motion by every means; but to say, according to the prayer of boys, [2]whatever are immovable, and have been moved, are both the being and the all.[2]

[1] Heindorf says that, "although ἔχειν might have dropt out easily after ψυχήν, he would not introduce it without the authority of MSS." Ficinus perhaps found it in his. For his version is "Utrum mentem, vitam, animam habere dicendum."

[2—2] Out of this mass of rubbish neither Schleiermacher nor Heindorf could elicit a particle of sense; for they did not see, what Stalbaum was the first to remark, that there is an allusion to some game, during which the children said, "What are unmoved, may they be moved." But in

Theæ. Most true.

[74.] *Guest.* Do we not then appear to have now reasonably in our discourse comprehended existence?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Ho! ho! Theætetus, how do we now seem about to know the difficulty of the inquiry about it.

Theæ. How so? and why do you assert this?

Guest. Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are at present in the greatest ignorance respecting it? And yet we appear to ourselves to say something about it.

Theæ. To myself at least. But I do not very well understand how we are unconsciously in this state.

Guest. Consider more clearly, whether, by assenting to this, we should not be justly asked, as we have asked them, who said that the whole consisted of the hot and the cold.

Theæ. Remind me what these questions were.

Guest. By all means: and I will endeavour to do this by asking you this, as I then asked them, that we may make some progress together.

Theæ. Rightly so.

[75.] *Guest.* Be it so. Do you not say then, that motion and standing are contrary to each other?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And you surely say that both and each of them exist equally.

Theæ. I do.

Guest. Do you then say that both and each are moved, when you admit that they exist?

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But do you mean that they stand, when you say that both exist?

Theæ. How can I?

that case the past participle *κεκινημένα* would not have been used instead of the present participle, *κινούμενα*. The allusion I suspect is to a top or teetotum, which the faster it is made to revolve on its axis, the more it seems to stand still, or, as boys say, to sleep; and thus gives the best idea of the universe being in motion and standing still at one and the same time. Hence Plato perhaps wrote *κατὰ τὴν τῶν περὶ δίνων τέχνην, οἷς ἀκίνητα ἃ καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν δίνην ξυναμφότερα λέγειν*: where *δίνην* still lies hid in *ἤδη*, found in a single MS. The sense would then be, "To call both the one and the whole a whirl, according to the skill of those engaged in playing with tops, by whom even things which have been put into motion become unmoved."

Guest. Placing then existence, as a third thing, alongside these in your soul, and considering it as comprehending under itself standing and motion, and looking to their communion with existence, you have asserted that both of them exist.

Theæ. We seem nearly to prophesy very truly that existence is a certain third thing, when we say that motion and standing exist.

Guest. Existence then is not both motion and standing, but something different from them.

Theæ. It appears so.

Guest. Hence existence, according to its own nature, neither stands nor is moved.

Theæ. It is nearly so.

Guest. Whither then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to fix in himself any clear conceptions respecting existence?

Theæ. Whither?

Guest. To no point do I think it is yet easy for him (to turn). For, if existence is not moved, why has it not stood still? Or on the other hand, why is that, which in no respect stands still, not moved? But existence has just now appeared to us to be apart from both of these. Is this, however, possible?

Theæ. It is the most impossible of all things.

[76.] *Guest.* In the next place, then, it will be just to call to mind this.

Theæ. What?

Guest. That being asked what name non-entity ought to bear, we were hampered by the greatest difficulty. Do you remember?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Are we then in a less difficulty now respecting entity?

Theæ. We appear to be, O guest, if it be impossible to say so, in a greater.

Guest. Let then this question of difficulty lie here. But since both entity and non-entity have equally a share of difficulty, there is now a hope that, if one of them shall appear more obscure, or more clear, the other will appear such likewise; and on the other hand, if we should not be able to see either of them, (the other also will be in a similar state.)[3]

[3] This clause, evidently required to balance the sentences, is omitted

And thus we shall pursue,[4] in the most becoming manner we can, the discourse respecting both of them together.

Theæ. Very well.

[77.] *Guest.* Let us state then after what manner we call on each occasion this same thing by many names.

Theæ. Such as what? Give an example.

Guest. In speaking of man we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, vices, and virtues; in all which, and ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that he is a man, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and in the same manner we lay down other things, each as one, and we again call it many things, and by many names.

Theæ. True.

Guest. Whence, I think, we have prepared a feast to young men, and to those old men who learn late in life.[5] For it is easy for every one immediately to lay hold (of the doctrine), that it is impossible for the many to be one, and the one many. Hence they exult forsooth, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that the good is a good, and the man a man. For I think, Theætetus, you have often met with those, who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, (and) sometimes (even)[6] with rather elderly persons, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and think they have discovered the very-wise thing itself.

[78.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. That our discourse then may extend to all who have ever conversed at all respecting existence, let what will be now said in the way of interrogation, be for those and for the rest with whom we have before conversed.

Theæ. What is this?

Guest. Whether we should neither join existence to motion

in all the Greek MSS., and preserved only in the version of Ficinus—"alterum quoque similiter fore."

[4] All the MSS. have *διωσόμεθα*, contrary to the sense. Heind. suggested *διωξόμεθα*, from "persequamur" in Ficinus. Stalbaum prefers *διασωσόμεθα*.

[5] Stalbaum thinks that Plato alludes here to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are said in Euthydem., p. 272, B., to have learnt Dialectics late in life.

[6] Ficinus has "plerumque etiam seniores."

and standing, nor any thing else to any thing else; but as if things were unmixed, and impossible to take a part with each other, we should place them thus (separate) in our discourse? Or whether we should bring all things to the same, as if they were able to take a part with each other? Or (only) some, and some not? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say they would prefer?

Theæ. I indeed have nothing to answer to this on their behalf. Why do you not, by answering each question, consider what follows from each?

[79.] *Guest.* You say well; and let us suppose them, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communion with any thing for any thing. Will not then motion and standing in no respect take a part of existence?

Theæ. They will not.

Guest. But will either of them exist, not having a communion with existence?

Theæ. It will not.

Guest. By this admission, all the doctrines, it seems, have become rapidly subverted, as well of those, who put all things in motion, as of those, who make (all things) stand like one, and of those, who assert that entities, according to forms, subsist ever under the same circumstances and in a similar manner. For all these join existence at least (with their doctrines), some asserting that things are really moved, and others that they really stand.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Moreover, such as at one time unite all things, and at another separate them, whether [7]dividing them into one and from one into infinite, or into finite elements, and composing from these,[7] and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a commingling.

[80.] *Theæ.* Right.

Guest. Further still, they will have gone through their discourse the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting no-

[7—7] I confess my inability to understand all this. I suspect there is an error here, arising from the wrong collocation of some words and the omission of others.

ning to the communion of the accident of "different," (have thought proper) to use the appellation, 'the other."[8]

Theæ. How so?

Guest. They are compelled somehow to employ about all things, "to be," and "apart," and "others," and "by itself," and ten thousand other (expressions), from which being unable to abstain, and[9] not to insert them in their discourses, they do not require others to confute them, but walk about, having, as the saying is, an enemy and an adversary at home, vociferating within, and always carrying, as it were, the absurd Eurycles[10] with them.

Theæ. You really say what is similar and true.[11]

Guest. But what if we permit all things to have the power of alternate communion with each other?

[12] *Theæ.* This I myself am able to refute.

Guest. How?

Theæ. Because motion itself would entirely stand (still), and on the other hand, standing itself would be moved, if they were alternately mingled[13] with each other.

Theæ. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, for motion to stand still, and standing to be moved.

Theæ. How not?

[12] *Guest.* The third thing therefore alone remains.

Theæ. Yes.

[81.] *Guest.* For one of these things is necessary; either

[8] To complete the sense I have ventured to supply the verb, which should govern *προσαγορεύειν*.

[9] I cannot understand this "and." The sense requires "so as," in Greek, *ὥστε*—

[10] This proverb, says the Scholiast, was applied to those who prophesy evil to themselves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain dæmon in his belly, from whence he was called a ventriloquist; but having on one occasion prophesied evil to some person, he was ill-treated by him; as Calchas would have suffered at the hands of Agamemnon for prophesying evil, had he not first engaged Achilles to defend him.

[11] Ficinus has "Verum est quod dicis ac simile." From whence it is easy to elicit *λέγεις ἀληθές τι ἢ καὶ ὅμοιον*. On *ἢ καὶ* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 114.

[12]—[12] In the arrangement of the speeches here I have followed Bekker; who knew, what Stalbaum did not, that the words *Ἀλλὰ μὴν*—*γε* always commence a speech in Plato.

[13] Ficinus has, "si invicem commiscerentur," in Greek, *ἐπιμιγνοίσθην*: and so probably reads one MS. Y., and not *ἐπιμιγνοίσθην*, as stated by Bekker.

that all things should be commingled, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be commingled, and others not.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Now it has been found that two cannot (be commingled).

Theæ. Just so.

Guest. Every one therefore who wishes to answer rightly, will adopt that which remains of the three.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But since some things are willing to do so, (be mingled,) and others not, they will be affected nearly in the same manner as letters. For some of these do not fit with each other, but others do fit.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. For vowels being pre-eminently the bond, as it were, of the other (letters), it has come to pass, that without some one of them, it is impossible for any of the rest to fit one with the other.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. Does then every one know what letters will unite with what? or is there a need of art to him, who is about to do this sufficiently?

Theæ. Of art.

Guest. What kind of art?

Theæ. The grammatic.

[82.] *Guest.* What then, with respect to sharp and flat sounds, is not he, who has the art to know the sounds that are combined or not, a musician, but he who does not know, not a musician?

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And in other things of skill, and want of skill, we shall find other circumstances of such a kind.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera (of things) have a mingling with each other, after the same manner, is it not necessary for him to proceed in his discourse with some science, who is about to show what kind of genera accord with what kind, and what do not receive each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again

in their divisions, whether there are other causes of division through wholes?

Theæ. How is there not a need of science, and, perhaps, of nearly the greatest?

Guest. What then, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of freemen? And do we nearly appear, while searching after a sophist, to have found previously a philosopher?

[83.] *Theæ.* How say you?

Guest. Shall we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

Theæ. Yes, we will say so.

Guest. He then who is able to do this, perceives sufficiently one idea every way extended through many things, of which each one lies apart, and many different from one another, externally comprehended under one; and on the other hand, one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and many ideas, every way separated (from each other). This is to know how to distinguish according to genus, in what point each can have a communion, and where they cannot.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But you will not, I think, assign the dialectic art to any other than one, who philosophizes purely and justly.

[84.] *Theæ.* For how should any one assign it to any other?

Guest. If we seek indeed, we shall find, both now and hereafter, a philosopher in a place of this kind, though difficult to see him clearly; but the difficulty in the case of a sophist and that of a philosopher is of a different kind

Theæ. How so?

Guest. The one flying into the darkness of non-entity, and by rubbing touching it,[12] is through the obscurity of the place hard to be perceived. Is it not so?

Theæ. So it seems.

[12] This is the literal translation of the nonsensical *τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς*, with which some will perhaps compare Milton's "darkness palpable," derived from the Scriptural—"a darkness that could be felt." But such an idea is not what the train of thought requires Ficinus has "et diuturna consuetudine tenebris illis offunditur," which Taylor translated "and by use becoming adapted to it."

Guest. But the philosopher, always lying, through reasoning, near the idea of entity, is, through the splendour of the region, by no means easily discerned. For the eyes of the soul of the many are unable to endure the looking upon what is divine.

Theæ. And this too it is likely is the case, no less than that.

Guest. On this point, therefore, we shall shortly reflect more clearly, if it be permitted to us wishing it. But with respect to the sophist, it is evident that we must not dismiss him, before we have sufficiently surveyed him.

Theæ. You speak well.

[85.] *Guest.* Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some genera have a communion with each other, and some have not, and that nothing prevents some from having a communion with a few, others with many, and others through all and with all,—let us, in the next place, follow the reasoning, and in this way speculate, not about all species, lest we be confounded by their multitude,—but, selecting some of those called the greatest, let us first consider the qualities of each, and then what power of communion they possess with each other, in order that, although we may not be able to comprehend entity and non-entity with all clearness, we may at least not want for reasons respecting them, as far as the manner of the present speculation admits, if perchance it be permitted us, when we assert that non-entity is in reality a non-entity, to escape unscathed.

Theæ. So must we do.

[86.] *Guest.* Now the greatest of all the genera, which we have now mentioned, are, entity itself, standing, and motion.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. And we have said that the two (latter) are unmixed with each other.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But entity is mixed with both; for both do somehow exist.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. These things then become three.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. Is not then each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

Theæ. It is.

Guest. What then have we now said of sameness and difference? (Must we say that), as there are two genera different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity, we have to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or have we unconsciously denominated the same and the different, as something belonging to them?[13]

[87.] *Theæ.* Perhaps so.

Guest. But surely motion and standing are neither the different nor the same?

Theæ. How so?

Guest. That which we in common call motion and standing can be neither of these.

Theæ. Why?

Guest. Because motion would be standing, and standing be motion. For, with respect to both, either one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating in the contrary.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But yet both participate of the same and the different.

Theæ. They do.

Guest. Let us then not assert that motion is either the same or the different, nor on the other hand (assert this), of standing.

Theæ. Let us not.

Guest. But must entity and the same be considered by us as one?

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. But if entity and the same signify that which is in no respect different, when we again say that motion and standing both exist, we shall thus assert that they are the same, as things existing.

Theæ. But this is surely impossible.

Guest. It is impossible then for the same and entity to be one.

Theæ. Nearly so.

[13] Instead of ἐκείνων τι, Ast has happily restored ἓ ἐκείνων τι, "something belonging to those five;" for thus numerals, by being united to nouns or pronouns, have frequently led to the corruption of the text; as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegomena, p. 223, by numerous instances to which I could now add many more.

Guest We must place then the same as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[88.] *Guest.* But must we say that the different is a fifth species? Or must we conceive that this and entity are some two names belonging to one genus?

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. But I think you will grant, that of existences, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to each other.[14]

Theæ. Why not?

Guest. But the different is always referred to the different. Is it not?

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But this would not be, unless entity and the different widely differed from each other. But if the different participated of both species, as entity does, there would be something even of the different not different with reference to the different. But now it happens from necessity that, whatever is really different, is so from its relation to that which is different.[15]

Theæ. You say, as the fact is.

Guest. We must say then, that the nature of the different must be added as a fifth to the species, of which we have already spoken.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And we will say that it pervades through all these. For each one is different from the others, not through its own nature, but through participating in the idea of the different.

Theæ. And very much so.

[89.] *Guest.* Let us say thus of the five genera, taking each singly.

Theæ. How?

[14] The antithesis in "themselves by themselves," requires here "others," not "each other," in Greek ἄλλα, not ἄλληλα: unless it be said that Plato wrote ἀλλῃ ἄλλα, i. e. "some to one thing, and some to another."

[15] So Taylor translates the version of Ficinus, "ut secundum id, quod est, alterum sit," answering to the Greek in some MSS., πρὸς ἕτερον τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶν, εἶναι: for which Bekker and Stalbaum read from other MSS. ἑτέρου τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶν, εἶναι: which I cannot understand

Guest. In the first place, that motion is entirely different from standing. Or how shall we say?

Theæ. Thus.

Guest. It is not then standing.

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But it exists through its participating in entity.

Theæ. It does.

Guest. Again, motion is different from the same.

Theæ. Nearly so.

Guest. It is not therefore the same.

Theæ. It is not.

Guest. And yet it was the same, through its participating on the other hand in the same.[16]

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. It must be confessed then that motion is both the same and not the same; nor must we be indignant at this. For, when we say that it is both the same, and not the same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when (we say)[17] it is the same, we call it so, through the participation of the same with respect to itself; but when (we say) it is not the same, (we call it so) through its communion with the different; through which, being separated from the same, it becomes not the same, but the different; so that it is again rightly said to be not the same.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. If, then, motion itself[18] has in any respect participated in standing, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

Theæ. Most truly, if we should acknowledge that some of the genera are willing to be mixed with each other, but others not.

Guest. And yet we arrived at the proof of this prior to the present (remarks), by showing that it exists in this manner naturally.

[16] I have adopted with Stephens the correction of Cornarius, who would read *διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάλιν ταὐτοῦ* in lieu of *διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὐτοῦ*: out of which others may perhaps make, what I cannot, something like sense.

[17] Heindorf would insert *λέγωμεν*, which Taylor had already anticipated by his "we say."

[18] Instead of *αὐτὴ*, which has no meaning here, Ast would read *αὖ ἡ*—Stalbaum prefers *αὐτὴ ἡ*.

Theæ. How not?

[90.] *Guest.* Let us then say again (that) motion is a thing different from the different, just as it was from the same and standing.

Theæ. It must be so.

Guest. It is then, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to the present reasoning.

Theæ. True.

Guest. What then follows? Shall we say it is different from the three (genera), but not from the fourth? acknowledging that there are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

Theæ. And how so? for it is impossible to grant that the number is less than it now appears.

Guest. We may, therefore, fearlessly contend that motion is different from entity.

Theæ. We may most fearlessly.

Guest. Clearly then motion is really a non-entity and an entity, since it participates of entity.

Theæ. Most clearly.

Guest. It is then of necessity that non-entity exists with respect to motion, and as regards all the genera. For as regards all, the nature of the different, rendering them different from entity, makes each to be a non-entity. Hence we rightly say, that all of them are, as regards the same, non-entities; and again, because they participate in entity, that they exist and are entities.[19]

Theæ. It appears so.

[91.] *Guest.* About each of the species then, the entity is many, but the non-entity is in multitude endless.[20]

Theæ. It appears so.

Guest. Must not then entity itself be said to be different from the others?

[19] If we wish to avoid the tautology in *εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα*, we must adopt the version of Ficinus, "entiaque vocabimus"—i. e. "and we will call them entities."

[20] These, to me at least, perfectly unintelligible words are thus explained by Heindorf and Stalbaum: "To each species many things may be attributed; and in this respect entity is many; but as each of the many may be varied infinitely, in this respect it is infinite." But as this explanation takes no notice of the non-entity, it may fairly be considered a non-entity itself.

Theæ. Of necessity.

Guest. [21] Entity then does not exist according to so many in number as the others; for entity, being one itself, is not them; but the others, being infinite in number, are not entity. [21]

Theæ. This is nearly the case.

Guest. We ought not then to be indignant at this, since the nature of the genera have a communion with each other. But if some one does not admit this, let him, having persuaded [22] our former reasoning, in like manner persuade [22] the subsequent assertions.

Theæ. You speak most justly.

Guest. Let us look at this likewise.

Theæ. What?

Guest. When we say non-entity, we do not, as it appears, speak of any thing contrary to entity, but only as something different from it.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to point out by this word what is small rather than what is equal?

Theæ. How could you?

Guest. We must therefore admit that the contrary to a thing is not signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only, that the (prohibitive) "not," and the (negative) "no," when prefixed, signify something relating to the words that follow, or rather to the things, respecting which are placed the words of the negation afterwards enunciated.[23]

Theæ. Entirely so.

[92.] *Guest.* This also let us consider, if it seems good to you.

[21]—[21] Such is the literal translation of the Greek; where, however, I have tacitly changed the last word *αὖ* into *ὄν*, to preserve the antithesis. But of the first clause I confess my inability to understand the sense. Taylor's version is—"Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the others. For not being them it is itself one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number." The reader is therefore left to choose which he prefers.

[22]—[22] In lieu of the nonsensical *πείσας* and *πειθέτω*, it is evident at a glance that Plato wrote *ἀπώσας* and *ἀπωθείτω*—i. e. "having rejected—reject."

[23] Here too is another unintelligible, because corrupt, passage.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. The nature of the different appears to me to have been cut into fractional parts, in the same manner as science.

Theæ. How?

Guest. The (nature) is one; but the portion of it that is attached to any thing does, when separated, possess individually its peculiar appellation; on which account arts and sciences are said to be many.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Have not then the parts of the nature of the different, which is itself one thing, been affected in the very same way?

Theæ. Perhaps so. But let us tell how this takes place.

Guest. Is there any part of the different opposed to the beautiful?

Theæ. There is.

Guest. Shall we say it is nameless, or that it has some appellation?

Theæ. That it has. For that which we call on each occasion not-beautiful, is not different from any thing else but the nature of the beautiful.

Guest. Come, then, tell me this.

[93.] *Theæ.* What?

Guest. When any thing is separated from some kind of existences, and is again opposed to some kind of existences, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?[24]

Theæ. It does.

Guest. But the opposition of entity to entity happens, as it seems, to be not-beautiful.

Theæ. Most right.

Guest. What then, according to this reasoning does the beautiful belong more to entities, and the non-beautiful, less?

Theæ. Not at all.

[24] In the place of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has what is at least intelligible in part; for his MS. was fuller than any, which have been collated subsequently. "Cum aliquid in parte quadam entium determinatum sit, rursusque alicui entium opponatur, contingatque ita non pulchrum dici, sequitur non pulchrum esse aliquid, quandoquidem est illud cui opponatur." There is however something evidently wanting after "determinatum sit," to this effect, "id dici pulchrum debere, cui nihil opponatur." So too there is wanting in Ficinus the close of this speech of the Stranger and the whole of the next one, together with the intermediate answer of Theætetus.

Guest. We must say then, that the not-great and the great exist similarly.

Theæ. Similarly.

Guest. Hence too we must lay down respecting the just, in the same manner as of the not-just, that the one in no respect exists more than the other.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And we will speak of other things in this way; since the nature of the different appears to be one of entities; and as it exists, it is necessary for us to lay down the parts of it, as no less existing.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. The opposition then, it seems, of a part of the nature of the different, and of entity [25] opposed to each other,[25] are no less existence, if it be lawful to say so, than existence itself; nor do they signify what is contrary to existence, but only so much, what is different from it.

Theæ. It is most clear.

[94.] *Guest.* What then, shall we call it the (antithesis)?

Theæ. It is evident that non-entity, which we have been seeking on account of the sophist, is this very thing.

Guest. Whether then, as you have said, is it no more deficient of existence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-entity possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great to be (not-great),[26] and the not-beautiful (not-beautiful)?[26] and that thus too non-entity was and is non-entity, as being one species numbered amongst the many existing? Or must we still, Theætetus, have with regard to this some want of faith?

Theæ. None at all.

Guest. Do you perceive then, how we have been with some prolixity disobedient to the prohibition of Parmenides?

Theæ. In what respect?

Guest. We have farther than he ordained [27] us to inquire, exhibited ourselves, still exploring onwards.

[25]—[25] The words "opposed to each other" are omitted by Ficinus correctly. For they are only an explanation of the preceding "opposition."

[26]—[26] The words "not-great" and "not-beautiful," which Heindorf and Stalbaum say that Boeckh was the first to restore, Taylor had already printed in his translation.

[27] Stalbaum led no doubt by the version of Ficinus, "ulterius quam

Theæ. How?

Guest. Because he says somewhere,—"Non-beings never and by no means are. And from this path thy searching thought restrain."

Theæ. And so he does say.

Guest. But we have not only shown that non-entities exist, but we have demonstrated what kind of thing a non-entity is. For, having proved that the nature of the different has an existence, and that it is cut up into fractions, (distributed) mutually through all things, we then dared to say, that each part of it, which is opposed to entity, is itself truly a non-entity.

Theæ. And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

[95.] *Guest.* Let no one then say, that we, having proved that non-entity is contrary to entity, dare to assert that it exists. For we some time since did to something, contrary to it, bid a farewell, whether it exists or not, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-entity, either let some one persuade (us) by showing that we speak not well; or, as long as he is unable (to do this), he must also say, as we say, that the genera are mixed with each other, and that entity and the different pervading through all things, and through each other, the different, partaking of entity, does through this participation exist, not being that of which it participates, but something else; and being different from entity, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-entity. And on the other hand entity, having partaken of the different, will be different from the other genera; but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing besides itself. So that incontestably entity is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and thus the rest taken singly and together exist in many forms, but do not exist in many forms.[28]

[96.] *Theæ.* True.

statuerit," which Taylor translated "beyond the limits he appointed," first objected to ἀπεῖπε: but he failed to see, what is obvious at a glance, that Plato wrote ἀνεῖπε, a word peculiarly applied to the ordonnance of a deity, with whom a philosopher was wont to be compared.

[28] This is an instance of the "reductio ad absurdum."

Guest. Now if any one either does not believe in these contrarieties, let him reflect and produce something better than has been stated now;[29] or if, perceiving this to be a difficult speculation, he is pleased at drawing out his arguments now on this side and now on that, he is engaged, as our present reasoning shows, in a pursuit not deserving very serious attention. For this is neither a clever thing nor difficult to discover; but that is at one and the same time difficult and honourable.[30]

Theæ. What?

Guest. That which has been stated before; so that, omitting these as possible, we may be able, by following up what has been said, each by itself, to confute a person, when he says that what is different is same, and what is the same different, [31]in the way and according to the circumstance by which he says either is affected.[31] For, to show that the same is different, and the different same, and the great small, and the similar dissimilar, and to be pleased in thus introducing contrarieties in discourse, is not a true confutation, but one evidently newly born of some one, who has recently laid hold of entities.

Theæ. Very much so.

[97.] *Guest.* For, my good (friend), to endeavour to separate every thing from every thing, is inelegant in other respects, and the part too of one untaught and unphilosophical.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. To loosen each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

Theæ. True.

Guest. Consider then, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mixed with another.

Theæ. With a view to what?

Guest. To this, that discourse may be one certain thing

[29] Compare Horace, "si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum."

[30] Here is an allusion to the saying, "Difficult things are honourable." See Hipp. Maj. § 56.

[31—31] The whole of this passage Taylor tacitly omitted, at the suggestion of Cornarius, who considered it an interpolation.

belonging to the genera of existences. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that we agree about discourse what it is. But if we take it away entirely from us, so as not to exist at all, we can no longer speak about any thing. And we should take it away, if we admit that there is no mixing of any thing for any thing.

[98.] *Theæ.* This is (said) quite rightly. But I do not understand why we should agree about discourse.

Guest. But, perhaps, you will most easily understand by following me in this way.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. Non-entity has appeared to us to be one of the rest of genera, and to be dispersed through all existences.

Theæ. It has so.

Guest. After this, therefore, we must consider whether it is mixed with opinion and discourse.

Theæ. On what account?

Guest. Because, if it is not mixed with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true; but, if it is mixed with these, false opinion and (false)[32] discourse is produced. For to fancy or speak of non-entities, is a falsehood existing in the mind and in discourse.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. But, being falsehood, it is deception.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. And deception existing, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and fancies.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But we have said that the sophist flew to (and stayed) in this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood; for (he says) that no one can either think or speak of a non-entity; because it in no respect partakes of existence.

Theæ. It was (so) said.

[99.] *Guest.* But now it has appeared to partake of entity; so that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps, however, he will say, that of species some partake of non-entity, and others not; and that discourse and opinion

[32] This idea, wanting in the Greek, has been preserved in the "oratioque falsa" of Ficinus alone.

are amongst those things that do not partake of it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and fancy-producing art, in which we have said he is concealed, exists not at all; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-entity; for that falsehood does not exist at all, if this communion of things takes place no where. Hence we must search out discourse, opinion, and fancy, what they are, in order that we may perceive after their appearance their communion with non-entity; and having perceived this, we may prove that falsehood exists; and having proved this, we may put the sophist into bonds, if he is guilty; or, setting him free, search for him in some other genus.

[100.] *Theæ.* What was said, O guest, at first about the sophist, appears to be very true—that he is a genus difficult to hunt out. For he appears to be full of fences;[33] of which when he throws up one, it is necessary to take it by storm, before you can reach him himself. And even now we have scarcely passed over the obstacle he had raised, that a non-entity does not exist, when he immediately throws up another. Hence it is requisite to show that falsehood does exist, both in discourse and opinion; and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that; and, as it seems, no end will e'er appear.[34]

Guest. He, Theætetus, should be bold, who is able to proceed, though only a little, continually onwards. For what will he be able to do in other things who is faint-hearted in these, and is either effecting nothing in these, or is driven back again? Such a person will scarcely, according to the proverb, ever take a city. But now, O good man, since this, as you say, has been passed through, the greatest wall will have been taken by us, and the rest will be more easy and of small account.

Theæ. You say well.

Guest. Let us then now in the first place take up, as we said, discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly cal-

[33] In the Greek word *πρόβλημα* there is a double sense; one applicable to a war carried on by soldiers in the field, and the other to that by philosophers in their schools; as Stalbaum has correctly observed.

[34] I have designedly put the concluding words into verse; as Plato himself has almost done in a trochaic line—*Καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν (ἐκ)φανήσεταί ποτε.*

culate,[35] whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

Theæ. Right.

Guest. Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For the present inquiry appears[36] somehow to lie in this road.

Theæ. What then is to be heard forsooth about nouns?

Guest. Whether all of them fit together, or not; or some are wont to do so, but others not.

Theæ. This is evident, that some are wont and others not

Guest. Perhaps you mean some such thing as this; that some being spoken in order and signifying something, do fit together; but that such as in continuity signify nothing, do not fit together.

[102.] *Theæ.* Why, and how say you this?

Guest. What I thought you would understand and acknowledge. For there is a twofold kind of significations by the voice respecting existence.

Theæ. How?

Guest. One called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theæ. Speak of each.

Guest. That which has a signification in the case of actions, is called a verb.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But a sign of the voice, applied to the doers themselves of those actions, we call a noun.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. From nouns then alone, spoken in succession, there is not a discourse; nor, on the other hand, from verbs spoken without nouns.

Theæ. I have not learned this.

Guest. Yet it is plain that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this very thing I meant to say, that when these are spoken in succession, there is not a discourse.

[35] Instead of *ἀπολογησώμεθα*, Heindorf conjectured *ἀπολογισώμεθα*. Ficinus had already "ostendamus."

[36] Stalbaum has adopted Heindorf's *φανεῖται* for *φαίνεται* unnecessarily.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. As for instance, should any one say in succession "walks," "runs," "sleeps," and such other words as signify actions, he would not form a discourse at all.

Theæ. For how could he?

[103.] *Guest.* Again then, when any one says, "lion," "stag," "horse," and such other nouns, as are named after those doing acts, no discourse is composed by such a continuity. For the words spoken do not, [37]either in this way or that,[37] signify action, or non-action, or the existence of a thing which is or is not, until one mixes verbs with nouns; and then they fit (with each other), and a discourse is produced immediately, and their first connexion is nearly the first and shortest discourse.

Theæ. How say you this?

Guest. When any one says, "Man learns," would you not say that this is the shortest and first discourse?

Theæ. I should.

Guest. For he then points out something respecting things which exist, or are in the course of existing, or have been, or will be; nor does he name a thing merely, but completes something by connecting verbs with nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not merely name a thing; and through this connexion we pronounce the noun "discourse."

[104.] *Theæ.* Right.

Guest. Thus too in the case of things, some did fit with each other, and others did not; so likewise with respect to the signs of the voice, some do not fit, but others of them by fitting produce discourse.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. There is still this trifling thing.

Theæ. What?

Guest. It is necessary for a discourse, when it takes place, to be a discourse about something; for it is impossible to be about nothing.

Theæ. It must.

Guest. Ought it not then to be of some particular kind?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Let us then pay attention to ourselves.

[37]—[37] These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are perfectly unnecessary.

Theæ. For it is requisite.

Guest. I will then pronounce you a discourse, having united a thing with an action, through a noun and a verb; and do you tell me of what it is the discourse.

Theæ. This shall be as far as I am able.

Guest. Theætetus sits.—This is not a long discourse.

Theæ. No; a moderate one.

Guest. It is now your business to say about whom is the discourse, and whose it is.

Theæ. It is evident that it is about me and mine.[38]

Guest. But what again is this?

Theæ. What?

Guest. Theætetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies.

Theæ. Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is mine,[38] and of me.

[105.] *Guest.* But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

Theæ. One must be false and the other true.

Guest. But of them the one which is true asserts things respecting you, as they are.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But the one which is false (asserts) things respecting you, different from what they are.

Theæ. It does.

Guest. It speaks then of things which are not, as if they were

Theæ. Nearly so.

Guest. And it speaks of things about you different from the existing. For we said that about each thing there are many things which exist, and many which do not.

[38]—[38] This is a remarkable instance of the carelessness of even the most attentive editors. For not one has remarked that, as the Guest, and not Theætetus, had pronounced the words "Theætetus sits," the discourse belonged to the former, although it was about the latter. Plato must therefore have written not ἐμὸς but ὁ σός: while instead of περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου we must read περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ—"about whom and whose," as shown by the version of Ficinus, "de quo et cujus;" although he shortly afterwards supports πλὴν ἐμὸν by his "nisi de me meaque;" where, for a similar reason, we must read πλήν γε σὸν, as we find a little below Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι σός.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. The discourse then which I last spoke about you, should, from what we have defined a discourse to be, of necessity be, in the first place, one of the shortest.

Theæ. This we have just now acknowledged.

Guest. In the next place, it is a discourse of some one.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. But if it is not yours, it is not of any one else.

Theæ. For how should it?

Guest. And if it is not about some thing, it cannot be a discourse at all. For we have shown that it is (one) of things impossible, for a discourse to exist about nothing.

Theæ. Most correctly.

Guest. When therefore the different is asserted of you as if it were the same, and things not existing as if existing, such an arrangement of verbs and nouns altogether becomes, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

Theæ. Most true.

[106.] *Guest.* But what, is it not now evident, that all these genera, both false and true, such as thought, opinion, and fancy, are produced in our souls?

Theæ. How?

Guest. You will more easily understand it thus, if you first take,[39] what each of them is, and in what they differ each from the other.

Theæ. Only give.

Guest. Are not then thought and discourse the same, except that the former being within the soul a voiceless dialogue with itself, is called by us by the name of thought?[40]

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But the stream of thought passing through the mouth with a sound is called discourse.

Theæ. True.

Guest. We know of this too in discourse.

Theæ. What?

Guest. Affirmation and negation.

[39] The verb "take" is used in English as λαμβάνειν is in Greek, in a mental as well as manual sense. Hence the joke in the answer of Theætetus, "Give."

[40] It was with reference to this notion, that the Greek verb φράζειν, "to speak" to another in the active voice, means in the middle, φράζεσθαι, "to think," i. e. to speak to oneself.

Theæ. We do.

Guest. When therefore this is generated in the soul according to thought, accompanied with silence, can you call it any thing else than opinion?

Theæ. How can I?

Guest. But when, again, some circumstance of this kind is present to any one, not according to itself,[41] but through sensation, is it possible to call it correctly any thing else than fancy?

Theæ. Nothing else.

[107.] *Guest.* Since then discourse is both true and false, and it appears that thought is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the termination of thought, and what we mean by "it appears" is the mixture of sensation and opinion, it is necessary, that of these, being allied to discourse, some should be false and sometimes.[42]

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Do you perceive then, that opinion and discourse have been previously found to be false more easily, than according to our expectation? For[43] just now we were afraid, lest by searching into this matter we should throw ourselves upon a work perfectly impracticable.

Theæ. I do perceive.

Guest. Let us not then be faint-hearted as to what remains. For since these have been made to appear, let us recall to our memory the previous divisions according to species.

Theæ. Of what kind were they?

Guest. We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other fanciful.

Theæ. We did.

Guest. And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the sophist.

[41] I cannot understand the words "according to itself," nor could Taylor, who translated "according to the dianoëtic energy," as if he wished to read *κατ' αὐτὴν*, and thus to make a proper distinction between *κατὰ διάνοιαν*, and *κατὰ μὴ διάνοιαν*.

[42] Had the editors looked to the version of Ficinus, "ut cogitationes opinionesque partim veræ, partim falsæ sint," they would perhaps have seen that Plato did not write the nonsensical *ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι*, where *τε* wants its corresponding conjunction, but something more fit to be read to this effect—*ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν τιν' ἐνίοτε καὶ αὖ ἐνίοτε μὴ εἶναι*. Stephens and Heindorf would expunge *τε* after *ψευδῆ*.

[43] Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the correct reading, *προσδοκίαν· ἐφοβήθημεν γὰρ ἄρτι*—instead of *προσδοκίαν· ὧν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι*—

Theæ. It was so (said).

Guest. And while we were doubting of this, a still greater dizziness was shed around us, through the assertion appearing a matter of doubt to all men, that there cannot be at all either a resemblance, or an image, or fancy; because no falsehood exists by any means at any time or in any place.

Theæ. You speak the truth.

[108.] *Guest.* But now since discourse has made its appearance, and false opinion likewise, it is conceded that there are imitations of things existing; and that from this disposition of things the art of deceiving is produced.

Theæ. It is agreed.

Guest. And yet was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is one of these?

Theæ. It was.

Guest. Let us then again endeavour, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed along the right hand[44] of the section, and attend to its communion with the sophist, until, having cut off all his common properties, we leave the nature peculiar to himself, and exhibit it to ourselves especially, and afterwards to those also, who are naturally the nearest of kin to this method.

Theæ. Right.

[109.] *Guest.* Did we not then begin by dividing the making art and the acquiring art?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And the acquiring art presented itself to us in hunting, contests, traffic, and in some such-like species.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But now, since the imitative art comprehends the sophist, it is evident that the making art must first receive a twofold division. For imitation is a certain kind of making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of each themselves.[45] Did we not?

Theæ. Entirely so.

[44] This seems to have been a phrase in Greece, something like the one in England, borrowed from horse-racing, "to get the whip-hand of a person."

[45] This nonsense was, strange to say, passed over by Heindorf. Ficinus has "non verarum rerum:" which leads at once to *οὐκ αὐτῶν τῶν ἑκάστοτ ὄντων*, "not of the things themselves existing on each occasion," in lieu of *οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων*.

Guest. But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the making art.

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. One divine, the other human.

Theæ. I do not understand you.

Guest. The making art, if we remember what was said at first, we asserted to be every power, which might be the cause of things being produced subsequently, that did not previously exist.

Theæ. We do remember.

[110.] *Guest.* But, with respect to all living animals, and plants, which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate bodies as subsist on the earth, able to be liquefied or not, can we say that not existing previously they were subsequently produced by any other than some fabricating god? Or making use of the opinion and assertion of the many—[46]

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That nature generates these from some self-acting fortuitous cause, and without a generating intellect; or (is it) with reason and divine science, originating from a god?

Theæ. I, perhaps, through my age, am often changing my opinions to both sides. But at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things are produced according to (the will of) a deity, I think so too.

Guest. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that you would be one of those, who at a future time would think differently, we should now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with the persuasion of necessity. But since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, it will of itself arrive at that conclusion to which you say you are now drawn, I will leave the subject; for the time[47] would be superfluous. But I will

[46] After χρώμενοι Fischer would supply φήσομεν. Heind. and Stalb. dream about an aposiopesis. Had they duly weighed the various readings, preserved by Stobæus in quoting this passage, χρώμενοι ποιητῶν τὴν φύσιν in lieu of χρώμενοι ποιῷ τῷ τὴν φύσιν, they would have been able perhaps to see that Plato wrote—ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι ποιητῶν, τὴν φύσιν φήσομεν—where φήσομεν has been lost on account of φύσιν.

[47] Ficinus has "nam supervacua talis disputatio esset," which shows, as Heindorf remarked, that he found not χρόνος but λόγος in his MS., as the sense evidently requires. Stalbaum still sticks to χρόνος.

lay this down, that the things, which are said to be made by nature, are (made) by divine art; but that the things, which are composed from these by men, are produced by human (art): and that, according to this assertion, there are two kinds of the making art, one human, and the other divine.

Theæ. Right.

[111.] *Guest.* But, since there are two kinds, bisect each of them.

Theæ. How?

Guest. Just as the whole of the making art was then divided, according to breadth, so now divide it according to length.

Theæ. Let it be so divided.

Guest. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the gods, divine.

Theæ. They will.

Guest. But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is self-making, but the remaining parts may be nearly called image-making; and in this way again, the making art is divided into two parts.

Theæ. Tell me again how each is (to be divided).

Guest. With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that all these productions are individually the offspring of a deity. Or how?

Theæ. Thus.

Guest. And that the images of each of these, and not the things themselves, follow, and these too produced by the artifice of some dæmon-like power.

Theæ. Of what kind are these?

Guest. Fancies, which occur in dreams, and such as appear in the day, are called self-produced; (as, for instance,) a shadow, [48]when darkness is generated in fire:[48] but this is

[48]—[48] This I cannot understand. Ficinus has, "cum tenebræ igni miscentur," which shows that he found in his MS. *σὺν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος συμμιγνύηται*, in lieu of *ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται*. But perhaps Plato alluded to those fantastic forms, which are seen in a fire, when it is gradually dying away. But in that case he would have written, I think, *ἐντὸς πυρὸς*, (as in the Timæus, p. 46, A., *ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐκτὸς ἐντός τε τοῦ πυρὸς*—,) and *σκότος σὺν αὐγῇ γεννᾷ τινα*, "when darkness with light produces one," i. e. a shadow.

[49] twofold, when its own and foreign light meeting in one about shining and smooth bodies, effects by these means a species,[49] producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision.

Theæ. These works then of divine making are two, the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

[112.] *Guest.* But what of our art? Shall we not say that it does, by the art of house-building, make a dwelling, and has made by painting another (dwelling), which is, as it were, a dream made by man to persons awake?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. [50] In this way then are the rest. (Divided) into two parts are the works of our making power; that which relates to the thing itself we call thing-itself-making, but that which relates to the image, image-making.[50]

Theæ. I now understand you better; and I lay down in two parts two kinds of the making art, the divine and human, according to one section; and, according to the other, [51] one (a production) from themselves, and the other of certain resemblances.[51]

[49]—[49] On these unintelligible words, all that the editors have hitherto been able to do, is to quote a still more obscure passage of Plato's Timæus, and his Latin commentator, Chalcidius. I suspect the author wrote—*διόπτρου δὲ ἠνίκ' ἂν φῶτε, οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον, παρὰ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθόντε, τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται*, i. e. "When two lights, its own and foreign, coming to one point along the shining and smooth part of a reflector, work out a form, that produces a sensation of seeing, opposite to the previously accustomed one." For the allusion is to a sheet of water, on the surface of which two lights were supposed to meet, one from within the water and the other from without, and thus forming a dioptron, or transparent mirror, that reflected an image directly contrary to what the object appeared itself out of the water. Compare § 53, where reflexion by mirrors (*κάτοπτρα*) and by water are alluded to. That there was here a reference to an optical illusion, is plain from the words of Chalcidius, p. 333, "At vero Plato censet duum luminum coitu confluentium in tersam speculi et solidam cutem, id est diurni luminis et intimi—" from whence I have altered *φῶς* into *φῶτε* for the sense; and, for the syntax, *ξυνέλθον* into *ξυνελθόντε*, with which neuter dual nominatives the singular *ἀπεργάζηται* agrees.

[50]—[50] This seems to be the meaning of what Stalbaum thinks Plato wrote. Ficinus has, "In aliis quoque similiter per duo partiendo, gemina opera effectricis nostræ actionis invenimus; ipsam quippe rem principali facultate, imaginem vero imaginaria facimus." This is certainly intelligible, but not to be elicited from the Greek, as found at present.

[51]—[51] Here again I am utterly in the dark. Ficinus has, "deinde in rerum ipsarum imaginumve effectionem."

Guest. Let us then recollect, that of the image-producing art we said, one kind was about to be a likeness-producing, and the other a fancy-producing, if it should appear that falsehood is in reality a falsehood, and one of things existing.

Theæ. It was so.

Guest. There have then appeared, and we shall on this account enumerate ourselves,[52] incontestably two species.

Theæ. Yes.

[113.] *Guest.* Let us then again divide into two the fancy-producing species.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. One produced through instruments, but [53]the other, when he, who causes the fancied appearance, exhibits himself as the instrument of the thing.[53]

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. I think, when any one employing his own body, causes your figure to appear similar to (his own),[54] or voice to voice, this is especially called an imitation belonging to the fancy-producing species.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but let us, now reduced to a jelly,[55] dismiss all the rest, and we will permit some other person to collect (the facts) into one, and to give them a proper appellation.

[52] Ficinus has "ipsi—enumerabimus," which leads to *αὐτὼ*, found in one MS. and adopted by Bekker. Heindorf and Stalbaum prefer *αὐτῷ*, which they refer to *ψεύδει*, understood. But the dative would be without regimen.

[53]—[53] Such is the English of Stalbaum's Latin version of the Greek, out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. It is beyond my comprehension. How superior is that of Ficinus, "Illius, qui sese instrumentum, phantasma efficientis, exhibet," i. e. "of him, who affords himself as an instrument of the person, who is working the fancied appearance;" just as persons do in the present day, when they put themselves into the hands of a mesmerizer or any other charlatan in any science real or unreal. There is however a slight error in the Greek, where we must read *τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον*. For thus *διὰ τοῦ παρέχοντος* will balance the preceding *δι' ὀργάνων*.

[54] Ficinus has preserved some words wanting here to complete the sense, "corpus suum tuo reddit persimile."

[55] This pugilistic phrase is the best version of the Greek word *μαλακισθέντες*. For to mental encounters are thus constantly applied the terms used in corporeal contests.

Theæ. Let one then be divided, and the other dismissed.

Guest. And yet, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is twofold; but take notice on what account.

Theæ. Say on.

Guest. Of those who imitate, some knowing what they imitate, do this, but others not knowing. And yet what division can we make greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

Theæ. Not one.

Guest. Will not then that, which was just now mentioned, be an imitation by those, that are endued with knowledge? For a man by knowing you, would imitate your figure likewise.

Theæ. How not?

[114.] *Guest.* But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? [56]Do not many, though ignorant, yet fancying they know it, vehemently endeavour to make it appear that, what seems to be (justice in them), is inherent in them, and that they are particularly desirous of it, by imitating it in deeds and words.[56]

Theæ. Very many indeed.

Guest. Do not then all fail in seeming to be just, by their not being just at all? Or does the contrary of this take place wholly?

Theæ. Wholly.

Guest. I think then we must say that the imitator, who is ignorant, is different from the other who knows.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. Whence, then, can any one of them obtain a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult; because a certain ancient cause[57] of the division of genera into species

[56]—[56] Such seems to be the meaning of the original; where I have endeavoured to overcome the difficulty by supposing that *δίκαιον* has dropt out before *δοκοῦν*, and by changing *προθυμεῖσθαι—ὅτι μάλιστα* into *προθυμεῖσθαί τε μάλιστα*.—Ficinus has "An non multi, dum ignorant, nosse autem hanc opinantur, quod illis videtur, id ipsum imitantes tam verbis quam operibus annituntur, ut inesse ipsis appareat?" as if his MS. omitted *προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα*.

[57]—[57] Boeckh was the first to find fault with *αἰτία*, and Heindorf with *ἀσύννους*: for which the former would read *ἀήθεια* and the latter *ἀσύννῳ*. Plato wrote perhaps—*διαιρέσεως πέρι παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσυνεσία*, i. e. "some old-fashioned, as it seems, idleness and stupidity respecting the division—"

was unknown[57] to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted even to divide; and on this account there was a necessity for them not to be very ready at names. But at the same time, although it may be rather bold to be asserted, for the sake of distinction, let us call the imitation which subsists with opinion, the "opinion-mimicking," but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain scientific[58] imitation.

Theæ. Be it so.

[115.] *Guest.* We must therefore make use of the other: for a sophist was not among the scientific but the imitators.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. Let us then look into this opinion-mimic, as if he were a piece of iron, and (see) whether he is sound and whole, or contains in himself some layer doubled over.

Theæ. Let us consider.

Guest. He has it indeed very thick. For, of sophists, one is a simpleton, and thinks he knows what he (merely) fancies. But the figure of another, through his tossing about in his discourse, carries with it much of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of what before others he pretends to know.

Theæ. There are both these kinds of sophists, of whom you have spoken.

Guest. We will therefore place one as a simple imitator, but the other as an ironical one.

Theæ. It is proper (to do so).

Guest. And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

Theæ. Do you look to it.

Guest. I do consider; and some two imitators appear before me. One I behold able to employ irony in public, and in lengthened speeches before the masses; but the other in private, and in short discourses, compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

Theæ. You speak most correctly.

[116.] *Guest.* What then may we show the imitator to be, who employs lengthened discourses? A statesman, or a mob-orator?

[58] Ficinus, uncertain how to translate ἱστορικὴν, has—"historicam quandam scientemque? I suspect the word conceals some corruption; which I confess I am unable to correct satisfactorily.

Theæ. A mob-orator.

Guest. But what shall we call the other? a wise man, or wiseman-like?

Theæ. To (call)[59] him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, it is plain he must receive some similar appellation; and I now nearly understand, that we ought truly to call this person the perfectly real sophist.

Guest. Shall we not then bind together his name, as we did before, connecting (every thing)[60] from the end to the beginning?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. [61]He, then, who is a portion of the art that makes a discourse to contradict itself, (and) a part of the ironic species, and of the opinion-mimicking, (and) of the fancy-producing, (and) of that (proceeding) from the image-making, (and) separated from the making, not as a god but man, (and) in discourses is the wonder-working portion,[61] whoever shall say that he is "of this race and blood"[62] a real sophist, such a person will, as it appears, speak with the greatest truth.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[59] Ficin. has "Sapientem quidem illum vocare non licet." Hence he probably found in his MS. Τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν σοφὸν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν, ἐπεί περ—for εἰπεῖν might easily have been lost through ἐπεί, while from hence Stephens got his τὸ for τὸν.

[60] Ficin. has "omnia complicantes," which shows that his MS. supplied πάντα, now wanting before ἀπὸ—

[61—61] The whole of this passage in the original presents considerable difficulties, as Stalbaum confesses; and even Heindorf has not been able to master them; for he did not perceive that there are not only interpolations and literal errors in the Greek, but a lacuna likewise, which it were easy to supply from the version of Ficinus, were this the place for a lengthened discussion.

[62] The words "of this race and blood," are taken from Homer, Il. Z, 211.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN.

Of this dialogue, which is feigned to have taken place on the same day as the Sophist, and may be considered both in manner and matter a continuation of it, although directed to a different subject. the argument may be comprised in a very few words. Its object, as stated towards the close of it, is to show that the head of the state, who should be a king, ought to combine not only in his own person, but in that of the people over whom he rules, the two conflicting characters of manliness and moderation. For by such an union alone is it possible to correct the mischiefs arising equally from the excess and deficiency of energy in all matters relating to the well-being of the state.

To arrive at this conclusion Plato has thought proper to give the rein to his imagination instead of curbing it; and he has been compelled in consequence to apologize for the prolixity of his discourse; where he was evidently carried away with the same desire to draw subtle distinctions in things apparently similar, as he has done in the Sophist. For he was anxious, perhaps, to show his acquaintance with the minutiæ of some handicraft trades, instead of keeping rather the attention of the reader fixed to a few leading points, and putting down only

> Quod bene proposito conducat et hæreat apte.
>
> What to the subject's fitted and sticks close.

In the midst, however, of this discursive matter, we meet with a curious digression, where Plato has in part anticipated the theory of the Geologists of the present day, respecting the changes which the earth has undergone at different periods, together with an allusion to a primæval state, not very unlike that recorded in Holy Writ; although in neither case did he probably do more than put into his own words, what he found in the writings of preceding philosophers

This dialogue is remarkable, moreover, for the development of the notion, so contrary to that of modern times, that laws should be made not so much to chime in with the feelings of the people, as to oppose their prejudices, provided the object of such legislation be to improve their moral and physical condition. But as this end could not be accomplished, where the ruling power rests with the masses, who, as Plato had seen at Athens, were alternately ferocious despots or fawning slaves, he suggested the propriety of establishing in conjunction with a king, an aristocracy, composed of persons, not superior to their countrymen in wealth, but in virtue, and possessing, like the king, the qualities necessary for a real statesman; who should be at once a shepherd, to look to the rearing of his charge, and a physician, to watch over their health, and a philosopher, to superintend their mental and moral culture.

As this dialogue has been edited separately only by Stalbaum—for Fischer's publication is, like the rest of that scholar's works, beneath even a passing notice—it presents not a few passages to exercise, and, as I have found, to baffle the ingenuity of emendatory criticism; to which Stalbaum should have resorted rather than have sought to support the nonsense of a corrupt text. As regards, however, the matter of the dialogue, he has left little to desire in his Prolegomena of 132 8vo pages; to which the reader is referred, who wishes to know something of what has been written by the more recent scholars of Germany on questions, that will, it is to be feared, remain for ever in their present obscurity.

THE STATESMAN.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, THEODORUS, A GUEST, AND SOCRATES JUN

SOCRATES.

[1] I owe you, Theodorus, surely many thanks for my acquaintance with Theætetus and this guest to boot.

The. Perhaps, Socrates, you will owe me thrice as many, when they shall have worked out for you a statesman and a philosopher.

Soc Be it so. But shall we say we have thus heard this from you, the most powerful in calculations and geometry?

The. How, Socrates?

Soc. As having put down each of these men of equal worth. who are in value more removed from each other than accords with the analogy of your art.

The. By our god Ammon,[1] Socrates, you have well and justly, and very rememberingly[2] reproved me for my error in calculation. But I will follow you up about this at a future time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be faint-hearted in gratifying us; but select for us either first a

[1] Theodorus, who was a mathematician of Cyrene, is feigned to swear by Jupiter Amm-on, (literally, "Sand-Being,) the tutelary deity of his native city, situated on the confines of the sandy desert of Libya.

[2] Edd. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν μνημονικῶς.* This I cannot understand. The sense required seems to be, "and you have very kindly reproved me, forgetful with respect to the error in calculation." At all events *μὲν οὖν* could not be found in this member of the sentence; while *μνημονικῶς* belongs to *ἁμάρτημα* rather than to *ἐπέπληξας.*

statesman, or a philosopher; and having selected go through (the discussion).

Guest. This must be done, Theodorus; for since we have put our hand to this discussion, we must not stand aloof, till we arrive at the end of it. But what must I do with Theætetus here?

The. As regards what?

Guest. Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates[3] here, his fellow-combatant? Or how do you advise?

The. Take him, as you say, in his stead. For, both being young men, they will after resting easily endure every labour.

Soc. And indeed, O guest, both of them appear almost to have an affinity with me from some quarter. For you say that one of them (Theætetus) seems to resemble me in the natural form of his face;[4] and the appellation of the other, being of the same name as myself, and his address[5] furnish a kind of family connexion. It is meet then for us to recognise always with readiness in conversation those of the same kin. Now yesterday I mingled in a conversation with Theætetus,[6] and I have now heard him answering; but neither (case applies) to Socrates (here). It is meet, however, for us to consider him likewise. Let him then at some other time answer me, but at present you.

Guest. Be it so. Do you, Socrates (junior), hear this Socrates?

Soc. jun. I do.

Guest. Do you then agree to what he says?

Soc. jun. Entirely.

Guest. It appears then, that your affairs will not be an hinderance; and perhaps it is requisite for me to be much less an hinderance. But after the sophist[7] it is necessary, as it appears to me, for us to seek out the statesman. [2.] Tell me then, whether must we place this (character) too among the possessors of knowledge, or how?

[3] Respecting this Socrates junior see Sophist, § 6, and Theætet. § 13.

[4] See Theætet. § 5.

[5] As κλῆσις and πρόσρησις have the same meaning, it is evident that Plato did not write both those words; but which of them he did write, is not quite so clear.

[6] From hence it appears that the present dialogue is feigned to have taken place the day after that in which the Theætetus occurred.

[7] This dialogue was written, then, after the Sophist.

Soc. jun. In this way.[8]

Guest. We must then divide the sciences, as (we did) when we were inquiring into the former (character).

Soc. jun. Perhaps so.

Guest. But yet the division appears to me, Socrates, to be not after the same manner.

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. But after another.

Soc. jun. It would seem so.

Guest. Where then can one find the statesman's path? For find it we must; and separating it from the rest, put on it the seal of one (general) form, and on the other deflections the mark of another species; and thus cause our soul to conceive that all the sciences do in reality belong to two species.

Soc. jun. I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.

Guest. But indeed, Socrates, it must needs be yours too, when it becomes apparent to us.

Soc. jun. You speak well.

Guest. Are not then arithmetic, and certain other sciences allied to this, divested of action; and do they not afford a subject of thought alone?

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. But those which pertain to carpenter's work, and the whole of handicraft trades, possess a science, as it were, innate in their operations, and at the same time complete the bodies produced by them, which had not an existence previously.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. In this manner then divide sciences in general, calling one practical and the other merely intellectual.

Soc. jun. Let there be then of one whole science two species.

Guest. Whether then shall we lay down the statesman, the king, the despot, and the head of a household, and call them all by one name? Or shall we say there are as many sciences as have been their mentioned names? Or rather follow me hither.

[8] To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. Ficinus has correctly, "Utrum hunc in eorum, qui scientes dicuntur, numerum referre deceat? Decet—" omitting ἢ πῶς.

Soc. jun. Whither?

Guest. On this road. If a private person is able to give advice sufficiently well to any of the public physicians,[9] is it not necessary for him to be called by the name of the art, the same as he is, to whom he gives advice.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. What then, whatever private person is skilled in giving advice to the king of a country, shall we not say that he possesses the science, which the ruler himself ought to possess?

Soc. jun. We shall.

Guest. But surely the science of a true king is a kingly (science).

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And may not he, who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a king, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, king-like.

Soc. jun. Justly so.

Guest. And are not the head of a household and a despot the same?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what, will the size of an extensive household or the swollen form[10] of a small state make any difference as regards the government?

Soc. jun. Not at all.

Guest. It is evident then, what is indeed the thing we were just now inquiring, that there is one science respecting all these. But whether any one calls it the science of a king, a statesman, or a family-man, let us not differ about it.

Soc. jun. Why should we?

[3.] *Guest.* This too is evident, that each individual[11] king

[9] By comparing this and some other passages of Plato and of Xenophon, M. S. iv. 2, 5, Aristotle, Polit. ii. 4, Strabo iv. p. 125, and Schol. on Aristoph. Αχ. 1029, quoted by Casaubon, Schneider, and Boeckh, Œcon. Athen. i. p. 132, it appears that there was at Athens a body of medical men paid by the state, as well as those in private practice.

[10] Instead of *μεγάλης σχῆμα—σμικρᾶς—ὄγκος*, one would have expected *μεγάλης ὄγκος—σμικρᾶς σχῆμα*: for *ὄγκος* applies rather to a thing of large size than a small one.

[11] Stalbaum renders *ἅπας* "unusquisque," a meaning that word never has. The train of thought requires *βασιλεὺς πᾶς αὐτὸς*, in lieu of *βασιλεὺς ἅπας*, "every king by himself." Compare a little below *ἀρχιτεκτων πᾶς αὐτὸς*.

has in his hands, and the whole of his body, some little power towards retaining his rule, as compared with the intelligence and strength of his soul.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. Are you willing then for us to say that a king is more allied to intellectual than to manual and wholly practical science?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. We will then put together in the same (class) statesmanship and a statesman, kingship and a king, as being all one thing.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. Shall we not proceed then in an orderly manner, if after this we divide the intellectual science?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can perceive any point of union?[12]

Soc. jun. Tell me of what kind.

Guest. Of this kind. We have a certain calculating art.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And this I think entirely belongs to the intellectual arts.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Shall we concede to the calculating art, that knows the difference in numbers, any thing more than that it distinguishes things, the subjects of intellect.

Soc. jun. How should we?

Guest. For every architect is not a workman himself, but is the ruler over workmen.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And he imparts indeed intellect, but not the work by hand.

Soc. jun. Just so.

Guest. He may justly then be said to have a share in intellectual science.

Soc. jun. Entirely.

Guest. And for him I think it is fitting, after he has

[12] Instead of *διαφυγήν*, Heindorf, on Phædon. p. 98. C., suggested, what has been subsequently found in three MSS., *διαφυήν* –a word applied to the knotty parts of a blade of straw, and to the union of bones and joints.

passed a judgment, not to have an end, nor to be freed, as the calculator was freed (from doing more), but to command every workman (to do) that which is suited to him, until they shall have worked out what has been commanded.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Are not then all such as these, and such as are consequent upon the calculating art, intellectual? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and commandment?

Soc. jun. They appear to do so.

Guest. If then we should divide the whole of the intellectual science into two parts, and call the one mandatory, and the other judicial, should we not say that we have made a careful division?

Soc. jun. Yes, according to my mind.

Guest. But for those, who do any thing in common, it is delightful to be of one mind.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. As far then as we participate[13] on this point, we must bid farewell to the opinions of others.

[4.] *Soc. jun.* Why not?

Guest. Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place the kingly character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as some spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, as being a despot?

Soc. jun. How not rather in this?

Guest. We may consider again the commanding art, whether it stands in any way apart. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster is separated from his, who sells his own goods,[14] so is the genus of a king from the genus of public criers.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Hucksters, having received the previously sold works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. The tribe of criers too, after receiving the thoughts of strangers, enjoins them again to others.

[13] I suspect there is some error in *κοινωνῶμεν*, which it were easy to correct if requisite.

[14] On the difference between the *κάπηλος* and *αὐτοπώλης*, see Sophist, § 18.

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. What then, shall we mix in the same (class) the king-art, and that of the interpreting, ordering, prophesying, and public-crying, and many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now instituted a resemblance (in things), we should make a resemblance in the name likewise? since the genus of those, who rule their own concerns, is nearly without a name; and shall we so divide these, by placing the kingly genus among those, who command their own concerns, and by neglecting every thing else, leave any one to put another name on them? For our method was (adopted) for the sake of a ruler, and not for its contrary.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[5.] *Guest.* Since then this stands at a moderate distance apart from those, and is separated from that, which is foreign, into that which is domestic, it is necessary to divide this again, if we have yet any yielding[15] section in this.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me and divide.

Soc. jun. Whither?

Guest. Shall we not find that all such as we conceive to be rulers, do, by making use of a command, give a command for the sake of producing something?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And indeed it is not at all difficult for all things that are produced, to receive a twofold division.

Soc. jun. In what way?

Guest. Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Soc. jun. They are so.

Guest. If we wish to cut the portion of intelligence, that has a commanding power over these very things, we will cut[16] it.

[15] Instead of *ὑπείκουσαν*, some one, says Stalbaum, wished to read *ὑπάρχουσαν*: which would certainly make a somewhat clearer sense. But I confess I do not very well see the meaning of the whole of this speech, and especially of the words *ἀλλοτρίητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα*.

[16] Instead of *τεμοῦμεν*, Ficinus found in his MS. *τέμωμεν*, as shown by his "secemus." One would prefer, however, *τέμοιμεν ἄν*, "If we wish to cut, we can."

Soc. jun. According to what?

Guest. By assigning one part over the generation of inanimate things, and the other over the generation of animated. And thus the whole will be divided into two parts.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. One part then let us put aside, and take up again the other; and after taking it up, divide the whole into two parts.

Soc. jun. But which of these do you say is to be resumed?

Guest. By all means, that which has a command over animals. For it is not the province of the kingly science to have a command over things inanimate, like the science of architecture; but, being of a more noble nature, over animals; and it ever possesses a power relating to such very things.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. (With respect to) the generation and nurture of animals, a person may see the former as single-feeding, but the latter as the common-feeding of the nurslings in herds.[17]

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But we shall find that the statesman is not a breeder of his own property, like an ox-driver, or some horse-currier;[18] but is rather like the person who rears horses and oxen.

Soc. jun. What has been just said seems to be the fact.

Guest. Whether then (with respect to) the nurture of animals, shall we call the common-rearing of all together a herd-rearing, or a certain general-rearing.

Soc. jun. Whichever may happen in the discourse.

[6.] *Guest.* You (have said) well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying too serious an attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in prudence. But now we must do as you recommended. But do you understand how some one will, having divided the herd-rearing art into two,

[17] On this mass of nonsense Stalbaum says, as usual, not a word; nor does he notice even the remarkable version of Ficinus, "Circa generationem nutritionemque animalium cura duplex invenitur; animalis cujusdam una; gregis totius altera." By uniting the Gr ek and the Latin, one might perhaps recover, without difficulty, the very words of the author.

[18] Here again Ficinus exhibits a curious variation from the text found at present in the Greek. "Civilis autem non propriam curam aggreditur, quemadmodum arator, qui bovem agitat, vel minister, qui sternit equum;" from whence Cornarius was the first to elicit *ἰδιοτρόφον*, in lieu of *ἰδιότροπον*, found in all the MSS. but a solitary one at Paris.

cause, what is now sought for in a double, to be sought for then in halves?[19]

Soc. jun. I shall be eager (to do so): and it appears to me that there is one rearing of men, and another of beasts.

Guest. You have divided in every respect most readily and courageously. However, (we must be careful) to the utmost of our power not to suffer hereafter this.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That we do not take away one small part as applicable to many and great parts, nor yet without a species; but let it always have at the same time a species. For it is very well to separate immediately the thing sought for from all the rest, if the separation be rightly made; just as you did a little before, through conceiving the division to be rightly made, hasten on, seeing that the discourse was tending to man. But, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtlety;[20] but it is more safe to proceed in the middle[21] by dividing (continually); for thus will one more (readily)[22] meet with forms (of existence). But the whole of this relates[23] to our inquiries.

Soc. jun. How say you this, O guest?

Guest. I must endeavour to speak yet more clearly, through a kind feeling towards your disposition,[24] Socrates. But it is impossible in the subject at hand to show what is now

[19] Such is Stalbaum's version of the Greek text. Both are equally beyond my comprehension; and so is the Latin of Ficinus: "Sed nunquid vides, quo pacto quis, gregis nutritionem geminam ostendens, efficiat ut, quod in duplis ad id, quod nunc propositum est, investigabitur, in dimidiis iterum perquiratur." By following however the train of thought, and adopting the alterations to which it leads, one might perhaps recover what Plato wrote.

[20] Ficinus has, "ad extremum quiddam et tenue protinus adventare."

[21] So Ovid, "medio tutissimus ibis."

[22] Ficinus has "facilius meliusque," as if he had found in his MS. *κἀλλιον καὶ μᾶλλον*, as a little below, *κάλλιον δέ ποι καὶ μᾶλλον*.

[23] To prove that *διαφέρειν*, which is elsewhere "to differ," is here "to refer," Stalbaum quotes Xenophon Œconom. 20. 16, *μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς τὸ λυσιτελεῖν γεωργίαν*—not aware that the author wrote *μέγα δὴ φέρειν*, and Plato perhaps ΔΙΑΝ *φέρει*, not ΔΙΑ*φέρει*.

[24] Such is Stalbaum's version. But *εὔνοια* is generally followed by a dative, as in Eurip. Tro. 7, *Εὔνοια—πόλει*. Orest. 858, *εὔνοιαν πατρί*. Isocrat. *εὔνοιαν—τοῖς πραττομένοις*. Demosth. Olynth. ii. *εὔνοιαν τῇ πόλει*. Coron. *εὔνοιαν—τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν*. Midian. *τὴν εὔνοιαν—τῇ πατρίδι*.

said in a manner wanting in nothing; still we must endeavour, for the sake of perspicuity, to carry on the inquiry a little further.

Soc. jun. In what respect then do you say we have, by dividing, just now not rightly done?

Guest. In this respect; that, should any one attempt to give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide, in the way that the majority here divide. For by separating the Grecian genus, as one apart from all, they give to all the rest, who are innumerable, unmixt, and not speaking the same language with each other, one name, that of a Barbarian race; and through this one name they fancy the race itself to be one; or as if some one, thinking that number should be divided into two species, should, after cutting off ten thousand from all numbers, put it aside as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that, through that appellation, this genus will become separate and different from the other. He however would make in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and[25] a two-fold division, who should divide number into even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and, after arranging the Lydians or Phrygians, or some other nations, should then separate them into wholes, when he is incapable of finding the genus, and at the same time the species of each of the divided portions.

[7.] *Soc. jun.* Most right. But (explain),[26] O guest, this very thing—How can any one rather clearly know that genus and species are not the same, but different from each other?

Guest. O Socrates, thou best of men, thou commandest no trifling thing. Already have we wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fitting; and yet you order us to wander still further. Now then let us, as is reasonable, turn back again; and hereafter we will at leisure pursue this point, as having come upon the track. Do not, however, by any means guard against this,[27] that you have heard from me this point clearly determined.

[25] Sauppe would omit *καὶ* before *δίχα*.

[26] Ficinus has, "At illud—ostende," which leads to *ἀλλ᾽ λέγε καὶ*, in lieu of *ἀλλὰ γὰρ*—

[27] The common text exhibits a combination of words at variance with correct Greek, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε—φυλάξαι*. For *οὐ μὴν* are

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That species and part are different from each other.

Soc. jun. Why (say you) so?

Guest. When any thing is a species of some thing, it is necessary for it to be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but there is no necessity for a part to be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.

Soc. jun. Be it so.

Guest. But tell me that, which is after this.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. The point of the digression which has brought us hither. For I think it was especially at that point, when, on your being asked how we must divide herd-rearing, you answered very readily, that there were two kinds of animals, the one of man, and the other of brutes taken all together.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. And you then appeared to me, after taking away a part, to think that you ought to leave[28] the remainder as one genus of all (brutes), because you could give to them all the same name, by calling them brutes.

Soc. jun. Such was the case.

Guest. But this, O most courageous of men, is just as if some other prudent[29] animal, such as seems to be the crane, or some other animal of a similar kind, should, in the same manner as you do, oppose the cranes, as one race, to all other animals, and make itself an object of respect; and, putting all the rest together with men into one race, call them perhaps nothing else but brutes. Let us then endeavour to avoid every thing whatsoever of this kind.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may suffer the less.

Soc. jun. For there is no necessity.

never united to an imperative; nor does ἀλλά, as far as I remember, ever follow οὐ μήν. To avoid the difficulty, Ficinus omits οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, and makes Plato write something like sense.

[28] Ficinus has, "putavisse ponendum," as if he had found in his MS. not καταλιπεῖν, but καταλειπτέον εἶναι, what the sense manifestly requires. After verbals in —τέον, εἶναι is thus found perpetually.

[29] Plato had probably in his mind the expression φρονιμώτατος, as

Guest. For we then erred in this way.

Soc. jun. In what?

Guest. Such part of intellectual science as related to commanding was (said) by us to be of the animal-rearing kind, as regards gregarious animals. Was it not?

Soc. jun. It was.

Guest. The whole animal genus, therefore, was even then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that have a nature to become gentle, are called tame; but those that have not, are (called) wild.

Soc. jun. Correctly.

Guest. But the science, of which we are in the hunt, was and is in the case of tame animals, and is to be sought for among the gregarious rearlings.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Let us then not divide, as formerly, looking to all animals, nor with haste, so that we may quickly arrive at state-science. For this has caused us to suffer even now according to the proverb—[30]

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. By not well dividing[31] quietly, to complete (the task) more slowly.

Soc. jun. And it has, O guest, properly caused (us to suffer).

[8.] *Guest.* Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common-rearing (of animals). For perhaps the discourse itself, being brought to a conclusion, will more clearly unfold what you desire. But tell me—

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. This; if indeed you have frequently[32] heard it from

[30] The proverb was, perhaps, Οὐχ ἥσυχοι βραδύτερον ἀνύτουσιν, similar to the Latin "Festina lente," according to Stalbaum; who, to avoid the doubled tribrach and to preserve the Attic form, should have suggested *βράδιον* and added *πόδες* to complete the verse.

[31] As there is nothing in the proverb to which Plato alludes, relating to "well dividing," C. Badham has, in The Surplice, No. 32, for July 4, 1846, suggested *ὀδοιποροῦντας* in lieu of *εὖ διαιροῦντας*; which led me, in No. 33, to propose *ἡσύχως πόδ' αἴροντας*—a form of expression found in MSS., or, from conjecture, in Hecub. 950, *πόδα—αἴροντι*. Phœn. 1034, *πόδ' αἴρουσ'*. Herc. F. 882, *Νῦν θὲς πόδ'. αἶρε κῶλον*. 868, *Στεῖχ' Ὀλύμπονδ' αὖ, πόδ' αἴρουσ'*, Ἶρι. Ip. *Γίγνομαι κποδών*. Phaethont. Fr., *Ἐκτόπιοί τε δόμων πόδ' ἀείρατε*.

[32] In the phrase, *εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις*, Heindorf on Phædon. p. 60, e., says

certain persons. For I do not think you have met with the tame-fish places in the Nile, or in the royal lakes. But perhaps you have seen the taming of these in (artificial) fountains.

Soc. jun. I have seen these frequently, and I have heard of those from many.

Guest. You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are reared, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. On this account I have asked you all these questions, because the rearing of herds of animals is partly of those moving[33] in the water, and partly on dry land.

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. Does it not then appear to you likewise, that we ought to cut in two the common-rearing science, [distributing to each of them its own part,[34]] and call the one a rearing-in-moisture, and the other a rearing-on-dry-land.

Soc. jun. (It does so appear) to me.

Guest. But we will not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts king-science belongs. For it is evident to every one.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And every one can separate the dry-rearing portion of the herd-rearing.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Into the flying and walking-on-foot.

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. But what of state-science, must it be inquired whether it relates to the walking-on-foot? Or do you not think, that the most stupid person, so to say, would imagine so?

Soc. jun. I do.

Guest. But it is requisite to show that the art of rearing foot-walking (animals) is, as number was just now, cut into two parts.

that πολλάκις means "perchance." But how πολλάκις, "frequently," could have such a meaning, it is difficult to understand. Plato wrote ὃ δη, to which οὐδὲ for εἰ, in one MS., plainly leads.

[33] In lieu of ἔννδρον, Athenæus, in iii. p. 99, B., gives another reading, ὑδροβατικόν. My friend Buckley would form the two into ἐνυδροβατικόν.

[34] All the words between brackets are omitted by Ficinus.

Soc. jun. This is evident.

Guest. And yet to the part, to which our discourse has led us on, there seem to be some two paths extending themselves: the one quicker, by being divided, a small part as compared with a large one; but the other longer, from preserving rather the precept, which we mentioned before, that we ought to cut as much as possible through the middle. It is in our power then to proceed by either of the paths we may wish.

Soc. jun. Is it then impossible to proceed by both?

Guest. What by both at once, O wonderful youth? Alternately, however, it is plain the thing is possible.

Soc. jun. I choose then both alternately.

Guest. The thing is easy; since short is the remainder (of the road). In the beginning indeed and middle of our journey the command[35] would have been difficult. But now, since this seems good, let us first proceed by the longer road. For, as we are fresh, we shall more easily journey through it. But do you look to the division.

[9.] *Soc. jun.* Speak it.

Guest. Of such tame animals as are gregarious, the foot-walking have been divided by us according to nature.

Soc. jun. What (nature)?

Guest. By some of their race being hornless and others horned.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. Divide then the art of rearing foot-walking animals, and assign to each part,[36] making use of reason. For should you wish to name them, the thing will become complicated more than is fitting.

Soc. jun. How then must one speak (of them)?

Guest. Thus. Of the science of rearing foot-walking animals, divided into two parts, let one portion be assigned to the horned part of the herd, but the other to the hornless.

[35] As no command had been given, C. Badham, in The Surplice, quoted in n. 31, would read *πρᾶγμα*.

[36] After "part," some word is evidently wanting. Ficinus has "utriusque partis conditionem sermone describe." Perhaps *ὅρον* has dropt out after *μέρει*. Stalbaum translates *λόγῳ χρώμενος* "using a definition." But he does not say what now is to fill the lacuna.

Soc. jun. Let this be so said: for they have been sufficiently shown to be so.

Guest. Now then the king is evidently the shepherd over a flock of animals deprived of horns.

Soc. jun. For how is he not evident?

Guest. Breaking then this (herd) into portions, let us endeavour to assign the result[37] to him (the king).

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Whether then are you willing for us to divide it (the herd) by the cloven, or, what is called, the solid hoof? Or by a common or individual generation? For you understand.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the race of horses and asses naturally procreate with each other.

Soc. jun. It does.

Guest. But the other still remaining portion of the smooth[38]-haired herd of tame animals, is unmixed in their generation with each other.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But whether does the Statesman appear to take care of animals having a common, or individual generation?

Soc. jun. It is evident of the unmixed (generation).

Guest. We must then, as it seems, divide this, as those before, into two parts.

Soc. jun. Yes; we must.

Guest. But we have cut into minute portions nearly every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs[39] among gregarious cattle.

[37] Stalbaum explains *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, the emendation of Cornarius, by "what is belonging to." The expression means rather "what is produced" by the breaking. The word in Latin would be "proventus." Ficinus has "quod movetur," answering to *τὸ κινούμενον*, found in all the MSS. but one; and even there *γινο* is merely a reading over *κινούμενον*, which would lead to *ἰκνούμενον*, "the result."

[38] Stalbaum after Bekker has adopted from four MSS. *λείας*, in lieu of *μιᾶς*, and refers to Cratyl. p. 406, A., where *ἥμερον τε καὶ λεῖον* are united and opposed to *τραχύ*. But *λεῖος* is here rather "smooth-haired," or "without manes," such as kine are. Ficinus acknowledges neither *μιᾶς* nor *λείας* in his version. "Reliqua vero domestica et socialis generis animalia, sine aliena commixtione, propria tantum ex specie procreant."

[39] Why dogs should be excluded, if they are gregarious, it is difficult to say; and if they are not, it is still more difficult to explain, why Plato mentioned them at all. Ficinus has "genus [illegible]

Soc. jun. It is not. But in what manner shall we divide these two?

Guest. In that, by which it is just for you and Theætetus to divide them, since you are handling the science of geometry.

Soc. jun. In what manner?

Guest. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.[40]

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Is the nature, which the race of us men possesses, adapted to locomotion in any other way than as a diameter, which is two feet in power?[40]

Soc. jun. In no other way.

Guest. Moreover the nature of the remaining genus is again according to the power of our power, a diameter, if it naturally consists of twice two feet.

Soc. jun. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to show.

Guest. But in addition to these, do we perceive, Socrates, something else belonging to those having a reputation for laughter,[41] which happened to us in making the former division?

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. This our human race, sharing the same lot and running the same course with a race the most generous[42] and most handy of existing (animals).

bilia pecora numerare non decet," as if he found in his MS. *τὸ γὰρ τῶν γ' ἄνωθ'*, (i. e. *ἀνθρώπων*).

[40]—[40] Others may perhaps, but I cannot, understand what is meant by the diameter of a diameter; except by saying, as Stalbaum has in part suggested, that as the diagonal of a square of one foot is two square feet, a man with two feet is compared to the diagonal of such a square; and hat as a four-footed animal is in that respect the double of a two-footed one, it may be called the diameter of a diameter. I suspect, however, that the whole passage has come down to us in a very imperfect state.

[41] The expression *τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα εὐδοκιμησάντων*, seems very strange in Greek. Ficinus has merely "risu dignum." Plato wrote perhaps *τῶν παρ' Ἰνδοῖς κινησάντων γέλωτα*—

[42] Of this utterly unintelligible word different emendations have been suggested by different scholars. Stalbaum alone has had the hardihood to attempt to defend a mass of nonsense by comparing *γενναιοτάτῳ καὶ εὐχρειστάτῳ* in this place, with *τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχρείας* in Rep. iv. p. 426, D. But even he is unable to tell what is the animal to which Plato alludes. Winckelmann suspected it was the monkey. But he failed to see that the author wrote *γελοιοτάτῳ*, which was first proposed

Soc. jun. I perceive it happening very absurdly too.[43]

Guest. Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?[44]

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous, when running together with the herd,[45] and performing his course in conjunction with him, who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.[45]

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

by C. Badham in The Surplice, No. 32, July 4, 1846, which I supported in No. 33, by quoting Hipp. Maj. p. 289, A., where Plato compares man to a monkey, as Heracleitus had done before him; who said that the most beautiful monkey would appear an ugly creature, when compared with a man; and so, says Plato, the wisest of men would be no better than a monkey, when compared with the Creator. And it was in allusion to this doctrine of Heracleitus, that Ennius said, as we learn from Cicero, "Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis." It will however be objected, perhaps, that monkeys do not herd together, nor converse with their keepers. But the monkey is known in its natural state to be a gregarious animal; and though their talk is not intelligible to man, their chatter, no doubt, is to each other. Besides, in this allusion to a monkey in a dialogue relating to Statesmanship, Plato had in mind, I suspect, an Æsopo-Socratic fable preserved in the prose of the Progymnasmata of Hermogenes to the following effect—The monkeys came together to consult about the necessity of fixing their dwelling in a city. After they had so decreed, and were about to put their hands to the work, an old monkey stopped them by saying that they would be caught still easier, should they shut themselves up within enclosures.—To the same fable there is an allusion in the Gorgias, p. 481, F., *ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἕλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί*; where, since *ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι* have not a particle of meaning, it is evident that Plato wrote, *ὥσπερ αἵ γε Μιμὼ αἱ πολιτικαι*. For *Μιμὼ* is the synonyme of *Πίθηκος*, as shown by Suidas, *Πίθηκος· ἡ Μιμώ*. With regard to *εὐχερεστάτῳ*, since man is, according to the theory of Helvetius, "the handy animal," and called by that name, from the Latin *man-us*, "hand," the same epithet may be fairly applied to the monkey, whose hand, both in form and power, is very similar to that of man; and whose very name, "monkey," is only a corruption of "mannikin," the diminutive of "man."

[43] In lieu of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has, "Cerno, et quidem clare, quod sequitur;" which leads distinctly to *καθορῶ καὶ μάλ' εὖ τό πωϛ ξυμβαῖνον*, instead of *μάλ' ἀτόπως*.

[44] I confess I do not see the relevancy of this remark; the words seem to contain a Choliambic verse spoken of the tortoise, *Οὐκ εἰκὸς ἕστατ' ἦν βράδιστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι*.

[45]—[45] Here again are some words, which having not the least connexion with what precedes, plainly prove that something has dropt out; to say nothing of the literal errors to be found in them.

Guest. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent, which was said by us in our search for a sophist.[46]

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. That in such a method of discourse there is no greater care for what is venerable, than what is not, nor does it prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which according to itself is most true.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. After this, that you may not anticipate me by asking what is the shorter road to the definition of a king, shall I traverse it the first?

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. I say then, that we ought to have divided forthwith the foot-walking genus into the biped and quadruped; and, seeing that the human race shared the same lot with the flying genus alone, we ought to have again divided the two-footed into the wingless and winged; and this division having been made, and the art shown, which is the rearer of men, we ought to have brought forward and placed over it the statesman and kingly character, like a charioteer, and given him the reins of the city,[47] in consequence of this science being peculiarly his own.

Soc. jun. You have (spoken) beautifully, and given me an account, as it were, of a debt,[48] and added a digression, by way of interest, and completed (the transaction).

[10.] *Guest.* Come then, let us, going back to the beginning, connect with the end the discourse concerning the name of the statesman's art.

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. One part then of intellectual science was at the beginning the commanding; and the part assimilated to this was called the self-commanding. Again, of the self-commanding, the rearing of animals was cut off, as not the smallest part of the genera; and of the rearing of animals, the rearing of herds was a species; and of the rearing of herds, (a part) was the care of foot-walking animals; and of the care

[46] The passage of the Sophist alluded to is in p. 227, A. § 26.

[47] On the phrase, *τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡνίας*, Stalbaum refers to Aristoph. Eccl. 466, Eq. 1109, and Boissonad on Marin. p. 81.

[48] Instead of *καθαπερεὶ χρέος*, the sense evidently requires *καθάπερ τον χρέους*. For *λόγος* is here "an account," not "a speech."

of foot-walking animals, the science of rearing the hornless race was especially cut off. But of this again, it is necessary to connect a part, not less than the triple, if any one is desirous of bringing it under one name, by calling it the science of tending an unmixed genius. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which rears men, as being a biped flock, is the part which has been just now explored, and is called, at one and the same time, the kingly and statesmanly kind.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Do you then, Socrates, think that this has been, as you say, really done well?

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the thing proposed has been in every respect sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this very thing, that the account has been given in words, but not in all respects worked out to the end?

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. I will endeavour to explain to ourselves more clearly what I am thinking of.

Soc. jun. Say it.

Guest. There is then of many herdsmen's arts, that have appeared to us, one, the statesman's, and the guardianship of some one herd.

Soc. jun. There is.

Guest. This our discourse has defined to be neither the rearer of horses, nor of other animals, but to be the science of rearing men in common.

[11.] *Soc. jun.* It did so.

Guest. Now let us see what is the difference between all herdsmen and kings.

Soc. jun. What is it?

Guest. If any one of the rest,[49] possessing the name of another art, says and pretends to be the rearer in common of the herd, (what should we say)?[50]

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Just as if all merchants, and husbandmen, and pur-

[49] I confess I cannot understand τῶν ἄλλων here, nor τῆς ἀγελῆς just afterwards; although Stalbaum says the sense is plain from what follows.

[50] These words Taylor added from Ficinus, "quid dicendum?"

veyors of food, and besides these, teachers of gymnastics, and the genus of physicians, should, you know that[51] by their speeches oppose altogether the herdsmen of the human race, whom we have called statesmen, and assert that it is their care to rear men, and not only men herded together, but even the rulers themselves—

Soc. jun. Would they not rightly say?

Guest. Perhaps so. And we will consider this too. We know that no one will contend with a herdsman about things of this kind; since he is himself the rearer, himself the physician, and himself, as it were, the bridesman (of the herd), and is alone skilled in the midwife's art respecting the birth and delivery of the produce.[52] No one, besides, is better able, by such sport and music as cattle can, by their nature, share in, to console and soothe, and render gentle, both with instruments and the naked mouth, handling in the best way the music of his flock.[53] And the same may be said of other herdsmen. Or may it not?

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. How then will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, when we place him alone, as the herdsman and rearer of the human herd, selecting him alone out of ten thousand others contending with him?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Did we not then a little before very properly fear, when we suspected, lest we should only speak of a certain figure of a king, and not perfectly work out the statesman, until by taking away those, who were diffused around him, and laid claim to a fellow-rearing, and, by separating him from them, we should exhibit him alone and pure?

Soc. jun. Most rightly (did we fear).

Guest. This then, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we are about to bring disgrace upon our discourse at its end.

[51] The phrase, *οἶσθ' ὅτι*, is here manifestly absurd, and omitted by Ficinus. Two MSS. read, *οἶδ' ὅτι*, from which nothing is to be gained.

[52] Instead of *τῶν γιγνομένων* one would prefer *τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων*, "of the increasing produce."

[53] That Plato thus repeated *μουσικὴν* after the preceding *μουσικῆς*, I for one will never believe; and still less that any Greek author would have written, *τὴν τῆς ποίμνης μουσικήν*. The whole passage has been corrupted by design rather than accident, and might perhaps be emended by a critic, conversant with the customs of ancient times.

Soc. jun. But this at least must by no means be done.

12.] *Guest.* We must then march by another road again from another beginning.

Soc. jun. By what road?

Guest. By mixing up almost some merriment. For it is requisite to make use of the prolix portion of a long story, and, as regards what still remains, to take away, as we did before, always a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit of the inquiry. Must we not do so?

Soc. jun. Certainly.

Guest. Give then, as children do, entirely your attention to my story; (for)[54] you are not altogether flying from many years[55] of merriment.

Soc. jun. Relate it.

Guest. Of the things then said of old, there have been, and will be still, many others (preserved), and the prodigy likewise relating to the reported contests between Atreus and Thyestes. For you have surely heard and remember what is then said to have happened.

Soc. jun. Perhaps you mean the prodigy respecting the golden ewe.

Guest. By no means; but respecting the change in the rising and setting of the sun, and of the other constellations, how that they set then at the very place from whence they now rise, and rose from the opposite one;[56] and that the deity gave a testimony in favour of Atreus, and changed (the heavens)[57] into the present figure.

Soc. jun. This too is reported.

Guest. And we have likewise heard from many of the kingdom over which Kronos (Saturn) ruled.

Soc. jun. We have from very many.

[54] Ficinus alone has "enim," required to supply the asyndeton.

[55] Instead of ἔτη, Plato wrote, I suspect, ἔπη, "words;" and in lieu of πολλά, Stalbaum would read πολύ: the error is in πάντως rather, which it would not be difficult to correct.

[56] In this solution of the story is to be found the germ of the notion of modern geologists, that the position of the poles of the earth has been changed at some very remote period.

[57] Ficinus has "in hanc cœli figuram mutavit," which is more intelligible than the Greek μετέβαλεν αὐτὸ (one MS. αὐτὸν) ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα: unless we read τὸ νῦν οὐνοῦ (i. e. οὐρανοῦ). As regards the story Stalbaum refers to Orest. 800 and 989. Add. Iph. T. 187.

Guest. And that the men of former times were produced earth-born, and not begotten from each other ?[58]

Soc. jun. This too is one of the things said of old.

Guest. All these things then arose from the same circumstance, and in addition to these ten thousand others, and still more wonderful. But, through the length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are told in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that which is the cause of this to all these, no person has told as yet; and it must be now told; for being told it will be something conspicuous for showing forth the king.

[13.] *Soc. jun.* You have spoken most beautifully. Say on then, and omit nothing.

Guest. Hear, then. This universe the deity does at one time conduct himself, as it proceeds, and with it rolls on; but at another leaves it, when its revolutions shall have received the measure of the fitting time; and it is then brought back again of its own accord to a contrary state, being a thing of life, and having a share of intelligence from him, who put it together at its outset. Now this movement backwards has been of necessity implanted in it through this.

Soc. jun. Through what ?

Guest. To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, belongs to the most divine of all things alone. But the nature of body is not of this order. But that, which we have called heaven and the world, has a share in many and blessed (gifts) from the producing (cause); moreover,[59] it has had a share of body; from whence it cannot be entirely without a share of change; nevertheless, according to its power it is moved as much as possible in the same, and according to the same, by one impetus. Hence it is allotted a revolving movement, as being the smallest change in its motion. But scarcely any thing is able to turn itself by itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful for this to move at one time in one way, and at another in a contrary way. From all this then we must say,

[58] This is a strange expression; as if both children were begotten by their parents, and parents by their children. Plato wrote, ἐξ ἑπαλλήλων—"from one after the other in succession," and similarly in § 15.

[59] I confess I do not understand ἀτὰρ οὖν δή—γε—a combination of particles not to be found, I suspect, elsewhere.

that the world does not always cause itself to revolve, nor that the whole is always made by the deity to revolve in two and contrary revolutions: nor, again, that some two deities, whose thoughts are contrary to each other, cause it to revolve; but what has been said just now, and remains alone, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, possessing the power to live again, and receiving an immortality prepared by the demiurgus; but that at another time, when it is let loose, it proceeds itself by itself; and, after being thus let loose for such[60] a time as to perform back again many myriads of revolutions, it proceeds by its being of the greatest size, and most equally balanced, to move at the smallest foot.[61]

Soc. jun. All that you have gone through appears to be said very reasonably indeed.

[14.] *Guest.* Reasoning then from what has been said already, let us think together on the circumstance, which we stated was the cause of all these wonderful doings. For it is this very thing.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the movement of the universe is at one time carried on, as it is at present, in a circle, and at another time in the contrary direction.

Soc. jun. How is this?

Guest. We must consider this change of motion to be the greatest and most perfect of all the revolutions, relating to the heavenly bodies.

Soc. jun. It is likely.

Guest. It is proper then to think that the greatest changes happen at that time to us, who are living within the universe.

Soc. jun. And this too is likely.

[60] I have with Sauppe united *τοσοῦτον* to *καιρὸν*, despite the opposition of Stalbaum, who might have found in Ficinus "tali tempore."

[61] I am quite at a loss in the words *ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἴέναι*. For though *βῆ ἴέναι* is constantly found in Homer, yet *βαίνει* is never, I believe, united to *ἴέναι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐπὶ σμικρότατον βῆμα οὐρανοῦ πόλους ἴέναι*, i. e. "to send the poles of heaven on the shortest march." For there would thus be an allusion to the theory, that the whole system of the universe had a progressive movement in space, but of so slow a kind, that it took about 120,000 years to complete the great year, when every thing was brought back to the point from whence the system first started. Respecting the loss or confusion of *οὐρανοῦ πόλους*, I have written something worth reading on Æsch. Suppl. 24, and I could now add not a little more equally valuable.

Guest. But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty changes great, numerous, and of all kinds?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Hence the greatest destruction of other animals necessarily takes place at that time, and that of the human race only some small portion remains. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances happen at the same time; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe at that period, when a turn occurs contrary to the present state of things.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. The period of life, which each animal then had, this was first arrested in all; and all that was mortal ceased to be seen advancing to old age, but changing back to the contrary, grew, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs too of older people became black, and the cheeks of those that had beards becoming smooth, brought back each person to the past blooming period of life. The bodies likewise of such as were in manhood's prime, becoming smoother and smaller each day and night, returned again to the nature of a newly-born child, and were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body; and thenceforth wasting away, disappeared in reality entirely;[62] and the corpses of those, who died at that time through violence, did, through undergoing the self-same fate, become in a manner unseen, and in a few days, quite putrid.[62]

[15.] *Soc. jun.* But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and in what manner were they produced from each other?

Guest. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another; but, it is said, there was once an earth-born race; this was at that period restored back again from out the earth; and the tradition of it was remembered by our first progenitors, who were close upon the revolution (that reached to) the period next in order, and were

[62]—[62] Ficinus offers a remarkable variation here. "Cadavera præterea illorum, qui cœlestis mutatione vertiginis subito corruerunt, idem patiuntur, et simili retrogressione clam ac brevi putrescunt," and such in fact is what the context requires; where the mention of violence in the present Greek text is scarcely intelligible

born at the beginning of the present state of things. For they became the heralds to us of those accounts, which are at present disbelieved improperly by the multitude. For I think we ought to reflect together on the consequence. For from the fact of old men coming to the nature of boys, it follows,[63] [64] that of such as were dead, but (not) laid in the earth, the corpses would be put together and made to revive [64] by the turn of production revolving in a contrary direction; and that the earth-born race would, according to this method [65] being necessarily produced, have their name and speech, except such as a deity conveyed (elsewhere), or invested with another fate.[66]

Soc. jun. This really follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life, which you say was under the rule of Kronos (Saturn), did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the change in the position of the stars and the sun coincides with both these revolutions.

Guest. You have followed well the discourse. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present revolution; but it occurred in the former. For then the deity was at first the ruler and guardian of the whole revolving circle; just as now the parts of the world are locally distributed by gods ruling in the very same way. Divine dæmons, too, had a share, after the manner of shepherds, in animals according to genera and herds, each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which

[63] Instead of *ἐχόμενον*, Stalbaum suggests *ἑπόμενον*, to which he was probably led by "consonum" in Ficinus, translated by Taylor, "it follows."

[64]—[64] I have translated this passage, as if the Greek were—*ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων μὲν, κειμένων δ' οὐκ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν νεκροὺς συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους ἔσεσθαι*, instead of *ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὖ, κειμένων δ' ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους—ἔπεσθαι*, words, I confess, beyond my comprehension.

[65] Heusde properly referred to just this place the variation of *τρόπον* for *λόγον*, preserved by Eusebius just afterwards.

[66] The MSS. vary between *ἐκόμισε* and *ἐκόσμησε*. The MS. used by Ficinus united both, as shown by his version "in aliam sortem—transtulit vel exornavit." I have therefore introduced "elsewhere." For *ἄλλοσε* might easily have dropt out before *ἑς ἄλλην*. I suspect, however, that Plato wrote *ἑς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν ἢ ἐκοίμισεν*, i. e. "conveyed to some other fate or put to sleep:" where there is an allusion to the fates respectively of Prometheus and Typhœus.

he presided; so that there was nothing of a wild nature, no eating of each other, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and ten thousand other things might be stated, which follow upon such an arrangement. But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men, has been stated on this account. The deity himself tended them, and was their protector; just as men now, being an animal more divine than others,[67] tend other races meaner than themselves; and as he tended them, there were no forms of state or polity, nor a property in women and children; for all these were restored to life from the earth, and had no recollection of former events.[68] But all such things were absent; they had however fruit in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, not grown by land tilling, but given spontaneously by the earth. They lived, too, for the most part naked, upon no strewed couch, and in the open air; for the temperament of the seasons was not painful to them; theirs were soft beds of grass, springing up without grudging from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you hear what was the life of men under Kronos (Saturn): but you, being present yourself, perceive what is life now, which is said to be under Zeus (Jupiter). But are you able and willing likewise to judge which of these is the happier?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Do you wish then that I should, after a fashion, judge for you?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[16.] *Guest.* If then those nurtured by Kronos (Saturn), when they had so much leisure and the power to converse not only with men, but with brutes likewise, had used all these means for the purposes of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from the rest for the collecting together of prudence, it is easy to judge that the men of that time were ten thousand-fold happier than those of the present. But if, being filled to satiety with meats

[67] I have adopted ἑτέρων, found in one MS., in preference to ἕτερον.

[68] On the other hand Plato, in the Meno and Phædo, says that man's present knowledge is only the recollection of what the soul knew in a previous state of existence, according to the Pythagorean doctrine of the Metempsychosis.

and drinks, they discoursed with each other, and with brutes, in fables[69] such as are now told of them, it is easy, according to my opinion, to prove the very same[70] thing. Let us, however, dismiss this question, until some one shall appear sufficient to point out whether the men of that time had any desire for science and the need of discourse. But let us now state for what reason we have raised up the fable, in order that we may after this proceed onwards.[71] For when the time of all these was completed, and it was necessary for a change to take place, and moreover when the whole race on earth was already consumed, [72]and every soul had given up its generations, and as many seeds as were ordained for each soul, it having fallen on the earth,[72]—then did the governor of the universe, releasing himself, as it were, from the handle of a rudder, depart to

[69] Here is evidently an allusion to the Æsopic Fables, which I have shown in The Surplice, No. 35, July, 1846, and foll., to have been written by Socrates; to which Plato has thus properly paid no mean a compliment; for they were above all praise; although they are found at present in only a mutilated form, like some of the finest temples of former times.

[70] I have translated as if the Greek were *ταὐτὸ*, not *τοῦτο*.

[71] Ficinus has a remarkable variation—"ut sequentia cum antecedentibus conjungamus," as if his MS. read—*ἵνα τοῖς πρόσθεν τὰ ὀπίσω συνείρωμεν*. For *τὰ ὀπίσω* means the future. Hesych. *Ὀπίσω—τὸ μέλλον*. See Elmsley on Soph. Œd. T. 490.

[72—72] On this mass of nonsense Stalbaum has written a lengthy note, where he vainly endeavours to explain what is absurd, and still more vainly to correct what is corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect, something to this effect—*πάσας αὖ ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐς τὰς γενέσεις ὑποδεδυκυίας, ὅσα τε ἦν ἑκάστῃ προσταχθέντα, τοσαῦτα αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ⊙ ἀγούσης*—i. e. "each soul having again secretly entered into all generations, and bringing from the sun seeds of light, as many as were ordained for each generation—" This would be intelligible to those at least, who know that the word *ἡλίου* is often expressed by the symbol ⊙, as shown by Schæfer on Aristoph. Plut. Epimetr. p. xlii., and Gaisford on Hesiod. Theogon. 709, and of myself on Æsch. Eum. 2: while they who remember the *σπέρμα πυρὸς* of Homer, and the "semina flammæ" of Virgil, will be ready to receive here *αὐγῆς σπέρματα*. The fact is, that Plato alluded to the story of Prometheus bringing fire from heaven, which he obtained from a ferule applied to the wheel of the chariot of the Sun, as we learn from Servius on Virgil. Bucol. vi. 42. But as the light of the soul is an immaterial light, and arising from reflexion, it would be said more correctly to be derived from the Moon, which shines itself by a reflected light; and hence we ought to read perhaps, *αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ τῆς ☾ ἀγούσης*. For Dobree has shown, on Photius, p. 699, that, instead of Σελήνη, the symbol ☾ is found in MSS.; and hence in Suid. *Ἐπηγκυλημένα—Θεοειδῆ*, where Toup wished to read *μηνοειδῆ*, we must write what Gaisford failed to see, ☾*εοειδῆ*, i. e. *Σεληνοειδῆ*.

his own place of a look-out; and then Fate and implanted Desire again caused the world to revolve. All the gods then, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest divinity, knowing what was now taking place, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world having undergone a change in its revolution, conflicting[73] and rushing with the contrary impulse of a beginning and end, and producing in itself a mighty concussion, worked out again another destruction of all kinds of animals. After this, when a sufficient time had gone on, the world ceasing from tumult, confusion, and concussions, did, taking advantage of a calm, proceed, arranged most beautifully[74] in its usual course, possessing a guardianship and dominion itself over the things in itself and belonging to itself; (and) remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father. Now at the commencement it performed this duty more carefully, but at the end more obtusely. But the cause of this is in the corporeal form of the temperature, which had grown up[75] with its former nature; since it partook of much disorder,[76] before it arrived at its present orderly arrangement. For from him, who put it together, it obtained every good; but from its previous habit, whatever harshness and injustice exist in heaven, these it does both possess itself from that former habit, and introduce likewise into animals. In conjunction then with the ruler, the world, when nourishing the animals within it, brings forth evil of a small kind, but good of a large; but separated from him, it conducts all things beautifully during the time nearest to his departure; but as time goes on, and oblivion comes on it, the circumstance of its former unfitness domineers with greater force; and at the concluding period of time it bursts out into the full flower of wrong;[77] and (producing) only a little good,

[73] I confess I cannot understand *ξυμβάλλων* thus standing by itself. Ficinus has omitted the word entirely. His version is, "Mundus deinde contraria principii finisque sese agitatione re reflectens."

[74] I have translated as if the Greek were *κάλλιστα κοσμούμενος*, not *κατακοσμούμενος*. Ficinus has "in ordine debito constitutus."

[75] So Stalbaum understands *ξύντροφον*. Ficinus has "priscæ naturæ fomes." He therefore found some other word in his MS.

[76] Ficinus, "Nam valde deforme erat et ordinis expers," as if his MS. read *ἀμορφίας μετέχον καὶ ἀταξίας*—On *ἀμορφία*, see my note on Prom. 504.

[77] Stalbaum says correctly, that *ἐξανθεῖν* is applied to a disorder or

but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both its own destruction, and of the things within it. Hence the god, who arranged the world, perceiving it in difficulties, and anxious lest, being thus tempest-tost, it should be thoroughly loosened by the hurly-burly, and be plunged into the infinite sea[78] of dissimilitude, again seats himself at the helm; and whatever is labouring and loosened[79] in its own former period, he having turned arranges, and by putting straight, renders the world free from death and old age. This then is (one) end of the whole story. But this is sufficient to show, from what has been said, the nature of a king to such, as lay hold of the discourse. For the world having been again turned to the present path of generation, its age was again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the contrary to what it had done formerly. For animals, wanting but little to be through their small size annihilated, are increased; and hoary bodies recently born from the earth, dying again, descend into the earth; and all other things are changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of conception, generation, and nourishing, followed all things from necessity. For it was no longer possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through the different things, which compose it; but, as the world was ordained to be the absolute ruler of its own progress, so after the

evil that bursts out into full strength; and aptly compares Æsch. Pers. 821, Ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν Ἄτης, and Plutarch Thes., § 6, ἐξήνθησαν αἱ κακίαι καὶ ἀνερράγησαν. Ficinus, mistaking the meaning, rendered it "deflorescit."

[78] This is the translation of Taylor, who doubtless wished to read πόντον for τόπον: and so too Stalb. For the whole description is taken from a ship in a storm. On the metaphorical use of πόντος, see Monk on Hippol. 824.

[79] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is as unintelligible as the English. The natural flow of ideas seems to require something of this kind—τὰ νοσήσαντα ἀκεῖται, λυθέντα τε συνδεῖ, καὶ στρεφθέντα ἐπανορθῶν, τῇ καθ' αὑτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἀγήρων αὐτὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον ἀπεργάζεται, i. e. "he repairs what has become disordered, and binds together what has become loosened, and making straight again what has become bent, he arranges it according to its former revolution under himself, and renders it free from old age and death." With respect to ἀκεῖται, that verb is properly applied to repairing a shattered ship, with which the world is here compared. It would be, however, hazardous to assert, that Plato did write so in reality. For if he did, the passage must have been corrupted antecedent to the time of Eusebius, who in Præpar. Evang. xi. 34, quotes it nearly as it is found here.

same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth,[80] generate, and nourish, as far as they were able. But we have now arrived at the very question for the sake of which the whole of our discourse has proceeded. For, with respect to other beasts, many circumstances, and of a prolix nature, might be gone through; such as, from what each is, and through what cause they have been changed; but those relating to man are shorter, and more to our purpose. For mankind having become destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon, who possesses and tends us, while the majority of animals, that were naturally cruel, have on the other hand become savage, men, now weak, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals; and, in those earliest times, they were without inventions and arts; for after the earth had failed in its spontaneous food, they did not know how to procure it, through no want having previously compelled them (to get it). From all these causes they were in the greatest difficulties. Hence, the old-mentioned gifts were given us by gods, together with the necessary instruction and erudition;[81] fire from Prometheus, and arts from Hephæstus (Vulcan), and his fellow-artist (Pallas); on the other hand, seeds and plants were given by others, and all such things as furnish a support for human life, were produced from these; since, as was stated just now, the guardian care of the gods had deserted mankind; and it became requisite for men to have the conduct and care of themselves, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born, now in this way, and now in that. Let this then be the end of the story. But we will make it useful for discovering how far we have erred in defining the characters of a king and statesman in our previous discourse.

[17.] *Soc. jun.* In what respect then, and how far, do you say has there been an error?

[80] Instead of *φύειν* two MSS. have *φύρειν*. They should read *κύειν*, "to conceive," as shown by *κυήσεως καὶ γεννήσεως καὶ τροφῆς*, just above.

[81] In what way *διδαχὴ* differs from *παίδευσις*, neither myself nor any one else could tell. Hence I suspect *καὶ παιδεύσεως* is an explanation merely of *διδαχῆς*, or else those letters conceal some words not difficult to elicit, relating to the givers of good things.

Guest. [82]Partly less, and partly in a very generous manner, and in a greater degree, and more than before.[82]

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Because, when we were asked respecting a king and a statesman belonging to the present revolution and generation, we spoke of a person tending a human herd of the contrary period, and this too a god, and not a man. In this then we transgressed very much. But when we exhibited him as the ruler of the whole state, we did not say in what manner (he was so); and in this respect the truth was told, but not the whole (truth), nor was it clearly enunciated; hence we erred less in this case than in that.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. We ought then, it seems, to expect that the statesman will have been completely described by us, when we shall have defined the manner of governing a state.

Soc. jun. Very well.

Guest. On this account we have brought forward the story, in order that (one)[83] might show, with respect to the herd-tending, not only that all contend about it with the person now sought for; but that we might more clearly perceive him, whom alone it is fitting, according to the pattern of shepherds and neat-herds, to have the tending of the human herd, and alone worthy to be called by that name.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than becomes a king; and that the statesmen now existing here are much more like subjects in their nature, and take more nearly a share in discipline and nurture.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But they will have to be investigated neither more nor less, whether they are naturally in this position or in that.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Let us then turn back again. For we said, that

[82]—[82] Ficinus has, "Partim minus, partim generosius magisque, et plus quam tunc erratum," which is a far more elegant collocation of words than the Greek is at present.

[83] I have inserted "one" answering to τις, which has evidently dropt out after ἐνδείξαιτο: that would otherwise want its nominative.

there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then straightway called the herd-tending art. Do you recollect?

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. In this then we erred. For we have not by any means laid hold of the statesman, nor given him a name; but as regards the appellation, it has lain hid from and escaped us.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. To tend the several kinds of herds belongs to all other herdsmen; but we have not given a fitting name to the statesman, it being requisite for him to bear one of those common to all.

Soc. jun. You speak the truth, if indeed there happens to be (a common one).[84]

Guest. But how is it not possible to apply the word healing, as something common to all, neither tending nor any other occupation being stated? and if [85]it is lawful for persons giving a name (to an art) to wrap it up (in words like) herd-tending, or healing in any way, as being applicable generally, (it is lawful to wrap up) the word statesman likewise[85] together with others, especially since reason shows that this should (be done)?

[18.] *Soc. jun.* Right. But after this in what manner would the division be made?

Guest. In the same manner, as we before divided the herd-tending art for the walking and wingless[86] tribes, and for the unmixed and hornless, in the very same manner by dividing the herd-tending, we shall have comprehended both the present kingly rule and that in the time of Kronos (Saturn) similarly in our discourse.

[84] Heusde was the first to see that something was wanting after εἴπερ ἐτύγχανέ γε ὄν. But he did not see that Plato wrote—γε κοινὸν ὄν. Stalbaum vainly, as usual, defends the old reading.

[85]—[85] Such seems to be the meaning which Plato wished to convey. But to get at it we must read ἀλλ' εἰ for ἀλλ' ἢ—which Bekker found in some MSS. in lieu of ἄλλην—and to repeat ἐξῆν before καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν —For when a word is thus repeated, it is generally followed by καὶ, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 156 and 281, and I could now add a host of similar passages.

[86] Ficinus has "et volatilium," which leads, as Stephens remarks, to πτηνοῖς.

Soc. jun. It appears so. But I am seeking what (will be) after this.[87]

Guest. It is plain that if the word herd-tending had been thus spoken, no one would have contended with us that there is no idea whatever of attention in it; as it was then justly contended, that there is no art amongst us which deserves the appellation of tending; and that if there were, it belongs to many things prior and preferable to any thing pertaining to kings.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. [88]But no other art would be willing to say that it is more and before kingly rule, as a careful tending of the whole of human fellowship, and of men taken generally.[88]

Soc. jun. You say rightly.

Guest. But after this, Socrates, do you perceive that an error has been made frequently towards the very end?

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. In this, that though we have conceived that there is a certain rearing art of a biped herd, we ought not any more to have straightway called it, as if entirely complete, the art of the king and statesman.

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. In the first place, as we said, we (ought) to have suited the name more to guardianship than to nutriment: and in the next place, to make a division in this (guardianship). For it will have no small divisions.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. In that we can surely place apart the divine shepherd, and the human guardian.

Soc. jun. Right.

[87] Ficinus has merely "Videtur; sed quid tum?"

[88]—[88] Such according to Stalbaum is the version of the Greek, where he would adopt *προτέρα*, found in Stobæus, ed. Trincavell., in lieu of *πραοτέρα*, and support *μᾶλλον καὶ προτέρα* by *μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφροδροτέρα* in Phileb. p. 41, C. But the syntax and the sense appear to me equally objectionable. Instead, then, of *ἐθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ πραοτέρα* I should prefer—*ἐθελήσειεν εὐνουστέρα μᾶλλον καὶ πραοτέρα*, i. e. "more kindly disposed and more mild." Ficinus has—"Nulla vero ars alia de hoc contendit, quasi sit totius humanæ communionis curatio major mitiorque regia," thus omitting entirely the concluding words of the speech, either because they were not in his MS., or because, like myself, he could not understand them.

Guest. And again it is necessary to cut into two the distributed[89] guardianship.

Soc. jun. Into what?

Guest. Into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. jun. What then?

Guest. By erring before in this more stupidly than was fitting, we put down together a king and a tyrant as the same; although they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their form of government respectively.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. Now therefore, again correcting ourselves, let us, as I have already said, divide human guardianship into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And calling the guardianship by the violent tyrannic, but the voluntary, [90][and the herd-tending of voluntary biped animals,][90] statesmanship, let us show, that he who possesses this [art and][91] guardianship is truly a king and a statesman.

[19.] *Soc. jun.* And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting the statesman, is very like to appear to us as being perfect.

Guest. This would be well for us, Socrates. But it is requisite that this should appear not only to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. At present, however, the king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure; but just as statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, do, through introducing more and greater things than are fitting, retard it; so have we at present, in order that we might show both quickly and splendidly, that we

[89] As *ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν* could hardly stand here by itself, Ficinus has correctly supplied "curationem item humanam in duo," which leads at once to *τὴν ανην ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν*, where *ανην* is the perpetual abbreviation of *ἀνθρωπίνην*, as I have shown in Append. ad Troad. p. 160. This introduction of *ἀνθρωπίνην* is plainly confirmed by what follows just after, *τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν δίχα διαιρώμεθα*.

[90]—[90] All the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation; or else something has been lost after the preceding *τῶν βιαίων*, to preserve the balance of the two sentences; which leads to *τὴν μὲν—τῶν βιαίων*, and *τὴν δε τῶν ἑκουσίων*.

[91] Here again is another interpolation

erred in the former part of our digression, through thinking that great patterns should be employed in the case of a king, have brought in a marvellous mass of a myth, and been compelled to use a greater portion of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a rather prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But our discourse really appears somewhat like an animal, to have its outline defined sufficiently, but to have not received the distinctness given by pigments, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by a description, to such as are able to follow the account,[92] than by painting, and all the work of hand; but to other persons through works of the hand.

Soc. jun. This indeed (is said rightly): but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.

Guest. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things sufficiently, without using patterns. For each of us appear to know all things as in a night-dream, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a day-dream.[93]

Soc. jun. How said you this?

Guest. We appear in the present case to have mooted very absurdly the circumstance relating to the knowledge (which is) in us.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. The pattern, O blessed one, has required itself again a pattern.

Soc. jun. What? Tell me, and do not, on my account at least, hesitate.

[20.] *Guest.* I must speak, since you are ready to follow. For we know, that children know their letters.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That they understand sufficiently each of the letters in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.

[92] I have translated this passage as if *καὶ* (or rather *γε*) *λόγῳ* were inserted between *δυναμένοις* and *ἕπεσθαι*. For *λέξει καὶ λόγῳ* could not be thus united, nor could *ἑπομένοις* here dispense with its case.

[93] On the difference between *ὄναρ*, "a night-dream," and *ὕπαρ*, "a day-dream," applied respectively to the things of fancy and fact, see Blomfield on Prom. 495.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But, being on the other hand doubtful about those in other syllables, they say what is false in idea and word.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Is it not then the easiest and the best thing to lead them thus to what is not yet known?

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. By first leading them back to those things, in which they had correct ideas respecting those very same matters; and after leading them, to place before them things not yet known; and by comparing them together, to show that there is the same likeness[94] and nature in both the combinations, till the things conceived, having been compared with all the unknown, are shown correctly; and, after being shown and becoming thus patterns, cause each one of all the letters in all the syllables to be called one different, and another the same, as being always under the same circumstances, different and the same (respectively).

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. This then we sufficiently comprehend, that the production of a pattern then takes place, when that, which is the same, is, in the case of another thing placed apart, rightly conceived by opinion, and being brought together to it, produces one true opinion respecting either, as it did about both.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. Shall we then wonder, if our soul, suffering naturally the same thing respecting the elements of all things, does at one time stand firm in certain points under the influence of truth respecting each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other points respecting all things? and that when, (as regards) some (elements) of comminglings, it thinks rightly, it should somehow or another again be ignorant of these very same things, when they are transferred to long and difficult syllable-like unions of things?[95]

[94] In lieu of *τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν*, where there is a combination of words at variance with common sense, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ καὶ ὁμοιοτάτην φύσιν*, i. e. "a nature the same or very similar."

[95] Such is the literal version of the Greek; out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. There is evidently something wanting in the first clause to preserve the balance of the sentence in the second.

Soc. jun. There is nothing wonderful in this.

Guest. But[96] how, my friend, can any one, beginning from false opinion, arrive at even a small portion of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?

Soc. jun. Nearly not at all.

Guest. If then these things are naturally in this way, you and I shall not in any respect overdo it, if, by first endeavouring to perceive the nature of the whole pattern in some other small and partial one, and after this,[97] by transferring to the nature of a king, which is the greatest of all patterns, the same species, from lesser things from some quarter, we shall be about to endeavour again, through a pattern, to know by art the care of state affairs,[97] so that there may be a day-dream instead of a night one.

Soc. jun. Perfectly right.

Guest. Again then let us take up the preceding reasoning, that since ten thousand persons contend with the kingly genus, respecting the guardianship of a state, it is requisite to separate all these, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said we have need of some pattern.

Soc. jun. And very much so.

[21.] *Guest.* By producing then what pattern, which embraces an occupation similar to statesmanship, [98] and is the smallest possible,[98] could one sufficiently find the thing sought for? Are you, Socrates, willing, by Zeus, unless we have something else at hand, for us to choose at least the weaving

[96] Instead of *πῶς γὰρ* Stalbaum suggests *πῶς ἄρ*. Read *πῶς δ' ἄρ'*—

[97] Here again a literal English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation proves, if any thing can, the mass of nonsense to be found in the Greek; which I can neither construe nor correct, except by reading—*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἑλόντες αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, μέγιστον ὄν, σχῆμα, διὰ παραδείγματος, ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων φέροντός ποθεν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὴν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν θεραπείαν τέχνῃ γνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ' ὀνείρατος ἡμῖν γίγνηται*, i. e. "and after this taking the form itself of the king, as being the greatest, we should endeavour by a pattern, that brings from some quarter the same form from lesser things, to discover by art the care of the things that relate to a state, so that there may be a day-dream (of fact) instead of a night-one (of fiction)." To the change of *μέλλοντες* into *ἑλόντες*, I was led by finding in one MS. *μέλοντες*.

[98]—[98] Instead of *τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικὴν πραγμάτειαν*, which is here manifestly absurd, Ast correctly suggested—*πολιτικῷ*, which even Stalbaum is disposed to adopt. But even thus the passage is not correct. For Plato wrote *σμικρότατον μὲν, ἔχον δὲ*, as found in the MS. of Ficinus; who translates "exemplum exiguum quidem et—continens."

art? and this too not the whole, if it seems good; for, perhaps, the art relating to weaving of wool will suffice. For it may happen, that even this portion being chosen will witness to what we want (to show).

Soc. jun. For why should it not?

Guest. Why then have we not, as we did before, after cutting the parts, each of them separate, done the very same thing now in the case of the weaving art? and why, after passing over all things to the best of our power in the shortest manner possible, have we not come to what is useful at present?

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. I will make the digression itself an answer.

Soc. jun. You speak most excellently.

Guest. Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of our doing something, and others are defences against our not suffering. And of these defences some are medicinal, both divine and human; others are protective. And of the protective, some are warlike implements, others (peaceful) defences. And of the (peaceful) defences, some are veils, others are to ward off heat and cold. And of those that ward off, some cover at a distance, others near. And of the near, some are extended under, others around. And of those extended around, some are cut as a whole piece, others put together. And of those put together, some are perforated, others are bound together, not perforated. And of those that are not perforated, some are composed of the fibres of the plants of the earth, others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, others are connected themselves with themselves. Now to these defences and coverings, which are wrought from the things bound together, themselves with themselves, we give the name of dress. And let us call the art, which is especially conversant with dresses, dress-making, from the thing itself; in the same manner as we called above the art respecting a state, statesmanship. And let us say too, that the weaving art, so far as it weaves for the most part garments, differs in nothing but the name from the dress-making art; just as (we said) there, that the king-art (differed only nominally) from statesmanship.

Soc. jun. Most correctly.

Guest. After this let us reason (thus), that some one ma

perhaps think that the weaving art relating to dresses has been thus defined sufficiently, he being unable to perceive that it is not yet distinguished from its proximate co-operators, but is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.

[22.] *Soc. jun.* Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

Guest. You have not followed what has been said, as it seems.[99] It appears, therefore, that we must return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand affinity, we have now separated this from that, by separating the composition of coverings into things put under, and around.

Soc. jun. I understand you.

Guest. We have likewise separated every kind of manufacture from flax and hemp, and all such things as we just now described in the list of the fibres of plants. We also defined the art of making a felt-like substance, and the putting together by means of perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the cobler's art.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. We have also separated the care[100] bestowed on the cobler's art relating to coverings cut in the whole piece, and of such as are employed in building, and in the whole of the carpenter's art, and in all others that are employed in stopping the flowing of water, and such arts too of (peaceful) defences as furnish works to be an impediment to thieving and to acts of violence, and which are employed about the production of obstacles and the fixing of doors, and are distributed as parts of the bolt-making art. We have likewise divided the armour-making art, which is a section of the great and varied power of defence-making. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of quackery, which is conversant with medicines; and we left, so that we might seem (to be),[1] the very art defensive against storms, of which we

[99] Instead of *ὡς φαίνει*, one would prefer, as Taylor translated, *ὡς φαίνεται*. But see Sophist, § 21, *προσερεῖς, ὡς φαίνει*.

[100] The word *θεραπείαν* is properly omitted here by Ficinus. I suspect it ought to be inserted a little below after *μαγευτικήν*, for it is applied to the art of medical quacks.

[1] Of this nonsense Stalbaum has taken not the least notice. After *λελοίπαμεν*, correct Greek would require *ὡς δόξαιμεν* without *ἂν*. Ficinus has, "artem—quæ visa est illa esse, quam quærimus," as if his MS. read, *ἣ ἔδοξεν εἶναι αὐτὴ ἡ ζητθεῖσα*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὡς δείξαιμεν αὖ εὖ*—for he goes on to show the weaving art.

are in search, and which produces woollen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.

Soc. jun. It seems so.

Guest. But this matter, O boy, has not been perfectly detailed. For he, who first engaged in the making of garments, appeared to act in a manner directly contrary to weaving.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. For the work of weaving is a certain knitting together.

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. But the work (of the garment-maker) consists in loosening things put together, and felted together.

Soc. jun. What kind of work is this?

Guest. The work of the art of the wool-carder. Or shall we dare to call the art of wool-carding the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. But if any one should call the art of making the warp and woof the weaving art, would he not assert a paradox, and give it a false name?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But whether shall we say that the whole of the fuller's and the mender's art contribute nothing to the attention to and care of garments? Or shall we call all these weaving arts?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the production of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the handicraft arts, relating to the instruments through which the works of the weaver are performed, should lay claim to be co-causes of all weaving.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. Whether then will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if we lay it down that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts, which are employed about woollen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but

yet neither clearly nor perfectly, till we have separated all these arts from it?

Soc. jun. Correctly.

[23.] *Guest.* Must we not then after this so act, that, what we say, may proceed in an orderly series?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. In the first place then let us consider two arts, which exist about all things.

Soc. jun. What are they?

Guest. One is the co-cause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Such arts, as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricating (arts), without the presence of which the proposed work could not be effected [2]by each of the arts,[2] these are co-causes: but those, which fabricate the thing itself, are causes.[3]

Soc. jun. This is reasonable.

Guest. In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments, all these are co-causes:[4] but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments, causes.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. But of causes, it is reasonable to comprehend that portion of it[5] especially, which pertains to washing and mending, and all the caring about these, since the adorning art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Soc. jun. It will so.

Guest. Moreover, the carding and spinning, and all that relates to the making of the garment, of which we are detailing the parts, is one art, called by all persons the wool-working.

Soc. jun. How not?

[2]—[2] These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently unnecessary.

[3] Hertelius, quoted by Stalbaum, would insert *καλῶ*, which he got from the version of Ficinus, "ut ita dixerim, nominamus—causas appellamus." Stalbaum says that by a kind of zeugma we are to understand *θεασώμεθα*, especially as Stobæus, who quotes this passage in Ecl. Eth. p. 380, does not acknowledge any verb here.

[4] Here, too, Ficinus has "concausas nuncupemus."

[5] I confess I do not understand the words—*τοὐνταῦθα αὐτῆς μόριον*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them.

Guest. Of the wool-working there are two sections, and each of these are together naturally parts of two arts.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. The carding, and the half of that which uses the shuttle, and separates from each other whatever are placed together, all this in short is a part of the wool-working art; and there were two great parts as regards the whole, one commingling, and the other separating.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Of the separating then, both the carding and all those just now mentioned are a part. For that, which in the case of the wool and thread is the separating art, takes place, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has the names which we have just now mentioned.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Again, let us take a part of the commingling, and of the wool-working contained in it; but let us pass by all that was there relating to the separating, and let us bisect the wool-working (art) together into the commingling and separating section.

Soc. jun. Let it be so divided.

Guest. We must then, Socrates, divide the commingling, and at the same time the wool-working, if we are about to comprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.

Soc. jun. It will be requisite.

Guest. It will indeed; and let us say, that one part of it is twisting, and the other complicating.

Soc. jun. Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the working of the thread is twisting.

Guest. Not the working of this only, but likewise of the woof.[6] Or shall we find any production of it which is not twisting?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Define also each of these: for perhaps the definition will be suitable.

Soc. jun. In what way?

Guest. In this. We say that of the operations of wool-

[6] As I am not a learned weaver, and do not know the words in English corresponding to the Greek, I must refer the reader, who wishes for the fullest information, to Salmasius Exercitat. Plinian. p. 277, and Schneider on Scriptores de Re Rustic. T. iv. p. 364, quoted by Stalbaum.

carding, that which has been drawn out into length and possesses breadth, is a certain filament.

Soc. jun. We do.

Guest. And of this, when it is turned by the spindle, and becomes a solid thread, do thou call a stamen; but the art, which regulates it, let us say that this is stamen-weaving.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But such fabrics as receive a loose twisting, and, by the infolding of the stamen through the dragging of the knapping process, acquire a moderate softness, of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, woof-spinning.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. And now that part of the weaving art, which we have brought forward, is obvious to every one. For, with respect to a part of the commingling art in wool-working, when it accomplishes that, which is woven by a straight-knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven we call a woollen garment, but the art (presiding) over it, weaving.

Soc. jun. Most right.

[24.] *Guest.* Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the weaving (art) is that which infolds the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a round-about way, and defining many things in vain?

Soc. jun. It does not appear to me, O guest, that of what has been said a single thing has been said in vain.

Guest. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will appear so. But against such a disorder, should it hereafter by chance[7] come upon you—[8]for nothing is wonderful[8]—hear a certain discourse, proper to be spoken about all such things as these.

Soc. jun. Only relate it.

Guest. Let us then in the first place look into the whole of excess and deficiency, in order that we may praise and blame

[7] Here, as in § 8, n. 32, Stalbaum translates *πολλάκις* "by chance." This sense was first pointed out by Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. on § 13, and has been adopted by the generality of modern scholars.

[8]–[8] This clause seems to be an explanation of the words *τὸ νόσημα τὸ τοιοῦτον*.

according to reason whatever is said on each occasion at greater length, or the contrary, than is becoming in disputations of this kind.

Soc. jun. It will be proper so to do.

Guest. Our discourse taking place on these points, would, I think, take place rightly.

Soc. jun. About what things?

Guest. About length and shortness, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. Let us divide it then into two parts. For it is necessary for that, to which we are hastening.

Soc. jun. Inform me how this division (is to be made).

Guest. Thus. One part according to the ideas relating in common to great and little, but the other part according to the necessary existence of production.

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Does it not appear to you to be according to nature, that we ought to speak of the greater as being greater than nothing else but the lesser? and on the other hand of the lesser, as being lesser than the greater, but nothing else?

Soc. jun. To me it does.

Guest. But what, must we not say that, what surpasses the nature of moderation, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is, when produced in reality, that by which the good and bad of us differ the most from each other?

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. These twofold existences then and judgments respecting the great and the small we must lay down; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only; but, as is just now said, we must speak of one as being referable[9] to each other, but of the other (as referable) to moderation. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. If any one admits the nature of the greater (to

[9] After δεῖν Heindorf wished to insert εἶναι; and so does Stalbaum Schleiermacher conceived the passage to be imperfect. Hence it is evident he did not see what Plato meant to say; nor do I.

be referable)[10] to nothing but the lesser, it will not be (referable) to moderation. Will it?

Soc. jun. (It will be) thus.

Guest. Shall we not then destroy the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not cause to disappear entirely the statesman's science, which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that, which is more or less than moderation, not as if it had no existence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in practice; and after this manner preserving moderation, they effect every thing beautiful and good.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. If then we cause to disappear the statesman's science, will not our subsequent search of king-science be without a road?

Soc. jun. Very much so.

Guest. Whether then, as in the Sophist, we compelled nonentity to exist,[11] after the discourse about it had fled from us in that direction, so now we shall compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the production of moderation? For no one can become indisputably a statesman, or be any person else, possessing a knowledge relating to actions, if this be not acknowledged.

Soc. jun. We ought then to do this even now as much as possible.

[25.] *Guest.* This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; although we remember how great was its prolixity. But it is very just to put hypothetically something of this kind respecting them.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. That there will be a need of what has been just stated, for the demonstration of what is accurate respecting it.[12] But as regards the present question, this reasoning is

[10] For the sake of perspicuity, Plato must, I think, have written, *ἐάσει τις φύσιν εἶναι—*

[11] See Sophist, p. 240, C. § 53.

[12] Ficinus has, "ad sinceri ipsius absolutique ostensionem," which leads to *τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐπίδειξιν*, instead of *τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἐπίδειξιν*. From the two we may elicit what Plato wrote, *τὴν*

shown, well and sufficiently, it appears to me, to assist us in a conspicuous manner, so that[13] we must think all arts are to be measured according to something more and at the same time less, not only with reference to one another, but to the production likewise of moderation. For when this exists, they exist also; and when they exist, this exists also; but when either of these does not exist, neither of those will exist.

Soc. jun. This indeed is right. But what is there after this?

Guest. It is evident that we should divide the art of measuring, as has been said, into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts, which measure number, and length, and depth, and breadth, and thickness, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as are separated from the extremes towards the middle (point).

Soc. jun. Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.

Guest. That, Socrates, which many clever men, who think they are saying something wise, sometimes assert, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, that very thing happens to be now asserted by us. For all things of art do after a certain manner partake of measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide according to species, these men immediately bring together to the same point things widely differing from each other, and consider them as similar; and, on the other hand, they do the very contrary to this, by not dividing according to their parts things that are different; although it is requisite that when any one first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it, which are placed in species; and again, when the all-various dissimilitudes in multitudes are perceived, he should not be able, through a feeling of disgust, to desist *(from this un-

περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐπίδειξιν, "the demonstration of accuracy respecting it."

[13] By taking δοκεῖ μοι parenthetically, and reading ὥστ' for ὡς, and uniting εἶναι to ἡγητέον, we can not only perceive what Plato wrote, but get rid of Stalbaum's lengthy and unsatisfactory annotation.

— Ficinus has alone "ab hac aspectus molestia,"—required by the sense.

pleasant view),* till, having enclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he invests them with the existence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect and excess. Let us only carefully observe, that two genera of the measuring art respecting these have been found out, and let us remember what we say they are.

[26.] *Soc. jun.* We will remember.

Guest. After this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our search, and the whole mental exercise in discourses of this kind.

Soc. jun. What is it?

Guest. If any one should ask us respecting the assembling together[14] of those that learn their letters, when one is asked of what letters does any word (consist), shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of the one word proposed, rather than that of the party becoming more skilful as a grammarian, with respect to every thing placed before him.

Soc. jun. Evidently as regards every thing (of grammar).

Guest. Has the inquiry respecting a statesman been proposed by us more for the sake of the statesman himself, than for ourselves to become more skilful dialecticians on every point?

Soc. jun. This too is evident, that (it is for ourselves to become such) on every point.

Guest. No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to hunt out the rationale of the art of weaving, for its own sake alone. [15]But I think it has lain hid from most men, that to some things, which are naturally easy to learn, there are certain similitudes to be perceived by the senses, which it is not difficult to make manifest, when any one wishes to point them out to some one inquiring a reason respecting a thing, not with trouble, but easily without a (long) speech.[15] But of

[14] I confess myself unable to understand *συνουσίαν*. Ficinus has "de puerorum—exercitatione." Perhaps Plato wrote *σύνεσιν*, "the intelligence."

[15]—[15] Such is the literal English version of the Latin one, given by Heusde in Init. Philosoph. Platon. vol. ii. P. 2, p. 119, which Stalbaum has thought proper to praise, without being able to understand it; for most assuredly *μὴ μετὰ πραγμάτων* could never mean "non ægre et cum molestia." Equally unintelligible, to myself at least, is the representation of Ficinus, "non cum ipsis rebus, sed seorsum ratione facile demonstrare." Had Plato written *μὴ μετὰ ταραγμάτων*, there would have

things the greatest and the most honoured, there is not any image made clear for men, by which being shown, he who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, will fill it sufficiently by suiting it to one of the senses. Hence it is requisite to practice oneself in being able to give and receive a reason for every thing. For incorporeal natures, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are exhibited by reason alone, and by nothing else; and it is for this that all has been said now. But the consideration of every particular occurs more easily in small things than in great.

Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.

Guest. Let us then remember that all these things have been said by us on this account.

Soc. jun. On what?

Guest. Not the least on account of the disgust, which we have felt disgustingly [16]through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and about the revolution of the universe, and that of the sophist about the existence of a non-entity, conceiving it to have a rather (considerable) length. And on all these accounts we reproached ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity.[16] That we may not then suffer any thing of this kind again, think that on account of all these things our former remarks have been made.

Soc. jun. Be it so. Only say what is in order.[17]

Guest. I say then, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, [18]and to give on each occasion blame and praise of brevity as well as prolixity[18]

been less perhaps to object to, as being opposed to *ῥᾳδίως*. But even thus the whole passage still fails to present a perspicuous sense.

[16]—[16] To avoid the insufferable tautology in *τῆς δυσχερείας ἥν— ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς*, Heindorf and Schleiermacher proposed to place *ἣν* after *ὑφαντικήν*. They should have suggested *ὁλοσχερῶς*, explained by Suidas *ὁλοτελῶς*, or have omitted *δυσχερῶς*, with Ficinus. Unless it be said that *ὁλοσχερῶς* ought to be inserted between *περίεργα* and *λέγοιμεν*, in lieu of *καὶ μακρὰ*, which are plainly superfluous after *περίεργα*; but if altered into *ἢ καὶ μακρὰ*, they might be placed after *πλέον*, a little before. At least by such changes we can get rid of all that is objectionable in the present state of the Greek text.

[17] Ficinus has "Dic age quæ restant," as if he had found in his MS. *μόνον τὸ λοιπόν*.

[18]—[18] In the place of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has what is at least intelligible in part—"ita ut non invicem prolixitates dijudicemus, sed secundum facultatis dimetiendi partem, quam supra diximus ad decori normam esse referendam." From whence it is evident that he did not

respecting what we may happen to be speaking, not judging of prolixities with reference to each other, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we then said we ought to remember relating to the becoming.[18]

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But yet all things are not (to be referred) to this. [19] For we shall not be in need of prolixity, which, as regards pleasure, is not all fitting, unless as something of no importance:[19] on the other hand, as regards the search of what has been proposed, in order that we may find it most easily, and quickly, reason bids us regard it as a secondary, not primary object; but to honour the most and in the first place, the method of being able[20] to divide according to species; and to pay a serious regard to a discourse, if when spoken at great length it renders the hearer more inventive; and not to take it ill; and in like manner, if it be shorter. And still, in addition to this, (reason says)[21] that he who blames long discourses in meetings such as these, and who does not admit round-about periods, must not dismiss them altogether, rapidly, and immediately, by abusing merely what has been spoken at great length, but he must show moreover that he [22]thinks that (words) being shorter[22] would render persons coming together more fitted for dialectics, and more able to discover the demonstration by reason of existing things; but of the praise and blame of others relating to any other subjects we need take no thought, nor appear to hear at all such words as these. [27.] But of this there is enough, if so it seems likewise to you. Let us then again return to the statesman, introducing the pattern of the above-mentioned weaving art.

find in his MS. *μεμνῆσθαι*: in lieu of which Schleiermacher would read *ᾧ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μετρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον*, in allusion to what is stated in § 25, *μετροῦσι—πρὸς τὸ πρέπον*.

[19]—[19] I confess I do not perceive what Plato is aiming at.

[20] Here again I am in the dark. I could have understood "the method of a person able to divide genera according to species" in Greek,—*τοῦ κατ' εἴδη δυνατοῦ γένη διαιρεῖν*.

[21] Stalbaum says that the ellipse, "reason says," is to be supplied from the expression used a little before, *ὁ λόγος παραγγελλει*. He got the idea from Ficinus' version, "eumque jubet."

[22]—[22] Ficinus has "immo potius ostendere disputationem breviorem," which shows that *οἴεσθαι* was certainly omitted in his MS., and *ὡς βραχύτερα ἂν τὰ λεγόμενα* probably found there instead of—*ἂν γενόμενα*· for *γενόμενα* and *λεγόμενα* are constantly confounded in MSS.

Soc. jun. You speak well; and let us do as you say.

Guest. Has not then the king been separated from the majority (of arts), as are fellow-tending, or rather from all that relate to herds? But the remaining, we say, (are those) that (belong to) the co-causes, and causes relating to the state itself, which we must separate from each other.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. You know then that it is difficult to bisect these; and the reason will, I think, as we advance, be not the less apparent.

Soc. jun. It will be then meet to do so.

Guest. Let us then separate them like a victim piecemeal; since we cannot do so by a bisection: for it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.

Soc. jun. How then shall we do so at present?

Guest. Just as before; for we laid down as co-causes whatever (arts) furnished instruments for weaving.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. The same thing therefore we must do now, and still more than then. For such arts as fabricate, with regard to a state instrument, either small or large, we must lay down all of them as co-causes; since without these a state could not exist, nor yet statesmanship. But on the other hand we will not lay down any one of these as the work[23] of kingship.

Soc. jun. We will not.

Guest. And yet we are attempting to do a difficult thing, in separating this genus from the rest. [24]For if it appears that he, who says that whatever exists is an instrument of some one thing, says what is credible, [25] still on the other hand let us say that there is this thing different from the possessions in a state.

Soc. jun. What thing?

[23] Instead of *ἔργον* the train of ideas seems to lead to *ὄργανον*.

[24] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔι τι—δοκεῖ τιν' εἰρηκέναι*, instead of *ὅτι—δοκεῖν εἰρηκέναι*. For whatever Stalbaum may assert to the contrary, *εἰπόντα* must have either the positive article before it, or the indefinite pronoun after it. To meet the difficulty in the syntax, Stephens suggested *ἔστι* for *ὅτι*. Ast would insert *δεῖ* before *δοκεῖν*, but Stalbaum, *ἀνάγκη* after *πιθανόν*.

[25] If I have restored correctly the preceding sentence, we must read here *ὅμως εἶναι* for *ὅμως δὲ*, or else omit *δὲ* entirely

Guest. As[26] it is not having this very power. [27]For that thing is not put together like an instrument, as a cause of production, but for the safety of that which is fabricated.[27]

Soc. jun. What kind of thing?

Guest. That thing, which being worked up from materials dry and moist, [28]and exposed to fire, and without fire,[28] is a species of varied kind, which we call by one appellation, a vessel; and though it is a numerous[29] species, it does not I think belong[30] at all to the science we are seeking.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Of these possessions, there is another and third species very numerous to be looked into, being on land and in the water, and much-wandering and not-wandering, and honourable and dishonourable; but possessing one name, because the whole of it exists for the sake of a certain sitting, as becoming always a seat for something.

Soc. jun. What kind of thing is it?

Guest. We call it a vehicle, a thing not at all the work of the statesman's science, but rather more of the carpenter, potter, and brass-founder.

[28.] *Soc. jun.* I understand.

Guest. What of the fourth (species)? Must we speak of one different from these, in which the most of the things formerly mentioned are contained; every kind of dress, the greater part of arms, and all walls, such as are thrown round, of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of a protection, the whole may most justly be called a defence; and may, for the most part, be considered much more the work of the architect, and more rightly[31] of the weaver, than of the statesman.

[26] Instead of ὡς the train of ideas leads to "Ο γ', "Which is—" For there is evidently required an answer to the preceding question.

[27]—[27] Here again I scarcely perceive what Plato means to say.

[28]—[28] The words καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροις are omitted by the three MSS. of the same family, considered by Stalbaum as the best; who, after describing the passage as wretchedly corrupt, attempts to amend it by reading παντοδαπὸν εἶδος ἐργασθὲν ἐργαλεῖον καὶ ἀγγεῖον, ὃ δὴ μιᾷ κλήσει προσφθεγγόμεθα.

[29] What can be the meaning of συχνὸν here, without a more specific enumeration?

[30] If the species did not bear upon the searched for science, what could have led Plato to allude to it?

[31] Stalbaum, who seems quite enamoured of the intolerable tautology

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Are we willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning and painting, and such as making use of it (painting) and music, finish as imitations, fabricated for our pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name?

Soc. jun. In what name?

Guest. They may be surely denominated amusement.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. This one name then will suit, when pronounced, with all these: for not one of these things is done through seriousness, but all for the sake of amusement.

Soc. jun. This too I nearly understand.

Guest. But that, which prepares for all these materials bodies, out of which and in which, whatever arts have now been mentioned, manufacture (something),[32] shall we not place as a sixth all-various species, the offspring of many other arts.

Soc. jun. Of what (art) are you speaking?

Guest. [33]That (which furnishes) gold and silver, and other substances found as metals, and whatever the art of felling trees, and the whole of the clipping art, furnishes to the carpenter, and the knitting art, and still further that which barks trees, and takes off the skins of living animals, [the currier's art,][34] and all such (arts) as are conversant with things of this kind, and such as working on corks, and papyrus-reeds, and withies, furnish the means of manufacturing from genera, not put together, species that are put together. The whole of this let us call the first-born possession of man, without any putting together, and by no means the work of the science of kingship.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. The possession of nutriment, and of such things as when mingled with the body possess a certain power, by their

in *πολλῷ μᾶλλον* and *ὀρθότερον*, was not aware that Ficinus has properly omitted *ὀρθότερον*, which is evidently a gl. of *πολλῷ μᾶλλον*.

[32] To preserve the syntax, we must insert *τι* after *δημιουργοῦσι*.

[33] The whole of this passage was found in a better state in the MS. used by Ficinus, than in any other collated subsequently; as is evident from his version: "Eam, quæ aurum et argentum cæteraque metalla, terræ eruta visceribus, præparat; item, quæ silvas incidit, quæ tondet, quæ ex his construit aliquid, quæ plicat atque contexit, seu quæ cortices arborum, sive quæ animalium pelles circumcidit et polit."

[34] Stalbaum considers *σκυτοτομικὴ* as an interpolation

parts, to be subservient to the parts of the body, we must rank in the seventh place, by calling it altogether our nurse, unless we have some other better name to give. However, we will place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, exercise, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these arts more properly than to the science of the statesman.

[29.] *Soc. jun.* How not?

Guest. Nearly then all, whatsoever is connected with possession, with the exception of tame animals, has I think been mentioned in these seven genera. But consider. For it was most just that the species (called) first-born should be placed first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, protection, amusement, and cattle.[35] But if any thing of no great consequence has escaped us, which it is possible to suit only (with difficulty)[36] to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of every thing bearing a mark. For these things have not in themselves a genus much in common; but some will agree as regards ornament, others as regards instruments, drawn (into the discussion) indeed with violence, but nevertheless completely. But the tending of herds, as previously divided, will appear to have comprehended the whole possession of tame animals with the exception of slaves.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. The genus of slaves and of all servants remains; amongst whom I conjecture will become apparent those, who engaged in the very thing woven,[37] contend with the king in the same manner as those above, that are engaged in knitting, and in wool-combing, and in such other arts as we then mentioned, did with the weavers. But all the rest, spoken of as co-causes, have, together with the works just now mentioned,

[35] So Taylor translates *θρέμμα*, which is literally "a nursling." Stalbaum says the word is here taken actively, as *γέννημα* is in the Sophist, p. 266, D. § 112. But nouns derived from the perfect passive of a verb, could never have an active meaning. Schleiermacher wished to read *τροφὴν* for *θρέμμα*, and Ast *θρεπτικόν*. They ought rather to have altered *τροφὸν* just before into *θρέμμα*.

[36] So Stalbaum, by reading *μόγις* for *μέγα*, which is omitted not only in his three best MSS., but by Ficinus likewise.

[37] This, says Ast, is to be explained by what the author states subsequently in p. 308, D., § 46, where the science of the king is compared with that of the weaver.

been done away with,[38] and separated from the action of the king and statesman.

Soc. jun. So they seem.

Guest. Come then, let us approach nearer, and consider the rest, that we may perceive them more firmly.

Soc. jun. It is requisite (to do so).

Guest. We shall find then that the greatest servants, so far as we can see from those here, are in a pursuit, and under circumstances the very contrary to what we have suspected.

Soc. jun. Who are they?

Guest. They who are purchased, and in this manner become a property; whom, beyond all controversy, we may call slaves and laying the least claim to the kingly science.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what shall we say of those free-born persons, who willingly put themselves to ministering to the parties[39] mentioned just now, and by conveying the produce of agriculture, and of other arts, to each other, and [40]by equalizing the possession and value of articles,[40] do some at (home) markets, and others by going from state to state, by sea and land exchange coin against other things, or itself against itself, (whom we have called money-changers, ship-owners, and hucksters,) will these contend for any part of the statesman's science?

Soc. jun. Perhaps some of the foreign merchants will.

Guest. And yet we shall never find those, who for wages most readily become servants to all persons, laying any claim to the science of a king.

Soc. jun. For how should we?

Guest. What then (shall we say) of those, that do such ministerings for us on each occasion.

Soc. jun. Of what and whom are you speaking?

[38] Instead of *ἀνήλωνται* Stalbaum says it were easy to read *ἀνῄρηνται*, "done away with:" but the alteration is not necessary. Ficinus has "sejuncti atque discreti," by an hendyadis, from which it is difficult to ascertain more than that his MS. did not read *ἀνήλωνται*. Perhaps *ἀναλέλυνται*, "loosened."

[39] Instead of taking *τοῖς—ῥηθεῖσιν* as dependent on *ὑπηρετικὴν*, Stalbaum would read *ὅσοι σὺν τοῖς—ῥηθεῖσιν*, i. e. "as many as together with those mentioned—"

[40]—[40] Such is perhaps the meaning of *ἀνισοῦντες*, in the language of commerce, that equalizes the products of different climes.

Guest. I speak of the tribe of heralds,[41] and of those who become accomplished in the art of writing,[42] and often act as ministers, and certain other persons, who have very great talents for some other and many kinds of business connected with public offices. What shall we say of these?

Soc. jun. What you have said just now, that they are ministers, but no rulers in states.

Guest. But surely [43]I was not, I think, seeing a vision,[43] when I said that in this way, perchance, would be seen those strenuously contending for the science of a statesman. And yet it would seem to be very absurd to seek after these in any ministering portion.

Soc. jun. Very much so, indeed.

Guest. Let us then approach still nearer to those who have not been as yet examined. Now these are such as possess a certain portion of ministering science relating to divination. For they are held to be the interpreters of gods to men.

Soc. jun. They are.

Guest. The genus too of priests, as the law says, knows how gifts should be offered by us through sacrifices to the gods, agreeably to them; and how we should request of them by prayer the possession of good things. Now both these are parts of the ministering art.

[30.] *Soc. jun.* So it appears.

Guest. Now then we seem to me to touch, as it were, upon some foot-print of the object to which we are on the road. For the figure of priests and prophets is replete with pru-

[41] The persons alluded to would be now called "diplomatists," as is evident from the Hippias Major; where the Pantologist of his day is said to have been frequently employed in that character.

[42] As the art of writing was in ancient times known only to a few, such persons became of necessity the men of office and consideration in the state; just as no man will ever become the prime minister of England, unless he can figure as a debater. For though nearly every body can read and write, yet few can open a debate with a long speech, and fewer still close it with a reply to the different arguments urged on the opposite side. The persons to whom Plato alludes were called Γραμματεῖς or Ὑπογραμματεῖς, i. e. "Secretaries," or "Under-secretaries;" who, says Aristophanes in The Frogs, 1095, while they amuse the people with monkey-tricks, pick their pockets. Stalbaum refers here to Boeckh's Œconom. Athen. i. p. 198, and Schœmann. de Comit. p. 318.

[43]—[43] In the place of the words between the figures Ficinus has merely, "Haud abs re—"

dence, and obtains a reputation for respect through the greatness of the matters in their hands; so that in Egypt it is not permitted for a king to govern without the sacerdotal science; and should any one previously of another genus[44] of men become by violence (the king), he is afterwards compelled to be initiated in the mysteries of this genus.[45] Further still among the Greeks, one may find in many places that the greatest sacrifices relating to matters of this kind are imposed upon the greatest offices; and what I assert is shown particularly among you. For to him who is chosen by lot the king here,[46] they say that of all the ancient sacrifices, those held in the highest veneration and most peculiar to the country are assigned.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. We must then consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, and their ministers, and a certain other very numerous crowd, which has just now become manifest to us, apart from those previously mentioned.

Soc. jun. Of whom are you speaking?

Guest. Of certain very strange persons.

Soc. jun. Why so?

Guest. As I was just now speculating, their genus appeared to me to be all kinds. [47]For many men resemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to weak and versatile wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their forms and their power into each other.[47] And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.

Soc. jun. Speak; for you seem to see something strange.

Guest. I do; for what is strange is the result of ignorance

[44] The modern name is "caste," still found in Hindostan; where have been preserved not a few of the customs of Egypt.

[45] Ficinus has, what appears requisite to complete the sense, "ut rex denique sit et sacerdos."

[46] The second archon at Athens was called "the king," and had cognizance over the principal religious festivals.

[47]—[47] With this passage in Plato may be compared that in Shakspeare, where Hamlet thus amuses himself at the expense of Polonius. "*Ham.* Do you see yonder cloud that is almost in the shape of a camel? *Pol.* By the mass, and it is like a camel, indeed. *Ham.* Methinks it is like a weasel *Pol.* It is backed like a weasel. *Ham* Or like a whale. *Pol.* Very like a whale."

in the case of all.[48] And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on seeing the dancing-troop[49] relating to state affairs.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. The greatest wizard of all the wise,[50] and the most skilled in this art; who must be separated from the really existing statesmen and kings, although it is very difficult so to separate him, if we are about to see clearly the object of our search.

Soc. jun. We must not give up this, at least.

Guest. Not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

[31.] *Soc. jun.* What?

Guest. Is not a monarchy one of the forms of state-rule?

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. And after a monarchy one would, I think, speak of an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But is not the rule of the many called by the name of a democracy, a third form of state-polity?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Do not these being three become after a manner five, by two producing from themselves two other names in addition to their own?

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. They who look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and wealth, to law and lawlessness, which take place in them, give a twofold division to each one of the two, and call monarchy, as exhibiting two species, by two names, one tyranny, the other royalty.

Soc. jun. How not?

[48] So Johnson said that wonder was the effect of novelty upon ignorance.

[49] By no process of thinking and writing correctly could a single person be called "a dancing-troop." He might indeed be called the leader of such a troop Hence it is evident that Plato wrote not χορὸν but χορηγόν.

[50] This is the correct reading found in six MSS., in lieu of σοφιστῶν: which Stalbaum says was altered by scribes, who did not perceive the ridicule which Plato was throwing on the Sophist, whom Stalbaum should have seen the author had not here, and could not have had, in his thoughts.

Guest. But the state ever governed by a few, (we call) an aristocracy and an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they strictly guard the laws or not, no one is ever accustomed to change the name at all.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. What then? Do we think that any one of these state-polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, such as by one, and a few, and a many, and by wealth and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, [51] and happening to exist [51] by statutes and without laws?

Soc. jun. What should hinder?

Guest. Consider more attentively, following me by this road.

Soc. jun. What road?

Guest. Shall we abide by what was asserted at first, or shall we dissent from it?

Soc. jun. To what assertion are you alluding?

Guest. I think we said that a regal government was one of the sciences.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Yet not of those taken together as a whole; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And from the presiding science (we selected) one part, as belonging to inanimate acts, and the other as belonging to animals. And dividing after this fashion, we have arrived thus far, not forgetful of science, but unable to determine with sufficient accuracy what science is.

Soc. jun. You say rightly.

Guest. Do we then understand this very thing, that the definition must be respecting them, [52] not (as regards) the few,

[51—51] The words *ξυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι* are omitted by Ficinus, and, after him, of course, by Taylor.

[52] I confess I cannot understand *περὶ αὐτῶν*. For *αὐτῶν* can hardly be referred to the forms of government; and if it could, the words *περὶ αὐτῶν* should be placed between *τὸν* and *ὅρον*, as in Ficinus, "ipsorum determinationem descriptionemque;" whose "secundum paucos" shows that he probably found in his MS. *οὐ κατ' ὀλίγους* in lieu of *οὐκ ὀλίγους*.

nor the many, nor the voluntary or involuntary, nor poverty or wealth, but (as regards) a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly detailed?

[32.] *Soc. jun.* It is impossible, indeed, not to do this.

Guest. We must of necessity then consider now this; in which of these does the science respecting the government of men happen to exist, being nearly [53]the greatest and most difficult[53] to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we may perceive who are the parties we must take away from a prudent king, who lay claim to be statesmen, and persuade the multitude (of it), and yet are so not at all.

Soc. jun. We must do so, as the reasoning has previously told us.

Guest. Does it then appear to you that the mass in a city is able to acquire this science?

Soc. jun. How can they?

Guest. But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred, or even fifty, to acquire it sufficiently?

Soc. jun. It would be then the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there could not be found so many tip-top draught-players as compared with those in the rest of Greece, much less kings. For, according to our former reasoning, we must call him, who possesses the science of a king, whether he governs or not, a regal character.

Guest. You have very properly reminded me. And I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it exists rightly, ought to be investigated as about one person,[54] or two, or[54] altogether about a few.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And we must hold, as we think now, that these exercise rule according to a certain art, whether they govern the willing or the unwilling, whether according to statutes or without statutes, and whether they are rich or poor. For we

[53]—[53] This, which is the natural order of ideas, is properly found in Ficinus, "comparatu maxima—atque difficillima." The common order, *χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης*, is supported however by Repub. viii. p. 551, C.

[54]—[54] So Ficinus has "unum vel duo vel paucos," which shows that his MS. read *ἕνα τινα ἢ δύο ἢ—ὀλίγους* instead of *καὶ δύο καὶ*. On the confusion of *ἢ* and *καὶ*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 112.

have considered those as not the less physicians, whether they cure us, willing or unwilling, by cutting, or burning, or applying any other pain; and whether according to written rules or not, and whether they are themselves poor or rich. In all (these cases) we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they stand over (the patient)[55] according to art,[56] purging or some other way attenuating (the body), or in causing (it) to increase, and so long as, for the good of the body alone, they bring it from a worse to a better state, and by attending preserve each[57] (body) attended to. After this manner, and in no other, as I think, we will lay down that the definition of the medicinal or any other rule is rightly made.

Soc. jun. And very much so.

[33.] *Guest.* It is necessary then, as it seems, first of polities that must be pre-eminently correct, and the only polity, in which the governors are found to possess [illegible][1] not in appearance merely; whether they rule according to laws or without laws, over the willing or the unwilling, and are themselves poor or rich. For not one of these things must we consider at all, as regards any rectitude (of government).

Soc. jun. Beautifully (said).

Guest. And whether they purge the state to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or by sending out colonies some where, like a swarm of bees, they reduce it to a less size; or whether by introducing some others from abroad they make citizens of them, and thus increase its size, so long as by making use of science and justice, they preserve it, and cause it to the utmost of their power to pass from a worse condition to a better one, then, and according to such limits, must we speak of a polity as alone rightly existing. But we must say that such others, as we have mentioned, are not genuine, nor do they in reality exist; [58]but that those, which we call well-regulated, imitate this for the better, the others for the worse.[58]

[55] This word is graphically applied here to a physician standing over the bed of the patient.

[56] Stalbaum says that the generality of translators have considered τέχνῃ as governed by ἐπισατοῦντες, instead of taking it as the dative of the manner. Ficinus has however, "arte—præsident."

[57] I have adopted ἕκαστα (i. e. σώματα), found in one MS., in lieu of ἕκαστοι, which is superfluous here as applied to the physicians.

[58]—[58] The version of Ficinus exhibits here a remarkable variation from the Greek text of Stalbaum, which is made up in part from the conjectures

Soc. jun. The other points, O guest, appear to have been stated with moderation: but that it is requisite[59] to govern without laws, has been stated as a thing rather harsh to hear.

Guest. You have anticipated me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was about to ask you, whether you admit all these points, or whether you find any difficulty in any matter that has been stated. It is however evident, that we now wish to discuss the point respecting the rectitude of those, who govern without laws.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. After a certain manner it is evident that legislation is a part of the science of a king: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail,[60] but for a man who has with prudence the power of a king. Do you know in what way?

Soc. jun. In what way do you mean?

Guest. Because [illegible] by comprehending that which is the best [illegible] justly in all cases, at the same time ordaining what is the best. For the inequalities of men and their actions, and the fact that not a single atom, so to say, of human affairs, enjoys a state of rest, do not permit any art whatever to exhibit in any case any thing simple (without exception) respecting all matters and through all time. Shall we admit this?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And yet we see the law tending nearly to this very point; and, like a certain self-willed and ignorant man, it does not suffer any person to do any thing contrary to its own orders, nor to put a question, not even should something new happen to be in some case [61]better as compared with the decree[61] it had ordained.

of Heindorf and his own, "Sed eas, quæ hanc imitantur, libenter laudamus, quasi facile ad meliora tendentes; alias vero contra vituperamus, tanquam imitatione malorum ad deteriora proclives."

[59] Instead of *δεῖν*, which Stalbaum absurdly endeavours to defend, Ast suggested *εἶναι*, to which he was probably led by Ficinus' version, "gubernationem sine legibus rectam esse posse;" from whence I would rather elicit, *ἄνευ νόμων εἶναι εὖ ἄρχειν ἐξεῖ*—

[60] This was a Pythagorean doctrine. Compare The Laws, ix. p. 875, C. So says Stalb., who refers to Valckenaer on Herodot. iii. 38.

[61]—[61] Stalbaum translates *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* "præter opinionem." But **λόγος** is "reason," not "opinion." And if it ever did mean "opinion," it could not do so here, where it is followed by *ὃν ὁ νόμος ἐπέταξεν*. For the law can never ordain an opinion, only a fact.

Soc. jun. True. For the law does really so, as you have just now said, to each of us.

Guest. Is it not then impossible for that, which is under all cases simple, to do well in cases which are never at any time simple?

Soc. jun. It appears so nearly.

[34.] *Guest.* Why then is it necessary to lay down laws? since law is not a thing of the greatest rectitude. Of this we must inquire the cause.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Are there not then amongst us, as in other cities likewise, certain exercises of men collected together for the sake of competition relating to running, or something else?

Soc. jun. Yes. There are very many.

Guest. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the orders of those, who practise scientifically exercises in meetings[62] of this kind.

Soc. jun. What is this?[63]

Guest. They do not conceive it is requisite to be very fine in ordering, according to each individual, what is suited to the body of each; but think more stupidly,[64] that they ought to make their arrangements of what benefits the body, suited to the majority of circumstances and persons.

Soc. jun. Excellent.

Guest. On which account assigning now[65] equal labours to persons collected together, they urge them on together, and stop them together in the race, and wrestling, and all the labours of the body.

Soc. jun. Such is the fact.

Guest. Let us hold then, that the legislator who would preside over his herds[66] in matters of justice, and their contracts

[62] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀγοραῖς*, not *ἀρχαῖς*, which is manifestly absurd. Stalbaum suggests *ἀγέλαις*. But as laws were made in the *ἀγορά*, and gymnastic exercises took place there likewise, a word is required suited at once to the arena of law and of gymnastics. Besides, in *ἀγοραῖς* there is an allusion to the mention of *ἀθρόων ἀνθρώπων*. For Hesychius explains Ἀγορά by *ἄθροισμα*.

[63] The question *τὸ ποῖον* seems strange, thus following *ἐπιτάξεις*.

[64] Instead of *παχύτερον* Plato evidently wrote *παχύτεροι*, opposed to *λεπτουργεῖν*: and so too shortly afterwards, *παχύτερος ὢν* instead of *παχύτερως*.

[65] To avoid the unmeaning "now," Stalbaum would read *ἀποδιδόντες*.

[66] Although Ficinus renders *ταῖσιν ἀγέλαις* "suis gregibus," yet it is

with each other, will never be sufficient for all collectively, by accurately enjoining upon each individual what is fitting.

Soc. jun. This is likely.

Guest. But I think he will establish laws suited to the majority of persons and circumstances, and somehow thus in a more stupid way for each, delivering them in writings, and in an unwritten (form),[67] and legislating according to the customs of the country.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one be so all-sufficient as, by sitting near[68] through the whole of life, to enjoin accurately what is adapted to each? Since, although any one soever of those who possess the science of a king could, I think, do this, he would scarcely impose on himself impediments, by writing down the so-called laws.

Soc. jun. (So it appears,) O guest, from what has been now said.

Guest. And still more, O thou best one, from what will be said.

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. Of this kind. For let us thus say to ourselves.

no where stated that the legislator has, like a king, a herd of his own. And were the fact otherwise, yet *ταῖσιν* could not be found in prose for *ταῖς*. Opportunely then do the three oldest MSS. offer *τασιν*, without an accent; a proof of the reading being corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect, *δίποσιν*, which would be in MSS. *῾δ῾ποσιν*. For thus errors constantly arise from the loss or confusion of letters indicative of numerals, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223, and 329; and to the passages corrected there by myself, Bentley, Porson, Kidd, and Dobree, I could now add full twenty more, where all the modern editors have, like Stalbaum here, been utterly in the dark. With respect to *῾δ*, thus written for *β*, see Bast in Palæograph. Græc. p. 218, and Wellaver on Eumen. 115, who has stolen there an emendation of mine.

[67] The words *καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποδιδοὺς καὶ ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις πατρίοις δὲ ἔθεσι νομοθετῶν* Stalbaum thus paraphrases, misled, it would seem, as Stephens was likewise, by Ficinus—"Et scriptis leges promulgans et secundum mores et instituta litteris quidem non consignata, sed tamen patria, leges sanciens—" observing that *ἔθος* is here, as in Critias, p. 121, B., the same as *νόμος*. Had he remembered that the laws, which Pythagoras gave his disciples, were unwritten, he would have seen to what is to be referred the expression *ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις*.

[68] I cannot understand *παρακαθήμενος* thus written by itself. Ficinus has "sedulusque assidere cuique." But even thus the passage is not complete. The place where the lawgiver is supposed to sit should be mentioned. There is a lacuna here, which it would not be difficult to supply by the aid of Æschylus and Aristophanes.

Would not a physician, or any teacher of gymnastics, being about to travel, and to be absent as he fancied from those under his care for a long time, and thinking that those engaged in exercises, or sick, would not remember his precepts, be willing to write something to refresh their memory? Or how (would he act)?

Soc. jun. In this way.

Guest. But what, if the physician, having been abroad a less time than he expected, should come back, would he not dare to suggest certain other things besides those contained in his writings, other circumstances occurring more favourable for the sick, through winds, or any thing else of those that are wont to take place from Zeus (the air), contrary to expectation? Would he think that he ought to persevere in not going out of his old injunctions, and neither himself order other things, nor dare to do to the sick man things different from what had been written, as if these were medicinal and salubrious, but those of a different kind noxious, and not according to art? Or rather, would not every thing of this kind, occurring according to science and true art, in all matters become altogether the greatest ridicule of such injunctions?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But shall not he, who writes down what is just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes unwritten laws for the herds of human beings who live in cities, in each[69] according to the laws of those who have written them,—whether he comes himself (back)[70] after having written (laws) contrary to art, or some other like him, be permitted to enjoin things different from these? Or, would not this interdiction appear to be in reality no less ridiculous than the former?

Soc. jun. How not?

[35.] *Guest.* Do you know then the language spoken by the multitude respecting such a thing?

Soc. jun. I have it not at present in my mind.

[69] The words "in each," which are here manifestly absurd, Stalbaum vainly, as usual, attempts to defend. For he did not know that Plato inserted them between *τῶν* and *γραψάντων*, understanding *πόλεσι*. They are omitted by Ficinus entirely.

[70] Ficinus renders *ἀφίκηται* "redeat," which shows that he found in his MS. *ἀφίκηται αὖ*.

Guest. And yet it is very specious. For they say that, if any one knows of laws better than those of their ancestors, such a person should, after persuading his own state, become a legislator; otherwise not.

Soc. jun. Do they not then (say) rightly?

Guest. Perhaps so. But if any one should, not by persuasion, force on the better, what would be the name of this violence? Do not however (say) a word, but previously respecting the former.

Soc. jun. What do you mean?

Guest. Should some one, not by persuading a person under a physician, but by possessing his art correctly, compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, contrary to prescriptions, to do that which is better, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than some[71] mischievous transgression of art? And is it not for us to say, that every thing (has happened[72]) to the compelled person, rather than that he has suffered any thing mischievous and without art from the compelling physicians?

Soc. jun. You speak most true.

Guest. But what is that error called by us, which is contrary to the statesman's art? Must it not be the base, evil, and unjust?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Of those, who have been forced to act contrary to the written precepts, and the customs of the country, more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, come, (tell me,) [73](can any one), unless he is about to be the most ridiculous of all men, (pronounce) a disapprobation of such violence done to such persons? Must it not be said[73] rather

[71] Stalbaum endeavours absurdly to defend *ἁμάρτημα, τὸ νοσῶδες*, where Stephens correctly suggested *ἁμάρτημά τι*—

[72] The word necessary for the sense Ficinus has supplied by his "*contigisse* dicendum," from which, one would suspect that he found in his MS. *πάντα ὀρθῶς εὖ πεσεῖν εἰπεῖν ἐστι.* For *εὖ πεσεῖν* has been similarly corrupted in the passages corrected by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 148.

[73]—[73] In translating this passage, where only a Stalbaum would attempt to defend the want of connexion in the syntax, I have put into English what I suspect Plato wrote to this effect, in Greek—*φέρε, τὸν ἐῶν τοιοῦτων ψόγον ἄν τις περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας ἐροίη, εἰ μέλλει*—— *πάντα δ' αὐτῷ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἑκάστοτε, ὡς, πλὴν αἰσχρὰ*—instead of

by him on each occasion, that they, who have been forced, have suffered at the hands of the forcing party every thing, except what is base, unjust, and evil?

Soc. jun. You speak most true.

Guest. But if he who forces is rich, will the acts done forcibly by him be just, but, if he is poor, unjust? Or, whether a person persuades or does not persuade, (whether) rich or poor, and (whether) according or contrary to written statutes, he does what is useful, must this be the definition the most true on all sides of the correct administration of a state, by which[74] a wise and good man will (well) administer the interests of those under his charge; just as a pilot watches over whatever happens to conduce to the welfare of the vessel and crew; and not by laying down written orders, but by making his skill a law, he preserves his fellow-sailors. And thus, [75][after this very same manner,][75] will an upright polity be produced by those who are able to govern thus, by exhibiting a strength of skill superior to the laws. And indeed in the case of prudent rulers there will be no error, let them do every thing; as long as they observe this one great maxim, to distribute ever with intellect and art to those in the state what is the most just, to keep them such as they are, and to finish by rendering them, as far as possible, better instead of worse.

Soc. jun. It is not possible to say the contrary to what has been now asserted.

Guest. Nor yet against those to say even a word.

[36.] *Soc. jun.* Of what are you speaking?

Guest. That no mob of any persons whatever can receive this kind of science, and be able to administer with intellect a state, but that we must seek for a correct polity amongst a small number, and a few, and one person;[76] and that we must lay down other polities as imitations, as we observed a little before, some for the better, and some for the worse.

τοιούτων αὖ ψόγον — βίας, ἆρ', εἰ μέλλει — πάντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον — πλὴν ὡς —

[74] Stalb. with Steph. considers ὃν governed by κατὰ understood. But as two MSS. read ἓν, perhaps Plato wrote ἐν ᾧ εὖ —

[75]—[75] These words are an intolerable tautology after οὕτω, "thus."

[76] Ficinus has, "apud unum vel paucissimos," which makes a far better sense.

Soc. jun. How and why say you this? For I did not understand just now forsooth[77] the remark respecting imitations.

Guest. Truly it were not a stupid act for a person, after starting an argument of this kind, to lay it down there,[78] and not, by going through it, to show the error which at present exists about it.

Soc. jun. What error?

Guest. It is meet to search into a thing of such a kind as[79] is not very usual, nor easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavour to apprehend it. For, come, since the polity of which we have spoken is the only correct one, you know that other politics ought to be thus[80] preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do what was just now praised, though it is not most right?

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. That no one of those in the city dare to do any thing contrary to the laws; and that he who dares, shall pay the forfeit by death, and all the extreme of punishments.[81] This too is most right and beautiful, as a second thing; [82]after that some one shall have first changed the just now said.[82] But in what manner that, which we have called second, exists, let us proceed to state. Shall we not?

Soc. jun. By all means.

[37.] *Guest.* Let us then again return to the images, to which it is ever necessary to assimilate kingly rulers.

[77] In *ἄρτι δῆθεν* is an error, not as yet noticed by any editor; but which it were not difficult perhaps to correct.

[78] Stalbaum explains *αὐτοῦ* by "immediately," a meaning that word never has. He should have suggested *αὖτως*, rendered "at ease." See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 141.

[79] Stalbaum has failed to notice that ὃ has dropt out before *οὐ*, but is preserved by Ficinus, "quod—"

[80] Stalbaum says that "thus" is explained by the following expression, "do what was just now praised." I suspect however that *οὕτως* is a corruption of *ἀεί πως*, for *ἀεί πως* carries with it the idea of a doubt.

[81] This alludes to the confiscation of property, and the prohibition of burial, which, as seen by the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles, was considered the extreme of punishment.

[82]—[82] This is a literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text; which Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by his version, "ubi quis mutaverit ac seposuerit primum illud, de quo modo dictum est;" which I will leave for himself alone to understand, for nobody else can. Ficinus has, "primo namque in loco ponendum quod nunc est dictum," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐπειδὴ ἦν ἐς τὸ πρῶτον ἐσμεταθετέον τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν*.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. The noble-minded pilot, and [83]the physician, who is of equal worth with many others.[83] Let us then, after moulding from these (two) a certain figure, contemplate it.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we are suffering the most dreadful things from them. For such of us as either of them wish to save, they do equally save;[84] and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning, at the same time ordering us to bring to them the means of expense, as a tribute, of which they spend on the sick little or even nothing,[85] but they and their domestics make use of the rest. And lastly, receiving money (as) wages,[86] from either the kindred or some enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. They too who have the command of a vessel, do ten thousand other things of this kind. [87]For after some plotting, when out at sea, they leave persons deserted, and, committing errors at sea, hurl them into the sea, and do them other mischief.[87] If then, reflecting on these matters,

[83—83] Plato here alludes to the Homeric,—Ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων, in Il. xi. 514.

[84] I confess I cannot understand here ὁμοίως δή, which Ficinus has omitted. I could have understood ὀλούμενον διασώζουσιν, "they save completely about to perish," or εὐνόως δή, "with a kind feeling."

[85] Ficinus has "nihil aut parum admodum—" His MS. had therefore σμικρὰ—ἢ καὶ οὐδέν, not καὶ οὐδέν. A similar error is to be corrected similarly in the passages quoted by Stalbaum. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 114.

[86] To avoid the tautology we must omit μισθὸν, as Ficinus does, who has merely "pecuniis acceptis."

[87—87] If Plato alluded, as I suspect he did, to the story of Arion, against whom some sailors laid a plot and threw him into the sea; and to that of Philoctetes, against whom the Greeks, alleging some fault, left him on a desert island, he would have written perhaps to this effect. "For after some plotting, they do, when out at sea, throw persons into the water, or, alleging some fault against them, leave them deserted in shallow places, and do them, beyond common ills, a wrong." For in the concluding words there is an allusion perhaps to the anecdote told by Plutarch in Dion. § 5, respecting the tyrant of Syracuse bribing one Pollis to murder Plato during his voyage home; or, if that were not practicable, to sell him into slavery; which would be considered by a person like Plato, the very height of wrong. To arrive however at this sense, greater alterations would be requisite than an ordinary scholar would admit; who is therefore left to believe, if he will, that Plato wrote what is found in the present text.

we should enter into some consultation respecting them, (so that)[88] we should no longer permit either of those arts to have an absolute control over slaves or the free-born; but that we should collect together an assembly consisting of ourselves or all the people, or the rich alone; and that it should be lawful for private individuals, and the rest of the operatives, to bring together their opinions respecting sailing and diseases, as to what manner it is meet to use medicines, and medical instruments, for those that are ill; and moreover, (how to use) both the vessels themselves and nautical instruments for the requirements of vessels in case of danger during the voyage from winds and the sea and the meeting with pirates, and, if requisite, in fighting with long ships[89] against others of the like kind; and that, what shall have been decreed by the multitude on these points, by the advice of physicians and pilots, or of other[90] unskilled individuals, persons should inscribe in triangular tables[91] and pillars, and laying down other unwritten regulations, as the customs of the country, it should be necessary to navigate vessels in all future times according to this method, and to administer remedies to the sick.

Soc. jun. You have mentioned things really very absurd.

Guest. Further, that rulers of the people should be appointed yearly, whoever may be chosen by lot from the rich or from all the people; and that the rulers so appointed

[88] To destroy the asyndeton in the protasis of this long-winded sentence, of which, says Stalbaum, the apodosis is to be found a full page lower, it was merely necessary to suppose, that ὥστε had here dropt out between τινα and τοῦτων, and that a little below ταῦτα δεῖν had been corrupted into ταῦτα δή.

[89] Amongst the ancients, ships of war were long, those of commerce more round.

[90] Instead of ἄλλων, which, despite what some scholars say about ἄλλος being used pleonastically, makes nonsense here, Plato wrote ἄλλως, "merely," a meaning on which Ruhnken on Timæus, Οὐκ ἄλλως προνοεῖ, and Toup on Longinus, § 7, have said all that is requisite.

[91] The tablet called Κύρβις had three faces forming a triangle, fixed to a centre pole, called the ἄξων, and on each face was laid, probably, a volume of the laws originally relating to religious matters, but subsequently to civil likewise. Such tablets were once found in Christian churches; and the priest, or rather some clerical assistant in the character of a canon or chorister, used to chant from it the Psalms, and to read the two Lessons of the morning or evening service, which were placed respectively on the three faces of the tablet.

should rule according to the written regulations, like pilots over vessels and physicians over the sick.

Soc. jun. These things are still more harsh.

[38.] *Guest.* Let us see now after this what follows. For when the year of each governor shall have expired, it will be necessary to appoint[92] tribunals of persons, taken either by a selection from the rich or from all the people by lot, and to bring the rulers before them and to pass their accounts, and for any one to accuse them for not having acted, during his year, the pilot, according to the written regulations, nor according to the old customs of their forefathers; and for the very same things to take place in the case of those healing the sick; and that whoever of them should be convicted, certain persons should fix what the party must suffer (in person) or pay (in purse).

Soc. jun. Would not he, who is ready of his own accord to be a ruler under such circumstances, most justly suffer (in person) and pay (in purse)?

Guest. Further still, it will be necessary to make a law on all these points, that, if any one be proved to be seeking out the art relating to piloting and ships in general, or to health, and the truth of the physician's theory about winds, heat and cold, contrary to the written regulations,[93] or devising[94] any thing whatever about affairs of this kind, he shall, in the first place, be called neither as one skilled in physicking or piloting, but a talker of matters on high, or some babbler; and that, in the next place, it shall be lawful for any one to write down an indictment against him for lawlessness,[95] and to

[92] Stallb. has adopted καθίσαντες from two MS. He did not know that καθίζειν would be said of a judge; καθιστάναι, of a tribunal.

[93] Here and elsewhere the English phrase, answering to the Greek παρὰ τα γράμματα, is "contrary to the statutes, made in that case and provided."

[94] After σοφιζόμενος, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. καὶ διδάσκων, as shown by his "philosophetur et doceat." At all events, such an idea is requisite on account of the subsequent "corrupting."

[95] The edd. have γραψάμενον εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰς δή τι δικαστήριον. Here Ast was the first to object to οἷς ἔξεστιν, as being without syntax, and consequently without sense. But his proposed new reading, οἱ ἔξεστιν, is, if possible, worse than the old one; while Stallbaum's notion that οἷς ἔξεστιν is an interpolation, arising from τὸν βουλόμενον, may be safely left to its own refutation. Had these scholars

bring him before some court of justice, as corrupting the younger,[96] and persuading the silly to put their hands to the arts of a pilot and a physician not according to the laws, and to rule self-willed over vessels and the sick; and that if any one shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written regulations, (it shall be lawful) to punish him with the extreme (of punishments). For no one[97] ought to be wiser than the laws; nor on the other hand,[98] should any one be ignorant of the arts of medicine and of healing, nor of piloting and shipping, (according to) the written regulations and the customs laid down of the country; for he who wishes may learn. If then, Socrates, this should take place about the sciences we mentioned, and we should look into any portion of the general's art, and the whole of any kind of hunting, and of painting, or of imitation in general, and carpentry, and the formation in general of instruments of any kind, and of agriculture, and the art relating to plants in general; or, again, into the care of breeding horses, according to written regulations,[99] and herds of cattle of every kind, and prophecy, and all the portion that the ministering art embraces, the playing at games of dice, the whole of arithmetic, (whether) simple or (relating to) a plane, either in depth, or swiftness;[100] [1](if) respecting all these things (it were) so done, what would appear produced according to written regulations, and not according to art?[1]

remembered that a genitive of the crime, laid to the charge of a person indicted, follows *γράφεσθαι*, they might perhaps have seen that Plato wrote *γραψάμενον—βουλόμενον ἀνομίας ἔξεσται*, as I have translated.

[96] Edd. *ἄλλους νεωτέρους*. One MS. *τοὺς ἄλλους νεωτέρους*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *τοὺς νεωτέρους*: while from *ἄλλους* I have elicited *ἄνους*, and inserted it after *ἀναπείθοντα*. On the confusion between *ἄνους* and *ἄλλους*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

[97] Instead of *οὐδὲν* common sense requires *οὐδένα*, and *οὐδ' ἕνα γ' ἄν* in lieu of *οὐδένα γὰρ*.

[98] By inserting *κατὰ τα* before *γεγραμμένα*, required alike by the sense and syntax, and placing *ἐξεῖναι—μανθάνειν* after *κείμενα*, and not, as usual, after *ναυτικὸν*, I have made Plato talk something like sense, in lieu of the nonsense with which Stalbaum is so highly delighted.

[99] The words *κατὰ συγγράμματα* are omitted by Ficinus, for he was not aware perhaps that horses, as shown by Xenophon, were reared by rules.

[100] Of the mass of nonsense to be found here, it is easy to see the correction by turning to p. 284, F. § 25.

[1] Of all this heap of rubbish, without sense or syntax, Ficinus has omitted every atom; and in the preceding summary of different arts, he

Soc. jun. It is evident that all arts would be entirely subverted, nor would they exist again, through such a law forbidding one to investigate. So that life, which is now difficult, would at that time become utterly unable to be endured.

[39.] *Guest.* But what (will you say) to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned to take place according to written regulations, and should appoint as the guardian of these statutes a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who, giving no thought to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavour, although knowing nothing, to act contrary to these statutes, would not this be a still greater evil than the former?

Soc. jun. Most truly so.

Guest. For he, who should dare to act contrary to those laws, which have been laid down after much experience, (or) through certain advisers recommending each in a pleasant manner, and persuading the people to pass them, will commit an error many-fold greater than an error,[2] and subvert every process much more than written statutes.

Soc. jun. How is he not about (to do so)?

Guest. Hence there is a second sailing, as is said, for those that establish laws and statutes respecting any thing whatever, that is, not to suffer any one person, or the multitude, to do any thing of any kind at any time contrary to them.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Will not these statutes then, written by men intelligent as far as their power permits, be imitations of the truth of each of these?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And yet, if we remember, we said that the man who is in reality a statesman, would, being intelligent, do many things from art, in reference to his own course of action without giving a thought to statutes, when other things seem to him better than what had been written by himself and enjoined upon some persons absent.

Soc. jun. We did say so.

Guest. Would not then any single man whatever, or any

has shown that his MS. omitted words that have been interpolated, and transposed those which have been misplaced.

[2] Ficinus has "scelus committit superiori peccato longe deterius," which is far more intelligible than the Greek.

people whatever, by whom laws happen to be laid down, act in the same way as that true (statesman), should they endeavour to do to the utmost of their power contrary to them[3] (the laws) what is something different and better?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. If then they should without knowledge act in this manner, would they not attempt to imitate what is true? and yet they would imitate all badly; but if with art, this is no longer an imitation, but is the very truth itself.

Soc. jun. Altogether so.

Guest. And yet it was before laid down as a thing acknowledged by us, that the mob is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

Soc. jun. It was so laid down.

Guest. If then there is a certain kingly art, the mob of the rich, and the whole of the people, could never receive this science of the statesman.

Soc. jun. For how can they?

Guest. It is requisite then, as it seems, that such-like polities, if they are about to imitate correctly, to the best of their power, the true polity under a single person ruling with art, must never, [4]the laws having been laid down by them,[4] do any thing contrary to the written statutes and customs of the country.

Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.

Guest. When therefore the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy; but when they give no thought to the laws, an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. So it nearly seems.

Guest. And again, when one man rules according to the laws, imitating the person endued with science, we call him a king, not distinguishing by name the person ruling alone with science, or with opinion according to the laws.

[3] Stalbaum says that *ταῦτα* is to be referred to *νόμους* (the laws). But how a neuter noun could thus be made to agree with a masculine one, was known only, I suspect, to himself and Matthiæ, whom he quotes. To my mind the noun to be understood is *συγγράμματα*.

[4—4] Of these words, perfectly useless here, Ficinus has taken not the least notice, either because he could not understand them, or because they were not in his MS. Perhaps *κειμένων αὐτοῖς* ought to be inserted between *τῶν* and *νόμων* in the next speech of the Guest, where *αὐτοῖς*, "by themselves," would refer to the rich

Soc. jun. We nearly appear to do so.

Guest. If then a person possessing in reality science rules alone, he is called altogether by the same name, a king, and no other will be mentioned in addition · through which[5] the five names of the polities just now mentioned become only one.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. But when one man rules neither according to the laws nor the customs of the country, but pretends, as the person possessing science, that the best is to be done, contrary to the written statutes, and there exist a certain desire and ignorance as the leaders of this imitation, must we not call each man of this kind a tyrant?

[40.] *Soc. jun.* How not?

Guest. Thus then we say has been produced a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, from mankind indignantly bearing with such a single monarch, and not believing that any one would ever be worthy of such an office, so as to be both willing and able to rule with virtue and science, and to distribute properly to all persons things just and holy;[6] but (disposed to) to maim, and kill, and maltreat[7] whomsoever he might wish: yet, if such a person should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved and live at home happily,[8] guiding throughout, like a pilot, alone a polity accurately correct.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But now, as we truly say, since there is no such king produced in states, as is produced by nature in a swarm of bees, excelling straightway alone in body and soul, we must,

[5] As there is nothing to which *δι' ἃ* can be referred, one would read here, either *δι' ὃ*, "through which thing," or *δι' ὃν*, "through which person."

[6] Ficinus inserts here, "timerentque præterea, ne forte vir unus licentiam nactus—" I suspect rather from his own head than his MS.: and he is followed, as usual, by Taylor, who rarely troubled himself with looking at the Greek.

[7] Here the maltreating, after killing, has reference to the conduct pursued by tyrants to the dead bodies of their political enemies, as shown in the case of Ajax by the Atridæ, and in that of Polynices by Creon.

[8] To obtain this sense, it will be requisite to put *εὐδαιμόνως* before *διακυβερνῶντα*, instead of after it. But if *οἰκεῖν* is to be taken transitively, which can hardly be done, after the preceding passive verb *ἀγαπᾶσθαι*, we must translate, "he would be beloved through his administering alone, and guiding throughout, like a pilot, happily a polity accurately correct:" as if the Greek were *ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἂν διὰ τὸ οἰκεῖν-τα ἀγαπᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ οἰκεῖν.*

as it seems, come together and write down statutes, treading in the footsteps of a polity the most true.

Soc. jun. It nearly appears so.

Guest. And do we wonder then, Socrates, that in such-like polities evils, such as do happen, and will happen, are produced, when the foundation placed under them (exists) by statutes and customs, [9]and not with the foundation of science, which performs its actions in a different way than what a polity does, which, making use of imprudence, will be evident to every one, that it will destroy every thing produced by that (imprudence).[9] Or ought we not to wonder rather at this, how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have for time without end been suffering thus, yet some of them are still remaining, and are not overturned. Many however sometimes, like sinking [10] vessels, are perishing, have perished, and will perish,[11] through the incorrect conduct of the pilots and sailors,[12] who, having obtained the greatest ignorance respecting the greatest concerns, do still, although they know nothing about state affairs, think they have obtained this knowledge the most clearly of all.

[41.] *Soc. jun.* Most true.

Guest. Which then of these incorrect polities, where all are full of difficulties, is the least difficult to live in, and which the most oppressive, it is meet for us to look into a little; although it is what is called a by-deed [13] as regards our present inquiry; yet, perhaps, on the whole, we all of us do all things for the sake of a thing of this kind.[14]

[9-9] Such is my translation of this passage, which is perfectly unintelligible in the Greek, through the loss of some words that neither Schleiermacher nor Stalbaum had the sagacity to supply, here enclosed within lunes—(καὶ) μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης (τῆς) πραττούσης τὰς πράξεις ἑτέρᾳ πως (ἢ ἡ), χρωμένη (ἀνοίᾳ), παντὶ καταδηλος (ἔσται), ὡς πάντ' ἂν διολέσειε τὰ ταύτῃ γιγνόμενα.

[10] Instead of καταδυόμεναι, one would prefer καταλυόμεναι, i. e. not "sinking," but "loosened as to their timbers."

[11] Ficinus has, "perierunt pereunt atque peribunt," which is the more natural order of ideas.

[12] By sailors are meant those who are sailing in the vessel of the state.

[13] So we say "by-play" and "by-blow."

[14] Stalbaum defends, with Wyttenbach in Select. Histor. p. 414, and Hermann on Philoct. 557, the pleonasm in ἕνεκα and χάριν, not aware that the passage here is corrupt. Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 350, renders ἕνεκα "only," a meaning never found elsewhere. Had he read my note on Phil. 549—556, he would have found there something better than his borrowed nonsense.

Soc. jun. It is meet. How not?

Guest. Of three things then, say that the same is remarkably difficult, and at the same time most easy.

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Not otherwise than, as I said before, that a monarchy, the government of a few, and of many, are those three polities mentioned by us at the commencement of the discourse, which has now flowed upon us.

Soc. jun. They were.

Guest. Bisecting then each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the correct polity, as a seventh.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Out of monarchy there came, we said, the regal and the tyrannic; and out of that (composed) not of the many, the well-omened aristocracy and oligarchy. But out of that (composed) of the many, we then laid it down under the name of a simple democracy; but we must now lay it down as two-fold.

Soc. jun. How so? And after what manner do we make this division?

Guest. Not at all different from the others; even although the name of this is now two-fold. But to govern according to the laws, and contrary to them, is common both to this and the rest.[15]

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. Then indeed, when we were seeking a correct polity, this bisection was of no use, as we have shown above; but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, the being contrary or according to law causes a bisection in each of these.[16]

Soc. jun. So it appears from what has now been said.

Guest. A monarchy then, yoked to correct writings, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when it is without law, it is grievous, and most burthensome to live under.

[15] As this passage is at variance with that in p. 292, A. § 31, where Plato denies that a peculiar name can be given to a democracy, according as the people exercise their power wisely or wickedly, some person, as stated by Stalbaum, conceived the existence of an error here.

[16] Ficinus seems not to have found *τούτων*, evidently unnecessary, after *ἐν ταύταις*, in his MS. His version is, "in his jam legis servatio et transgressio singulas bifariam partiuntur."

Soc. jun. It nearly appears so.

Guest. But the polity of the not-many we have considered as a medium between both, as a few is a medium between one and many; but on the other hand, the polity of the many, as being weak in all things, and unable, as compared with the others, to do any thing great, either for good or evil, through the offices in this polity being divided into small parts amongst many. Hence, of all the polities acting according to law, this is the worst, but the best of all such as act contrary to law. And where all are intemperate, it is the best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst to live in. In the first polity is the first and best condition (of life), with the exception of the seventh; for we must separate this from all the other polities, as a god from men.

Soc. jun. These things appear thus [17] to be produced [17] and happen; and that must be done, which you mention.

Guest. Ought we not then to take away the sharers in all these polities, with the exception of the scientific one, as being not truly statesman-like but seditious-like; and as presiding over the greatest resemblances, and being such themselves; and, as they are the greatest mimics and enchanters, to be called [18] too the greatest sophists of sophists?

Soc jun. This appellation seems nearly to be retorted most correctly on those called statesmen.

Guest. Be it so. This indeed is, as it were, a drama for us; just as it was lately said, that we saw a certain dancing-troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, which was to be separated from the statesman's art; and now this separation has been with so much difficulty effected.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. But another thing remains, still more difficult than this, through its being more allied to the kingly genus, and at the same time more difficult to understand. And we ap-

[17]—[17] The words γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ are omitted in the three oldest but not the best MSS. They are rejected by the Zurich editors, but defended by Stalbaum. They are certainly here perfectly useless. But, if interpolated, why and from whence did they come?

[18] Instead of γίγνεσθαι, the train of ideas leads to λέγεσθαι, as I have translated; unless it be said that Plato wrote both, γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι, and that from this passage came the γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ found at present a little above.

pear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that wash gold.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but after this there are left substances, allied to gold, mixed together and of value, and to be separated only by fire, such as brass and silver, and sometimes a diamond; which[19] being with difficulty separated by the experiments of fusion (in the crucible), suffer us to see itself by itself that which is called pure gold.

Soc. jun. It is said that such things are so done.

[42.] *Guest.* After the same manner then it seems that things different from, and such as are foreign and not friendly to, the statesman's science, have been separated by us; but there have been left such as are of value and allied to it. Now of these are the military and judicial arts, and that oratory, which has a share of the kingly science, and does, by persuading men to do justice, conjointly regulate affairs in states; by separating (all) of which in a certain manner, most easily will a person show naked and alone by itself the character of which we are now in search.

Soc. jun. It is evident that we should endeavour to do this in some way.

Guest. As far as experiment goes, it will be evident. But let us endeavour to show it by means of music. Tell me, then—

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. Have we any teaching of music, and universally of the sciences, relating to handicraft trades?

Soc. jun. We have.

Guest. But what, shall we say that there is this too, a certain science respecting those very things, [20](which teaches

[19] This word, wanting in all the MSS., has been preserved by Ficinus alone; from whose version, "quæ," Stephens elicited, with the approbation of all modern scholars, *ἃ*—required by the syntax for the following *ἀφαιρεθέντα*—

[20]—[20] The words "which teaches" are taken from "quæ doceat" in the version of Ficinus, who probably found in his MS. *διδακτικὸν* in lieu of *αὖ καὶ ταύτην*, that are quite superfluous; to say nothing of the repeated *αὖ*, which even Stalbaum can hardly stomach; while, instead of *Ἔστι· Τί δὲ τὸ δ' αὖ*, which he vainly attempts to defend, we must read, *Soc. jun.* *Ἔστι· τί δ' οὔ.* *Guest.* *Τί δέ*—

us)[20] whether we ought to learn any one of them whatever or not? Or how shall we say?

Soc. jun. We will say that there is?

Guest. Shall we not then confess, that this is different from the others?

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. But whether must we say that not one of them ought to rule over the other? or the others over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Soc. jun. That this science (ought to rule)[21] over those; (which teaches)[21] whether it is requisite to learn, or not.

Guest. You tell us then, that it ought to rule over both the taught and the teaching.

Soc. jun. Very much so.

Guest. And that the science (which decides)[22] whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over that which is able to persuade?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. To what science then shall we attribute that, which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through fable-talking,[23] but not through teaching?

Soc. jun. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the science of the orator.

Guest. But on what science, on the other hand, shall we impose this, (to decide)[24] whether it is meet to do any thing whatever to any persons by persuasion, or violence, or to abstain[25] entirely.

[21]—[21] The words within lunes were inserted by Taylor to complete the sense. Stalbaum follows Ast, who thus arranged the speeches. *Soc. jun.* This over those. *Guest.* Do you then tell us, that the science, (which teaches) whether it is requisite to learn or not, ought to rule over the taught and teaching?

[22] Ficinus supplied, what Taylor adopted, "quæ—dijudicat."

[23] There is the same distinction drawn between ῥητορικὴ and διδαχὴ in Gorg. p. 454, E. § 22, as remarked by Stalbaum; who however does not state in what way ὄχλος differs from πλῆθος; and still less that Ficinus has merely "ad turbam," as if πλήθους κε καὶ were wanting in his MS.

[24] Here again Ficinus has inserted the word "judicare," requisite to supply the sense.

[25] So Stalbaum, by reading ἀπέχειν for ἔχειν. Ficinus has "in quibus et in quos uti deceat," as if he had filled out the sense from his own head, in consequence of some defect in his MS.

Soc. jun. To that, which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.

Guest. But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the statesman.

Soc. jun. You have spoken most beautifully.

Guest. Thus then the science of the orator appears to have been very rapidly separated from that of the statesman, as being another species, but subservient to this.

Soc. jun. Yes.

[43.] *Guest.* But what on the other hand must we conceive respecting this power?

Soc. jun. What power?

Guest. (Respecting) that, by which we are to war with each of those against whom we may have chosen to war. Whether shall we say that this power is without art or with art?

Soc. jun. And how can we conceive that power to be without art, which the general's art and all warlike operations put into practice?

Guest. But must we consider that power, which is able and skilful in deliberating, whether we ought to engage in war, or separate peaceably, as different from this, or the same with it?

Soc. jun. To those following[26] the preceding (reasoning) it is of necessity different.

Guest. Shall we not, then, assert that this (the art of deliberation) rules over that (which carries on war), if we understand in a manner similar to what has been advanced before?

Soc. jun. So I say.

Guest. What power then shall we endeavour to show as the mistress of the whole art of war, so terrible and mighty, except the truly kingly science?

Soc. jun. None other.

Guest. We must not then lay down the science of generalship as that of the statesman, of which the former is the ministering assistant.

[26] In ἑπομένοισιν, an Ionic form, inadmissible in an Attic writer, evidently lies hid ἑπομένοις ἦν. We find indeed in p. 291, A. § 30, τούτοισιν ἑτέροις, where it is easy to read τοιούτοις γ' ἑτέροις. Stalbaum refers to Zeller in Commentat. de Legg. Platon. p. 87. But I suspect nothing more is to be found there than what Matthiæ has stated in Gr. Gr. § 69. 7.

Soc. jun. It is not reasonable.

Guest. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges, who judge rightly.

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. Is it then capable of doing any thing more than merely judging respecting compacts, when, having received from a king the lawgiver, whatever has been laid down as legal, and looking both to those, and to what has been ordained to be just and unjust, it exhibits its own peculiar virtue, of never being overcome by certain bribes, or fear, or pity, or any other[27] hatred, or love, so as to be willing to settle mutual accusations contrary to the ordonnance of the legislator.

Soc. jun. The employment of this power is nearly nothing else,[28] than what you have mentioned.

Guest. We find then, that the strength of judges is not kingly, but the guardianship of the laws, and ministering to the kingly science.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. This also must be understood by him, who looks into all the aforesaid sciences, that the statesman's science has not appeared to be one of them. For it is not meet for the truly kingly science to act itself, but to rule over those able to act; since it knows that the commencement and progress[29] of things of the greatest consequence in states depends on opportunity[29] and the want of it; but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.

Soc. jun. Right?

Guest. Hence, since the sciences which we have just now

[27] On the pleonastic use of ἄλλος, which Stalbaum renders "moreover," various scholars, quoted in his note, have produced various instances. But in all of them it were easy to show, that there is some error hitherto unnoticed. Here Ficinus has omitted ἄλλης. Plato wrote ἄλλοις ἔχθρας, "enmity to others." For nouns of anger govern a dative. See my note on Æsch. Suppl. 125, and Poppo's Prolegom. p. 173, 264, 313.

[28] Ficin. has "Non aliud certe quam," which leads to Οὐκ ἄλλ' ἢ—in lieu of Οὔκ ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν.

[29] Ficinus translates τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν by "principium et progressum." De Geer, in Diatrib. de Politic. Platon. Princip. p. 144, wished to read ῥώμην. Stalbaum defends ὁρμὴν, and renders it "aggressionem," attack. But in that case he should have applied τῶν μεγίστων to persons and not to things. With regard to the sentiment, we may compare the proverb that "opportunity makes the thief." Some however would prefer perhaps to translate "since it knows that the power and onward movement of the greatest men in states—"

discussed, neither rule over each other nor themselves, but that each is occupied with a certain proper employment of its own, they have justly obtained according to the peculiarity of their actions a peculiar name.

Soc. jun. So they seem.

Guest. But we having rightly comprehended its power under an appellation in common, should, it seems, most justly call that the science of the statesman, which rules over all these and takes care of the laws, and of every thing relating to the state, and weaves all things together most correctly.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[44.] *Guest.* Are we then willing to go through this science at present, according to the pattern of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a state have become manifest to us?

Soc. jun. And very much so.

Guest. We must then, as it seems, define what is the kingly entwining, and what, after entwining, is the web it produces for us.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. It has become necessary, as it appears, to show forth a thing really difficult.

Soc. jun. It must however be told by all means.

Guest. For that a part of virtue differs in a certain manner from a species of virtue, is a point that may be very easily attacked by those, who contend in discourses against the opinions of the many.

Soc. jun. I do not understand you.

Guest. (Think) again in this way.[30] For I suppose you consider fortitude to be one part of virtue.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And that temperance is different indeed from fortitude, but that this is also a part of what that is likewise.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. On these points then we must dare to unfold a certain marvellous discourse.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. That they have after a certain manner very greatly

[30] Stalbaum supplies the ellipse by Ἀλλ' ὧδε πάλιν ἴδωμεν, and refers to Heindorf on Sophist. p. 262, A. ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν τόδε. Ficinus has "Sic forte intelliges."

an enmity with each other, and are of an opposite faction in many of the things that exist.[31]

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. An assertion by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.[32]

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Let us consider then, applying very closely our mind, whether this is so without exception,[33] or whether rather any part[34] of them differs from their kindred.

Soc. jun. Inform me how we are to consider.

Guest. In all such things as we call beautiful, it is proper to investigate, but we refer them to two species contrary to each other.[35]

Soc. jun. Speak more clearly.

Guest. Of acuteness then and swiftness, either in bodies or mind, or of the throwing out the voice, when such things exist themselves or in their resemblances, such as music and painting by imitating exhibit, have you ever been a praiser yourself, or, being not[36] present, have you heard another person praising any one of these things?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Do you likewise remember after what manner they do[37] this in each of these cases?

[31] In this speech Ficinus has omitted the Latin for the Greek words *εὖ μάλα* and *στάσιν ἐναντίαν*, either because they were not in his MS. or rejected as unnecessary.

[32] Ficinus has "amicitia vinciri dicuntur," as if he had found in his MS. *σύνδετα ἀλλήλοις*—λέγεται *φιλίᾳ* instead of *οὖν δὴ*—*φίλια*: where *οὖν δὴ* have not an atom of meaning.

[33] So Stalbaum translates here and elsewhere *ἁπλοῦν*.

[34] Here Stalbaum has inserted *τι* after *ἐστι* from the conjecture of Heindorf.

[35] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I do not understand, even though Stalbaum says that by a change of construction the demonstrative pronoun *αὐτὰ* is put for the relative *ἃ*. I could have understood a sense to this effect—"In all things, such as we say are beautiful, it is meet to seek, whether there are two species, which we place opposite to each other—" in Greek, *Ἐν τοῖς ξύμπασι χρὴ ζητεῖν, ὅσα καλὰ γ' εἶναι λέγομεν, εἰ ἔστι δύο δή, ἃ γε τίθεμεν ἐναντία ἀλλήλοιν εἴδη*, instead of *καλὰ μεν λέγομεν εἰς δύο δ' αὐτὰ τίθεμεν*—

[36] I cannot understand *εἴτε ἄλλου παρὼν*, nor could Ficinus, I suspect, who has omitted *παρὼν*. I have therefore translated as if *οὐ* had dropt out after *ἄλλου*.

[37] Stalbaum explains *δρῶσι* by "they praise," and so Ficinus, "laudant."

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Shall I then be able to point out to you through words, as I have it in my mind?

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it then in genera somewhat contrary. For in many actions, and oftentimes on each occasion,[38] when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of manliness.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. We say it is acute and manly, swift and manly, and in a similar manner vehement:[39] and, universally, by applying the name which I say is common to all these natural qualities, we praise them.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. But what, have we not often praised in many actions [40]the species of quiet production?[40]

Soc. jun. And very much so.

Guest. Do we not then, in saying the contrary to what (we did) about them, say this?[41]

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. As[42] we speak on each occasion of things done quietly and moderately as regards the mind, and admire them; and as regards actions, slowly and softly; and further as respects voice, smoothly and gravely, and of all rhythmical movement, and the whole of music which makes use of slow-

[38] Of the absurdity of thus uniting *καὶ πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε*, Ficinus seems to have been aware. At all events he has omitted those words. I suspect, however, that Plato wrote, *πολλαῖς πολλάκις καὶ τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα—λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε*—For thus *ἑκάστοτε* is perpetually united to verbs of speaking, as may be seen in Ast's Lexicon Platon., while *ἐν πολλαῖς πολλάκις* is supported by *πολλάκις—ἐν πολλαῖς* a little below.

[39] Ficinus has, "vehemens et forte." as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον*, not *καὶ σφοδρὸν ὡσαύτως*.

[40—40] Stalbaum remarks that this is said for "the species of things produced in quietness."

[41] Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "Non contrariis in hac atque in illis laudibus utimur?"

[42] Both Ast and Stalbaum would expunge Ὡς, as being merely a repetition in part of the preceding *πῶς*. They should have suggested either Οὕτως· or Ὡδ'.

ness opportunely, do we not assign to all these the appellation of the moderate, and not of the manly?

Soc. jun. Most assuredly.

Guest. But when, on the other hand, both these take place unseasonably,[43] we then in turn blame each of them by their names, distributing (them) back to their opposites.[44]

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. By calling things that are and seem (to be) more acute, and quick, and harsh than is seasonable, by the names of insolent and mad; but those that are more slow and soft, (by the names of) timid and slothful. And for the most part nearly we find that these, and the moderate and manly natures, having like hostile species obtained by lot their respective stations[45] opposite to each other, never mingle together in actions about things of this kind; and still further we shall see, if we pursue (the inquiry) diligently,[46] that they, who possess these in their souls, are at variance with each other.

[45.] *Soc. jun.* Where do you say?

Guest. In all the points which we have just now mentioned, and, it is likely, in many others. For I think that, on account of their alliance with each,[47] by praising some things as their own property, but blaming the things of those who differ, as being foreign, they stand in great enmity with each other and on account of many things.

Soc. jun. They nearly appear to do so.

Guest. This difference then between these species is a kind of sport. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to states about things of the greatest consequence.

[43] All the MSS. read absurdly *ἀκέραια*. Ficinus has "opportunitatem —non servant." From which Stephens elicited *ἄκαιρα*.

[44] This is the only version I can give to *ἐπὶ τἀναντία πάλιν ἀπονέμοντες*. Ficinus omits *ἀπονέμοντες*, in which the whole difficulty lies.

[45] Stalbaum renders *διαλαχούσας στάσιν* by "seditionem sortitas." But no person or thing could be said to have obtained by lot a sedition. There is here, I suspect, an allusion to the three powers of matter, called respectively, the creative, the conservative, and the destructive, each having its allotted station; and on which was founded some unknown boys' game.

[46] With a perversity of judgment, to be found only in a stickler for the received text, Stalbaum rejects *σπουδῇ*, furnished by the very MSS. which he elsewhere follows, almost to the very letter, and supported by "diligenter" in Ficinus, as Winckelmann was the first to remark.

[47] Ficinus has "utrique pro naturæ suæ convenientia."

Soc. jun. About what things are you speaking?

Guest. About the whole form of living, as it is reasonable I should. For they who are pre-eminently well-ordered are always prepared to live a quiet life, themselves by themselves, managing only[48] their own concerns, and so associating with all at home, and being ready, in like manner, to be at peace, after a certain fashion, with foreign states; and through this desire, more unseasonable than is fitting, when they are doing that which they wish, they become unconsciously unwarlike, and affect the young men in a similar manner, and become ever the prey of parties attacking; of whom in not many years themselves, their children, and the whole city, often unconsciously, instead of being free, become the slaves.

Soc. jun. You speak of a severe and terrible suffering.

Guest. But what are they, who incline more to manliness? Do they not incite their own cities ever to some warfare, through a desire more vehement than is becoming of such a kind of life; and thus standing in hostile array against many and powerful (nations), either entirely destroy their own country, or place it in slavery under the power of their foes?

Soc. jun. This too is the case.

Guest. How then shall we not say, that in these cases both these genera have ever against each other the greatest enmity and array?[49]

Soc. jun. It can never be that we should say no.

Guest. Have we not then found out, what we were considering at the beginning, that certain parts of virtue differ not a little from each other naturally, and that they likewise cause those, who possess them, to do the same?

Soc. jun. They nearly appear (to do so).

Guest. Let us handle again this too.

[46.] *Soc. jun.* What?

Guest. Whether any one of the sciences, that bring things

[48] By reading *μόνον* for *μόνοι*, we can get rid of the objection started by Valckenaer on Hippol. 785, against *αὐτοὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς μόνοι*. It is good Greek to say, *αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν*, or *μόνος καθ' αὑτὸν*, or *αὐτὸς μόνος*, but not *αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν μόνος*. In Rep. x. p. 604, A., *ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν γίγνηται*, the *μόνος* is evidently an interpretation of *αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν*.

[49] Although *στάσιν* seems to be supported by *διαλαχούσας στάσιν* a little above, yet here it is quite superfluous.

together, does compose any act of its works,[50] although it should be the vilest, willingly from things evil and useful? Or does every science always reject things evil to the utmost of its power, and receive such as are apt and useful? and that from these, both similar and dissimilar, it does, by collecting all into one, fabricate one certain power and form?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. The statesman's science, when it really exists according to nature, will never willingly form a state composed of good and bad men; but it is very evident, that it will first examine by means of play;[51] and, after the examination, it will hand over to such as are able to instruct and to minister to this very purpose, itself commanding and presiding, just as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, [52]and those who prepare the rest of the materials for weaving, and following them up, gives its orders and stands over them, pointing out to each to complete their work, such as it conceives to be fitted for its own putting together.[52]

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. In the very same way the kingly science appears to me to keep to itself the power of the presiding art, and not to permit all, who instruct and rear up according to law, to practise aught, except what any one would, by working out a manner suited to its own temperament, effect; and this alone it exhorts them to teach; but those who are unable to communicate a manner manly and moderate, and whatever else tends to virtue, and through the force of a depraved nature are impelled[53] to ungodliness, and insolence, and injustice, it casts

[50] Such a union of *πρᾶγμα* and *ἔργων*, is, I believe, not to be found elsewhere. Ficinus has "opus aliquod suum," as if his MS. omitted *ἔργων*.

[51] Stalbaum, adopting *παιδιᾷ* from fifteen MSS., explains it by saying that Plato considered that the disposition of boys was to be first ascertained in their sports. But the mention of boys could not be omitted. Opportunely then two MSS. offer *παιδία*, "children." But as the subject of the examination ought to be stated, something it is evident has dropt out. Ficinus has "immo disciplina unumquemque primum examinabit." Perhaps Plato wrote *παιδία παιδιᾶς*, "children by their sports."

[52]—[52] Ficinus has exhibited the whole of this passage in an abridged and somewhat better form—"cæterisque lanificii præparationibus præsidet, talia præcipiens singulis, qualia ad texturam suam conducere arbitratur."

[53] Stalbaum has adopted *ἀπωθουμένους* in lieu of *ἀπωθούμενα* from a solitary MS. It was so written however in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "qui—ad impietatem—raptantur."

out, punishing them with death and exile and the greatest of dishonours.

Soc. jun. This is said to be the case.

Guest. But those who wallow in ignorance and have a very abject spirit, it yokes to the race of slaves.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. With respect to the rest however, whose natures meeting with instruction are sufficient to reach[54] to what is high-minded, and to receive through art a commingling with each other, of these it considers such, as incline more to manliness, to have a firmness of conduct like the strong thread in the web; [55]but such (as incline) more to a well-ordered conduct (it considers) as making use (of a thread) supple and soft, and, according to the simile (from weaving), suited to a thinner stuff;[55] and it endeavours to bind and weave together the natures inclining in a contrary direction from each other in some such manner—

Soc. jun. In what manner?

Guest. [56]In the first place, according to the alliance having fitted together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond; and after that the divine (portion) that produces life with human—[56]

[47.] *Soc. jun.* Why again have you said this?

Guest. When an opinion really true exists with firmness in the soul, respecting the beautiful, and just, and good, and the contraries to these, I say that a god-like (opinion) is produced in a divine genus.[57]

[54] Ficinus has "ad generosum habitum—evehi," as if he had found in his MS. either *καθικνεῖσθαι* or *καθάπτεσθαι*, instead of *καθίστασθαι*.

[55]—[55] Such is the only intelligible translation I can give to the elliptical and technical language of the original.

[56]—[56] Such is the literal version of the Greek text; where I confess I am utterly in the dark. For I cannot understand why the middle voice, *ξυναρμοσαμένη*, is here used instead of the active, nor what is the verb required to complete the sentence, nor how *δεσμοῖς* can be supplied after *ἀνθρωπίνοις*; nor in what way *ἀειγενὲς* and *ζωογενὲς* could be, as they seem to be here, opposed to each other. Ficinus has "Primo quidem secundum cognationis naturam, animæ ipsorum partem, quæ sempiternæ generationis est, divino vinculo nectit; post divinam autem illam, quæ animalis naturæ est, humanis."

[57] Here again I must leave for others to understand what is quite beyond my comprehension. Stalbaum explains *ἐν δαιμονίῳ γένει* by *ἐν τῷ θείῳ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν μέρει*. But if Plato intended to say so, what

Soc. jun. It is proper it should.

Guest. Do we not know that it befits the statesman and a good legislator alone to be able, with the discipline of the kingly science, to effect this very thing in those who take properly a share in instruction, and whom we have just now mentioned?

Soc. jun. This is reasonable.

Guest. But the person, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, we must by no means call by the names now sought for.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. What then? Is not a manly soul, when it lays hold of a truth of this kind, rendered mild? and would it not be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But not sharing it, will it not incline rather to a certain savage nature?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what, does not that, which is a part of a well-ordered nature, after receiving these opinions, become truly moderate and prudent, at least in a polity? But when it has not partaken of the things we are speaking of, does it not obtain most justly some disgraceful reputation for stupidity?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Must we not say that this entwining and binding together of the evil with themselves, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever employ it with any serious care on such as these?

Soc. jun. For how can it?

Guest. But that in those alone, who have been born with noble manners from the first, and educated according to nature, this (bond) is naturally implanted through the laws? and for these too there is a remedy through art; and, as we said before, that this is the more divine bond of the parts of virtue which are naturally[58] dissimilar, and tending to contraries?

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. Since then this divine bond exists, there is scarcely

could induce him to put down words not necessarily conveying such a meaning?

[58] Instead of φύσεως Stalbaum would read φῦσει, with Stephens, who got the idea from the version of Ficinus, "natura contrariarum."

any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or for a person understanding to bring them to a completion.

Soc. jun. How so? And what are these bonds?

Guest. Those of intermarriages and of a communion of children, and those relating to private[59] betrothals and espousals. For the majority are in these matters not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.

Soc. jun. Why?

Guest. The pursuit of wealth and power on such occasions who would seriously blame, as being worthy of notice?[60]

Soc. jun. It is not.

[48.] *Guest.* But it will be more just to speak of those, who make the genera[61] the object of their care, should they do any thing not according to propriety.

Soc. jun. It is at least reasonable.

Guest. They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue a life easy for the present; and through their hugging those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they give up themselves for the greatest part to an unpleasant feeling.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. They that are well-ordered seek after manners like their own, and as far as they can marry from amongst such; and on the other hand send away to them their own daughters to be married. In the same manner acts the genus that delights in manliness, while going in the pursuit of its own nature; whereas it is requisite for both the genera to do entirely the contrary.

Soc. jun. How, and on what account?

Guest. Because manliness, having been propagated, unmixed for many generations with a temperate nature, is

[59] I cannot understand here *ἰδίας*, "private," as if there were ever public betrothals. Ficinus exhibits a remarkable variation, "Conjugia inquam maris et fœminæ ad filiorum procreationem. Plurimi enim circa hæc tum accipiendo tum dando aberrant."

[60] Such is the version of the Greek, with the exception of the words *τί καὶ* before *τίς ἂν*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them. One MS. has *τινα*—another omits *τι*. There is some error here.

[61] Stalbaum, uncertain to what *τὰ γένη* can be applied, would read *ἤθη*, referring that word to the varieties of disposition, mentioned just afterwards.

naturally at the beginning blooming with strength, but in the end bursts out altogether into madness.

Soc. jun. It is likely.

Guest. On the other hand, a soul very full of modesty, and unmixed with manly boldness, when it has been propagated in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unseasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.

Soc. jun. And this also is likely to happen.

Guest. I have said that it is not difficult to bind together these bonds,[62] the fact being that both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of kingly weaving, never to suffer moderate manners to subsist apart from such as are manly; but, placing both in the same shuttle, to bring out from them a web smooth, and, as it is said, well-woven, by means of similar opinions, and honours, and dishonours, and glories,[63] and the interchange of pledges,[64] and to commit over to these in common the offices in the state.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Wherever there happens to be a need of one governor, by choosing a president who possesses both these (manners); but where (there is need) of more than one, by mingling a portion of both of them. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and conservative; but they are in want of a certain sourness, and a sharp and practical daring.

Soc. jun. These things also appear so to me.

Guest. On the other hand, manliness is with respect to

[62] Ficinus has "His, ut diximus, ligamentis vincire utraque hominum genera facile possumus," which is, what the Greek is not, intelligible. Perhaps Plato wrote Τούτοις δὴ τοῖς δεσμοῖς—ξυνδεῖν τὼ γένη, ὑπάρξαντε τοῦν—μίαν ἔχειν ἀμφότερα δόξαν—i. e. "With these bonds—to bind the two genera, after they have begun to have both one opinion." For thus we get rid of the strange use of ὑπάρξαντος, thus found absolutely in the sense of existing.

[63] Ficinus correctly omits δόξαις: which, if it means "glories," is almost synonymous with τιμαῖς; if "opinions," with ὁμοδοξίαις. On the other hand, the oldest MS. omit ἀτιμίαις, which Ficinus renders "vituperationes."

[64] Such is Stalbaum's version of ὁμηρείων ἐκδόσεσιν. But interchange is in Greek ἀντίδοσις or ἐπίδοσις. In ἐκδόσεσιν there is evidently an allusion to the "giving in marriage" mentioned above. Hence Ficinus has "per alterna conjugia." There is however some deep-seated disorder here, which only a bold conjecture will be able to cure.

justice and caution rather deficient in those virtues; but it has pre-eminently in actions a daring.[65] It is however impossible for all things pertaining to states, both of a private and public nature, to well exist, unless both of these are present.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Let us say[66] then that this is the end of the web of the statesman's doing, (so as for him) to weave with straight-weaving the manners of manly and temperate men, when the kingly science shall by bringing together their common life, through a similarity in sentiment and friendship, complete the most magnificent and excellent of all webs, [67][so as to be common,][67] and enveloping all the rest in the state, both slaves and free-men, shall hold them together by this texture, and, as far as it is fitting [68]for a state to become prosperous, shall rule and preside over it, deficient[68] in that point not one jot.

Soc. jun. You have brought, O guest, most beautifully, on the other hand,[69] the characters of the king and statesman to a finish.

[65] From the letters *τὸ μὲν*, which Stalbaum has cancelled, as if they had dropped from the clouds, Ast most happily elicited *ἰταμὸν*, the very word requisite to complete the sense.

[66] Stalbaum has improperly adopted *φαμὲν*, with his three best MSS., in lieu of *φῶμεν*.

[67]—[67] To the words within brackets, in Greek *ὥστ' εἶναι κοινὸν*, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, first objected; for he probably saw that they were omitted by Ficinus. They ought not however to be rejected entirely, but inserted a little above, by reading—*Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος, ὑφάσματος ὡς εὐθοπλοκίᾳ ξυμπλακὲν, γίγνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικῆς πράξεως, ὥστ' εἶναι κοινὸν τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἦθος, ὁπόταν*—i. e. "Let us say then that this is the end, as of a garment woven by a straight weaving, of the statesman's working, so that the manners of manly and moderate men may be in common." To get, however, at this sense it was requisite to retain the old reading, *ξυμπλακὲν*, for which Stalbaum has from his three best MSS. substituted *ξυμπλέκειν*, to the destruction alike of sense and syntax, and to insert *ὡς* after *ὑφάσματος*.

[68]—[68] Ficinus has more intelligibly, "ut nihil prætermittat eorum, quæ, quoad fieri potest, beatam efficiunt civitatem."

[69] In lieu of *αὖ*, which has no meaning here, one MS. has *ἂν*, which would lead to *δὴ*, as shown by Porson in Miscellan. Crit. p. 182. Unless indeed it be said with Stalbaum that the concluding speech is to be assigned to the elder Socrates; who would thus be seen to praise this dialogue at its end, as he does at its commencement the Sophist; which is feigned to have taken place on the same day as this, and of which the Statesman is merely the continuation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRATYLUS.

PLATO having on various occasions, and especially in the Sophist and Statesman, applied some of the phænomena of language to the illustration of his argument on questions relating to Dialectics, and Moral and Political Philosophy, has in this Dialogue entered more at length on so much of the same subject, as is connected with the origin of words in the case of persons, acts, and things.

To this step he was probably led by finding that the Sophists, whom he every where opposes with reason and ridicule united, and whom he hunted down with all the ardour of a philosophical Nimrod, were generally the followers of the school of Parmenides or Heracleitus. Of these, the former asserted that all the phænomena of existence could be explained on the principle, that all things are ever at rest; the latter on the contrary principle, that every thing is in motion. To prove then that both were equally wrong, Plato had recourse to the phænomena of language. For as they formed a part of things in existence, the supporters of those theories ought to be able to explain, why certain names were given to certain persons, acts, and things. And so, it would seem, Protagoras did in reality attempt to do in that part of his work under the title of Ἀλήθεια (Truth), which was Περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος (On the propriety of names), as Stalbaum has suggested; and so too, I suspect, did Euthyphron, in his philosophical poem called Μοῦσα Φιλόσοφος, where the doctrines attributed to Orpheus were developed; and from whence Proclus probably obtained the quotations from the Orphic poems, to be found in his Commentaries on the Cratylus and Parmenides. For such was the elasticity of the Greek language, that subjects, apparently the least suited to verse, were treated in a metrical form; as is shown by the fragments of Empedocles, Parmenides, and of Epicharmus the philosopher.

But as the reasons, by which the Philosophical Etymologists arrived at their conclusions, were little satisfactory to Plato, he probably thought, that to prove the absurdity of their theories, it was only requisite to carry out their principles to the fullest extent. He therefore amused himself with bringing forward some proper names, and nouns appellative, and a few verbs, which he pretends to explain on their own principles. But this is done in a manner so utterly ridiculous, as to exhibit its own refutation on its very face; but with an air so grave, that Payne Knight said it was difficult to decide whether Plato was in jest or in earnest. So successfully indeed has the mystification been carried on, that, as stated by Stalbaum, while Menage and Tiedemann believed Plato to be speaking seriously his real sentiments, Garnier and Tennemann perceived that he was playing his usual part of an ironical philosopher. For the etymologies are not only at variance with all the well-ascertained principles of the Greek language, but they are supported by arguments one can hardly believe to be other than, as in the case of the Hippias Major, the broadest caricature of those brought forward by the persons, whom it was Plato's intention to ridicule.

To preserve however his assumed character the better, Plato pretends to account for his ignorance of the origin of some words by saying, as probably did some of the Pseudo-philosophical Etymologists of his day, and as their counterparts of the present time do certainly, that to the East we must look for the solution of many difficulties connected with this inquiry; as if any person, acquainted with all the dead and living languages of the whole world, could arrive at the origin of words, unless he could tell—what, I suspect, Prodicus or some other of the philosophers, whom Plato had in mind, attempted to do—what was the origin of each letter, and why they had a certain form, and how that form was connected with the sound of each, and how they came to follow each other in a certain order. It was not then without reason that Plato concluded the Dialogue by saying, that the question was one of so intricate a nature, as to require much further consideration; as it was impossible to prove in all cases that the names of persons, things, and acts were originally given with reference to the inherent nature of the objects represented by them, or from the caprice of one person, or the agreement of many.

THE CRATYLUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES

HERMOGENES.

[1.] ARE you willing then that we should communicate our discourse to Socrates here?

Crat. If it seems good to you.

Herm. Cratylus here, O Socrates, says that there is a propriety of appellation naturally subsisting for every thing that exists; and that this name is not, what certain persons conventionally call it, while they articulate with a part of their speech; but that there is a certain propriety of names, naturally the same both among the Greeks and all Barbarians. I ask him then whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. What then is the (true name) of Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In the case of all other persons then, said I, is not that the name of each, by which we call him? Your name, says he, is not Hermogenes, although all men call you so.[1] And upon my putting a question, and being very desirous to know what he means, he does not state any thing distinctly, but uses dissimulation towards me, and a feint, as if he had some thoughts in his own mind, which, should he, as being conversant with the subject, be willing to state clearly, he would cause me to agree with him, and to say

[1] "Cratylus," says Stalbaum, "denies that Hermogenes was correctly so called. For Hermogenes was neither wealthy nor eloquent, as shown by § 3 and § 54."

what he does himself. [2.] If then you can by any means unfold by guessing this oracular language of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I would much more gladly hear about the propriety of names, in what way the matter seems to stand to you.

Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus,[2] there is an old proverb, that beautiful things are somehow difficult to learn.[3] Now the learning relating to names happens to be no small affair. If however I had heard that exhibition of Prodicus valued at fifty drachms,[4] by which he who heard might have been instructed, as he himself says, on this very point, nothing would have prevented you from knowing immediately the truth respecting the propriety of names. But I never heard except the one for a single drachm.[5] Hence I know not where the truth is on such-like points; but am nevertheless prepared to seek it along with you and Cratylus. [3.] But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he is, as it were,[6] scoffing at you; for he thinks, perhaps, that though covetous of wealth, you have failed on each occasion in acquiring it. But, as I just now said, it is hard to know such-like matters; by placing however (the arguments) in common, it is meet to consider whether the fact is as you say, or as Cratylus.

Herm. In good truth, Socrates, although I have frequently disputed with this person and many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other propriety of appellation, than through convention and common consent. For to me it appears, that the name, which any one assigns to a thing, is the proper one; and that, if he should even change it to another,

[2] Respecting this Hipponicus, Heindorf refers to Thucyd. iii. 91; Andocid. Orat. iv. p. 296; Plutarch, Alcibiad. p. 195; and Athenæus v. p. 218.

[3] On this proverb, see the Schol. here, and Hesych. in Χαλεπά.

[4] To this high-priced exhibition Plato alludes in Charmid. § 24, and Aristotle in Rhetor. iii. 14. HEIND.

[5] From this passage, and the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus, § 6, it has been inferred that Prodicus used to suit the price of his instructions to the purse of his pupils. Hence as Socrates was a very poor man, he could only get at the lectures given for a very low sum, and consequently of very little value.

[6] I have translated ὥσπερ as if it were ὡσπερει. Ficinus has, "tibi non esse revera nomen Hermogenis, quod a lucro dicitur," either from his own head or the MS. before him.

and call it no longer by the previous one, the latter name will be no less right than the former; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants, [7][and the name so changed is not the less proper than the one previously given];[7] for to each thing there is no name naturally inherent, but only through the law and custom of those who are wont so to call them. But, if the case is otherwise, I am ready both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

[4.] *Soc.* Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something (to the purpose). Let us then consider, Is that the name of a thing, which any one puts on each thing as its appellation?

Herm. To me it appears so.

Soc. And this, whether a private person so calls it, or a state?

Herm. So I say.

Soc. What then, if I should give a name to whatever that exists, in such a manner, as to denominate that a horse, which we now call a man, and that a man, which we now call a horse, the name of man will, as regards the public, remain to the same (object); but as regards the individual, the name of horse? and on the other hand, as regards the individual, the name of man, but as regards the public, the name of horse? Do you say so?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, do you say it is a thing, to speak true and false?

Herm. I do.

Soc. There will then be a discourse, one true but another false.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not that discourse then, which speaks of things as they are, be true; but that which (speaks of them) as they are not, false?

Herm. Yes.

[5.] *Soc.* This then is possible,[8] to speak in a discourse of things which are, and which are not.

[7]—[7] Cornarius was the first to reject as spurious the words within brackets; for he doubtless saw they were omitted by Ficinus. They are vainly defended by Heindorf and Stalbaum.

[8] So Heind. explains Ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, as if ἔστιν were used in the

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is the discourse, which is true, true as a whole, while its parts are not true?

Herm. No; but the parts are true likewise.

Soc. But are the greater portions true, and the smaller, not? or are they all (true)?

Herm. I think all.

Soc. Is there any part of a discourse, of what you are speaking, smaller than a name?

Herm. No. This is the smallest of all.

Soc. And the name is said to be a part of a true discourse?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. And it is, as you say, true.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But is not the part of a false discourse false?

Herm. I say so.

Soc. It is then permitted to call a name true and false, since (we can call) a discourse so.

Herm. How not?

Soc. Is that, which each person says is the name of a thing, the name of each thing?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Will there be as many names to a thing, as any person assigns to it? and at that time, when he assigns them?

[6.] *Herm.* I have no other propriety of appellation, Socrates, than this; that I should call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you (assign) to it. And after this manner, I see that by each state, names are assigned individually, sometimes[9] to the same things, both by Greeks apart from[10] the other Greeks, and by Greeks apart from Barbarians.

sense of ἔνεστι. But in that case, as Heindorf confesses, one would expect τοῦτο, τὸ—λέγειν, although the article is omitted in Euthyd. § 37, ἢ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο—ἐξελέγξαι. Had however Heindorf known that one MS. reads τοῦτ'οὖν for τοῦτο, and another τῷ, perhaps he would have seen that Plato wrote ὁτῳοῦν λόγῳ, i. e. "by any discourse whatever."

[9] Buttmann's emendation, ἐνίοτε for ἐνίοις, preserved by some MSS. after ἑκάσταις, has been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

[10] So Stalbaum translates παρὰ. I suspect however that τισὶ has dropt after the first Ἕλλησι, and πᾶσι after the second, to preserve the balance in the two parts of each sentence.

Soc. Come, let us see, Hermogenes, whether things that are, appear to you to exist in such a manner, [11] with respect to the peculiar essence of each,[11] as Protagoras said, when he asserted that man was the measure of all things; [12] (and) [13] that things are to me, such as they appear to me; and that, on the other hand, they are to you such, as (they appear) to you; or do some of these seem to you to possess a certain stability of existence?

Herm. Already, Socrates, I have, through doubting, been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; [14] but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

[7.] *Soc.* But what, have you ever been led to this, so that it never seemed to you that a man existed perfectly evil?

Herm. Never, by Zeus! But I have often had this feeling, so as to think, that there are some men, and very many too, profoundly wicked.

Soc. But what, have there never seemed to you to be men very good?

Herm. Very few, indeed.

Soc. Yet they have seemed to be?

Herm. Yes, to me.

Soc. How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus? That the very good are very prudent, and the very bad are very imprudent?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. Is it possible then, if Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself,[15] that each [16] thing is such, as it appears to each one to be, for some of us to be prudent, and some imprudent?

[11]—[11] So Taylor translates the Greek words *ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἶναι ἑκάστῳ*, where I can discover neither sense nor syntax; nor could Ficinus, as may be inferred from his version, "ut propria rerum apud unumquemque essentia sit," which to me is quite as unintelligible as the Greek.

[12] On this celebrated doctrine of Protagoras, see Theætet. § 23, and the authors quoted by Menage on Diogen. L. ix. 61.

[13] I have translated as if *καὶ* had dropped out before *ὡς*.

[14] Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain away the incorrect Greek in the words *ἐνταῦθα—εἰς ἅπερ—λέγει*. There is some error here, which only a bold critic would be able to correct.

[15] Stalbaum conceives there is an allusion to a work of Protagoras under the title of "The Truth."

[16] Heindorf thinks that Ficinus found in his MS. *ἑκάστῳ ἕκαστα*: for his version is "qualia quæque cuique videntur."

[8.] *Herm.* By no means.

Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since prudence and imprudence exist, it is not possible for Protagoras to speak the truth entirely; for one person will not in truth be more prudent than another, if that, which seems to each one, is to each one true.

Herm. It is so.

Soc. I think however you will not, according to the theory of Euthydemus,[17] imagine that all things exist to all persons in a similar manner, and at the same time,[18] and always; for thus some persons would not be good, and others bad, if virtue and vice existed to all persons, and in a similar manner, and always inherent in all things.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. If then neither all things exist similarly and at the same time, and always to all persons, [19]nor each thing is what it seems to each person,[19] it is evident that there are things, which possess themselves a certain firm existence of their own; and this not as regards us, nor by being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through our imagination, [20] but possessing of themselves their own existence, which is naturally theirs.[20]

Herm. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

[9.] *Soc.* Will then the things themselves exist naturally in this manner, but their actions not in the same manner? or are not their actions themselves one species of things?

[17] This is the same person as he who is mentioned in the dialogue of that name, where his theory is explained in § 55.

[18] Ficin. omits ἅμα, correctly it would seem, for it is not introduced into the next sentence. But as it is repeated in the next speech of Socrates, perhaps καὶ ἅμα ought to be inserted here before καὶ ἀεὶ, or else ἅμα omitted again with Ficinus.

[19]—[19] So Taylor translated, as the train of ideas evidently requires. The Greek is literally, "nor to each person individually are each of the things existing." Ficinus has, "neque cuique proprium unumquodque," as if his MS. omitted with thirteen others τῶν ὄντων ἔστι.

[20]—[20] I have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκεν—not αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν—ἥπερ, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version is "sed secundum se ipsas, quoad ipsarum essentiam, ut naturæ institutæ sunt, permanentes," as if he had found in his MS. ὄντα instead of ἔχοντα, in which word the whole difficulty lies; for it could not be taken here intransitively, as shown by the preceding αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα, and by αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς—τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσι in Parmenid § 15, quoted by Heindorf.

Herm. They are perfectly so.

Soc. Actions too are performed then according to their own nature, (and) not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any of things existing, whether must each (particular) be cut as we please, and with what we please? or if we should desire to cut any thing, [21] according to its nature of being cut, and with the (instrument) of which it is the nature to cut,[21] [22] shall we both cut and will something more take place, and shall we do this rightly?[22] But if (we wish to act) contrary to nature, shall we (not) err, and effect nothing?

Herm. To me it appears so.

Soc. If then we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it, according to every opinion, but according to that which is the right one; [23] and this is in the way, in which each thing is by nature to be burnt and burn, and with what it is by nature.[23]

Herm. It is so.

[10.] *Soc.* Are not thus too the rest of things?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not then to speak one of the things (called) actions?

Herm. Yes.

[21]—[21] All the MSS. have *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν——τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε*, nor has a single editor seen that the thing to be cut can alone have the nature to be cut, and the cutting instrument alone the nature to cut. Wisely then did Taylor omit the words *τέμνειν τε καὶ*. But he failed to see that *τέμνειν τι* should follow *ᾧ πέφυκε*, as I have translated.

[22]—[22] Others may, but I never will, believe that Plato wrote *τεμοῦμέν τε—καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο*, as if the latter expression were not perfectly superfluous after the former. He might indeed have written, and probably did, *καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τὸ πᾶν*, as opposed to *οὐδ' ἓν πράξομεν*: while, as opposed to *ἐξαμαρτησόμεσθα*, common sense requires *πελοῦμέν τι εὖ*.

[23]—[23] Here again, in the place of a mass of nonsense, Plato wrote I suspect, something more fit to be read, to this effect, "And this is for each thing to be burnt in the way it is naturally, and with the material which naturally burns,"—in Greek, *αὕτη δέ ἐστι τὸ, ᾗ γε πέφυκεν, ἕκαστον καίεσθαι, καὶ, ᾧ γε πέφυκε, καίειν*: where I have substituted *ᾗ γε πέφυκε* and *ᾧ γε πέφυκε*, partly with two MSS., instead of *ᾗ ἐπεφύκει* and *ᾧ ἐπεφύκει*, where the preposition is perfectly absurd, as Hermann might have remarked, who, in his book, De Emendand. Ration. Græc. Gramm. p. 202, and on Eurip. Hec. 213, ed. pr., correctly objected to the pluperfect.

Soc. Whether then does he, who speaks in the way he thinks he ought to speak, correctly speak? [24]or, should he speak in the way in which it is the nature of things to speak and be spoken of, and with the instrument,[24] will he effect something and speak; but if not, will he err and effect nothing?

Herm. It appears to me it is thus as you say.

Soc. Is it not then a part of speaking to name a thing? [25]For they who name a thing, speak the discourses.[25]

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is it not then an action to name a thing? since to speak about things was a certain action.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But actions have appeared as existing not with respect to us, but as having a certain proper nature of their own.

Herm. They have so.

Soc. We must then give names to things, in the way and by the instrument through which they exist in nature, [26][to name and be named,][26] and not as we please, if there is about to be an assent to what has been said before. And thus we shall do something more, and give a name, but otherwise not.

Herm. It appears so to me.

[11.] *Soc.* Come then, say we that a thing which we ought to cut, we ought to cut with something?

[24]—[24] Here again the Greek presents the same incorrect collocation of words, as I have already noticed, and at variance with the natural flow of ideas, which is partially preserved in the version of Ficinus—"an potius quisquis ita dicat, ut natura ipsa rerum dicere dicique requirit? et, quo natura exigit, eo et dicat, aliquid dicendo proficiet?" From whence it is easy to see that Plato wrote—*ἐὰν μὲν, ᾧ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε λέγειν—ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ.*

[25]—[25] Heindorf considered the whole of this clause as an interpolation. For *λέγουσι* is not used by Plato, like *φασὶ*, without a nominative. Stalbaum, in defence of the omitted article, quotes, as Heindorf had done himself, Thucyd. vii. 69, *ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσιν.* But there I have restored *οἱ* before *ἐν*, in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 107. The preceding however is not the only error here. For *τοὺς* before *λόγους* is perfectly unintelligible. Plato wrote, *οἱ ὀνομάζοντες γάρ τι οὐ λέγουσί του λόγου τι*; i. e. "For do not they, who name a thing, speak a part of a discourse."

[26]—[26] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. Opportunely then does one of the three oldest MSS. omit *ὀνομάζειν τε*, and another *καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι*, and a third place *ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι* only in the margin.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. And that what we ought to weave, we ought to weave with something? And that what we ought to bore, we ought to bore with something?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And what we ought to name, we ought to name by something?

Herm. It is so.

Soc. Now what is that with which we ought to bore?

Herm. An auger.

Soc. And what (is that) with which (we ought to weave)?

Herm. A shuttle.[27]

Soc. And what (is that) by which (we ought) to name?

Herm. A name.

Soc. You speak well. The name then is a certain instrument.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. If then I were to ask, What instrument is a shuttle? [28](would you not answer,)[28] It is that with which we weave?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform with the shuttle? Do we not separate the warp and the woof, which have been mixed together?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not be able to speak in the same manner of an auger, and the other (instruments)?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Can you in like manner speak of a name? Using the name as an instrument, what do we perform by naming?

Herm. I cannot tell.

[12.] *Soc.* Do we teach one another something, and distinguish things as they are?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. A name then is a kind of instrument to teach and

[27] Ficinus, uncertain how to translate κερκὶς, makes use of two words, "radius pectenque."

[28—28] The words within lunes Taylor inserted from "responderes" in the version of Ficinus. Stalbaum says that the apodosis is omitted, where one would expect οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγοις ἄν, as supplied by Heindorf. But why Plato should thus omit what is absolutely requisite for the sense, Stalbaum does not, for he could not, tell. I suspect that ἐρεῖς has dropt out after ᾧ κερκίζομεν.

distinguish the (parts) of existence,[29] as a shuttle (does those) of a web.

Herm. C rtainly.

Soc. The shuttle is a weaving instrument?

Herm. How not?

Soc. He who weaves then will employ a shuttle well;[30] and by well, is meant in a weaver-like manner; and he who teaches (will employ) a name well, and by well, (is meant) in a teacher-like manner.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. By the work of whom does the weaver employ properly the shuttle, when he uses it?

Herm. The carpenter.

Soc. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) the art?

Soc. By the work of whom does the borer properly use the auger, when he uses it?

Herm. The smith's.

Soc. Is then every one a smith, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) the art.

Soc. Well then, by the work of whom does the teacher employ a name, when he uses it?

Herm. Not even this can I tell.[31]

Soc. Nor can you tell even this, who has handed down to us the names which we use?

Herm. Not I.

Soc. Does it not appear to you that custom[32] has handed down these?

[29] As the genitive *τῆς οὐσίας* cannot thus depend upon *διακριτικὸν*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ οὐσίας*. For otherwise the article *τοῦ* would be required before *ὑφάσματος*.

[30] The word "well," in Greek *καλῶς*, Cornarius was the first to see was wanting here; for he found "recte utetur" in the version of Ficinus.

[31] Heindorf says that in *Οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔχω*, without *λέγειν*, there is an allusion to *Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν* in § 11. But as the allusion would be too distant, one would have expected rather *Οὐκ ἔχω*, similar to "Nescio" in Ficinus.

[32] So Heindorf explains *ὁ νόμος*, referring to *νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν—καλούντων* in § 3, whom Stalbaum follows. But instead of *ὁ νόμος*, "a thing," the train of reasoning evidently requires *ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης*, "a person," as is read in MS. Gud. here and elsewhere. Besides, although a person may be said to introduce a custom, he can scarcely be said to

Herm. It does.

[13.] *Soc.* He then who teaches, employs the work of the custom-introducer[33] when he uses a name.

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But does every man appear to you to be a custom-introducer, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) that art.

Soc. It is not then the province of every man, Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it seems, is the custom-introducer,[34] who is the most rare of artificers among men.

Herm. So it appears.

Soc. But come, consider, to what does the custom-introducer[35] look when he establishes names; and make the survey from the previous instances. To what does the carpenter look, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is weaving naturally?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But if the shuttle should be broken by him while making it, would he make another, looking to the broken one, or to that form, according to which he was making the shuttle he had broken?

Herm. To that, it appears to me.

Soc. [36]Should we not therefore most justly call that very form the shuttle itself?[36]

possess the art of introducing a custom. For there is not, and never was, such an art.

[33] So Stalbaum understands *νομοθέτου*. But *νομοθέτης* always means elsewhere in Greek a "law-giver;" nor is Plato thus wont to affix new meanings to well-known words.

[34] Heindorf says, that if *ὀνοματοθέτης* be rendered "a name-imposer," Plato will be guilty of a wretched tautology in thus introducing *ὀνοματοθέτης* after *ὀνοματουργός*. But *ὀνοματοθέτης*, found in the margin of one MS. and in the text of the MS. used by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "hic autem etiam, ut videtur, nominum institutor," is evidently an interpretation of *ὀνοματουργὸς*, a word coined by Plato, after the analogy of *δημιουργὸς*; and hence the whole clause, *οὗτος δὲ ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης*, must be rejected as the interpolation of some Scholiast.

[35] One MS. has *ὀνοματοθέτης* as a var. lect., which Ficinus found in the text of his MS. For he translates it "nominum institutor."

[36] Ficinus seems to have found something different from the present Greek text in his MS., for his version is, "Nonne speciem ipsam merito ipsius radii rationem ipsumque radium nominabimus?"

Herm. It appears so to me.

[14.] *Soc.* When therefore it is requisite to make a shuttle, (adapted) to a thin or thick garment, either of thread or wool, or of any material whatever, it is necessary for all of them to have the form of the shuttle; but to impart its nature to each kind of work according as it is naturally the best suited for it.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. And the same method applies in the case of other instruments. For he who has discovered an instrument naturally suited to each thing, must assign it to that work, from which he will make not what he pleases, but that which is natural (to the instrument). [37] For as it seems, a person ought to know how to form of iron an auger naturally suited for each (work).[37]

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And of wood a shuttle naturally suited for each (work).

Herm. It is so.

Soc. For each shuttle, as it seems, is naturally suited to each kind of weaving; and so are the other (instruments).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. It is necessary then, O best (of men), for the custom-introducer[38] to know how to form a name of sounds and syllables; and looking to what is really a name,[39] to frame and establish all names, if he is about to be the master-founder of names. [15.] But if each founder of names does not form of the same syllables a name,[40] we ought not to be ignorant of this.[41] For neither does every smith use the same iron, when

[37]—[37] Ficinus has, "Terebrum namque cuique accommodatum scire oportet in ferro perficere," omitting *φύσει—ὡς ἔοικε—πεφυκὸς—*

[38] Heindorf and Stalbaum still stick to *νομοθέτην*, although MS. Gud. has *ὀνοματοθέτην*, and Ficinus "nominum institutor." But a little below, (n. 5,) Heindorf has correctly preferred *ὀνοματοθέτης*, found in the same MS.

[39] Instead of *οὗ ἔστιν ὄνομα*, Buttmann, with the approbation of Heindorf and Stalbaum, suggested *ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα*, which he obtained from Ficinus, "quod ipsum nomen est."

[40] Ficinus has "nominum conditor nomen exprimit," for he doubtless found in his MS. *ὀνοματοθέ-της τίθησιν ὄνομα—*

[41] Stalbaum, as usual, vainly attempts to defend the unintelligible *οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν*, by saying that "one must not be ignorant of this," is the same as, "one must remember this." Heindorf more cor-

making the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but as long as he gives it the same form, although from even[42] a different kind of iron, the instrument is equally[43] correctly made, whether one makes it here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Will you not therefore deem it right to say, that, so long as the founder of names,[44] both here and among the Barbarians, assigns the form of a name accommodated to each thing, in any kind of syllables whatever, the founder of names here is not worse than the founder in any other place whatever?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Who then is likely to know whether the convenient form of a shuttle exists in any kind whatever of wood? Is it the carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it?

Herm. It is more probable he who is to use it, Socrates.

[16.] *Soc.* Who is it then that uses the work of the lyre-maker? Is it not he, who knows how best to superintend the maker, and knows when it is made, whether it is properly made or not?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But who is this?

Herm. The lyre-player.

Soc. And who is it (that uses) the work of the ship wright?

Herm. The pilot.

Soc. And who is he, that would superintend the best the work of the founder of names, and decide about it when finished,

rectly saw that the version of Ficinus, "animadvertendum est quod," gave a sense better suited to the train of thought. Hence out of *οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, οὐδε γὰρ*, one might elicit *εἰδέναι εὖ τοῦτό γ' ἂνῳ ἦν ὅτι οὐδε εἰς*—"a man without wit might know this well, that not even"—

[42] Stalbaum would read, *ἐὰν καὶ* for *ἐάν τε*. He should have suggested *ὀτῳοῦν ἐν ἄλλῳ* as being nearer to *ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ*.

[43] Stephens correctly suggested *ὁμοίως* for *ὅμως*. Heindorf quotes opportunely Euthyd. § 3, *ἐξελέγχειν—ὁμοίως, ἐάν τε ψεῦδος ἐάν τε ἀληθὲς ᾖ*. Stalbaum still sticks to the doubled *ὅμως*, because forsooth *ὁμοίως* is opposed to the reading of the MSS.; as if all conjectures are not made in defiance of them.

[44] Here, and shortly afterwards, Stalbaum rejects, what Heindorf had properly restored from MS. Gud., *ὀνοματοθέτην*: and a similar observation applies to all the subsequent passages of the same kind.

both here and among the Barbarians? Is it not he, who is to use it?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise to answer?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer, any thing else, than a dialectician?

Herm. No; but this.

Soc. It is the business then of the shipwright to make a rudder, while the pilot is superintending, if the rudder is about to be a good one.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. And (to make) a name (it is the business) of the name-founder, it seems, to have a dialectician as his superintendent, if he is about to found names correctly.

Herm. Such is the case.

[17.] *Soc.* It nearly appears then, Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is not, as you think it, an affair of no moment, nor for men of no mark, nor of such as may be met with any where. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature; and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone, who looks to that name, which is naturally suited to each thing, and who is able to mould its form into letters and syllables.

Herm. I know not, Socrates, how I ought to oppose myself to what you are saying. It is not however easy perhaps to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what is that which you call a natural propriety of appellation.

Soc. I myself, O blessed Hermogenes, say there is none. But you have forgotten, what I said a short time previously, that I knew nothing, but would consider the matter together with you. But now, to myself and you considering well the question together,[45] thus much appears contrary to our former opinion, that the name possesses some natural propriety, and

[15] Ficinus has "mihi et tibi simul investigantibus." From whence it is easy to read ἄμ' ἐῦ for ἡμῖν—

that it is not for every man to know how to give a name to any thing whatever correctly. Or is it not so?

Herm. Entirely so.

[18.] *Soc.* It is necessary then to inquire, if you desire to know it, after this, in what does the propriety of a name consist.[46]

Herm. But I do desire to know it.

Soc. Consider then.

Herm. How must I consider?

Soc. The most correct inquiry, my friend, (will be) with those, who know through your telling out money to them, and giving them thanks. These are the sophists, to whom your brother Callias[47] told out a mint of money, and (now) appears to be a wise man. But, since you are not the master of your patrimony,[48] you must earnestly entreat your brother, and beg of him to show you the propriety respecting things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

Herm. But this request of mine would be absurd, Socrates, if, when I reject entirely "The Truth"[49] of Protagoras, I should embrace what is stated in such a truth,[50] as things of any value.

[19.] *Soc.* But if this does not please you, we must learn from Homer, and the other poets.

Herm. And what says Homer, Socrates, about names; and where?

Soc. In many places. But those are the chief and most beautiful (passages), in which he distinguishes between the names, which men and gods assign to the same things. Or do you not think that he says something great and wonderful

[46] Instead of *αὖ ἐστὶν*, where *αὖ* has no meaning, one MS. has correctly *ἔνεστιν*.

[47] On this Callias, see Heindorf on Theætet. § 57.

[48] From this it would seem that the father of Hermogenes was still alive. Compare Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 1354. *Νῦν δ' οὐ κρατῶ 'γὼ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ χρημάτων. Νέος γάρ εἰμι.*

[49] Here is an allusion to the work of Protagoras called "The Truth," as in § 8.

[50] Unless *τῇ τοιαύτῃ* be said in contempt of the work, one would suspect that Plato—*τὰ δὲ ἔπη ἐν ἀυτῇ*, of which *τῇ 'Αληθείᾳ* would be the interpretation. On the loss or confusion of *ἔπη*, I have written something worth reading in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 180, and in the Glossary appended to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 68, and I could now add a great deal more.

in those passages relating to the propriety of names? For it is evident surely that the gods call things according to the propriety which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

Herm. I well know, that if (the gods) call any thing by a name, they call it so correctly. But of what passages are you speaking?

Soc. Do you not know, that when speaking of the river at Troy, which fought in a single combat with Hephæstos, (Vulcan,) he says, (Il. xx. 74,)

Whom gods call Xanthus, but Scamander, men.

Herm. I do. What then?[51]

Soc. Do you not think that this is something of high import, to know in what way it is right to call that river Xanthus, rather than Scamander? [20.] Or, if you prefer it, in the case of the bird, which he says, (Il. xx. 291,)

Chalcis the gods, but men Kymindis call.

Do you think this is a trifling piece of learning, (to know) how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrine than Batiea;[52] and there are many other (passages), both in this poet and in others. But these things are perhaps too great for me and you to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax are, as it appears to me, more for a (common) man to investigate and more easy (to see), what is the propriety of the names, which, he says, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses, in which are the names I am speaking of.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Which then of these names do you think Homer considered as more correctly given to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Herm. I cannot tell.

Soc. But reflect in this way. If any one should ask you, whether you thought the more wise or the less wise would call things in the more correct manner?

[51] I have adopted with the Zurich editors Heindorf's suggestion in assigning "What then?" to Hermogenes, and not, as in other editions, to Socrates.

[52] The passage alluded to is in Il. ii. 813.

Herm. It is manifest I should answer, the more wise.

[21.] *Soc.* Whether then do women, or men, to speak of the whole (human) race, appear to you to be the wiser in cities?[53]

Herm. The men.

Soc. Do you not then know, that Homer says that the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy,[54] Astyanax, but Scamandrius, [55]it is plain,[55] by the women; since the men[56] were wont to call him Astyanax.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Do you not then conceive that Homer considered the men of Troy wiser than the women?

Herm. I think so.

Soc. He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more correctly given to the boy than Scamandrius.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. But let us consider why he did so. Or does he not himself give the best explanation for the reason? For he says,

> To throw a bulwark he alone was found,
> The city's gates[57] and the long walls around.

On this account then, as it seems, it is proper to call the son of the saviour, Astyanax; of that[58] which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

[22.] *Herm.* So it appears to me.

[53] i. e. in a civilized state.

[54] In Il. xxii. 506.

[55]—[55] The words *δῆλον ὅτι* are omitted in MS. Gud. and the version of Ficinus. They are perfectly unnecessary.

[56] It was not the men of Troy, but Hector himself, who called his son Astyanax, as stated in Il. vi. 402.

[57] In Homer, Il. x. 506, the existing text has *πύλας* instead of *πόλιν*, as quoted by Plato. I have united the two readings.

[58] In lieu of the unintelligible *τούτου*, which has nothing to which it can be referred, Ficinus offers a supplement, nothing similar to which seems at present to have been found in any MS.—"Quapropter decet, ut videtur, protectoris filium nominare Astyanacta, *id est regem urbis; urbis, inquam, ejus*, quam pater suus servavit, ut inquit Homerus." Perhaps Plato wrote *καλεῖν τὸν Ἕκτορος υἱὸν Ἀστυάνακτα, ὅτι τὸ ἄστυ ἔσωζεν ἄναξ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτός*, i. e. "to call the son of Hector Astyanax, because the father had, as a prince, himself saved the city." Opportunely then does MS. Gud. read Ἕκτωρος for *σωτῆρος*.

Soc. But what is this? For I do not myself understand this at all. Do you understand it?

Herm. By Zeus, I do not.

Soc. But, my good (friend), Homer has himself given to Hector his name.

Herm. Why so?

Soc. Because it appears to me that this name (of Hector)[59] is something similar to Astyanax, [60]and these names appear to be Greek; for king and Hector signify nearly the same thing; both the names to be royal.[60] For over whatsoever one is a king, he is also doubtless a Hector over it; since he evidently rules over it, [61]possesses and has it.[61] Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but unconsciously (err), in thinking I have hit upon, as it were, the track of Homer's thoughts respecting the propriety of names?

Herm. By Zeus, not you indeed, as it seems to me; but perhaps you have hit upon something.

Soc. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not mean, should something else than a horse be produced, like a monster, from a horse, but I speak of that which should be its offspring as a natural production. For [62]if a horse

[59] Ficinus alone has "id nomen Hector."

[60]—[60] Such is the literal version of the nonsense in the Greek text. Ficinus has "Ferme enim idem significant; putantque Græci utraque hæc nomina regia esse." Heindorf, translating ἔοικεν by "like to," would read δοκεῖ—Ἀστυάνακτι καὶ ἐοικέναι Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα (ὁ γὰρ ἄναξ καὶ ὁ Ἕκτωρ σχεδόν τι ταυτὸν σημαίνει) βασιλικὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα; while Stalbaum would incorrectly expel βασιλικά, κ. τ. λ., as an addition arising from a gloss. He saw however correctly that τὰ ὀνόματα could not be thus repeated. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν τι ταύτὸν σημαίνει ταύτω τῶ ὀνόματε ὅ τε ἄναξ καὶ ὁ ἕκτωρ· καὶ ἐοικεν Ἑλληνικῶς ἀμφότερα βασιλικὰ εἶναι. The source of the error is to be traced to the transposition of some words and the interpolation of others.

[61]—[61] This repetition of αὐτοῦ and αὐτὸ is extremely inelegant. Instead of κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ one would prefer κρατεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος. With regard to the derivation of ἕκτωρ from ἔχω, like ἄκτωρ from ἄγω, Plato seems to have forgotten that it was contrary to analogy. For all nouns in τωρ are derived from the third pers. sing. of the perf. pass. But as ἔχω has no perf. pass., there could be no such noun appellative as ἕκτωρ. But though ἔχω has no perfect passive in use, it seems to have had one originally. At least there would be naturally formed from it ἔχμα, as remarked by the Etymol. M. p. 405, 19, and ἕξις.

[62]—[62] Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek; and equally

should, contrary to nature, beget a calf, the produce of a cow by nature, we must call it not a colt, but a calf.[62] [63]Nor do I think that, if from a man an offspring should be produced not of a man, the progeny ought to be called a man; but if it be the offspring.[63] And similar is the case of trees, and all other things. Or do you not agree with me?

Herm. I do agree.

[23.] *Soc.* You speak well. But take care lest I somehow cheat you. For according to the same reasoning, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. Now it matters not whether the signification be the same in syllables different in one way

nonsensical is the version of Ficinus, "Si enim bovis secundum naturam filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui nascitur, sed pullus equinus est nuncupandus." Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐὰν γὰρ βοῦς ἵππου ἔκγονον, ὃν φασιν ἡμίιππον παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ, οὐ μόσχον, κλητέον ἀλλὰ πῶλον*, i. e. "if a bull should, contrary to nature, beget the progeny of a mare, which they call a half-horse, we must call it not a calf, but a colt." With regard to *ἡμίιππον*, the compound follows the analogy of *ἡμίανδρος*, and *ἡμίονος*, and *ἡμίθεος* in Greek, and of "semivir" and "semibos" in Latin. This, however, is not the only error in this passage. For, as Taylor was the first to remark, Ficinus found in his MS. something at present wanting in the common text, *ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*. Instead of which we ought, says Taylor, to read, *ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππον τέκῃ οὐ μόσχον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ πῶλον, καὶ ἐὰν ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*, corresponding to the version of Ficinus, "Si enim bovis secundum naturam filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui nascitur sed pullus equinus est nuncupandus; et, si equus præter naturam gignit vitulum, non pullus equinus dicendus est iste, sed vitulus." By the aid of which, Buttman would read, with the approbation of Heindorf, *Ἐὰν γὰρ βοῦς ἵππου ἔκγονον φύσει παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ, οὐ μόσχον ἀλλὰ πῶλον κλητέον· καὶ ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος τέκῃ, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον*. But in the first clause, *φύσει παρὰ φύσιν* could not be thus united; and if they could, *παρὰ φύσιν* could not be omitted in the second clause. I suspect then that, as the whole of this sentence was meant to balance the preceding one, Plato wrote, *ἐὰν δὲ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν, ὃν φασιν ἡμίβουν, βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*, i. e. "if a horse should, contrary to nature, beget a progeny from a cow, what they call a half-cow, we must call it not a colt but a calf. See § 25, *κἂν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ*. Stalbaum however conceives, with Schleiermacher and Beck, that no alteration will be requisite if we merely expunge the first *μόσχον*.

[63]—[63] Here again the Latin of Ficinus is both different from, and superior to, the present Greek text—"Neque etiam, si ex homine alia proles, quam humana, producitur, quod nascitur, homo vocari debet," which would be in Greek, *οὐδ' ἄλλ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, οἶμαι, ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπου, ἔκγονον γένηται, τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέον*.

or another; nor if a letter be added or taken away, is even this any thing, so long as the existence of the thing is in force, and shown by the name.

Herm. How say you this?

Soc. Nothing complex; but as you know we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, except four, ε and υ, and ο and ω; and placing round,[64] you know, other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, (consonants,) we form names, and pronounce them. But, as long as we insert the exhibited power of the element, it is well to call it by the name which the element exhibits. As, for instance, βῆτα. Here you see that, although the η and the τ and the α have been added, there is nothing to pain[65] us, so as not to exhibit by the whole name the nature of that element which its name-founder[66] intended; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

Herm. You appear to me to speak the truth.

[24.] *Soc.* Will not then the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, both good from a good one, and beautiful from a beautiful one;[67] and so in the case of every thing else, from each genus another such is the progeny, unless something monstrous is produced, and they must be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary (the names) by syllables, so that, to an unskilled person, what are the same would appear to be different from each other. Just as the drugs of physicians, when varied by colours or smells, appear to us to be different, although really the same; but to the physician, as one who looks to the power of the drugs, they appear to be the same, nor is he struck at all with astonishment by the additions to them. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names looks to their value, and is not struck with astonish-

[64] Ficinus has "addentes," as if he found in his MS. προστιθέντες. Perhaps Plato wrote ἢ προστιθέντες ἢ περιτιθέντες—

[65] The verb constantly used elsewhere by Plato in this formula is κωλύει.

[66] Strange to say, Heindorf has here left ὁ νομοθέτης in the text, although Ficinus had already pointed to ὀνοματοθέτης by his "nominum auctor."

[67] Such too is the sentiment of Horace, "Fortes creantur fortibus; et bonis Est in juvencis, est in equis patrum Vigor," for so Wakefield correctly points that passage.

ment if a letter is added, or changed, or taken away, or the same value of the name is found in the other letters taken all together. [25.] As in the names of Astyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of; they do not possess any one of the same letters, except the τ, and yet they signify the same thing. And what has ἀρχέπολις (ruler of a city) in its letters common (with the two preceding names)?[68] and yet it means the same thing. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; and others again (which signify) an army-leader, as Ἄγις, Πολέμαρχος, Εὐπόλεμος; and others connected with medicine, as Ἰατροκλῆς and Ἀκεσίμβροτος. And perhaps we could find many others disagreeing in syllables and letters, but in their value speaking the same sense. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And that to those, who exist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

Herm. Perfectly so.

Soc. What then, to those, who are born contrary to nature, and in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious one is produced; surely, as we said before, that if a horse should beget a progeny from a cow (the offspring)[69] ought not to have the name of the begetter, but of the party that brought it forth?[70]

Herm. Entirely so.

[26.] *Soc.* To the impious man, then, produced from the pious one, the name of his genus must be assigned?

Herm. Such is the case.

Soc. Not Theophilus, (god-loving,) nor Mnesi-theus, (god-remembering,) nor any name of this kind, but something which

[68] The words within lunes Taylor took from the version of Ficinus, "cum duobus superioribus."

[69] Heindorf acutely saw that τὸ ἔκγονον, which is wanting, was preserved correctly in the version of Ficinus, whose Latin is rather more intelligible than the Greek: "qui genitus est, non genitoris nomen sortiri debit; sed, ejus in quo ipse est generis; quemadmodem supra diximus, si equus bovis prolem generat, non equum ejus filium sed bovem denominandum."

[70] Such is evidently the sense required by the antithesis; although it can hardly be got from the words τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη, which mean literally, "of the genus to which it belongs." But as the offspring in this case would belong to two genera, that genus should be distinctly stated, from which it has to take its name.

signifies the contrary to these, [71](must we call such a son,)[71] if names are to possess any propriety.

Herm. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. Just as, Hermogenes, the name of Orestes nearly appears to be correct; whether a certain fortune assigned to him this appellation, or some poet, [72] pointing out by this name the savageness of his nature, and his wildness, and the (habits) of a mountaineer.[72]

Herm. So it appears, Socrates.

Soc. It seems also that the name of his father was according to nature.

Herm. It does so.

Soc. For it nearly appears that Agamemnon was [73] such a person as, with respect to whatever he had determined to labour through and endure, to put the finish to what he had determined on through valour.[73] And the proof of his patient endurance is his staying at Troy with so great a host.[74] That

[71]—[71] Ficinus has in his version alone, "vocare filium talem decet," preserved the words wanting to complete the sense.

[72] This notion turns on the supposition that Ὀρέστης, like Ὀρεστιὰς, the name for a mountain-nymph, is derived from Ὄρος, a mountain. While from the allusion to a poet, it is easy to see that Æschylus or Euripides wrote in some play the distich—Καλῶς Ὀρέστην ὄνομά τις τύχῃ θετο, Τὴν θηριώδους σὴν ὀρεινὴν γνοὺς φύσιν—addressed to Orestes by Clytemnestra, Menelaus, or some other character.

[73] Such is the literal version of the Greek text, οἷος, ἃ ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τέλος ἐπιτιθεὶς τοῖς δόξασι δι' ἀρετήν: where others may, but I will never, believe that Plato wrote ἃ ἂν δόξειεν—τοῖς δόξασι—or that οἷος ἐπιτιθεὶς is any thing but a barbarism. Opportunely then does MS. Gud. offer ἐπιτιθέναι. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in τοῖς δόξασι δι' ἀρετὴν there lies hid τῆς δόξης ἀϊδίας δι' ἀρετην. For the whole sentence was originally to this effect—οἷος, οἷς ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι τῆς δόξης ἀϊδίας δι' ἀρετήν, i. e. "such as to put by his valour the finish of an eternal glory to whatever he had determined to labour through and endure." For thus, δόξης ἀϊδίας may be compared with ἄϊδιον δόξαν in Thucyd. iv. 87; ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι in Plato Sympos. p. 208. D., ἀθάνατον δόξαν in Isocrat. Archidam. p. 138. B.

[74] I have adopted, with Heindorf, what Ficinus found in his MS. as shown by his version: "Argumentum vero tolerantiæ suæ apud Trojam tanto cum exercitu perduratio præbuit:" which is far more intelligible than the Greek, σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πλήθους τε καὶ καρτερίας—which Stalbaum fancies is to be restored by reading τοῦ πλήθους μετὰ καρτερίας. But it was not by his staying with a great or small army that Agamemnon gave any proof of his patient endurance. It was rather by the great number of the years, during which he staid at

this man therefore is to be admired for his staying, and is denoted by the name Agamemnon.[75] [27.] Perhaps, too, Atreus is correctly said; for his murder of Chrysippus, and what he did so very cruelly to Thyestes, were all noxious and hurtful as regards virtue.[76] The appellation, therefore, of the name[77] turns a little on one side, and conceals its meaning, so as not to show the nature of the man to all; but to those who are skilled in names, Atreus sufficiently points out what it means. For his name properly exists in every way with reference to what is not worn down, not fearing,[78] and hurtful. It appears also to me, that his name was properly given to Pelops: for this name signifies one who sees things near; and I think[79] he is worthy of the appellation in some such way as this.

Herm. How?

Soc. In such a way as this. It is reported against this man, that in the murder of Myrtilus, he was neither able to think beforehand, nor perceive any of the things afar off relating to his whole race, with how great a calamity he would fill it; but only to see[80] what was near, and on the instant; for such

Troy. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς καρτερίας ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ ἀν' ἐτῶν τόσον πλῆθος*: where I have elicited *μονὴ ἀν' ἐτῶν τόσον πλῆθος* from *μονὴ μετὰ τόσου πλήθους* in a solitary MS. Respecting the loss or corruption of *ἐτῶν* see my Poppo's Prolegem. p. 222; and with the phrase *ἐτῶν πλῆθος* compare *χρόνου πλῆθος* in Thucyd. i. 1, Plato Theætet. p. 158, D., *μηνῶν πλήθει* in Soph. Philoct. 724, *πλήθους ἐτῶν* in Aristoph. Νεφ. 845, and *πλῆθος—ἐτῶν* in Isocrates.

[75] For *Ἀγαμέμνων*, says the Etymol. M., is formed from *ἄγαν*, "very," and *μίμνων*, "staying."

[76] As the name of *Ἀτρεὺς* is thus feigned to be connected with *ἀτηρὸς*, the words *ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν* ought to follow *ἀτηρὰ*, not precede it. Plato wrote *πάντα ταῦτα ἀτηρὰ καὶ ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἦν*.

[77] Heindorf vainly attempts to explain *τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπωνυμία*. For he did not see that Plato wrote *τοῦ ἀνόμου τόσου ἐπωνυμία*, i. e. "the appellation for such iniquity."

[78] Etymol. M. *Ἀτρεύς—παρὰ τὸ τρέω γίνεται τρευς· καὶ μετὰ τοῦ στερητικοῦ α ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἄφοβος, ἢ παρὰ τὸ τείρω τὸ καταπονῶ, μετὰ τοῦ στερητικοῦ α, ἀτειρεὺς καὶ συγκοπῇ ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἀκαταπόνητος.*

[79] The common text is *ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας*. But one MS. has *καὶ ἄξιον*, and another *τῆς οὐτωσί πως ἐπωνυμίας*: while to support the syntax Buttmann would read *οἶμαι* for *εἶναι*. Plato wrote, as I have translated, *καὶ ἄξιον οἶμαι εἶναι αὐτὸν οὐτωσί πως τῆς ἐπωνυμίας*. Stalbaum's rendering is, "For this name signifies that he, who looks near, is worthy of such an appellation." But the word Pelops could not signify that such a person was worthy of such a name.

[80] One MS. has *ὁρᾶν* for *ὁρῶν*, which leads to *τὸ δ' ἐγγὺς*, for *τὸ ἐγγὺς*—Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend the anomaly of the syntax.

is the meaning of πέλας (near), when he desired to obtain, by all means, his marriage with Hippodamia. [81](From whence the name of Pelops comes from πέλας, near, and ὄψις, sight).[81] [28.] To Tantalus, likewise, all would deem the name to have been properly and naturally assigned, if it be true what is told of him.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. That, while he was yet living, many and terrible misfortunes happened to him; of which[82] at last his whole country was overthrown;[83] and that, when he was dead, there was the vibration[84] of the stone over his head in Hades, it being wonderfully in unison with his name; for it really seems as if one, wishing to call him ταλάντατος (most miserable), did, [85]concealing (that name), call him by the name of Tantalus (instead of Talantatus).[85] And it seems that the accident

[81]—[81] The words within lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus. "Unde Pelopi nomen a pelas, id est prope, et opsis, quod ad visionem pertinet."

[82] Stalbaum fancies that ὤν can follow τέλος used adverbially. Heindorf would supply the ellipse by τὸ τέλος ἦν. Plato wrote perhaps ὥστε καὶ—for καὶ thus follows ὥστε, as shown by Elmsley in Cl. Jl. N. xi. p. 222.

[83] Stalbaum would translate ἀνετράπετο, "corruit." But the aor. 2, in the middle voice of τρέπω, could not be thus used passively. He should have read ἀνετρέπετο, or ἀνετέτραπτο.

[84] Bekker has ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου τανταλεία, θαυμαστὴ ὡς ξύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι. But as τανταλεία could not be used for ταντάλευσις or ταντάλωσις, or, if it could, it would not suit the subsequent ταλάντατον, Stalbaum has adopted ταλαντεία, the conjecture of Schleiermacher, found subsequently in one MS., and to which Schleier. was probably led by "sors certe durissima" in Ficinus. But ταλανεία, not ταλαντεία, would come legitimately from τάλας. I suspect that Plato wrote ἡ τοῦ λίθου ταλαντιαίου θαυμαστὴ στάσις, οὖσα ξύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι. For λίθου ταλαντιαίου would be similar to ταλαντιαῖον κλῆρον in Suid. Ἔγγειον, and to χρημάτων βάρος τριταλαντιαῖον in Suid. Τριτάλαντον: while in the play upon the words Τάνταλος and Ταλαντιαῖος, there would be an allusion to the proverb τὰ Ταντάλου τάλαντα, which Plato had in mind, when he was speaking of the Ταντάλου χρήματα in Euthyphr. p. ii. D.=§ 12. With regard to στάσις, the more correct word would perhaps be κρέμασις, as may be inferred from the passages quoted by Porson on Orest. 5. But στάσις οὖσα are nearer the letters αστη ὡς συμ than κρέμασις οὖσα.

[85]—[85] Edd. ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἀνὶ ἐκείνου. But Ficinus, "paulo locutus obscurius pro Talantato Tantalum posuisset," thus avoiding the inelegant tautology in ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι, where lies hid, I suspect, εὖ τὰ ἀνόσια καὶ ἄθεα, εἴποι— For the acts of Tantalus were ἀνόσια and ἄθεα.

of the rumour[86] contributed to some such appellation. But it appears that the name of him, who was called his father, was made in an all-beautiful manner. It is however by no means easy to understand it. For in reality the name of Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividing it into two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another; for some call him Ζήν, and some Δίς. But these parts collected into one, exhibit the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought and should be able to do. For there is no one, who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all.[87] [29.] It follows therefore that this god is rightly named, through whom life is present to all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, Dis and Zēn. Now he, who hears on a sudden that this god is the son of Kronos, may perhaps think it an insulting assertion. But it is according to reason for Zeus to be the offspring of some great intellect. Now Koros[88] does not signify a boy, but the pure and unmixed nature of intellect. Now he (Kronos) is the son of Ouranus (Heaven): and the sight directed to things above has fairly a right to be called by this name, Ourania (heavenly), from beholding things on high. From whence too, Hermogenes, they who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with

[86] I cannot understand ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης. I could however ἡ τῆς τύχης ἡ φήμη, i. e. "the report of his misfortune."

[87] From this passage of Plato were perhaps derived the Pseud.-Orphic verses, quoted by Joannes Diac. Allegor. on Hesiodi Theog. p. 278; 482, Gaisf. Ἔστιν δὴ πάντων ἀρχὴ Ζεύς. Ζεὺς γὰρ ἔδωκε, Ζῶά τ' ἐγέννησεν· καὶ Ζῆν' αὐτὸν καλέουσι, Καὶ Δία τ' ἠδ' ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἅπαντα τέτυκται. Εἷς δὲ πατὴρ οὗτος πάντων. θηρῶν τε βροτῶν τε. i. e. "Zeus is the beginning of all things. For Zeus has given and generated animals, and men call him Ζήν, and also Δίς: because all things were fabricated through him; and he is the one father of all things, both beasts and men."

[88] Ficinus has "Quod enim Coros dicitur." But the train of ideas evidently requires something to connect Kronos with Koros. Hence, says Heindorf, one would have expected that Plato wrote Κρόνος γὰρ κόρον σημαίνει· κόρος δὲ οὐ παῖδα. There was, I suspect, originally something to this effect, "Now Koros, which Kronos was once, signifies not a boy." For that Kronos was once a boy, is evident from the legend that makes him the son of Ouranus. To this passage is to be referred Etymol. M. Κρόνος· ὁ Κρόνος τῆς νοερᾶς ζωῆς ἐστὶ δοτὴρ, κόρος ὢν τοῦ νοῦ· μᾶλλον δὲ κόρος νοῦς καὶ καθαρὸς

him, and that the name of Ouranus[90] is very properly given to him. Indeed, if I had remembered Hesiod's genealogy of the gods, (and)[91] whom he mentions as their still preceding progenitors, I should not have desisted from showing you how correctly their names have been laid down, until I had made trial of this wisdom, what it will effect, whether it faints or not, which has now recently come upon me so suddenly, I know not from whence.

[30.] *Herm.* Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to speak oracles on a sudden, like those inspired by a god.

Soc. And the reason I assign,[92] Hermogenes, is, that this wisdom has come upon me through Euthyphron of the ward of Prospaltius:[93] for I was much with him in the morning, and I gave him my ears.[94] It nearly appears then, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but laid hold also of my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in this way; to make use of this wisdom to-day, and to contemplate what yet remains concerning the propriety of names; but to-morrow, if it seems good to you, we will send it away (as a pollution), and purify ourselves from it, after finding out a person who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he be one of the priests, or the sophists.

Herm. I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains (of the discussion) respecting names.

Soc. But it is necessary to act thus. From whence then do you wish us to begin the inquiry, since we have arrived at a certain form,[95] that we may know whether the names them-

[90] For *Οὐρανὸς* is feigned to be derived from *ὁρᾶν ἄνω*, "to look above."

[91] This "and," requisite for the sense and syntax, has been preserved by Ficinus alone.

[92] Ficinus translates *αἰτιῶμαι* by "reor," as if he had read *ἀξιοῦμαι*.

[93] This was a ward of the tribe of Acarnas. On the wards of Athens the reader may consult Gronovius' Thesaur. Antiquitat. t. xi. Leake in The Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, t. i. p. 2, p. 114, and foll. A Dissertation by Westermann in Zeitschrift für die Alterthums—wissenschaft, 1848, No. 5—8. Sauppe too has written "De Demis Urbanis Atheniensibus," Leips. 1846, and Ross, "Die Demen von Attika," Halle, 1846. But of the two last works I know nothing except the titles.

[94] The phrase in Shakspeare is "Lend me thine ears"

[95] Instead of *τύπον* one would expect either *τόπον*, "place," or *ἄτραπον* "path." For though I am well aware that *τύπος* is constantly applied

selves will testify in our favour, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but possess a certain propriety? [31.] Now the names that are mentioned of heroes and men would perhaps deceive us; for many of these exist according to the appellations of their ancestors, and do not suit some persons,[96] as we stated at the commencement. But many assume them, as matters of boasting,[97] such as Eutychides (the son of the fortunate), Sosias (the son of the saved), and Theophilus (the god beloved), and many others. Such then as these, it appears to me, we ought to dismiss. But it is most probable that we shall find names properly imposed, respecting things existing for ever, and naturally produced; for in these it is especially fitting for the imposition of names to be a careful study. But perhaps some of these have been given by a power more divine than that of man.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well.

Soc. Will it not then be just, to begin from the gods, when we are considering that very thing, why the gods are properly called by that name?

Herm. It will be reasonable.

Soc. I suspect then it is of this kind. It appears to me that the first men of those connected with Greece, considered those only as gods, whom many at present of the Barbarians do; the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heavens. Now as they perceived all these moving and running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods;[98] but afterwards, perceiving that there were others, they called all of them by the same name. Seems what I say to be like the truth, or not?

Herm. It seems very like.

to a discourse, yet, I believe, it is not elsewhere united to *εἰσβαίνειν*. Ficinus has "formulam præscripsimus."

[96] Some MSS. *ἐνίοις*, others *ἐνίοτε*. Perhaps Plato united the words.

[97] Stalbaum has failed to see that in *εὐχόμενοι* there is an allusion to the Homeric *εὔχομαι εἶναι*.

[98] For *θεὸς* was supposed to come from *θέειν*. Hence in Etymol. M. *Θεός, παρὰ τὸ θέω, τὸ τρέχω·—οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων, ἀστατοῦσι γάρ, ἐτίθεσαν τὸ ὄνομα παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ θεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι—ἢ παρὰ τὸ θέω, τὸ κατασκευάζω καὶ ποιῶ· ὁ πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων κατασκευῆς αἴτιος γίνεται θὸς καὶ θεός*; where instead of ΘΟC, one would prefer ΘΟΘ. For, as Herodotus says in ii. 52, the Egyptians called the deities *θεοὺς*, as *θέντας* (having placed) the universe in order.

[32.] *Soc.* What then shall we consider after this? Is it not clear, (we ought to consider about) dæmons, heroes, and men?

Herm. About dæmons.

Soc. Now in good truth, Hermogenes, what does the word dæmons mean? Consider whether I say aught to the purpose?

Herm. Only say what it is.

Soc. Know you then whom Hesiod says are dæmons?

Herm I do not understand.

Soc. But know you not that he says, the golden race of men was first created?

Herm. This I know.

Soc. He says, then, concerning it,[99]

> But when concealed had Destiny this race,
> Dæmons there were, called holy, upon earth
> Good, ill-averters, and of man the guard.

Herm. What then?

Soc. I think he calls the race golden, not as being naturally of gold, but as being beautiful and good. And I infer this, from his calling us an iron race.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. Do you not then think, that if any one of those living now were good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race?

Herm. Probably.

Soc. But are the good any other than the prudent?

Herm. The prudent.

[33.] *Soc.* On this account then, especially, as it appears to me, he speaks of them as dæmons; because they were (dæmones) prudent and learned. And, in our old language, this very name occurs. Hence both he, and many other poets, say well, who say that when a good man shall have reached his end, he receives a mighty destiny and honour, and becomes a dæmon, according to the appellation of prudence. I therefore give (my vote)[100] for this, that every[1]

[99] In Hesiod's Works and Days, v. 120, the present text has more correctly Γαῖα, instead of Μοῖρα, while Plato, in Rep. v. p. 468, E., has more correctly τελέθουσι than καλέονται.

[100] After τίθεμαι, we must understand γνώμην, as shown by the passages quoted by myself on Soph. Philoct. 1445, or ψῆφον, as shown here by the subsequent ὁμόψηφος.

[1] Stalbaum omits πάντα with a single MS. He should have inserted

dæmon (learned) man, who is good, is dæmon-like, both while living and when dead, and is properly called a dæmon.

Herm. And I, Socrates, seem to myself to give entirely the same vote with you on this point. But what can the name of hero be?

Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand. For their name is drawn aside a little, showing that its origin is from love.

Herm. How is this?

Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Herm. What then?

[34.] *Soc.* All of them were doubtless begotten either from a god falling in love with a mortal woman, or from a mortal man (falling in love) with a goddess. If then you consider the matter according to the old Attic language, this too you will more clearly understand. For it will show you that the word (hero) is slightly drawn aside, for the sake of the name,[2] from the word love, through which the heroes were begotten. And either this says the heroes,[3] or because they were wise and rhetoricians, powerful and skilled in dialectic, and all-sufficient to interrogate;[4] for εἴρειν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic language they, who are called heroes, coincide[5] as certain rhetoricians,

it before ἀγαθὸς. For πάντα is thus constantly united with ἀγαθός. See Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 1402, τῷ πάντ' ἀγαθῷ.

[2] This derivation depends on the affinity between ἥρως and ἔρως.

[3] This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, ἤτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "aut hinc heroum est nomen ductum." Opportunely then does the best MS. Gud. read λέγειν, by the aid of which it is easy to see that Plato wrote ἤτοι ἐκ τούτου λέγ' εἶναι τοὺς ἥρωας, i. e. "either from this (love) say thou the heroes are."

[4] After ἐρωτᾶν, Stephens wished to insert καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. For in p. 390, § 16, the dialectician is said to be ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος. Besides, Ficinus has "ad interrogandum disserendumque promptissimi." From whence Stalbaum endeavoured to elicit λέγειν, to preserve the train of thought between λέγειν and εἴρειν. He should have suggested ἐρωτᾶν καὶ εἴρειν, which latter verb Plato naturally explains by λέγειν, for it is very rare in Greek. It is however found in Hesiod. Theog. 38, Εἰρεῦσαι (Μοῦσαι) τά τ' ἐόντα—quoted by Heindorf.

[5] So we may perhaps render συμβαίνουσιν. But as the translation of Ficinus is "videntur," it would seem that he found in his MS. συμφαίνουσιν, a corruption, I suspect, for συμφωνοῦσιν, i. e. "harmonize," as in § 41, συμφωνεῖ.

interrogators, and lovers:[6] so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists becomes an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men, why they are called ἄνθρωποι. Can you tell the reason?

Herm. From whence, my good (man), can I? And indeed were I at all able to find this out, I shall not exert myself, through my thinking that you will more easily discover it than myself.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphron.

Herm. Evidently so.

Soc. And rightly relying. For I now seem to myself to understand it in a clever manner; and I shall run the risk, if I do not take care, of becoming to-day wiser than is fitting. [35.] But consider what I am saying. For this ought in the first place to be understood concerning names, that we often introduce letters, and (often)[7] take some away, while we give names, as we please: and (often)[8] change the acute syllables. As when we say Διὶ φίλος (a friend of Dis): for, in order that there may be a noun instead of a verb, we take away the second ἰῶτα, and, instead of an acute syllable in the middle, we pronounce a grave one. But on the contrary, in others we introduce letters, and others again, with a graver accent, we pronounce with a more acute one.[9]

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. Of these things one, as it appears to me, takes place in the name ἄνθρωπος (man): for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, α, being taken away,[10] and the end of the word becoming more grave.

Herm. How do you mean?

The MSS. vary between ἐρωτητικοὶ and ἐρωτικοί. Ficinus found both in his MS. For his version is, "disputatores et amatorii." Stalbaum omits ἐρωτικοὶ, although Plato had just above shown the affinity between ἥρως and ἔρως. To this passage is to be referred the gl. of Etymol. M. in Ἥρωες——ἀπὸ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως· διαλεκτικοί γαρ——ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρώτων· ἐξ ἐρώτων γὰρ θείων ἐγένοντο ——οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ συνερχόμενοι ἐποίουν τὸ τῶν ἡρώων γένος.

[7]—[8] This "often" is found only in Ficinus—"sæpe etiam demimus"—and again, "sæpenumero transmutamus."

[9] From the MS. of Serranus, whose version is, "et quæ acute pronuntiabamus, graviter pronuntiamus," Buttmann was led to introduce ὀξύτερα, adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

[10] "For according to the derivation it should be ἀναθρωπός." STALB.

Soc. Thus. This name (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that other animals, who can see, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but that man sees—for such is the meaning of ὄπωπε—[11] and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon what he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ἄνθρωπος,[11] contemplating what he sees.

[36.][12] *Herm.* What then, shall I ask you what follows after this, (and) which I would very gladly hear?

Soc. By all means.

Herm. As then there appears to me to be something in order after these; for we surely call the soul and body of man by some name.[13]

Soc. How not?

Herm. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these too, as we did the former subjects.

Soc. Do you say that you have considered[14] first the soul, that it has with reason this name, and afterwards so has the body?[12]

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. To speak then off-hand, I think that those, who called the soul by that name, understood some such thing as this; that whenever it is present to the body, it is the cause of its life, giving it the power to breathe, and cooling it; but as soon as the cooling power ceases, the body is dissolved and comes to an end. From whence, as it appears to me, they

[11]—[11] This clause is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. By its aid, however, we can restore what Plato wrote—ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ὄπωπε—τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ ἐώρακε. For it is evident that ἐώρακε, the more common word, would be the interpretation of the less common one; and that ὄπωπε would be mentioned here as being one of the words, from which ἄνθρ-ωπος is supposed to be derived. With regard to this description of man, Qvid has something similar in Metam. i.: "Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus."

[12]—[12] In the arrangement of the speeches Heindorf, whom Bekker and Stalbaum follow, has done all that a critic should do. But with respect to the words, he has been unable to explain ὥσπερ τοίνυν, in which lie hid Ὡς τὸ πρίν, τὸ νῦν, i. e. "As before, (so) now—" Ficinus has, "Succedere statim superioribus mihi videtur de anima et corpore consideratio."

[13] Stalbaum learnedly defends the reading furnished by ten MSS., σῶμά τι καλοῦμεν, where Bekker had rejected τι. Ficinus, too, has "nam anima et corpus aliquid hominis sunt."

[14] I cannot understand ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι: I could, ἐπισκέψεσθαι, "Say you that you will consider?" Ficinus, "Quærendum prius de anima putas?"

called the soul (ψυχή).[15] But, if you please, be quiet. For I think I see something carrying more conviction than this to the followers of Euthyphron; for this, as it appears to me, they would despise, and consider it as farcical. But consider whether this will please you.

Herm. Only say it.

[37.] *Soc.* What else but the soul do you think contains and carries the nature of the whole body, so that it lives and goes about.

Herm. No other.

Soc. But what, do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul orders and holds the nature of every thing else?

Herm. I do.

Soc. It will be proper then to give this name to that power which carries and holds nature, φυσέχην: but it may be called more elegantly ψυχή.[16]

[17] *Herm.* Entirely so; and this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

Soc. For it is certainly so. It would however appear to be truly ridiculous, if it were named, as it is formed.[17]

Herm. But what shall we next consider after this?

Soc. Are you speaking of the body?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. In many ways this appears to me, whether one causes it to deflect little or much.[18] For some say it is the sepulchre

[15] From the affinity between ψῦχος, "cold," and ψυχή, "soul," which some considered to be warm, others cold, as we learn from Aristotle, Περὶ Ψυχῆς, i. 223, quoted by Stalbaum, Διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. And it was perhaps in ridicule of this theory, that Socrates wrote the Æsopic fable of the person who blew hot and cold with the same breath.

[16] By the change of φυσε into ψυ. See Eustath. Il. A. p. 22, 50, Bas.

[17]—[17] Heusde was not the first to arrange the speeches in a correct order. For Ficinus had done so already.

[18] Stalbaum's translation is, "The name of the body seems to me to be many-fold; if any one causes it to deflect even a little, it is still many-fold." But this is at variance equally with the Greek words and with common sense. He did not perceive that Plato wrote Πόλλ' ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε, ἂν μὲν ἢ σμικρόν τι τις παρακλίνῃ ἢ καὶ πάνυ, i. e. "This word (body) seems to me to have many (meanings), whether any one causes it to deflect either little or much:" where the edd. have Πολλαχῇ—καὶ σμικρόν τις—καὶ πάνυ.

of the soul, as being buried[19] at the present time; and on the other hand, because whatever the soul marks out it marks out by the body; on this account it is properly called a mark. [38.] The followers however of Orpheus appear to me to have founded this name, especially since the soul suffers a punishment on account of the things it suffers;[20] and that it may be preserved, it has this enclosure, the image of a prison; and that (the body), as it is called, is the saving of the soul, until it (the soul) shall have paid the penalty due; and that there is no need of introducing[21] a single letter.

Herm. On this, it appears to me, Socrates, enough has been said. But about the names of the gods, could we, in the same manner as you have just now spoken about Zeus, consider by what propriety their names are laid down.

Soc. By Zeus, Hermogenes, if we possessed any mind, (we should have)[22] one the most beautiful method, (by confessing)

[19] This was the doctrine of Philolaus the Pythagorean, in the passage preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. lib. iii. p. 403, *Μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεόλογοί τε καὶ μάντεις, ὡς διά τινα τιμωρίαν ἀ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τούτῳ τέθαπται*, i. e. "The ancient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in a body, as in a sepulchre." T.

[20] I confess I cannot understand *δίκην διδούσης—ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσι*, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "quod anima in corpore hoc delictorum det pœnas," which gives a sense perfectly intelligible; but not to be obtained from the Greek. Some error had crept in here before the time of Stobæus, who has quoted this passage in Eclog. Physic. p. 86, where Gesner has given the version of Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς νῦν, ὧν δὴ ὁ ὢν ἐκεῖ οὐ δίδωσιν*. For thus *ἐκεῖ* is said *δεικτικῶς* of the grave in § 43, and Rep. i. p. 330, D., *τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην*: ii. p. 365, A., *τελετὰς—αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς*: p. 366, A., *ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην δώσομεν, ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν*. The followers of Orpheus seem to have thought with Juvenal, "Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipsi Displicet auctori; prima est hæc ultio quod, se Judice nemo nocens absolvitur," and with Cicero in Milon. § 23, "pœnam semper ante oculos versari putant, qui peccaverunt." Or we might read *ὧν ὁ νεκυς οὐ δίδωσι*, "which the dead body does not suffer." For the Orphic verse might have been *Ψυχὴ δοῦσα δίκην ὧν ὀυχὶ δίδωσιν ὁ νεκρός*. The preceding is however not the only error here. For the version of Ficinus points to a lacuna, which it were easy to supply by the aid of Etymol. M. in *Σῶμα*.

[21] I have translated *παράγειν* "to introduce." Ficinus has "neque literam aliquam adjiciendam putant," which leads to *ἐπάγειν*.

[22] Heindorf says that it is easy to supply *ἔχοιμεν ἄν που—ἐπισκέψασθαι*. But words are not to be thus supplied at random. Ficinus has "præcipuum rectitudinis modum arbitraremur, fateri—"

that we know nothing of the gods either themselves or the names by which they call themselves; for it is evident that they call themselves by correct names. But the second mode of propriety consists in our calling the gods by those names, by which there is a law for us to invoke them in our prayers, whatever they are, and by whatever name they like to be addressed, since we know of nothing else; for this appears to me to have been beautifully ordained. [39.] If you are willing, therefore, let us consider this point, having previously, as it were, declared to the gods, that we shall speculate nothing about them—for we do not think ourselves worthy to do so—but about the men, what thoughts they had, when they gave the names; for this will not expose us to their wrath.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak with moderation; let us therefore act in this manner.

Soc. Ought we not then to begin, according to custom, from Hestia?[23]

Herm. It is just what we should.

Soc. What then shall we say the person intended, who gave the name of Ἑστία?

Herm. By Zeus, I do not think this is an easy thing.[24]

Soc. The men, O good Hermogenes, who first founded names, seem almost to be no mean persons, but conversant with high subjects and discourses on them.[25]

Herm. What then?

Soc. It seems to me that the founding of names was the work of some such men. And indeed, if any one considers foreign names, what each means is not the less discovered. [40.] For instance, in the case of that which we call Οὐσία, there are, who call it Ἐσία, [26]and others again Ὦσία.[26] In

[23] The goddess whom the Greeks called Ἑστία, was the Vesta of the Romans. From which it would seem that the Greek word had originally the digamma F placed before the aspirate, just as we have a *w* before *h* in some words. The altar of the deity was in the centre, as it were, of the house, and sacrifices commenced with her; because, as Plato says in the Timæus, she was the oldest of all the gods; or rather the pivot on which all the others turned.

[24] Ficinus, "facile inventu," as if his MS. had γνῶναι instead of εἶναι.

[25] Originally μετεωρολόγοι and ἀδολέσχαι were taken in a good sense; but subsequently in a bad one, as shown respectively by Phædr. § 120, and Rep. vi. p. 488, quoted by Heindorf. Add Aristoph. Νεφ. 148.

[26—26] It is not known in what dialect οὐσια became ἐσία: but ὦσία

the first place then, according to one of these names (Ἐσία), the existence of things (Οὐσία) has a right to be called Ἑστία; and again, because we call that which participates in existence by the name of Ἐστία, it would on this ground be properly called Ἑστία: for we too seem of old to have pronounced Οὐσία, Ἑσία.[27] Moreover, if any one bears in mind the business of sacrifice, he will deem that this was in the thoughts of those who instituted (the names). For it is likely, that they, who called Οὐσία (Ousia), the existence of all things, Ἑστια (Hestia), sacrificed to Hestia before all the gods. But they who called it Ὠσία (Osia), would nearly, according to Heraclitus, consider that all things move, and nothing is at rest. The cause therefore and leader of things with them was τὸ ὠθοῦν (the pushing on): and hence they very properly called it Ὠσία (Osia).[28] And thus much let it be said as if from those who know nothing.[29] But, after Hestia, it is just to speculate about Rhea and Kronos, although we have discussed already the name of Kronos. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

[41.] *Herm.* Why so, Socrates?

Soc. I perceive, (my) good man, a certain hive[30] of wisdom.

Herm. Of what kind is it?

Soc. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it has some plausibility.

Herm. What is this?

Soc. I seem to myself to see Heracleitus speaking artlessly[31]

for οὐσία is found in the Doric of Archytas and Ocellus, quoted by Stobæus, p. 76, and p. 44.

[27] This may fairly be doubted. They more probably pronounced it Οσίαν, the very word found in MS. Gud. But such a pronunciation would not suit the argument. Stalbaum has however acutely seen that in Ἐσία, or rather Ἑσία, there is perhaps an allusion to the doctrine of the Eleatic school, who considered the universe as a "one-ness," i. e. Ἑσία, derived from Εἷς, as Οὐσία is from Εἶμι.

[28] For Ὠσία is derived from Ὦσις, the root of which is Ὠθέω, "I push."

[29] From this it is evident that the whole of the preceding derivation of Ἑστία is a ridicule of those, whom Plato considered as knowing nothing on the subject; although it is quite clear that Ἑστία is derived from ἧσ-αι, the third pers. perf. pass. of ἕζομαι, and means that point at the centre of the universe, where sits the power that gives motion to all the particles of matter around it.

[30] This is a favourite metaphor of Plato. Heindorf refers to Meno, p 72, A. § 3, and Rep. v. p. 450, A.

[31] I have translated ἀτέχνως "artlessly," and united it to λέγοντα, to

some old wise saw about Kronos and Rhea, which Homer too asserts.

Herm. How say you this?

Soc. Heracleitus says some where that all things move, and nothing is at rest; and comparing things to the flowing of a river, observes that "Thou canst not twice into the same stream go."[32]

Herm. Such is the fact.

Soc. What then, does he appear to you to think differently from Heracleitus, who gave the names of Rhea and Kronos to the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heracleitus by chance assigned to both of them the names of flowing streams?[33] As then[34] Homer (Il. xiv. 201) calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod.[35] Likewise Orpheus says some where,

> Ocean with lovely streams did first begin
> Marriage, and wedded Tethys, sister-kin.

Consider then, how all these harmonize witn each, and all tend to the doctrine of Heracleitus.

[42.] *Herm.* You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose. I do not however understand what the name Tethys means.

Soc. Surely it nearly implies this of itself, that there is a name of a fountain concealed; for that which is percolated,[36] and strained through, is the representation of a fountain; and from both these names the name Tethys[37] is composed.

show what Plato really thought of the doctrine of Heracleitus, as being Kronika, that is, old and silly, as in Aristoph. Plut. 581.

[32] As the words of Heracleitus fall into a Choliambic verse, Δὶς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, I have designedly introduced a metrical version.

[33] To understand this, Buttmann conceived that Plato alluded to a fancied affinity between Κρόνος and Κρουνὸς, "a rivulet."

[34] Instead of αὖ, adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. from nearly all the MSS., Stephens has οὖν, and so MS. Gud., which is far preferable to αὖ. Heindorf indeed refers to § 48, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Θετταλοί. But Plato wrote ὥσπερ νῦν—

[35] "In Theogon. v. 337, Hesiod says that Ocean and Tethys were the parents of rivers and ocean nymphs, but not of all the gods." Heind.

[36] The reading διαττώμενον, in lieu of διαττόμενον, which Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 80, discovered in Proclus on the Timæus, p. 294, has been subsequently found in five MSS.

[37] For τηθὺς was supposed to have some affinity with τὸ ἠθοῦν.

Herm. This, Socrates, is elegant.

Soc. How is not about to be?[38] But what is after this? Of Zeus we have already spoken.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Let us then speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, and of that other name[39] by which he is called.

Herm. By all means.

Soc. The name then of Poseidon appears to me to have been given by[40] the party first naming it, because the nature of the sea stopped him when walking, and did not permit him to proceed any further, but became as it were a chain to his feet. He therefore denominated the ruler of this power Ποσειδῶν, as Ποσί-δεσμος ὤν being (a foot-chainer). But the ε was perhaps added for the sake of elegance. And perhaps too it would not mean this; but two λλ were originally spoken instead of σ; signifying that this god is much-knowing.[41] And perhaps likewise he was denominated ὁ σείων (the shaking), from σείειν (to shake), and π and δ were added.[42] [43.] But Πλούτων (Pluto) was so called from the gift of Πλοῦτος (wealth), because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth.[43] But by the appellation Ἅϊδης, the multitude appear to me to understand that τὸ ἀειδὲς[44] was spoken of, and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

Herm. But how does it seem, Socrates, to you?

Soc. In many ways do men appear to me indeed to have erred about the power of this god, and to have a fear of him, who is not worthy of it. For they fear that, when any one

[38] Heind. was the first to restore Τι δ' οὐ μέλλει instead of μέλλω from MS. Gud. And so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is "Quid ni?"

[39] This was Ἅϊδης.

[40] Heindorf, whom Stalbaum should have followed, has properly inserted ὑπὸ, preserved only in the best MS. Gud.

[41] For Πολλ-ειδὼν would thus be formed, similar to πολλὰ εἰδώς, "much-knowing."

[42] Cornarius, perceiving that σειων could not become ποσειδων by adding π and δ, proposed to read τὸ π καὶ τὸ ο καὶ τὸ σ; and so one MS. subsequently collated. Heindorf however says that the ο is to be got from ὁ σείων.

[43] In allusion to this notion, Æschylus says in S. Th. 948, ὑπὸ γᾶς πλοῦτος ἄβυσσος ἔσται. See more in Spanheim's Commentary on Callimach. p. 841.

[44] The word ἀειδὲς is either "unseen" or "unseemly,"—both equally suited to the receptacle for the dead.

of us dies, he remains[45] there for ever, and that the soul, divested of the body, departs to him, [46]this too they fear.[46] But all these things, the empire of the god, and his name, appear to me to tend to something the same.

Herm. How so?

Soc. I will tell you what appears to me. For tell me, Which of these is the stronger bond to any animal whatever, so as to cause it to remain in any place whatever, necessity, or desire?

Herm. Desire, Socrates, is by far the superior.

[44.] *Soc.* Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who go thither by the strongest bond?

Herm. This is evident.

Soc. It binds them then, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Now are there not many desires?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. It binds them therefore with the greatest of all desires, if it is about to bind them with the greatest of bonds.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Is there then any greater desire, than when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through him, he shall become a better man?

Herm. By Zeus, Socrates, there is not any whatever.

Soc. On this account, Hermogenes, let us say, that not one of those there[47] is willing to come hither, not even the Syrens themselves;[48] but that both they, and all others, are enchanted; such beautiful discourses does Pluto, it seems, know how to utter. And by this reasoning this god is both a perfect sophist, and a great benefactor to those with him; and who sends up to those here such good things; so many things does he have in superfluity; and from hence he has the

[45] Instead of ἐστὶ, one would prefer ἔσται. Ficinus has "quod nemo—huc redit," i. e. οὐ κάτεισί τις. On κάτειμι see Porson Med. 1011.

[46]—[46] This clause Ficinus has properly omitted.

[47] Instead of τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, one would prefer, as I have translated, τῶν ἐκεῖ, unless we omit τῶν, as Ficinus has done, "huc illinc—reverti."

[48] "There is," says Heindorf, "frequent mention of the Syrens or sepulchres, but not of them in Hades."

name of Pluto. [45.] And on the other hand, through[49] his unwillingness to associate with men invested with bodies, but only to have an intercourse with them, when the soul becomes cleansed from all the evils and desires which were around the body, does he not appear to you to be a philosopher,[50] and to have well considered this, that he should thus detain them, by binding them with the desire for virtue; but that if they possessed the flutterings and mad feelings[51] of the body, not even his father Kronos would be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he was said to be bound.[52]

Herm. You nearly seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

Soc. The name then, O Hermogenes, of Ἀΐδης, wants much of being called Ἀΐδης from Ἀειδὴς, "unseemly:" but it is much rather from knowing all beautiful[53] things, that Ἀΐδης was so called by the fabricator of names.[54]

Herm. Be it so. But what shall we say of Demeter, and Hera, and Apollo, and Athena, and Hephæstus, and Ares, and of the rest of the gods?

[46.] *Soc.* It appears that Δημήτηρ (Demeter) was so called from the gift of food, as being διδοῦσα μήτηρ, "a giving mother." But Ἥρα (Hera) from being Ἐρατὴ (beloved); as if[55] Zeus is said to have loved her, and had her (for a wife).[56] Perhaps, also, the founder of this name, speculating upon things on

[49] The syntax requires ΚΑΙΔΙΑ, not ΚΑΙ simply.

[50] Heindorf has without reason approved of the reading suggested by Heusde, and founded on the version of Ficinus—"annon philosophi tibi videtur officium virique summa prudentia et consilio præditi."

[51] The words πτοίησις and μανία are frequently used to express any strong carnal desires. See my notes on Bailey's Hermesianax, p. 79.

[52] To the bonds with which Zeus is said to have bound his father, there is an allusion in Æsch. Eum. 627, and Aristoph. Νεφ. 898, while Macrobius, in Saturn. i. 8, has preserved the interpretation of the legend given by Apollodorus.

[53] Although Ἀΐδης might be formed from εἶδω, yet there is nothing in that word to which τὰ καλὰ can be referred. Hence there is probably some error here. Plato wrote, I suspect, βαντί τῳ κάτω ἀεὶ δοῦναί τι, i. e. "ever giving something to a person going below," for thus Ἄιδης would be from ὁ ἀεὶ δούς.

[54] Here, as before, and shortly afterwards, Heindorf properly reads with MS. Gud. and Ficinus, ὀνοματοθέτου for νομοθέτου.

[55] In the words ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ there is not a particle of meaning. In Poppo's Prolegom. p. 317, I have restored εἰς σπόρον γε—

[56] So Stalbaum, after Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. § 559, b., explains ἔχειν.

high, denominated Ἀὴρ (air) Ἥρα: but, for the sake of concealment, he placed the beginning at the end.[57] And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name Ἥρα.[58] But Φερρέφαττα (Proserpine) many are terrified at, and at Ἀπόλλων (Apollo), through a want of skill, as it appears, in the propriety of names. For by making a change, they think upon Φερσεφόνη; and this appears to them a thing of dread.[59] But it (Φερρέφαττα) means, that the goddess is wise. For while things are carried along, that which [touches upon],[60] and handles, and is able to follow them, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may with great propriety be named Φερέπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along: and hence the wise Ἀΐδης (Pluto) associates with her, because she too is such (i. e. wise). But men now turn aside from this name, setting more value upon a good pronunciation than truth, so as to call her Φερρέφαττα. [47.] In like manner with respect to Ἀπόλλων (Apollo), many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dreadful.[61] Or know you not this?

[57] That there is some affinity between HPA and AHP is true enough. But to understand what Plato says respecting the placing the beginning at the end, we must suppose him to have written τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ η, "the letter η at the beginning," instead of τὴν ἀρχήν.

[58] Boissonade, on Excerpt. ex Procl. Schol. in Platon. Cratyl. p. 99, says, after Heindorf, that ἀὴρ will be seen if one pronounces ηρα ηρα. Of this doctrine there is a ridicule in Aristoph. Ἱππ. 25, where no critic has yet seen, what it is easy enough to discover by the aid of the Scholiast, all the jokes of the dramatist, concealed at present by the corruptions of the text. To this passage of Plato, allusion is made by Athenagoras Legat. pro Christian. § 18, p. 83, quoted by Stalbaum.

[59] As if Φερσε-φόνη were derived from Φέρ-ειν, "to bring," and Φόνος, "slaughter"

[60] The words ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ are evidently a gl. of ἐπαφῶν. Respecting καὶ, or ἤ, or ἤγουν thus introducing an interpretation into the text, I have written something worth reading in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 188, although neither Poppo, nor Arnold, nor Bloomfield, have thought proper to take notice of the truths developed in that volume; and I could now add not a little more equally valuable.

[61] For Ἀπόλλων was supposed to have some affinity with Ἀπολλύων, as shown by Æschylus in Agam. 1048, Ἄπολλον—ἀπολλὺν μένος· Ἀπώλεσας γάρ μ' ἐν βολαῖς τὸ δεύτερον. For so we must read, in lieu of ἀπολλων ἐμός· Ἀπώλεσας γὰρ οὐ μόλις τὸ δεύτερον: where οὐ μόλις is an absurdity, that only a Hermann would have dared to defend. So too Euripides in Phaëthont. Fr. has Ὦ χρυσοφεγγὲς Ἥλι', ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας· Κἀκ τοῦδ' Ἀπόλλων ἰμφανῶς κλήζει βροτοῖς.

Herm. I (know it) very well; and you speak the truth.

Soc. But this name, as it appears to me, is most beautifully laid down, with respect to the power of the god.

Herm. How?

Soc. I will endeavour to tell you what the fact appears to me. For there is no other name, which, although one, fits[62] better with four powers of this god, so as to touch upon them all, and to show, in a certain manner, his art in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

Herm. Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something strange.

Soc. This name then is well fitted, as belonging to a musical god. For, in the first place, would not purgations and purifications, both according to the arts of medicine and prophecy, and likewise the going round with torches steeped in drugs, ordered by medical men and prophets,[63] and the lustrations on such occasions,[64] and the sprinklings, would not (I say) all these be able (to do)[65] one thing, (namely,) to render a man pure, both in body and soul?

Herm. Entirely so.

[48.] *Soc.* Will not then the god who purifies, who washes, and who releases us from such evils, be of such (a name)?

[62] Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, adopted *ἥρμοσεν* from MS. Gud., with which many MSS. coincide. But in that case *ἂν* should be omitted. For *οὐκ ἐστιν ὅτι ἂν ἥρμοσεν* is a solœcism, as I have shown on Prom. 299. Other MSS. offer *ἁρμοσμένον* in lieu of *ἥρμοσεν ἓν ὄν*. But in that case we must read *οὐκ ἐστιν ὅ, τι ἂν ὄνομ' εἴη ἡρμοσμένον*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα μᾶλλον ἡρμοσμένον*—

[63] They, who have seen in a Roman Catholic chapel the young choristers going round with censers filled with frankincense, will be the best able to understand this passage; which is well illustrated by Casaubon on Theophrast, Character. xvi., and Turnebus Adversar. iv. 15, where reference is made to Virgil. Æn. vi. 226, "Idem ter socios pura circumtulit unda:" and to Tibullus, i. 5, "Ipseque ter centum lustravi sulfure puro, Carmine quum magico præcinuisset anus;" from which last passage one would have suspected that Plato wrote *μαγικὴν* and *μαγικοῖς*, instead of *μαντικὴν* and *μαντικοῖς*, were it not that *μαντικὴν* has reference to what had just been stated.

[64] I confess I do not understand *ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*, omitted by Ficinus; while one MS. has *τὰ ἐν τούτοις*. I could have understood *καὶ αἱ περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ καὶ αἱ περιράνσεις ἔν τε τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς μαγικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*. For all three are alluded to in Eurip. Helen. 872—878.

[65] Heindorf says *δύνασθαι* is here "to be able to do;" and Stalbaum refers to Phileb. p. 23, A., Gorg. p. 453, Phædr. p. 275, A.

Herm. Perfectly so.

Soc. According then to the releasings and washings which he affords, as being the physician in the case of such-like things, he will be properly called Ἀπολούων (the washer). But according to his prophetic power, and truth and simplicity, for these two are the same,[66] he would most properly be called Ἁπλοῦς (simple), as the Thessalians call him now[67] [for all the Thessalians call this god Ἄπλων].[68] But, on account of his being ever mighty in shooting arrows by his skill in archery,[69] he is Ἀεὶ-βάλλων (ever-darting).[70] But with respect to his musical power, it is proper to understand that, as in the words ἀκόλουθος (a follower), and ἄκοιτις (a wife), α often signifies the same as together; so here (α and πολέω signify)[71] τὴν ὁμοῦ πολησιν (the rolling together), both about heaven, which men call πόλους[72] (the poles); and about the harmony existing in song, which is called symphony; because all these, as the clever in music and astronomy assert, cause all things to roll together with a certain harmony.[73]

[66] Instead of ταὐτον γάρ ἐστιν, the sense manifestly requires τούτω γὰρ ἐστιν ἕν, i. e. "for these two are one." With regard to the identity of truth and simplicity, it will be sufficient to quote the well-known verse of Euripides, Ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ, in Phœn. 472.

[67] In lieu of ὥσπερ οὖν, I have translated as if the Greek were ὥσπερ νῦν. See at § 41. Of course I am aware that ὥσπερ οὖν are sometimes found thus united. But all the passages are corrupt, and have been corrected by myself in The Surplice, No. 22, April 25, 1846.

[68] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[69] On the subject of Apollo's skill in archery, there is an elegant Pseudo-Babrian fable, No. 68, amongst those discovered a few years ago in an Athos MS., in a more perfect state than it had been previously in a Vatican one; but which I partially emended on the Pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus, § 5, n. 3, and restored completely in Revue de Philologie, T. ii. p. 225.

[70] Plato, remembering no doubt the commutability of the cognate letters π and β, considered Ἀ-πόλλων as an abbreviation of ἀεὶ-βάλλων.

[71] The words within lunes have been happily preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, "in his quoque *a et polleo significant* versionem, quæ simul et una peragitur," and we thus get rid of Stalbaum's abortive attempt to explain and correct a corrupt text.

[72] With regard to the etymology, it was evidently ridiculed by Aristoph. in Ὄρν. 181, Ὅτιὴ πολεῖ τις ταῦτα καὶ διέρχεται Τὰ πάντα, διὰ τοῦτ' εὖ καλεῖται νῦν πόλος: which Cobet, whom Holden has incorrectly followed, should have emended as I have done, and not have rejected as an interpolation.

[73] Plato alludes here to the so-called harmony of the spheres, which was founded on the similarity of the phænomena of light and sound, over both of which Apollo presided. For as there are seven prismatic

Now this god presides over harmony, ὁμοπολῶν, (causing to roll) all these things together, both among gods and men. [49.] As therefore we call ὁμόκελευθος (following together) and ὁμόκοιτις (lying together), ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιτις, by changing *o* into *a*, so likewise we denominate Ἀπόλλων, who was ὁμοπολῶν, by inserting another λ, because it would have been[74] synonymous with the harsh name.[75] And this some at the present day suspecting, in consequence of the value of this name not being rightly considered, are terrified at it, as if it signified some destruction. But, as was just now stated, the much[76] is laid down, touching upon all the powers of the god, his simple, ever-darting, purifying, and together-rolling nature. But the name of the Μοῦσαι (Muses), and of music universally, some one,[77] as it seems, made from μῶσθαι (to inquire), and from investigation and philosophy. But Λητὼ (Latona), (is derived) from the mildness of the goddess, [78]with reference to her being ἐθελήμων (willing), in what any one might request; but perhaps, as foreigners call her; for many call her Ληθώ. It seems then that she was called Ληθὼ by those calling her by this name, with reference not to the roughness, but the gentleness and smoothness of her manner.[78] [50.] But Ἄρτεμις (Diana) appears to be (so

colours, from whence the sun was called, by the Chaldæans, a seven-rayed god, so there are seven notes in the diatonic scale of sound. For a list of the writers on the harmony of the spheres, the reader must turn to Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. Advers. Music. p. 363.

[74] Ficinus has, "æquivocum fuisset," which leads to ὁμώνυμον ἂν ἐγίγνετο.

[75] i. e. ἀπολλύων, "destroying."

[76] Heindorf, justly objecting to πολὺ, felt half inclined to omit it, with MS. Gud. Stalbaum would read with one MS. τὸ δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον—Ficinus has "re vera." Perhaps Plato wrote τὸ δὲ διὰ πολλὴν ἅμιλλαν ἰὸν, i. e. ὄνομα, "But the name which has gone through a great contest:" or we may read τὸ δὲ πολοῦν μετὰ λλ ἢ ἑνὶ, i. e. "but the word πολοῦν with two λ or one."

[77] Between τοῦτο and ἐπωνόμασεν, τις has perhaps dropt out; unless we read ἐπωνόμασαν with MS. Gud., which Heindorf adopted.

[78]—[78] This derivation, and indeed the whole passage, would have been perfectly unintelligible, but for the gloss in Etymol. M. Λητώ· παρὰ τὸ λήθω, τὸ λανθάνω· ὁ μὲν Πλάτων φησὶν Ἐλεητώ· ἐλεήμων γὰρ ἡ θεὸς καὶ πραεῖα καὶ πάντας ἐλεοῦσα· κατὰ δέ τινας Ληθώ· τὸ γὰρ ἥμερον καὶ πρᾶϋ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλεληῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμελημάτων ἐμφαίνεται· ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος παρὰ τὸ λῶ τὸ θέλω.—καὶ τὸ λῆ τὸ θελει Δωρικῶς· ἐπειδὴ ὃ ἂν τις θέλῃ, παρ' αὐτῆς λαμβάνει. From hence Buttmann was led to believe that the writer of the gloss found in his copy of Plato not ἐθελήμονα,

called) on account of her conduct being ἀρτεμὲς,[79] flawless and orderly through her desire of virginity.[80] Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being cognizant of virtue.[81] And it may be, that hating the ἄροτον[82] (ploughing) of man in a woman, or through some of these or all of them, the founder of the name gave it to the goddess.

Herm. But what is Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Soc. You are asking about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the manner of the appellations given to these divinities, has been said to be both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious manner;[83] but nothing

but ἐλεήμονα. He ought rather to have said that Plato probably wrote to this effect—Λητὼ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πραότητος τῆς θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐθελήμονα εἶναι δοῦναι, ὧν ἄν τις τι αἰτῆται· ὡς γὰρ ξένοι καλοῦσί τινες, τὸ λῆν τὸ ἐθέλειν: ἴσως δὲ καὶ Ἐλεητώ· ἀφ' ἧς, τοῦ ε δὶς ἀφῃρημένου, γίγνεται Λητώ, ἡ πάντας ἐλεοῦσα· πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ Ληθὼ καλοῦσι· τὸ γὰρ ἥμερον καὶ πρᾶον ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμεληθέντων ἐμφαίνεται· ἑοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἤθους ἀλλὰ τὸ λεῖον Λητὼ κεκλῆσθαι. i. e. "But Λητὼ (Latona) (is derived) from the mildness of the goddess, with reference to her being willing to give something of what any one may request. For as some foreigners say, τὸ λῆν means "to be willing." Perhaps too (her name was) Ἐλεητώ, from which, the ε being twice taken away, there becomes Λητώ, "who pities all." Many too call her Ληθώ. For her gentleness and mildness is shown by her forgetting those who sin against her. It seems then that she is called Λητὼ from not the roughness, but the smoothness of her conduct." This at least would be worthy of Plato, which cannot be said of the rubbish in the text.

[79] This derivation is adopted by the Etymol. M. and his transcriber Eustathius; from whom it would seem that Plato wrote Ἄρτεμις δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμὲς ἢ ἄρτιον, κατὰ τὸ κόσμιον.

[80] As shown by Callimachus H. in Dian. 6. Δός μοι παρθενίην.

[81] By what process Ἄρτεμις could be derived from, or explained by ἀρετῆς ἵστορα, even Plato, or the philosophers whom he is ridiculing, would have been unable to state. By turning however to Etymol. M. in Ἄρτεμις· ἡ θεὸς ἀερότεμίς τις οὖσα ἡ τὸν ἀέρα τέμνουσα· ἡ αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστι τῇ Σελήνῃ, it is easy to see that Plato probably wrote ἴσως δὲ ἀέρα τέμνουσα δι' ἄστρα: with which may be compared the expression of Euripides in Phœn. 1, Ὦ τὴν ἐν ἄστροις οὐρανος τέμνων ὁδὸν—Ἥλιε. Stalbaum indeed says that the reader must be as stupid as the stump of a tree not to see that Plato is here having a bit of fun. But even fun ought to be something more than folly merely.

[82] On the metaphorical use of ἄροτον, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian. Timon. § 17; D'Orvill on Chariton. p. 345, ed. Lips; Bergler on Alciphron i. 6; myself on Æsch. Eum. 400; Peerlkamp in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. T. i. p. 96; Winckelmann on Plutarch, Amator. p. 757.

[83] Plato, who had been partly initiated in the mysteries of Demeter and Dionysus, where the meanings of those names were expounded in a

hinders us from relating the jocose; for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Now Διόννσος (Dionysus) would be the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called Διδ-οίννσος. And οἶνος (wine) may be most justly called οἰόνους, because it makes the majority of those who drink it to have wit, not having it (before).[84] But, with respect to Aphrodité, it is not proper to contradict[85] Hesiod, (Theog. 195,) but to allow that she was called Ἀφροδίτη, through her generation from ἀφρὸς (foam).

[51.] *Herm.* But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you will not forget either Athena, or Hephæstus, or Ares.

Soc. For it is by no means reasonable.

Herm. It is not.

Soc. One of the names of her, (Athena,) it is not difficult to say why it was imposed.

Herm. Which?

Soc. We surely call her Pallas?

Herm. How not?

Soc. Considering then this name to have been formed from dancing in armour,[86] we shall, as it appears to me, think properly; for to lift up oneself or any thing else on high, either from the earth, or to shake or be shaken in the hands, we call it to make to[87] dance and to dance.

serious manner, thus avoids the necessity of breaking his oath of secrecy. So Herodotus constantly does by his formula, *εὔστομά μοι κείσθω*.

[84] With this passage may be compared the expression in Horace, applied to the wine bottle, "Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves Plerumque duro:" although Shakspeare says that "when the wine is in, the wit is out."

[85] Plato said this, because he doubtless knew that Euripides had, in Tro. 992, given a less favourable etymology in the words—Τὰ *μωρὰ γαρ πάντ' ἄφροσι δὴ κραίνει βροτοῖς, Ἥς τοὔνομ' ὀρθῶς ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτη*, Κύπρις. For so I would have edited that passage, had the dissertation of Lydus *περὶ Μηνῶν*, been published in 1807, who says, in p. 88—2I2, Εὐριπίδης δὲ Ἀφροδίτην αὐτὴν ἀξιοῖ ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ ἄφρονας ἐρῶντας ἀποτελεῖν.

[86] How Plato could assert that Παλλὰς has any affinity with *ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὀρχεῖσθαι*, is past my comprehension. The Etymol. M. has more properly—*παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ πάλλειν—δόρυ*. I suspect that the passage has come down in an imperfect state, and that Plato wrote something to this effect—*ἀπὸ τοῦ πολὺ ἄλλεσθαι ἡγούμενοι*—and shortly afterwards—*μετεωρίζειν ἀπὸ γῆς δια τῆς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ὀρχήσως*. For the word *μετέωρος* is particularly applied to vessels seen at a distance from the land, and, as it were, dancing on the water, while the tide is flowing or ebbing, or tost in a storm.

[87] The verb *ὀρχεῖν* is rarely found in a transitive sense. Heindorf

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. The goddess therefore on this account (we call)[88] Pallas.

Herm. And properly so. But what say you of her other name?

Soc. That of Athena?

Herm. Yes.

[52.] *Soc.* This name, my friend, is of greater weight. For the ancients appear to have considered Athena, as those of the present day do, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer. For the majority of these, in explaining the poet, say that by Athena he intended mind and intellect. Now he who founded names seems to have understood some such thing as this respecting the goddess; or expressing rather something yet greater, he speaks of her as the intelligence of a god;[89] for that she is a Θεσονόη, (the god-mind,) employing after a foreign mode *α* instead of *η*, and taking away *ι* and *σ*. But perhaps it is not even in this way. But he called her Θεονόη, as she understood divine concerns better than all the rest. Nor is it far off to say that he was willing to call "intelligence in manner," [as being this deity,][90] by the name of Ἠθονόη. But either the founder himself, or some persons afterwards, turned the name aside to something more beautiful, as they thought, and called her Ἀθηνάα (Athena).

Herm. But what will you say of Hephæstus?

Soc. Are you asking about the noble (deity) skilled in light?

Herm. I seem so.

Soc. Is he not evident to all as being Φαῖστος (luminous), having drawn to himself the *η*.[91]

Herm. It nearly appears so; unless [as it seems][92] it appears to you in some other way.

quotes opportunely Athen. i. p. 21, A. Ἴων· Ἐκ τῶν *δ*έλπτων μᾶλλον ὥρχησεν φρένας.

[88] Ficin. "Palladem eam vocamus." The verb can scarcely be omitted.

[89] Ficinus has "ut Dei mentem induxit," as if he had found in his MS. *νόησιν, ὡσπερεὶ θεοῦ, ἐπάγει*, instead of *λέγει*.

[90] The words within brackets, which are an evident interpolation, Ficinus has correctly omitted. To understand however the etymology, we must suppose Ἠθο-νόη to come from Ἦθος and *νόος*, and to be corrupted into Ἀθη-νάα.

[91] Ficinus adds, "Unde Ephæstos, id est luminis præses, est dictus," which is evidently an interpolation.

[92] The words between brackets Bekker was the first to introduce from

Soc. But, that it may not appear, ask about Ἄρης (Mars).

Herm. I ask then.

Soc. If you please, then, the name of Ἄρης shall be derived from τὸ ἄρρεν (the male), and τὸ ἀνδρεῖον (the manly). But if, on the other hand, (you wish it) from his harsh and not-to-be-turned nature, which is called ἄρρατον,[93] it will be proper for a god warlike every where, to be called by this name.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Let us then, by the gods, free ourselves from the gods; for I fear to discourse about them. But about some others, if you wish it, propose as questions, that you may see of what kind are the horses of Euthyphro.[94]

Herm. I will do what you say, after asking you one thing yet about Ἑρμῆς (Hermes), since Cratylus says[95] that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour then to look into the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.

Soc. This name of Hermes[96] does indeed seem to pertain somewhat to discourse, and to imply that with reference[97] to his being an interpreter and a messenger, and to his stealing and deceiving in discourses and market-dealing,[98] the whole of his business is connected with the power of speech. [54.] [99]As then we said before, (§ 34,) τὸ εἴρειν is the use of speech, and as Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο, (he planned), [now

all the MSS. They are perfectly useless, and correctly omitted by Ficinus. As far as I remember, ὡς ἔοικε never thus follows κινδυνεύει. Perhaps Plato wrote ἐὰν μή πῄ σοι, ὃς ἔθηκεν αὐτὸ, ἔτι ἄλλο θέλειν δόξῃ, i. e. "Unless it appears that he, who founded the name, meant something else."

[93] This word is found only in Plato, and even there very seldom. See Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 50.

[94] Here is an allusion to Homer, Il. v. 221, ὄφρα ἴδηαι Οἷοι Τρῴοισ ἵπποι.

[95] In § 1 and 3.

[96] The words ὁ Ἑρμῆς, are evidently an explanation of τοῦτο.

[97] I have adopted καὶ κατὰ τὸ, found in one MS. for καὶ τὸ—

[98] Ficinus improperly translates τὸ ἀγοραστικὸν, "vehemens concionator." The reference is to Hermes, the god of gain, arising from dealings in a market. In enumerating these attributes of the god, Plato had probably in mind Aristoph. Plut. 1153—1161.

[99]—[99] Out of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has contrived to elicit something like sense—"Profecto, quemadmodum in superioribus diximus, irin sermonis est usus. Sæpe vero de hoc Homerus ait, emesato, id est

this is to plan.] From both of these then this god, planning to speak, and the speech—but εἴρειν means to speak—just as if the name-founder gives his command to us, He, O men, who has planned the speaking, would be justly called Εἰρέμης.[99] But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμῆς, Hermes. [100][And Iris too it seems is so called, from εἴρειν, (to speak,) because she is a messenger.][100]

Herm. By Zeus, well does Cratylus seem to me to have said that I am Hermogenes. I am not indeed a ready planner of a discourse.

machinatus est. Ex utrisque igitur nomen hujus dei componitur, tum ex eo, quo loqui est, tum ex eo, quod machinari et cogitare dicenda. Perinde ac si nominis auctor nobis præciperet, Par est, O viri, ut deum illum, qui irin emesato, id est loqui machinatus est, Iremen vocetis." Different however as this translation is from the Greek text at present, it is easy to see that, instead of τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαι ἐστι, he found in his MS. τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατο: and made perhaps out of his own brain ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων, τοῦ τε εἴρειν, ὅ ἐστι λέγειν, καὶ τοῦ τὰ λόγου μήσασθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐτίθετο, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπιτάττοι ἡμῖν ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης, τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτε Εἰρέμην. And this indeed is, as regards the substance, nearly what the author in all probability wrote. One would however prefer something to this effect—τό τε εἴρειν, ὃ λόγου χρεία ἐστὶ, το τε, οἷον καὶ Ὁμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, ἐμήσατο—τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατό ἐστι—τίθει συ· ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ, οἶμαι, τούτων τοῦ τε εἴρειν καὶ τοῦ τὰ λόγου μησαμένου, τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν πέρι, οὕτως ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης, Ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Εἰρεμης; i. e. do you put down both the word εἴρειν, which means the use of speech, and, what Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο—that is, he planned. For from both of these, the act of speaking, and the party planning the things belonging to speech, I think, the founder of the name does, as regards this deity, thus give us an ordonnance—"O men, he who has planned the art of speaking, may be justly called by us Εἰρέμης." To arrive however at this sense, it is necessary to reject what has been interpolated, and to correct what has become corrupt; of which latter the most remarkable are the change of φησὶ into τίθει συ: of ἂν into γὰρ οἶμαι; and of ὡσπερεὶ into πέρι οὕτως.

[100]—[100] All the words between the brackets Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Bekker consider as an interpolation. But who would have interpolated them, or why, those critics have not deigned to tell us. I suspect they ought to be inserted a little above, after τό τε εἴρειν, ὃ λόγου χρεία ἐστὶ, to show that as both Ἑρμῆς and Ἶρις were the messengers of the gods, their names were derived from the same verb εἴρειν, "to speak," as remarked by Eustathius, Ιλ. Α. p. 84, 50. ed. Bas. ὅτι δὲ κήρυκες—λέγονται Ἑρμῆς καὶ Ἶρις παρὰ τὸ εἴρειν, δῆλόν ἐστι. And if this notion of mine be correct, we must read καὶ γὰρ ἡ Ἶρις, instead of καὶ ἥ γε Ἶρις.

Soc. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the two-formed son of Hermes.

Herm. How so?

Soc. You know that speech signifies the all,[101] and circulates and causes to roll perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not then the truth of it smooth and divine, and dwelling on high amongst the gods; but that which is false (dwells) below amongst the mass of mankind, and is rough and goat-like? For from hence are the greatest number of fables, and the falsehoods connected with the goat-like life.[2]

[55.] *Herm.* Entirely so.

Soc. Rightly then would he, who indicates every thing,[3] and ever rolls, be Πὰν αἰπόλος, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us free ourselves from the gods.

Herm. From gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates.

[101] How speech can be said to signify the all, is beyond my comprehension. Perhaps we ought to read Οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐς τὰ ὦτα πᾶν σῆμα νοῦ κατακυλίει [ἢ πολεῖ] ἀεί, i. e. "You know that speech ever rolls to the ears every indication of mind." For thus ἢ πολεῖ would be the interpretation of κατακυλίει, which I have elicited from καὶ κυκλεῖ; and this with the greater readiness, as ἀεὶ πολῶν is said just below to be the origin of αἰπόλος; while ὦτα and νοῦς would be corrupted here, as they are elsewhere, as shown by myself in Tro. Append. p. 176, C., Æsch. Eum. 120, Prom. 667, and Soph. Philoct. 49, 86. With regard to the general idea, it may be compared with what Pope says in his Abelard and Eloisa of letters, that they

> "Speed the soft intercourse of soul with soul,
> And waft a sigh from Indus to the Pole."

[2] Heindorf conceives that there is a pun in τραγικὸν, where allusion is made to the goat-like form of Pan, and to tragedies, so called from the goat given as a prize for the best tragedy. Such a pun would however be frigid beyond conception. Plato wrote, I suspect, περὶ τὸν Σατυρικὸν βίον, in reference to the satyric drama, where Pan was no doubt frequently introduced and ridiculed.

[3] If I have rightly altered, just above, τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει into τὸ πᾶν σῆμα νοῦ, it is easy to read here ὁ πᾶν νόημα μηνύων, in lieu of πᾶν μηνύων.

But what hinders you from discussing such divinities[4] as Ἥλιος (sun), and Σελήνη (moon), and Ἄστρα (stars), and Γῆ (earth), and Αἰθὴρ (æther), and Ἀὴρ (air), and Πῦρ (fire), and Ὕδωρ (water), and Ὧραι (seasons), and Ἐνιαυτὸς (year)?

Soc. You enjoin me many things; still if it will gratify you, I am willing (to speak).[5]

Herm. You will indeed gratify me.

[56.] *Soc.* What then do you wish the first? Or shall we discuss as you have enumerated, (first) the sun?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. It seems then that this would become more manifest, if one should use the Doric name: for the Dorians call the sun Ἅλιος. He will therefore be Ἅλιος, from ἁλίζειν (collecting) men into one spot when he rises; and he would be so, from always εἰλεῖν (revolving) while going round the earth. And he would seem to be so, because in going he causes to be various the productions of the earth. Now the verbs ποικίλλειν and αἰολεῖν have the same meaning.

Herm. But what will you say of Σελήνη (moon)?

Soc. This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.

Herm. Why?

Soc. It seems to indicate something of a more ancient date than[6] what he lately stated, that the moon obtains her light from the sun.

Herm. But how?

Soc. Σέλας is the same with φῶς (light).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Now this light about the moon is perpetually νέον (new), and ἔνον (old),[7] if the Anaxagoreans say true; for, perpetually revolving in a circle, she perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And many call her Σελαναία.[8]

[4] For such alone were once considered divinities, as stated in § 31.

[5] The word λέγειν is supplied by only one MS.

[6] Had Heusde seen that ἢ had dropt out, he would not have altered δηλῶν τι into δηλῶντι: which, though adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum, I cannot understand.

[7] According to the Etymol. Σελήνη is παρὰ τὸ σέλας νέον ἔχειν· ἢ παρὰ τὸ σέλας ἀεὶ ἐν ἔχειν, ὅθεν καὶ ἔνος, ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, ὁ ἀεὶ νεάζων. On ἔνον see Ruhnken, Tim. p. 103.

[8] Heindorf quotes Phœn. 178, and Aristoph. Νεφ 614.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called σελα-ενο-νεο-άει-α but compressed together it is called Σελαναία.

[57.] *Herm.* This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of Μὴν (month), and Ἄστρα (stars)?

Soc. Μεὶς (month) would be properly called μείης, from μειοῦσθαι (to be diminished);[9] but Ἄστρα (stars) appear to derive their name from Ἀστραπὴ (lightning). Now ἀστραπὴ would be ἀναστρωπὴ, because it ὤπα ἀναστρέφει (turns the eyes); but being formed with elegance, it is now called ἀστραπή.

Herm. But what (are) Πῦρ (fire) and Ὕδωρ (water)?

Soc. About Πῦρ (fire) I am at a loss; and it nearly appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or this word is very difficult. Behold then the artifice which I introduce in all such cases where I am at a loss.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. I will tell you. Answer me then. Do you know on what account Πῦρ (fire) was so called?

Herm. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Consider then what my suspicions are concerning it. For I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

Herm. What then?

[58.] *Soc.* Should any one then investigate how reasonably these names were given according to the Greek language, and not according to that from which the name happens to come, you know he would be at a loss.

Herm. Very likely.

Soc. Consider then, whether this name, πῦρ (fire), is not of Barbaric origin. For it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek language. But the Phrygians are thus clearly calling fire, with a trifling deviation, and the word ὕδωρ (water), and κύνες (dogs),[10] and many other names.

Herm. They are so.

[9] How the idea of diminution came to be connected with the name of a month Plato has failed to explain. By comparing however Etymol. M. in Μεὶς, where Plato is quoted, it would seem that something has dropt out here.

[10] From this confession on the part of Plato that πῦρ, ὕδωρ, and κύνες are foreign words, it would seem that *fire*, *water*, and *canis*, found in the

Soc. It is not proper then to use violence with these words; since any one can say about them.[11] On this account therefore I reject the words πῦρ and ὕδωρ. But Ἀήρ (air), Hermogenes, (is so called)[12] because αἴρει (it raises) things from[13] the earth; or because ἀεὶ ῥεῖ (it always flows); or because, from its flowing, a breathing is produced: for the poets[14] call winds ἀήται (breathings). Perhaps then it means as if a person[15] should say πνευματόρρουν (a flowing breathing), or ἀητόρρουν (a flowing wind), [16][from whence he wishes to call it thus, because it is Ἀήρ].[16] But I consider αἰθὴρ (æther) in some way as this; because ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων (it always runs and flows about the air), it would be called ἀειθεήρ. [59.] But Γῆ (earth), more plainly indicates its meaning, if any one calls it Γαῖα. For γαῖα would be properly called γεννήτειρα (producer), as Homer says; for he speaks of γεγάασι as γεγενῆσθαι (to have been produced).

Northern and Latin languages, were of Phrygian origin. According to Etym. M. Πῦρ· φῦρ τι ἐστίν, where is the Teutonic "fire."

[11] Ficin., "de ipsis nihil dicere quisquam potest." From whence Cornarius got his ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχοι γ' ἄν τις. He should have written ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχοι—Heindorf attempts to support ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γ' ἄν τις, by rendering "nam possit quispiam aliquid:" which would be in Greek ἐπεὶ ἔχοι ἄν τι τις; and hence in Rep. i. p. 350, D. καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, he should have read καὶ ἔχω τι περὶ—and in Euthyphr. p. 9, B. ἐπεὶ πανύ τι σαφῶς ἔχοιμ' ἄν, instead of πάνυ γε, especially as in the former case λέγειν, and in the latter ἐπιδεῖξαι, require an accusative.

[12] Ficin., "sic est dictus."

[13] Ficin., "quæ circa terram," i. e. τὰ περὶ τῆς γῆς. This derivation was obtained from a philosopher of Cyrene, as shown by the Etymol. M. Αἰθήρ, παρὰ τὸ θεῖν κυκλοφορικῶς, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ Κυρηναίων, by whom Ζεὺς was called Αἰθήρ, as may be inferred from Eustath. Ιλ. Ξ. p. 972, 47, ὁ Ζεὺς αἰθὴρ ἀεὶ ἐγρήγορε τῇ κυκλοφορίᾳ, ὃς καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ θεῖν αἰθὴρ καλεῖται.

[14] Homer Ιλ. Ο. 626, and Hesiod frequently.

[15] In the formula ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι τις cannot be omitted. See Heindorf on Phædon. p. 87, B. G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 68, p. 198, and myself on Pseudo-Platon. Sisyph. § 2, n. 4.

[16]—[16] This mass of nonsense Ficinus omitted, either because he could not understand it, or because it was not in his MS. Heindorf considers it as an interpolation. Hence Stalbaum has bracketed it. Perhaps Plato wrote ὅθεν δὴ βούλοιτ' ἄν τις αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅστις ἐστὶ νοήρης, where I have elicited βούλοιτ' ἂν τις from βούλεται, and ὅστις ἐστὶ νοήρης from ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀὴρ in MS. Gud. For Hesych. has Νοαρέως· νουνεχόντως, the Doric form for Νοήρως, similar to Φρενήρης. On words in -ήρης I have said something at Æsch. Suppl. 34, and I could now say a great deal more.

Herm. Be it so.

Soc. What is there then for us after this?

Herm. Ὧραι (hours), Socrates, and Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος.[17]

Soc. Now Ὧραι must be pronounced (Ὅραι),[18] as of old in the Attic dialect, if you wish to know what is reasonable. For they are ὅραι, through their determining winters and summers and winds, and the fruits[19] of the earth; and as ὁρίζουσαι (determining), they would be justly called ὅραι. But Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος (year), nearly appear to be one thing, each in turn. For that which brings to light the natural productions of the earth, and does, itself by itself, explore them, is Ἐνιαυτὸς (the year). And as stated before, regarding the name of Zeus, divided into two, some called the deity Zeus and some Dis, so here with respect to the year, it is called by some Ἐνιαυτὸς, because it (explores) ἐν ἑαυτῷ (in itself); but Ἔτος, because ἑτάζει[20] (it explores). [21]And the whole reasoning is for that, which explores in itself, to be called, being one, twofold;[21] so that two names are produced, Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος, from one reason.

[17] MS. Gud. and Ficin. omit καὶ ἔτος incorrectly.

[18] Heusde and Heindorf correctly saw that ὅραι had dropt out between παλαιὸν and ῥητέον.

[19] Serranus proposed to read, what the sense requires, and is therefore adopted by Heindorf, τοὺς καιροὺς πρὸς τοὺς καρποὺς, "the seasons suited for fruits." Stalbaum, however, sticks as usual to the nonsense of the common text. Etymol. M. Ἐνιαυτὸς—παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ διειληφέναι πάντα τούς τε καρποὺς καὶ τὰς τροπάς.

[20] Although the word ἑτάζειν is thus repeated in the text, I cannot believe that it was written even once by Plato. For by comparing Etymol. in Ἔτος—παρὰ τὸ ἔτι καὶ ἔτι εἶναι ἢ ἴέναι, and in Ἐνιαυτὸς—παρὰ τὸ ἰαύω, σύνθετον ἐνιαύω τὸ ἐνδιατρίβω, and Eustath. Il. B. p. 144, 49, Bas. ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς γίνεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰαύω τὸ διατρίβω· δηλοῖ δὲ χρόνον μακρόν· ἰαύειν γὰρ τὸ διατρίβειν, Plato wrote, I suspect, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔτος ἐξ ἔτους ζῶν—and οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ ἔτος, ὅτι ἔτι ζεῖ. For thus ἔτος ἐξ ἔτους, is similar to ἔτους εἰς ἔτος in Soph. Antig. 348. If however ἑτάζον is to be preserved, it is evident that the preposition ἐξ would be at variance with the derivation.

[21]—[21] Stalbaum proposed to read ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑτάζον· τοῦτο δὲ προσαγορεύεται ἓν ὂν δίχα, which he got from Ficinus; "Integra vero oratio est ipsum quod in se ipso examinat: unde ex oratione una nomina duo selecta sunt." I suspect however that we ought to read ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔτι ζῶν οὕτω προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἓν ὄν, δίχα χρῆ—for thus ὅτι might have easily dropt out between ἐστὶ and τὸ, and χρῆ after δίχα.

Herm. But then,[22] Socrates, you have made a great progress.

[60.] *Soc.* I seem, indeed, to have driven a long way on the road to wisdom.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Perhaps you will speak something[23] more.

Herm. But after this species (of inquiry), I would most gladly contemplate those beautiful names relating to virtue, with what propriety φρόνησις (prudence), σύνεσις (consciousness), δικαιοσύνη (justice), and all the rest of this kind are given.

Soc. You raise up, my friend, no mean a genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin,[24] I must not act the coward; but, as it seems, look into prudence, and intelligence, and thought, and knowledge, and all the other beautiful names of which you speak.[25]

Herm. We ought by no means to stand apart previously.

Soc. And indeed, by the dog,[26] I seem to myself not to act the part of a prophet badly, about what I understand at present, that those ancient men, who laid down names, did, like the majority of the wise men of the present period, through their frequently turning themselves round, while in search of the spot where existences are, become dizzy beyond all bounds; and that subsequently all[27] things appear to them to turn round[28] and to be borne along on every side. [61.] They do not however blame what they suffer within them-

[22] In lieu of the nonsensical δῆτα, three MSS. read δῆλα, which leads to δῆλα δή—a phrase perpetually used by Plato. The error arose from the similarity of τ and λ in MSS. as shown by Pierson on Mœris, p. 254.

[23] Heindorf was the first to read φήσεις for ἐφήσεις, and to support it by Legg. i. p. 625, C., and Rep. x. p. 596, C. Perhaps however in ἐφήσεις lies hid τι φήσεις.

[24] Here is an allusion to a well-known Æsopo-Socratic fable, to which Shakspeare alluded in King John.—"Thou wear the lion's hide! Doff it, for shame; And hang a calf's skin on thy recreant limbs."

[25] Instead of ἃ φῂς, MS. Gud. ἀφιῇς, which leads to ἃ ἔφης, "of which you were speaking."

[26] On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 1.

[27] In lieu of τὰ πράγματα, common sense demands πάντα; for thus πάντα and πάντως are perpetually united, as shown by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 178, and by Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 852, ed. 2.

[28] One MS. has alone preserved περιστρέφεσθαι. Ficinus has "perferri et vacillare," which leads to περιφέρεσθαι, and στρέφεσθαι.

selves as the cause of this opinion, but that things are of themselves so formed by nature, (that)[29] nothing is abiding and firm, but that all things[30] flow and are carried along, and are full of all kinds of generation and destruction.[31] I speak this, as having thought on the names just now (mentioned).[32]

Herm. How is this, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps you have not perceived that those lately mentioned were imposed upon things altogether borne along, flowing, and in a state of generation.[33]

Herm. I do not altogether consider it.

Soc. Now, in the first place, what we mentioned first is entirely something of this kind.

Herm. Which is that?

Soc. *Φρόνησις* (prudence). For it is the perception of a movement and flowing. One may also understand by it the utility of movement.[34] But at least it is connected with the idea of being carried along.[35] But if you will, *Γνῶμη* (thought) indicates altogether the looking-into and agitating (mentally) a begetting;[36] for the word *νωμᾷν* (to agitate) is the same as the word *σκοπεῖν*[37] (to look into). Or if you will, *νόησις* (intelligence) is *τοῦ νέου ἔσις* (the desire of a novelty); since for existing things to be new, it indicates that they are perpetually in the course of being produced. Hence he, who founded the word *νεόεσιν*, pointed out that the soul was desirous of this (novelty): for it was not called *νόησις* anciently, but instead of *η*.

[29] After *οὕτω πεφυκέναι* we must insert *ὥστε*, despite the authority of all the MSS. that omit it, except the one used by Ficinus; who has "ita natura habere se putant, ut nihil—sit."

[30] Here again Ficinus shows by his "fluant omnes," that he found in his MS. *μεστὰ εἶναι πάντα πάσης*—

[31] In lieu of *φορᾶς* three MSS. read *φθορᾶς*. Ficinus has "gignantur et defluant," which leads to *γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, found in Parmen. § 20. Rep. vi. p. 485, B., Legg. x. p. 891, E. 894, B., all quoted by Heindorf. Cornarius was the first to suggest *φθορᾶς*.

[32] Ficin. "quæ nunc relata sunt," as if his MS. read *τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα*.

[33] Ficin. "jugi generatione," as if he found in his MS. *ἀεὶ ἐπιγιγνομένοις*.

[34] This is said, as if *φρόνησις* were derived from *φορὰ* and *ὄνησις*.

[35] As the Schol. has preserved a various reading—*καὶ περὶ τὸ ῥεῖν γε*, Heindorf would unite the two—*περί γε τὸ ῥεῖν τε καὶ φέρεσθαι*—correctly: to which *ῥεῖν* for *περὶ* in one MS. plainly leads.

[36] This appears from Æsch. S. Th. 25, *Ἐν ὡσὶ νωμῶν καὶ φρεσὶν*: and Soph. Œd. T. 300, *Ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία διδακτά τε Ἄρρητά τε*.

[37] For *γνώμη* is thus feigned to be derived from *γονὴ* and *νωμᾶν*.

it was necessary to pronounce ε twice, —*νεόεσιν*.[38] [62.] But Σωφροσύνη (temperance) is the *σωτηρία*[39] (safety) of that *φρόνησις* (prudence) which we have just now considered. Ἐπιστήμη (science) moreover points out that the soul, which is worthy of notice, follows things hurried along, and is neither left behind them, nor goes before them. Hence [40] by throwing out ε, it ought to be called *πιστήμη*.[40] But Σύνεσις (understanding), [41] on the other hand, would thus[41] appear to be, as it were, a syllogism. [43] For when it says[42] *συνίεναι* (to understand), it follows that the same thing in every respect is meant as by the word *ἐπίστασθαι* (to know): for *συνιέναι* means that the soul marches along with things.[43] Σοφία (wisdom), however, means to touch upon movement. This, however, is rather obscure and foreign. But we should recollect, from out of the poets, that they often say, (when they happen to say) [44] of a person from among those, who begin to go forward quickly, that *ἐσύθη* (he rushed forth) they say:[44] and a man

[38] Ficinus adds "quasi neu (*νέου*) id est novi, et esis, appetitia;" as if he had found in his MS. *ἅτε νέου ἔσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὄν*: what the train of thought manifestly requires.

[39] For Plato feigns that *σωφροσύνη* is derived *παρὰ τὸ σώζειν τὸ φρονεῖν*, as stated by Etymol. M. in p. 744, 33, who has thus preserved some words that were found in this passage originally, as shown by Aristotle in Ethic. vi. 5, *ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοῦτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν*.

[40]—[40] Although Stalbaum has left in the text *ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ει, ἐπιστημένην αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν*, he prefers in the notes the correction of Cornarius—*ἐκβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ει, πιστήμην*. But as we thus not only lose sight of *ἕπεσθαι*, but introduce *πιστήμη*, a word to which there is not the most distant allusion in the text, Heindorf suggested *ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ει, ἐπειστήμην*. The reader is therefore left to take his choice; for I confess I am here quite in the dark.

[41]—[41] Heindorf explains *αὖ οὕτω μὲν* by "thus, the matter not having been considered." But such could not be the meaning of those words. Ficinus takes no notice of them. They conceal something like *ἔννῳ τινι ἂν*—"to any person of mind."

[42] Ficinus has "cum autem syniena dicitur;" from whence Heindorf would read *λέγηται*, instead of *λέγῃ*, which wants its nominative. Stalbaum suggests *λέγῃς*—I should prefer *λέγῃ τις*—

[43]—[43] To understand this etymological syllogism, we must suppose that *συνιέναι*, "to understand," is derived from *συνιέναι*, "to go together," like *συμπορεύεσθαι*. Now as *ἐπιστήμη* has been shown to come from *ἕπεσθαι* and *ἵσημι*, and as *ἕπεσθαι* is the same as *συμπορεύεσθαι*, it follows that *σύνεσις* is the same as *ἐπιστήμη*.

[44]—[44] This is Stalbaum's translation of the words in the text; as if *λέγουσι* and *φασι* could be thus repeated actually, and *λέγοντες* too be

of Lacedæmon, (one) of the famous, had the name of Σοῦς[45] (rusher): for by this appellation the Lacedæmonians denominate a rapid rush. Of this hurried motion then Σοφία (wisdom) signifies ἐπαφὴν[46] (the contact), as if things were continually carried along. [63.] But the word Ἀγαθὸν (good) is wont to be imposed as the name for that portion of all nature which is ἀγαστὸν (to be admired): for since all[47] existences march on, there is in some swiftness, but in others slowness prevails. [48] Every thing therefore is not swift, but there is a part of it ἀγαστὸν (to be admired). To this portion, ἀγαστὸν (to be admired), is given the appellation ἀγαθὸν (good).[48]

understood. How superior to this rubbish is the version of Ficinus—"quotiens volunt adventantem aliquem et irruentem exprimere, esythe (id est erupit, prosilit) dicere." Perhaps Plato wrote ὅ τι πολλαχοῦ λέγουσι, ἂν τύχῃ τις ἑκὼν ἢ περί του ἀρχόμενος προϊέναι, ἐσύθη· φασὶ δὲ Λακωνικῷ γε ἀνδρὶ—εἶναι, i. e. "that they often say, should a person, either willingly or being commanded respecting a thing, happen to go forward quickly, that ἐσύθη (he rushed). It is said too that there was the name of Σοῦς borne by even a Lacedæmonian."

[45] The name of the Lacedæmonian was probably Σόϝος, not Σοῦς, as acutely remarked by Valckenaer in Digress. in Theocrit. p. 271, C., who wonders that Plato should not have so written, as being nearer to Σοφός. I suspect that he did so. But that when the F became obsolete, its place was supplied by another letter, just as we find Γερωϝία altered into Γερωσία, as Valckenaer has pointed out himself.

[46] By the introduction of the word ἐπαφὴ, Plato shows that he meant to derive Σοφὸς from σόω and ἀφὴ, for so we must read in lieu of ἐπαφὴ, where the preposition interferes with the etymology.

[47] Ficin. has "postquam fluunt omnia," which leads to ἐπειδὴ πορεύεται πάντα τὰ ὄντα, instead of ἐπειδὴ πορεύεται τὰ ὄντα.

[48]—[48] The Greek is ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν· τούτῳ οὖν δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. This even Stalbaum confesses to be wretchedly corrupt; and he proposes to read ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστὸν, τὸ θοόν. For it appears from § 83, that the word θοὸν formed a part of the etymology of the word ἀγαθὸν, as Heindorf saw acutely. The words there are οἷον νῦν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι. But neither of those Scholars have told us why any part of the quick moving should be said to be admired. I suspect then that the Etymol. M. in Ἀγαθὸν, παρὰ τὸ ἄγαν θέειν ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτὸ, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγάζω, has preserved some words that have dropt out here, and that Plato wrote Ἔστιν οὖν οὐ τὸ πᾶν θοὸν, ὅ ἐστι ταχὺ, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστὸν, διὰ τὸ ἄγαν θέειν ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτό· τούτῳ οὖν, ᾧ δή τι τῶν ἀγαστῶν, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. i. e. The whole is not θοὸν, that is, quick, but some part of it is to be admired, through our running quickly to it. Hence to that, to which there is a portion of the admired, this appellation is given of good—where I have adopted ᾧ from one MS. and τῶν ἀγαστῶν from another. Ficinus has "Est igitur non omne velox; sed ipsius aliquid agaston; quid

But of Δικαιοσύνη (justice) it is easy to conjecture that its name was imposed on the perception of what is just. But what is just in itself, it is difficult (to say):[49] for it appears to be agreed upon by the multitude up to a certain point; but beyond it to be disputed. For indeed, such as think that the universe is on a march, conceive the greatest part of it to be of such a nature, that it does nothing but yield; and that, on this account, there is something pervading the universe[50] by which all generated natures are produced; and that this pervading thing is most swift and most attenuated: for otherwise it would be unable to pass through every thing while going on, unless it were the most attenuated, so as to hold nothing; and the most swift,[51] so as to make use of the other things as if in a state of rest.[51] Because therefore it governs all other things διαϊὸν (by going through), it is properly called δίκαιον, receiving the value of the letter κ for the sake of an elegant pronunciation. [64.] And thus far, as we have just now stated, the multitude agree with us, that this is the meaning of the word δίκαιον (just).[52] But I, Hermogenes, being eager on this point, have inquired about all these things, (and heard)[53] in the Ἀπόρρητα (Mysteries to be unrevealed),

quidem agathon ipsius agathon nomine declaratur," where the first "agathon," in Bekker's reprint, is a typographical error for "agaston," found correctly in ed. pr.

[49] Although συμβαλεῖν might be supplied after χαλεπὸν, yet as Ficinus has "difficile cognitu," one may suppose that he found in his MS. either χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, as in § 65, οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι, or χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν.

[50] The Greek is διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιὸν, which Ficinus translates "perque omne aliquid permanare," as if his MS. had, what is found in three others, διὰ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς—Plato wrote διὰ δὲ αὐτὸ (i. e. τὸ χωρεῖν) τοῦ παντὸς—

[51]—[51] I confess I hardly understand what is meant "by making use of the other things as if in a state of rest."

[52] That the multitude had any such notion of the meaning of δίκαιον, Plato has indeed asserted; but "credat Judæus Apelles, Non ego," to use the words of Horace.

[53] It seems very strange that Plato should confess that he had heard any secrets from those who had sworn in the Mysteries not to reveal them. Perhaps he wrote ἐν ἀεί ποτε ῥητοῖς, "in words ever spoken," to which the subsequent ἰδίᾳ, "privately," would be properly opposed. Ficinus has "perscrutatus sum, et in arcanis percepi," as if ἀπόρρητα meant here simply "a secret;" for the philosophers of antiquity were wont to make a secret of their doctrines, as may be inferred from Phædon. p. 62, B. § 16, Theætet. p. 152, C. § 25, Rep. ii. p. 378, A. In that case however the subsequent ἰδίᾳ would be superfluous. Ficinus indeed

that this is[54] the just and the cause; for that, through which a thing is generated, is the cause;[55] and some one has said privately, that it was on this account it was (said) so correctly. But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless quietly ask them, What, O best of men, is the just, if this is (said) so correctly? I seem to inquire beyond what is becoming, and to leap, as it is said, over the lines dug out;[56] for they say I have sufficiently inquired and heard, and they endeavour, through the wish to satisfy me, to say, one one thing, and another another, and they no longer chime-in together. For one says that the Sun is *τὸ δίκαιον* (the just); for that by it alone, *διαϊόντα* (pervading) and *καίοντα* (burning), it becomes the guardian of all things. But when, delighted, as having heard something beautiful, I mention[57] this to another person, the hearer laughs at me,[58] and asks me if I think there is nothing just amongst men, when the sun has set? [65.] Upon my begging then (to know) what the other means, he says it is fire itself.[59] But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person says, it is not fire itself, but the heat itself which exists in fire. Another again says, that he laughs at all these opinions; but that the just was that intellect of which Anaxagoras speaks; for he said that this possesses a power from itself, and is not mixed up with anything,

translates *ἰδίᾳ καλεῖν* by "proprie vocare." But that would be *εὖ*, or *καλῶς*, or *ὀρθῶς*, or *δικαίως*. Hence Buttman proposed to read *καὶ διακὸν καλεῖν*, as if *διακὸν* were derived from *δι' ὃ* and the origin of *δίκαιον*: while C. F. Hermann on Lucian De Hist. Conscrib. p. 21, prefers *καὶ τὸν Δία καλεῖν*. Stalbaum's version is "et peculiariter justum causæ nomine appellare;" where his "peculiariter" in Latin is quite as unintelligible as *ἰδίᾳ* in Greek.

[54] Buttmann would read *ταὐτὸ* for *τοῦτο*—And so Taylor had already translated "the same."

[55] This is certainly true; but how *δίκαιον* could thus be shown to be the same as, or similar to, *αἴτιον*, I cannot understand.

[56] With this proverb, Leopard. in Emendat. i. 22, compares the expression in Horace, "Sæpe trans finem jaculo nobilis expedito." Hesych. *Σκάμμα· ὁ ἀγὼν, στάδιον*. It was rather the dug-out limit of the arena, where a contest took place; answering to the ring of English prize-fighters.

[57] Ficinus, "omnia gubernare," which leads to *πάντα τα ὄντα*, instead of *τὰ ὄντα*, or else to *τὰ ὅλα*, found in one MS.

[58] Compare Hipp. Maj. § 15 and 32.

[59] This was the doctrine of Heracleitus and of Hippasus, as we learn from Aristot. Metaphys. i. 3. HEIND.

but that it puts into order (all)[60] things while pervading all things. But here, my friend, I am in a much greater difficulty than before I attempted to learn what justice is. But[61] at least this name, for the sake of which we have been making the inquiry,[62] appears to have been given to it (justice) for these reasons.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these (notions) from some one, and not to improvize[63] them yourself.

Soc. But what of the rest?

Herm. Not entirely so.

Soc. Hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, as if I had not heard (what)[64] I am saying. What then remains for us after justice? [66.] I think we have not yet discussed Ἀνδρεία (fortitude); for injustice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power;[65] but Ἀνδρεία (fortitude) signifies that it is so named from fortitude in fight.[66] Now a fight, if things flow in reality, is nothing else than a contrary flowing. If then one takes away the δ from the name *ἀνδρία*, the name Ἀνρεία, which remains, points out the thing itself.[67] Hence it is evident that not the flowing, which is contrary to every flowing, is Ἀνδρία (fortitude), but only that which flows contrary to what is just; for (otherwise)[68] fortitude would not be praised. In some similar man-

[60] Ficinus, "exornare omnia per omni penetrantem," who found doubtless in his MS. *κοσμεῖν παντὰ τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα*, not *κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα*.

[61] Ficinus, "Cæterum, ut redeamus ad id, cujus gratia disputamus," which would lead to the insertion of *ἐπανίωμεν* after *ἐσκοποῦμεν*.

[62] Since two MSS. read *οὕτω κεῖσθαι*, one would suspect that Ficinus found the same word likewise in his; for he renders "quale diximus." Unless in *οὕτω* lie hid *εὖ πω—*

[63] This is the exact meaning of *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν*.

[64] Ficinus, "quasi quæ afferam, non audiverim," which leads to *ὡς αὐκ ἀκηκοὼς ἃ λέγω*. Or we may read *τὰ ἐπίλοιπα—λέγων*. The common text, *ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω*, is unintelligible.

[65] i. e. *τοῦ διαϊόντος*, which *τὸ δίκαιον* was said to possess, and from which it was feigned to be derived.

[66] In lieu of this inelegant repetition of *ἀνδρείας*, Ficinus has simply "Andria in pugna versatur," as if his MS. had *ἀνδρεία δέ ἐστιν ἐν μάχῃ*.

[67] For *ἀνρεία* is feigned to be formed from *ἀνὰ* (back) and *ῥοή* (flowing).

[68] Ficinus has "neque enim aliter," absolutely requisite for the sense. Hence it is evident that *ἄλλως* has dropt out after *ἀν*.

ner τὸ ἄρρεν (the male) and ὁ ἀνὴρ (man) (derive their origin)[69] from ἄνω ῥοή (an upward flowing). But Γυνὴ (woman) appears to me to mean γονὴ (begetting); and τὸ θῆλυ (the female) seems to be so called from θηλὴ (the pap); but θηλὴ, Hermogenes, from causing, as it were, things irrigated to germinate.

Herm. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. But the word θάλλειν (to germinate) appears to me to represent the increase of younglings, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly. Such then has he[70] imitated by the name, having fitted it together from θεῖν (to run) and ἅλλεσθαι (to leap). But do you not perceive that I am carried, as it were, out of the course, since I have come upon a smooth (path)? But many words yet remain of those that seem worthy of attention.

Herm. You speak the truth.

[67.] *Soc.* One of these is Τέχνη (art), which we must look into (and see) what it means.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Does not then this signify ἕξιν νοῦ (a habit of thought), by taking away τ, and inserting ο between χ and ν, and between ν and η?

Herm. And this in a very poor[71] manner, Socrates.

Soc. But do you not know, blessed man, that the names first formed, are now overlaid by those desirous of travestying them in a stilted style; and who, for the sake of an elegant pronunciation, add and take away letters, and twist them in every way, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word Κάτοπτρον (mirror), does it not appear to you that the ρ has been absurdly introduced? But such alterations some, I think, make, who care nothing for truth,

[69] In lieu of ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινι τούτῳ ἐστὶ τῇ ἄνω ῥοῇ, where τούτῳ is perfectly unintelligible, Ficinus has "a simili quodam ducunt originem, scilicet ab ano rhoe." Perhaps Plato wrote, εἰπὲ, παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἴσ' ἐστὶ (are equal) τῇ ἄνω ῥοῇ: where εἰπὲ (say thou) lies hid in ἐπεί, found in three MSS., one of which is Gud., that in this dialogue is the best of all.

[70] Edd. οἷόν περ οὖν μεμίμηται, which Stalbaum defends by taking οἷον in the sense of ὅ, "quod," as translated by Ficinus. Plato wrote, I suspect, τοιόν τι ὁ ἐρῶν μεμίμηται, i. e. "He who was about to speak of some such thing, has imitated"—

[71] Heindorf quotes γλίσχρως εἰκάζω from Rep. vi. p. 488, A. Ficinus, "aride et inculte."

but moulding (prettily)[72] the mouth; so that, after adding much to the first names, they at length rendered it impossible for a single man to understand what the name means; as in the case of the Sphynx, which they call Σφίγξ instead of Φίγξ,[73] and so in many others.

Herm. Such is indeed the case, Socrates.

[68.] *Soc.* Indeed, should any one permit one to add to names, and take away from them whatever he wishes, there would be a very easy road; and one might adapt every name to every thing.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. The truth indeed. But I think that you, who are a wise president, ought to keep a guard over what is moderate and the probable.

Herm. I wish I could.

Soc. And I too, Hermogenes, wish it with you. But do not, O divine man, discuss too accurately, "lest you perfectly exhaust my force:"[74] for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after τέχνην (art), I have considered μηχανὴν (artifice). For Μηχανὴ (artifice) seems to me to mean τὸ ἄνειν (to complete a thing for the most part). For μῆκος signifies "length." From both of these, μῆκος (length) and ἄνειν (to complete), is formed the word μηχανή. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse. For we must inquire what the names of Ἀρετὴ (virtue) and Κακία (vice) mean. Now one of these I do not as yet see clearly; but the other appears to me to be manifest; for it chimes-in with all that has been said before. For in consequence of all[75] things moving on, whatever is καιῶς ἰὸν (moving on badly) will be κακία (bad-moving); but this, when it subsists in the soul, through its badly moving on to her concerns, [76] most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity.[76] [69.] But that to move on badly,

[72] Ficinus has, with more elegance than truth, "talia—faciunt quod oris illecebras pluris æstimant, quam veritatem." From whence, however, I conceive εὖ has dropt out between στόμα and πλάττοντες.

[73] On the word Φίγξ, which seems to have been peculiar to Bœotia, see J. Clericus in Hesiod. Theogon. 326.

[74] Here is a quotation from Homer, Il. vi. 265.

[75] Ficinus, "tanquam eant omnia," which leads to ἰόντων πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων, not merely ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων.

[76]—[76] Such is Taylor's translation of the words μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου

whatever it is, appears to me to show (itself) in Δειλία (timidity), which we have not yet discussed, but have passed it over; although it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have passed over many other names. Now δειλία (timidity) means, that the bond of the soul is strong: for the word λίαν (vehemently) is (applied to) strength: and hence the vehement and greatest bond of the soul will be timidity,[77] just as ἀπορία (want) is an evil, and every thing, as it seems, which is an impediment to [going and] marching on.[78] To go on badly, then, seems to signify the marching on in a restrained and shackled manner; which when the soul suffers,[79] it becomes full of κακίας (evil). But if to such things the name of vice is applicable, the contrary of this would be ἀρετὴ (virtue), signifying, in the first place, ease in marching; and, in the next place, that τὴν ῥοὴν (the

ἀπορυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. Stalbaum's is, "hoc a toto maxime appellatur, hoc est, a pravitate," which I hope he could understand. It is above my comprehension. Ficinus has, "communiter prava dicetur," which is evidently a guess at the meaning.

[77] That Plato would thus, after saying in one sentence that timidity is the greatest bond of the soul, repeat the very same idea in almost the next sentence, I for one will never believe; and still less that in deriving δειλία from δεῖν (to bind) and λίαν (vehemently), he would omit one half of the etymology; and least of all that he would here assert that δειλία is τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸς, when that is the very proposition to be proved. There is evidently a lacuna here, which might be thus supplied, "δειλία is some evil of the soul, and signifies, I think, a strong binding." For δέος (fear), from whence is δεσμὸς, binds the foot, the tongue, and the mind; and λίαν (vehemently) is applied to strength. Hence δειλία would be the vehement binding of the soul." That there was some allusion to κακὸν here, is evident from the subsequent expression, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν; and it is equally evident that some affinity was pointed out between δειλία and δέος, of which the Etymol. M. says that it is derived, ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσμεύειν· ὁ γὰρ φόβος συνδεῖ τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος: in lieu of which I have substituted some words taken from Euripides, probably—Πόδας τε γὰρ γλῶσσάν τε καὶ νοῦν δεῖ φόβος, a sentiment it were easy to support by numerous parallel passages. Instead, however, of endeavouring to follow out the chain of reasoning, Stalbaum is content to say that "Plato derives ridiculously δειλία from δεσμὸς and λίαν," which, if my notions are correct, Plato did not do; and, even if wrong, no man in his senses would ever attempt to do.

[78] As ἀπορία has an affinity with πορεύεσθαι, it is evident that ἴέναι καὶ are from a gl.; nor were they in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "ac summatim quodcunque progressus ipsius impedimentum," as if he had found καὶ πάνῃ εἰπεῖν, instead of καὶ πᾶν, ᾧ ἔοικεν.

[79] Ficinus renders ἔχῃ by "subit," which leads to πάσχῃ.

flowing) of a good soul is ever let loose; so that what always flows unrestrained and unimpeded, very properly, as it seems, receives this appellation. [It is right then to call it][80] ἀειρείτη. Perhaps also (some one[81]) may call it αἱρετή, as this is a habit the most eligible.[82] But the word is moulded together and called ἀρετή.[82] Perhaps, too, you will say again, that I feign; but I assert, that if the name of vice is correct, as I have said above, this name of virtue is correct likewise.

[70.] *Herm.* But what does Κακὸν (evil) mean, through which word you have explained many things previously?[83]

Soc. It appears to me, by Zeus, something strange, and difficult to conjecture. I bring therefore to this too that artifice.

Herm. What is that?

Soc. To assert that this name too is something barbaric.

Herm. And you seem to be like a person speaking correctly. But, if it seems good, we will omit[84] these; and endeavour to see in what way the words Καλὸν (beautiful) and Αἰσχρὸν (base) are well said.

Soc. Αἰσχρὸν (base), then, seems to me just now[85] to be very plain as to what it means. For it corresponds with the preceding remarks. For he who founded names, appears to me to have throughout found fault with that, which hinders and restrains things from their flowing; and that he now

[80] The words within brackets are rightly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently an interpolation. They show, however, that Plato wrote εἴληφεν εὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ἀειρείτην; where εὖ answers to ὀρθῶς.

[81] Ficinus has "vocet quis," which leads to λέγει τις. One MS. has λέγειν, i. e. λέγειν ἦν. Heindorf and Stalbaum understand ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης. But nominatives are not to be thus understood at random.

[82—82] All these words were omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus' version. They ought, however, to be inserted after ἀειρείτη. For those are the letters moulded together to form ἀρετή. Besides, the repeated "perhaps" ought not to be separated by any extraneous matter.

[83] So Stalbaum; and so, long before him, Taylor had correctly translated this passage.

[84] This was very clever in Plato; for he was, doubtless, unable to suggest an etymology for κακός.

[85] Stalbaum agrees with Hartung in his German work on Greek Particles, i. p. 254, who explains καὶ δή "jam adeo." They did not know that Plato wrote καὶ παιδί, "to me even a boy." Heindorf quotes Thesm. 769, οἶδ' ἐγὼ καὶ δὴ πόρον Ἐκ τοῦ Παλαμήδους He should have suggested τόνδ' ἔγωγ' οἶδ' εὖ πόρον—For καὶ δὴ are never found except in the beginning of a sentence.

assigned the name ἀεισχορρόυν to that which is ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῦν (ever restraining the flowing). But at present they call it, by moulding the words together, αἰσχρόν.

Herm. But what is Καλὸν (beautiful)?

Soc. This is more difficult to understand; [86] although he says that it is α derived only by the harmony and length of the ου.[86]

Herm. But how?

Soc. It appears that this name is some appellation for intellect.

Herm. How say you?

[71.] *Soc.* What think you is the cause of each existing thing being called by some [87] name? Is it not that which gives names?

Herm. Entirely so.

[86]—[86] Such is the literal English translation of Stalbaum's text—καίτοι λέγει γε αὐτὸ ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ ου παρῆκται, which Stalbaum thus renders into Latin, "Quanquam τὸ καλὸν dicit numeri tantum gratia; atque hoc nomen mora syllabæ ου est mutatum." But what he meant by those words I confess myself unable to explain. For, 1. λέγει wants its nominative. 2. Even if λέγει ἁρμονίᾳ could mean "dicit numeri gratia," καὶ μήκει would not be thus separated from ἁρμονίᾳ, especially if μήκει means, as Buttmann and Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, understand it, the metrical quantity of a syllable. 3. A nominative is required for παρῆκται: and lastly, παρῆκται does not mean "mutatum;" for παράγειν is, etymologically speaking, "to derive." Correctly then did Heindorf conceive the whole passage to be most obscure and corrupt. And so too did Buttmann; who, thinking that καλὸν had some affinity with καλεῖν, wished to read καίτοι τοῖς λέγουσί γε αὐτὸ ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ ου παρῆκται, i. e. "although by those pronouncing it there is a change only in the harmony and length of the vowel ο," which was written and called in the time of Plato ου: and hence καλὸν was originally καλοῦν, a notion for which Buttmann was indebted, I suspect, to Etymol. Καλός—παρὰ τὸ καλῶ ἐκ τοῦ καλεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον, ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἐφ' ὃ ἄγαν θέομεν. Creuzer however seems to have been nearer the mark in his Prolegom. in Plotin. Περὶ Κάλλους, p. xvii., where he wishes to read μήκει τοῦ νοῦ παρῆκται. For, says he, to the question of Hermogenes, What is καλόν? Socrates replies by saying, "It is difficult to understand. But by those who pronounce the word, it is turned aside from νοῦ by its harmony and length." For thus the mention of νοῦ is connected with that of διανοίας just afterwards; while both are subsequently united. By following then this clue it is easy to suggest that Plato wrote something to this effect—καίτοι λέγουσί γ' ὅτι, αὐτοῦ ἡ ἁρμονία μόνον μὴ κάμῃ μήκει, τὰ νου περιῄρηται—"And yet they say that the letters νου have been clipt off, merely that its harmony might not labour from its length." For the word was originally καλόνου.

[87] Stalbaum would insert τι after κληθῆναι—

Soc. Will not then this (cause) be the intellect either of gods, or men, or of both?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. That then which calls things, and the beautiful, are the same, this [88] intellect.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Whatever things then mind and intellect effect, these are to be praised; but what they do not, are to be blamed?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Now the medicinal business produces medical results; and the carpenter's business carpentry results: or how say you?

Herm. I (say) thus.

Soc. And the beautiful produces things beautiful?

Herm. It must needs do so.

Soc. But this, as we have said, is intellect.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Τὸ *καλὸν* (the beautiful) then will be properly the appellation of that *φρόνησις* (prudence) which produces such things as we call beautiful, and which we embrace.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. What then remains of such like names?

Herm. Those that are conversant with the *ἀγαθὸν* (good), and the *καλὸν* (beautiful), such as *Συμφέροντα* (things conducive), and *Λυσιτελοῦντα* (profitable), and *Ωφέλιμα* (advantageous), and *Κερδαλέα* (gainful), and their contraries.

[72.] *Soc.* You may then by reflecting find *τὸ συμφέρον* (the conducive) from the previous remarks; for it appears to be a kind of a brother to science. For it exhibits nothing but the motion of the soul in conjunction with things; and that what results from some such a thing should be called *συμφέροντα* and *σύμφορα* (conducive), from *συμπεριφέρεσθαι* (to be carried round in conjunction), is reasonable.[89]

Herm. It is reasonable.

[88] I cannot understand *ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῦτο διάνοια.* I could *ταὐτόν ἐστί που τῇ διανοίᾳ*—i. e. "it is the same with intellect."

[89] By adding here *ἔοικε* with Heusde, and repeating *Ἔοικε μέντοι* in the answer of Hermogenes, we shall not only support the syntax, but restore Plato's usual method of uniting *μέντοι* with the word repeated in the answer, as I have shown on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, and to the passages there quoted I could now add many more. Here *μέντοι* might easily have dropt out between *ἔοικεν* and *τὸ*—

Soc. But κερδαλέον (gainful) is from κέρδος (gain); and to him, who puts a ν instead of a δ in this name, it points out what it means: for it thus gives, after another manner, the name for "good;" for as it is mingled with [90] and pervades all things, he who assigned it this name expressed its power, and thus, by placing δ instead of ν, he pronounced it κέρδος.[91]

Herm. But what is λυσιτελοῦν (profitable)?

Soc. It seems,[92] Hermogenes, not as hucksters use it, should any one [93] settle an expenditure, does it seem good to me to understand τὸ λυσιτελοῦν (the profitable); but being the swiftest[94] thing in existence, it does not suffer things to stand still, nor the rushing-on to obtain an end of being borne along, and to stand still[95] and to cease; but always [96] frees it,

[90] Ficin. "omnibus immiscetur diffusum per omnia," as if he had found in his MS. κεράννυται πᾶσι, πάντα διεξιὸν instead of κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιὸν—

[91] Since by changing δ into ν, κέρδος would become κέρνος, a word would be formed which Plato must have known never existed in Greek, the derivation was feigned, I suspect, with the view of ridiculing something equally absurd propounded by other etymologists.

[92] Enamoured, as usual, with a faulty expression, Stalbaum endeavours to defend the union of ἔοικε with the subsequent μοι δοκεῖ. Had he remarked that for δὲ τί δή, in the question of Hermogenes, the best MS. Gud. reads τῇδ'—he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote Λυσιτελοῦν δὲ τί; ΣΩΚ. τῇδ' ἔοικεν εἶναι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· i. e. "It seems to be in this way."

[93] Here again Stalbaum would mislead an incautious reader by his assertion that κάπηλος is to be understood before ἀπολύῃ. For there τις has evidently dropt out after ἐὰν. Nor is this the only error; for the expression is not ἀπολύειν, but λύειν τἀνάλωμα, as shown by Diphilus in Athen. vi. p. 227, F. Ἧς αἱ πρόσοδοι λύουσι τἀναλωματα. And were the fact otherwise, ἀπὸ could have no part here, where Plato is explaining the word λυσιτελοῦν, not ἀπολυσιτελοῦν. Nor could τὸ ἀνάλωμα be introduced here without showing its affinity in meaning with τέλος. He wrote, I suspect, ἐάν τις τέλος, ὅ ἐστιν ἀνάλωμα, πᾶν λύῃ. For Etymol. M. has Τελος—δαπάνημα. Besides it is only after the whole bill has been settled, that a tradesman can count up his profit.

[94] How the profitable can be the swiftest thing in existence I must leave for others to explain; and even if it were the quickest, it would be unable to keep every thing in motion, unless it had a weight, or rather a momentum, which in mechanics represents the velocity multiplied into the mass of matter.

[95] Edd. τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι. But that Plato would thus unite τὴν φορὰν and τοῦ φέρεσθαι, and repeat here στῆναι after the preceding ἵστασθαι, others may, but I will not, believe. Correctly has Ficinus, "neque permittit lationem telos (id est finem) progressionis accipere atque cessare," which leads to τὴν φορὰν πορεύεσθαι καὶ παύεσθαι.

should any end attempt to be produced,[96] and renders it unceasing and immortal. In this way it seems to me that λυσιτελοῦν (the profitable) obtained the reputation of ἀγαθόν (the good); for τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος (that which dissolves the end of rushing) was called λυσιτελοῦν. [73.] But [97]Ὠφέλιμον (useful) is a foreign name which Homer himself often uses, τῷ ὀφέλλειν.[97] But this is the appellation of increasing and making.[98]

Herm. But how stand the contraries of these?

Soc. Such of these as express a negation, there is no need, it appears to me, to go through.

Herm. But what are they?

Soc. The non-conducive, and useless, and unprofitable, and the non-lucrative.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. But Βλαβερὸν (hurtful), and Ζημιῶδες (noxious).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Now τὸ βλαβερὸν (the hurtful), he says,[99] is that which is βλαπτὸν τὸν ῥοῦν (hurting the flowing). But βλάπτον means τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν (that which wishes to bind); and ἅπτειν (to bind), is the same as δεῖν: but this he blames[100] every

[96—96] Edd. ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῆς, ἂν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, which words, says Stalbaum, are to be thus resolved—ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λύει, ἂν τέλος τι αὐτῆς ἐπιχειρῇ ἐγγίγνεσθαι: as if Plato would have thus separated αὐτῆς from τέλος, and have used ἐγγίγνεσθαι for the simple γίγνεσθαι. Ficinus has, "sed semper solvit ab illa fugatque, si quis terminus superveniat." Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῇ ἄν γε ἐπιχειρῇ τέλους ἐγγὺς γίγνεσθαι, i. e. "but ever does what is good for it (τῇ φορᾷ), should it attempt to be near its end." For thus λύει αὐτῇ is similar to τέλη λύει φρονοῦντι in Œd. T. 324.

[97—97] Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, Ὠφέλιμον δὲ, ξενικὸν τὸ ὄνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ ὀφέλλειν. But Homer never uses ὠφέλιμον, although he frequently does ὀφέλλειν. Plato wrote εἰ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται τῷ ὀφελλίειν. Nor is this the only error. For the article before ὄνομα is superfluous. Read then ξενικόν τι, as in § 70, βαρβαρικόν τι, and ξενικόν τι in § 77, and βαρβαρικόν τι in § 82, where many MSS. omit τι.

[98] Instead of ποιεῖν Heindorf suggested, even with the approbation of Stalbaum, πιαίνειν, of which the interpretation would be πίονα ποιεῖν.

[99] Both Heind. and Stalb. understand ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης before λέγει. But as one MS. has λέγειν, and εἶναι is perfectly useless, we must read, what Plato wrote—οἶμαι λέγειν, "I think it means"—.

[100] Here again Heind. and Stalb. supply ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης before λέγει. But why the founder of the name should find fault with the notion that ἅπτειν καὶ δεῖν mean the same, we are not told. Since then MS. Gud.

where. He, therefore, who wishes ἅπτειν ῥοῦν (to bind a flowing), will be most properly called βουλαπτεροῦν; but it appears to me, that, being spoken elegantly, it (becomes) βλαβερόν.

Herm. A variety of names come out, Socrates, to your view; and you just now appeared to me to have played a prelude with your mouth, as it were, of the melody belonging to Athena, while you pronounced this name βουλάπτεροῦν.[1]

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but those who founded the name.

[74.] *Herm.* You speak the truth; but what can the word ζημιῶδες (noxious) be?

Soc. What can ζημιῶδες (noxious) be? Behold, Hermogenes, how I shall speak the truth by saying, that through adding and taking away letters, persons vary so very much the meanings of names, that by turning then aside sometimes only a little they cause words to have the very contrary meaning. As in τὸ δέον (the needful). For I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that[2] this new speech of ours, itself the beautiful, has turned round τὸ δέον and ζημιῶδες, (so as) to indicate the contrary,[2] and causing to disappear what they

has ἀπανταχοῦ, I suspect Plato wrote τοῦτο δ' εἰπόντα γ' οὐ ψέγει τις· τὸ—i. e. "And no one blames a person so speaking."

[1] How Socrates could be feigned to have played a prelude with his mouth to the hymn of Athena, the goddess of wisdom, by his absurd etymology of βλαβερὸν, I cannot understand; unless it be said that Plato is here, as elsewhere, speaking ironically. Instead of τῆς Ἀθηνάας, I suspect the author wrote τῆς σῆς Ἀνειλειθύιας. For as Socrates was the son of a midwife, and professes, in Theæt. p. 151, B. § 22, to practise in the case of the mind, what his mother did in that of the body, the midwife's art, the tutelary deity of his family would be not Ἀθηνᾶ but Ἀνειλείθυια. But as Euripides in Ion, 452, thus identifies the two, Σὲ τὰν ὠδίνων λοχίαν Ἀνειλείθυιαν ἐμὰν Ἀθανᾶν ἱκετεύω, we might perhaps read here σῆς Ἀθηνᾶς Ἀνειλειθυίας.

[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek; where, says Heindorf, there is a ridicule of the new speech in the words ἡ καλὴ αὕτη. But why Plato should introduce this ridicule, neither he, nor Stalbaum, who follows him, has deigned to explain. Besides, although Stalbaum asserts that περιέτρεψε καὶ μηνύειν is the same as περιέτρεψεν ὥστε καὶ μηνύειν, no one conversant with the language will admit the assertion for a moment. And even if such an ellipse would preserve the syntax, still the sense would be none. For we have still to learn what is the contrary meaning, which the new speech attributes to the words δέον and ζημιῶδες. Lastly, in the phrase "to turn round to the contrary," correct Greek would require ἐς τοὐναντίον περιέτρεψε. Unless I am egregiously mis-

mean: but the ancient speech points out what both these words mean.

Herm. How say you?

Soc. I will tell you. Our ancestors you know very frequently used the ι and δ, and not the least the women, who particularly preserved the ancient tongue.[3] But now, instead of the ι, they perversely use either ε or η, and ζ instead of δ, as being more stately.

Herm. But how?

Soc. Just as, for instance, the most ancient men called ἡμέρα (day) ἱμέρα, and some of them ἐμέρα; but those of the present times ἡμέρα.

[75.] *Herm.* This is so.

Soc. You know then that this ancient name alone points out what was in the mind of the founder; for, because light is wont to emerge from darkness upon men pleased with and desiring its beams,[4] on this account they called day ἱμέρα.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. But as it is now spoken in high-flown language, you can by no means understand what ἡμέρα means; although some think that day is called on this account ἡμέρα, because it renders things ἥμερα, gentle.

Herm. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewise know that the ancients called Ζυγὸν (a yoke) Δυογὸν.[5]

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Now ζυγὸν indicates nothing. But that which exists for the two things together, for the sake of a binding, is justly

taken, Plato wrote—*ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ κεκαλλιεπημένη οὐκ εὖ ἐς τοὐναντίον περιέστρεψεν, ἃ μηνύει νῦν ἓν, τὸ δέον καὶ ζημιῶδες*, i. e. "the new speech, having been beautified by words, has not well turned round to the contrary the words *δέον* and *ζημιῶδες*, which now signify one thing:" where I have adopted *περιέστρεψε* from three MSS., and *μηνύει* from one; and been led to *κεκαλλιεπημένη* by *κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους* in Apolog. p. 17, B., and *οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα* in Thucyd. vi. 83, which Valckenaer, in Diatrib. p. 291, so beautifully elicited from *οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπόμεθα*.

[3] The same thing took place in Italy, as remarked by Cicero de Orator iii. 12, "Facilius mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant sermonis."

[4] Compare Æsch. Prom. 23, *ἀσμένῳ δὲ σοὶ—Πάχνην ἐφ' ἁλιος σκεδᾷ πάλιν*.

[5] Schneider would read *δναγὸν* from Etymol. *Ζυγὸς παρὰ τὸ δέω ἄγειν δναγὸς, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ δυγὸς καὶ ζυγός*.

called δνογόν. But it is now ζυγόν. And there are many others so circumstanced.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. In this way then at first the word δέον (binding), when it is thus spoken, signifies the contrary to all the names connected with ἀγαθὸν (good). For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a binding of, and hinderance to, a rushing-on, as being the brother of βλαβερὸν (noxious).

[76.] *Herm.* It appears, Socrates, to be very much so.

Soc. But not if you use the ancient name; which it is likely was founded with much more propriety than the present one. And it will agree[6] with those former good names, if you substitute as of old ι for ε; for διὸν[7] and not δέον, signifies that good, which (the founder of names)[8] praises. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself; but the names δέον, ὠφέλιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον, ἀγαθὸν, συμφέρον, εὔπορον,[9] (easily-going,) all appear the same; signifying by different names that [10]what adorns and pervades every where (is) praised,[10] but that what detains and binds, is blamed. And indeed, in the name ζημιῶδες, if, according to the ancient speech, you substitute δ for ζ, it will appear to

[6] Ficinus, "consenties." But ὁμολογήσει is not the fut. med. 2 pers., but fut. indic. 3 pers., and agrees with ὄνομα understood, as Heind. was the first to remark.

[7] As διὸν at no period was written for δῐῖὸν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς δὶς. For thus δὶς might easily drop out after -δῷς.

[8] Ficinus alone has preserved the nominative to ἐπαινεῖ in his "quod semper nominum laudat institutor." But not the name-founder alone praises the good, but every one else. Hence I suspect we ought to read ὅπερ ἀεὶ πᾶς ἐπαινεῖ, similar to πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, a little below. Stalbaum, with his so-called best MSS., reads δὴ and omits AEI, of which ΔΗ is the evident corruption.

[9] The introduction of εὔπορον seems strange here; for neither before nor subsequently is there given any etymology of it, as there is of all the other words; and though εὐπορία is mentioned in § 77, yet there it has come from a gloss.

[10—10] Ficinus has "aliquid per omnia penetrans, omniaque perorans, idque ubique laudatum," which leads, as Heindorf saw, to καὶ δῐῖὸν πάντα, πάνταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον. Instead however of δῐῖὸν, nearly all the MSS. read καὶ ὂν, from whence Bekker elicited καὶ ἰὸν, with the approbation of Stalbaum; who forgot that the whole chain of reasoning imperiously demands δῐῖὸν, of which οἷον, found in two MSS., preserves the vestige. For δ and ο are constantly confounded, as shown by Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 120, ed. Schæf.

you that this name was applied to δοῦντι τὸ ἰὸν (binding that which is going), and was called δημιῶδες.[11]

[77.] *Herm.* But, Socrates, what is Ἡδονὴ (pleasure), and Λύπη (pain), and Ἐπιθυμία (desire), and such like names.

Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes. For ἡδονὴ (pleasure) seems to have obtained this appellation as an action tending towards ὄνησις (enjoyment); but the δ was added, that it might be called ἡδονὴ instead of ἡονή.[12] But λύπη (pain) seems to be so named from the διάλυσις (dissolution)[13] of the body, which the body undergoes in that suffering: and Ἀνία (grief), as impeding τὸ ἰέναι (going):[14] but Ἀλγηδὼν (torture) appears to me to be some foreign word, and to be so called from ἀλγεινὸς (torturing).[15] But Ὀδύνη (anxiety) appears to be called from the ἔνδυσις (ingress of pain). But Ἀχθηδὼν (heaviness of heart) is clear even to all[16] that it is a name assimilated to the heaviness of rushing: [17] (for ἄχθος is "a burden," and ἰὸν "a thing moving").[17] But Χαρὰ (joy) seems to be called from the [18] διάχυσις (diffusion) and Εὐπορία (easy going) of the flowing [18] of the soul; but Τέρψις (delight) was derived from τερπνὸν (pleasant); but τερπνὸν was so called from being assimilated to πνοὴ

[11] Compare Etymol. Ζημία—ἢ δημία τις οὖσα ἡ πολιτική.

[12] For Plato thus supposes the existence of ὄνη, the root of ὄνημι.

[13] On λύπη, as if it were derived from λύειν, and its affinity with διάλυσις, Heind. refers to Wyttenbach upon Plutarch. S. N. V. p. 103. But even he failed to see that, as Chrysippus, quoted by Cicero in Tusc. Disp. iii. 25, considered λύπη to be λύσις totius hominis, Plato perhaps wrote here ἴσχει τις ἄνος, not ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα: where σῶμα is inelegantly repeated after τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος. Stalbaum would read ἢ—ἴσχει, and render ἴσχει "keep in, restrain."

[14] Hence Etymol. Ἀνία—δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵέναι γίνεσθαι· ἐμποδιστικὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀνία.

[15] That Plato derived ἀλγηδὼν from ἀλγεινὸν, and then lost all sight of -δὼν, it is impossible to believe. He might have written ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλγη δύνειν; just as he derives ὀδύνη from ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης.

[16] The expression "even to all" is a manifest absurdity. Plato wrote καὶ παιδί, "even to a child."—The word παντὶ without καὶ would have been intelligible. There is a similar error in Sympos. p. 187, A. § 14.

[17]—[17] The words within lunes have been found only in Ficinus' version, "achthos enim onus est; ion vero pergens."

[18]—[18] By comparing Etymol. Χαίρω, παρὰ τὸ χῶ τὸ διαχέω, παραγωγὸν χαίρω, one would have expected χαρὰ δὲ τῇ χύσει καὶ εὐροίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς So that χαρὰ might be derived from χέω and εὖροια: but must assuredly it could not be from διάχυσις and εὐπορία.

(the breath), creeping through the soul; it would be therefore justly called ἕρπ-νουν [19] (mind-creeping), but in time it was deflected into τερπνόν. [78.] But Εὐφροσύνη (hilarity) wants nothing to explain "the why" of its denomination; for it is obvious to all, that it received its name, εὐφεροσύνη, in strict justice from the soul being εὖ (well) συμφέρεσθαι (borne along) with all things;[20] nevertheless we call it εὐφροσύνη. Nor is Ἐπιθυμία (desire) difficult:[21] for it is plain that this name was applied to a power going on to Θυμὸς (anger). But Θυμὸς (anger) would have its appellation from Θύσεως (raging) and ζέσεως (boiling). And again, Ἵμερος (desire) was so called from ῥοῦς (a flowing) vehemently drawing the soul. For because ἱέμενος ῥεῖ (it flows urged on), and is desirous of things, and thus strongly draws the soul through the sending-forth of its flowing, it is, from the whole of this power, called ἵμερος. Moreover Πόθος (regret) is so called signifying [22] that there is (something) of desire not present, and of a stream,[22] but from that which is elsewhere, and absent. [23] From whence it is called πόθος (regret), a feeling which is then called ἵμερος (desire), when that is present, for which there is a wish.[23] [79.] But Ἔρως (love), because it flows inwardly from without,[24]

[19] Ficin. "merito vocaretur empnum, id est inspirans," this MS. therefore read ἔμπνουν.

[20] Ficinus has strangely misunderstood this passage; "hoc nomen trahitur ab eo quod dicitur eu, id est bene, et sympheresthæ, id est una sequi, quasi dicatur anima bene res assequi."

[21] The ellipse, supplied by Stalbaum, is seen in the version of Ficinus—"neque difficile est assignare quid epithymia—sibi velit." But whether he found the corresponding Greek words, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι βούλεται, in his MS. is another question.

[22]—[22] To get rid of the nonsense in the words σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἱμέρου τε καὶ ῥεύματος, Stalbaum would reject ἱμέρου τε καὶ ῥεύματος as an interpolation. But why they were interpolated he does not, for he could not, tell. Ficinus has "quod sane presentem suavitatem non respicit, quemadmodum himeros, sed absentem ardet." Perhaps Plato wrote σημαίνων οὔ του παρόντος εἶναι ἵμερόν γε κατὰ ῥεῦμάτι ὅσον, i. e. "signifying that there is not of something present the desire, how great, rushing stream-like." Stalbaum indeed fancies that πόθος was derived by Plato from πόθι, not aware that τὸ ὑπαῖθον had probably dropt out between ἀπόντος and ὅθεν. For both the desire of something present, and the regret of something absent, carry away the mind, as with a torrent, or inflame it, as with a torch.

[23]—[23] All the words between the figures were omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus.

[24] The same doctrine broached in the Phædrus, p. 251, B. § 63.

and because this flowing is not the property of him who possesses it, but is introduced through the eyes, was on this account called of old ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν (to flow towards); but at present it is called ἔρως, through the change of ω into ο.[25] But what say you[26] shall we still consider?

Herm. What does Δόξα (opinion), and such-like names, seem to you (to signify).

Soc. Δόξα (opinion) was denominated either from δίωξις (pursuit), in which the soul proceeds, while pursuing its knowledge as to how things exist; or else from τόξου βολῇ (the darting of an arrow);[27] and to this it seems more like.[28] Hence Οἴησις (opinion) chimes in with this;[29] for it seems to be like ἴέσις (a sending-forth) of the soul to all things, when it is showing to those in doubt what each is in reality.[29] For

[25] Beck was the first to remark that there is some error here. It should have been stated that ἔσρος first became ἔρος by throwing out the σ, and then ἔρως by the change of ο into ω.

[26] Ficinus has "Verum quid deinceps considerandum præcipis." From whence Heindorf elicited τί ἔτι σὺ λέγεις—Stalbaum still sticks to οὐ, although he confesses that, if οὐ be retained, ἔτι should follow σκοπῶμεν.

[27] That Plato would thus compare δόξα with the shooting of arrows, without assigning some reason for the comparison, it is impossible to believe. I suspect there is a lacuna here, which it would be easy to supply.

[28] In lieu of τοῦτο in some MSS., Bekker has edited from others τούτῳ, which I cannot understand: while instead of μᾶλλον two MSS. read μάλιστα. I suspect that Plato wrote τοῦτο τὸ βαλλόμενον μάλιστ' εὖ, in allusion to the preceding βολῇ. We should say in English, "This appears to be the best shot." Or we may read κάλλιστα, which is perpetually confounded with μάλιστα.

[29]—[29] Such is the meaning of the words which Plato wrote, I suspect —ἱέσεσι γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῷ ὄντι ὂν, δηλούσης τοῖς ἀπόροις, ἐοικεν εἶναι, in lieu of which Bekker's edition has—οἷσιν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων δηλοῦσθη προσέοικεν. But of the strange word οἷσιν, which some have attempted to derive from οἴσω, the fut. of φέρω, the variations in MSS. are very remarkable. Some read οἴσειν ἴσως, others οἴσιν ἴσως, and others εἶσιν ἴσως. Some again, omitting ἴσως, have οἶσιν or εἶσιν, and

εἶ οἶ

some have both, οἶσιν, or εἶσιν: one reads οἶ' εἰσιν, and one ἴσῃ. Heindorf acutely saw that the word, ἴεσις, derived from ἰέναι, lay hid here; for thus ἴεσις would be similar in meaning to βολή. But beyond this he did not venture to go. Stalbaum has however not only adopted the correction, which he calls "egregious," but edited τὸ πρᾶγμα for πᾶν πρᾶγμα, from seven MSS., without deigning to explain how ἕκαστον could thus follow τὸ πρᾶγμα, or, if in ἕκαστον there is no reference to τὸ πρᾶγμα, what is the meaning of τὸ πρᾶγμα; and still less has he shown

[29]just as Βουλὴ (counsel) is to βολὴ (shooting), so βούλεσθαι (to wish), which signifies τὸ ἐφίεσθαι (to desire), is to βουλεύεσθαι (to consult).[30] For[31] all these in following δόξα (opinion), appear to be certain resemblances of βολὴ (shooting);[32] just again as, on the contrary, Ἀβουλία (a want of counsel), appears to be the mishap [33]of a person neither shooting, nor obtaining that at which he shot, and what he wished, and about what he deliberated, and what he desired.[33]

[80.] *Herm.* [34]You seem to me, Socrates, to have just now introduced these names rather thickly and rapidly.

Soc. For I now wish an end.[34] But I wish then still to go through Ἀνάγκην (necessity), which comes in order after those, and also Ἑκούσιον (voluntary).[34]

what he understands by δηλούσῃ προσέοικε, or how προσέοικε could be used here for the simple ἔοικε.

[30]—[30] Here again, aided partly by Stalbaum, I have been able to restore what Plato wrote—ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχει ἡ βουλὴ πρὸς τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, ὃ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, in lieu of the unintelligible ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ βουλὴ πρὸς τὴν βολὴν καὶ τὸ βουλεσθαι τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ βουλεύεσθαι: where Stalbaum was the first to see that to preserve the balance of the sentence πρὸς must be inserted in the second clause. With regard to the affinity between βούλεσθαι and βουλεύεσθαι, Shakspeare has something similar in his well-known—"Harry, thy wish was father to the thought."

[31] Taylor has properly introduced "for," to preserve the connexion of the sentences.

[32] As MS. Gud. has τῆς ψυχῆς instead of τῆς βολῆς, Heindorf wished to read τῆς βολῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

[33]—[33] Even Heindorf failed to see the absurdity of the present text. For most assuredly, it cannot be said of him who does not shoot at all, that he misses what he shot at; nor would Plato have been guilty of a tautology in writing οὗ ἐφιετο after ὃ ἐβούλετο: unless it be said that οὗ ἐφίετο is to be rendered "at what he aimed;" but even then it would be unnecessary after περὶ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο. Common sense evidently leads to —"of a person neither shooting where he intended, nor hitting what he wished, or, obtaining what he did not desire;" according to the saying in English, "He shot at a pigeon, and killed a crow;" and, "He shot at a barn-door, and missed the barn." The Greek then would be ὡς οὐ βαλόντος του, οἳ ἐβουλεύετο, οὐδὲ τυχόντος, οὗ ἐβούλετο, ἢ καὶ, οὗ ἐφίετ' οὗ, λαβόντος.

[34]—[34] All within the figures are generally assigned to Hermogenes; in Ald., to Socrates, from τέλος to the end, which Stalbaum after Stephens adopts, and reads θέλω for θεῷ, or, as it is written in one MS., σὺν θεῷ, as Ficinus found in his MS. likewise. For his version is, "Quare finis sit jam favente deo." But as scarcely more than two-thirds of the dialogue has been gone through, there would be scarcely any allusion here to its termination; and even if there were, correct Greek would require

Soc. Now *το ἑκούσιον* (voluntary) signifies *τὸ εἶκον* (the yielding), and not the beating-against; but, [35] as I say, *εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι* (yielding to what is going on) would be shown by this name, which exists according to *βούλησις* (the will).[35] But *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* (the necessary), and *ἀντίτυπον* (the beating-against), the being contrary to the will, would be connected with *ἁμαρτία* (error), and *ἀμαθία* (ignorance).[36] But they are

τὸ τέλος. Some one says Stephens wished to read *θεῶ*, "video;" but *θεῶ* in that sense is found only in the middle voice. Hence he suggested *εἰς τέλος θέω*, "ad finem propero," i. e. "I am hastening to the end." But that could be no reason for Socrates introducing a number of names. He would rather have cut short his speech. Abresch. in Auctor. Thucyd. p. 306, suggests *τέλος θεῶ*, "look to the end." He ought rather to have proposed *θὲς εὖ*—But the imperative could not thus follow *γάρ*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *βέλος γὰρ ἤδη ἴσον θείῳ*, "For I have witnessed a bolt equal to a divine one." And thus there would be an allusion to the *βολὴ* just spoken of, and to the fact that in a storm the bolts of heaven fall fast and thick." So in Œd. C. 1462, we must read *οὐρανοῦ γὰρ ἀστραπὴ φλέγει πόλον, μάταν ἐφεῖσ' οὐ βέλος· δέδια δ'*—not *φλέγει πάλιν· τί μὰν ἀφήσει τέλος*: where *βέλος* is due to London ed. B., noticed by Elmsley; while *μάταν ἐφεῖσ' οὐ βέλος* may be compared with the Homeric *οὐχ ἅλιον βέλος*, and *θεῖον βέλος*. After this compliment, Socrates returns to the subject, by saying *Ἀνάγκην δὲ τὸ ὄνομα*, not *οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι*: to which Hermogenes rejoins, *Καὶ βούλομαι*. At least by such a remodelling of the speeches, can we understand the course of the dialogue.

[35—35] I cannot understand how after *τὸ εἶκον* Plato could add *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ λέγω εἶκον*: still less how *εἶκον* could stand here by itself; and least of all, what Heindorf was the first to notice, how a name could be said to be produced according to will in the abstract. Ficinus has, "Ecusion equidem est icon, id est cedens, neque renitens. Hoc si quidem nomine declaratur icon ionti, id est, cedens eunti, quodve ex voluntate perficitur." He therefore did not find *ὥσπερ λέγω* in his MS., or finding it, designedly omitted it, as being unintelligible. Heindorf proposed to read *ὀνόματι τοῦ—γιγνομένου*. From which I do not see what we are to gain. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἑκούσιον τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντίτυπον ἦν τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησίν του γιγνομένῳ· καλῶς ἄρα, λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι τι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι*—i. e. "The word *ἑκούσιον* (voluntary) means yielding to, and not beating against, that which exists according to the will of some one. I say then that by this name would be correctly indicated any thing yielding to what is going on." This, I flatter myself, is something more fit to be read, than the rubbish which Stalbaum attempts to explain by asserting that the words *τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ* are added after *τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι* as an epexegesis to, and having the same meaning as, *τῷ ἑκουσίῳ*. If then I have correctly restored here *κατὰ τὴν βούλησίν του*, we must read just afterwards *παρὰ τὴν βούλησίν του*—

[36] This is said because, according to Plato's theory, no one errs except unwillingly or unwittingly.

likened to a going along κατὰ ἄγκη (gorges); because being difficult to pass, and rugged and thick (with bushes), they impede a going-on. And hence, perhaps, ἀνάγκη (necessity) was so called from its resemblance to a journey through a gorge. But as long as our strength remains, let us not give up the journey. Do not you then give up, but interrogate me.

Herm. I ask then about things the greatest and most beautiful, Ἀλήθεια (truth), and Ψεῦδος (falsehood), and τὸ Ὄν (entity); and that very thing, about which is the subject of our present discourse, Ὄνομα (name), why was it so called?

Soc. You say that μαίεσθαι means something.

Herm. I say it means ζητεῖν (to inquire).

[81.] *Soc.* [37] It looks like a name moulded together from a discourse, which says that this name is an entity which an inquiry hits.[37] But you would know it rather in the word which we pronounce ὀνομαστὸν (to be named); [38] for there it clearly states [38] that that is ὄν (entity) of which there is μάσμα (an in-

[37]—[37] Such is the literal version of the Greek, Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα, τὸ ὄνομα. Ficinus has, "Videtur nomen hoc ex illo sermone conflatum, quo dicitur on, id est ens, esse, cujus nomen inquisitio est?" He therefore found in his MS. Ἔοικε τοίνυν τὸ ὄνομα ἐκ λόγου τον συγκεκροτημένον, λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, οὗ ὂν τυγχάνει ζήτημα τὸ ὄνομα. "The word ὄνομα seems to have been moulded from some discourse, which asserts that the entity exists, the name of which happens to be the object of inquiry." But how Hermogenes could get any clue to the meaning or etymology of ὄνομα, I must leave for others to explain. Heindorf cuts the matter very short by saying, that according to Socrates "the word ὄνομα is derived from ὄν and μαίεσθαι, i. e. ζητεῖν, to seek, for that ὄνομα is that entity about which there is an inquiry. But in that case μαίεσθαι would have been distinctly mentioned or alluded to. Besides, there is not here at least, whatever there may be in other dialogues, especially the Parmenides, any inquiry about entity, or its correct name. Moreover unless τυγχάνειν means "to hit upon," it would require the participle ὄν, which might however have easily dropt out after οὗ.

[38]—[38] Here again I confess myself completely in the dark. The Greek is, ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὀνόμασμά ἐστιν, which Ficinus thus translates, "Hic enim exprimitur nomen quid sit, entis videlicet inquisitio." From whose "inquisitio" both Heusde and Buttmann were led to οὗ μάσμα ἐστιν. But if μάσμα formed any portion of ὄνομα, most assuredly some reason would have been assigned for the change of μάσμα into ομα. But as no such reason is here given, it is evident that after all the exertions of critics we neither know now, nor perhaps are ever likely to know, what Plato wrote, except by the aid of conjectural criticism, which few can apply successfully, and fewer still appreciate, when so applied. I shall therefore refrain from producing my own.

quiry). [39] But Ἀλήθεια (truth), this seems to have been moulded together [39] like the rest; for the divine rushing-on of entity appears to have been addressed by this name ἀλήθεια, as being θεία ἄλη (a divine wandering). But Ψεῦδος (falsehood) is contrary to a rushing-on. For here again returns that which is abused as being detained and is compelled to be at rest; and (the name) is assimilated to those, who sleep; [40] but the ψ being added conceals the meaning of the name. But Ὄν (entity) and Οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀλήθεια (truth), by receiving the addition [41] of an ι; for then they signify ἰὸν (going), (and ἰουσία) [42] (the act of going). And on the other hand οὐκ ὄν (non-being), as some also call it, οὐκ [43] ἰὸν (not-going.)

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have rattled through these questions in a very manly manner. But should any one ask you, what propriety of appellation have the words Ἰόν (going), Ῥέον (flowing), and Δοῦν (binding)—

[39—39] The Greek is, ἡ δ' ἀλήθεια καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε συγκεκρῆσθαι, which Stalbaum thus translates, "Quod autem attinet ad nomen ἀλήθεια, etiam hoc reliquis simile videtur, hoc est, conflatum esse ex integra propositione." But as there is nothing in the original to which the words "ex integra propositione" can be referred, we may dismiss his interpretation as utterly untenable. Heindorf was near the mark in suggesting κατὰ ταὐτὰ, and so was Stephens in proposing ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ἄλης. For Plato probably wrote, κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἀπό τινος ἄλης—and shortly afterwards—τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, ὡς ἄλη θεία οὖσα—for τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is evidently as gl. for τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι: while the etymology in ἀλήθεια requires not θεία οὖσα ἄλη, but ἄλη θεία οὖσα.

[40] Instead of καθεύδουσι it is manifest that Plato wrote τοῖς γε εὕδουσι instead of τοῖς καθεύδουσι. For ψεῦδος is formed, not by adding ψ to καθευδω, but to εὕδω.

[41] Instead of ἀποβαλὸν, which makes absolute nonsense, Heusde was the first to conjecture ἀπολαβὸν, which he got from the version of Ficinus, "si apponatur," and is confirmed by three MSS. I do not however remember another passage where ἀπολαμβάνειν means "to receive in addition." Hence I should prefer τοῦ ἰῶτα ἐπιβαλλομένου. But this is not all. For instead of τῷ ἀληθεῖ we must read τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. For τὸ ἰὸν and ἡ ἰουσία have an affinity with ἀληθείᾳ rather than τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

[42] To complete the sense I have added the words within lunes.

[43] Out of this mass of nonsense we may elicit something intelligible by reading in the Greek, καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἰὸν αὖ εἰσί τινες οἳ ὄνομά τί νομίζουσιν, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ὄν—and rendering in English, "and on the other hand, there are some who consider that what does not go on is a name merely, and does not itself exist:" where, since the two oldest MSS. read τινὲς ὀνόματι instead of ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν, I have, by uniting the readings, obtained τινες οἳ ὄνομά τι μόνον νομίζουσι, adding to complete the sense and syntax δ' after αὐτό.

Soc. Should I be able to answer him? you mean. Is it not so?

[82.] *Herm.* Perfectly so.

Soc. One thing I have just now got somehow, so that by answering I shall appear to say something to the purpose.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. To say that what we know not is of Barbarian origin: for perhaps this would be really the case with some; and the first names would be inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For through the names being twisted in every way, it would be not at all wonderful if the ancient speech, as compared with the present, differed in nothing from a Barbarian one.

Herm. You speak nothing from the purpose.

Soc. Nay, I speak what is reasonable. But yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of excuses;[44] but we must be ready to reflect upon these matters; and let us consider, that, should any one always inquire into the verbs, through which a noun is spoken, and again those nouns through which verbs are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, must not he, who answers such a one, fail at length in his replies?

Herm. It appears so to me.

[83.] *Soc.* When therefore will he, who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names, which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they are so circumstanced, can no longer justly appear to be composed from other names. Just as we said above,[45] that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was composed from ἀγαστὸς (to be admired) and θοὸς (swift). But θοὸς, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever lay hold of that, which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

Herm. You seem to me to speak correctly.

Soc. Are not then the names, about which you are asking, elements? And must we not consider in some other manner what is their propriety?

Herm It is likely.

[44] On this expression see Heindorf's learned note.

[45] See § 63.

Soc. It is likely indeed, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must come back to these. And if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again with me, lest I act like a silly person, while stating what the propriety of the first names ought to be.

[84.] *Herm.* Only do but speak, and I will, to the utmost of my power, consider the matter with you.

Soc. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one propriety in every name, both first and last; and that none of them differ, so far as they are names.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But the propriety of the names we have just now discussed, was such as to show of what kind is each of the things existing.

Herm. How should it be not so?

Soc. This property then the prior names ought to possess no less than the posterior, if they are to be names.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But the posterior names, as it appears, are able to effect this through the prior.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Be it so then. [46]But after what manner will the first names, which no others precede,[47] make, as much as they possibly can, the things existing clear to us, if they are about to be names?[46] But answer me this. If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to point out things to one another, should we not, as the dumb do at present, endeavour to indicate them by the hands, head, and the rest of the body?

[85.] *Herm.* How could we otherwise, Socrates?

Soc. I think then that if we wished to indicate that which is (going)[48] upwards and is light, we should raise our hands towards heaven and imitate the nature of the thing itself; but if (to indicate) things (going) downwards and heavy, (we should point) to the earth. And if we were desirous of indicating a horse running, or any other animal, you know that

[46]—[46] I fear I do not quite understand this.

[47] So the sense requires. But *ὑπόκειται* is "succeed." Hence since MSS. vary between *ἕτερα* and *πρότερα*, we must read *ἕτερα πρότερα κεῖται*.

[48] This is evidently required by the sense. The word *ἰὸν* has accidentally dropt out between *τὸ* and *ἄνω*, and *ὂν* after *κοῦφον*.

we should make our bodies and gestures as like as possible to those things.

Herm. It appears to me that the facts are necessarily as you say.

Soc. For in this manner, I think, the indication of any thing is produced by the body imitating,[49] as it seems, that which any one wishes to point out.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But since we wish to indicate a thing by our voice, and tongue, and mouth, will not an indication of each thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing whatever is produced through them?

Herm. It appears to me necessarily so.

Soc. A name then is, as it seems, an imitation by the voice[50] of that, which he who imitates, imitates and nominates by the voice what he imitates.[51]

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But, by Zeus, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

Herm. Why so?

Soc. Because we should be compelled to confess, that they who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. But do you think this is correct?

Herm. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will the name be?

[49] Edd. *τῷ σώματι — μιμησαμένου — τοῦ σώματος.* But two MSS. *μιμησαμένους.* To avoid the inelegant repetition in *σώματι* and *σώματος*, it is easy to read *μιμησαμένῳ*, and to omit *τοῦ σώματος*, and to insert *τις* after *ἐβούλετο*, as I have done in the translation.

[50] Stalbaum unjustly hesitates between *φωνῇ* and *φωνῆς*. For *μίμημα φωνῆς* is "imitation of a voice," but *μίμημα φωνῇ*, "imitation by a voice," what the sense manifestly requires.

[51] In this definition Heindorf has corrected one error by reading *ὅταν μιμῆται* for *ὃ ἂν μιμῆται*; which Stalbaum has properly praised and learnedly supported. But Heindorf failed even to see the other error. For who can believe that Plato wrote *ὃ μιμεῖται—ὁ μιμούμενος—ὅταν μιμῆται.* He might however have written *ὃ μιμεῖταί τις, καὶ ὀνομάζει τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν μομῆται*, "which some one imitates, and, when he imitates, gives it a name with his voice." Ficinus has, "imitatio vocis, qua quisquis aliquid imitatur, per vocem imitatur et nominat," omitting *ὃ ἂν μιμῆται*.

[86.] *Soc.* [52]In the first place, as it appears to me, not if, as we imitate things with music, we so imitate, although we then imitate with the voice: and in the next place, if we imitate what music imitates, we do not appear to me to make use of names.[52] But I assert something of this kind. There is a certain voice, figure to each thing, and a colour to many.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. It appears then that although any one should imitate in this way, the name-giving art would not be conversant with these imitations; for these are partly musical and partly painting. Is it not so?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But what is this? Seems there not to you an existence to every thing, as well as colour, and the other things we just now mentioned? In the first place,[53] is there not an existence to colour itself, and voice, and to all the rest, which are deemed deserving of the appellation of being?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But what then, if any one is able to imitate this very thing, the existence of each thing,[54] by letters and syllables, would he not indicate what each thing is?

Herm. Entirely so.

[52]—[52] This is the literal English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot comprehend; nor will, I suspect, any one else. Ficinus has, "Non talis imitatio, qualis per musicam fit, quamvis voce fiat; neque etiam eorundem, quorum et musica imitatio est, neque per musicam imitationem enim nominare videmur," which is evidently a vain endeavour to give, what he believed to be the general sense of the passage; which was perhaps originally to this effect, "In the first place, as it seems to me, (the name) would not be an imitation, should we, as with music, imitate with the voice things well and beautifully; nor, secondly, should we well imitate, what music does not, do I think a name would be an imitation;" i. e. in Greek, *Πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐὰν, καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ, οὕτω καὶ τῇ φωνῇ εὖ καλῶς τε μιμῶμεθα τὰ πραγματα· ἔπειτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν, ἔαν, ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ οὐ μιμεῖται, εὖ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὄνομα μίμησιν.*

[53] Ficinus has, "Annon inest colori ac voci essentia quædam et aliis," omitting *πρῶτον αὐτῷ* before *τῷ χρώματι*, and *ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν*, not without reason; for all those words are quite useless; and so too does the whole clause, *πρῶτον—ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν*, after the preceding sentence.

[54] Either *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* or *ἑκάστου τήν οὐσίαν* is an interpolation. Ficinus omits *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*. Perhaps, however, as MS. Gud. has *αὐτῶν τοῦτο*, there lies hid *ἔκ του θεῶν ἢ αὐτὸς*; for *τούτων* and *τοῦ θείων* are confounded in Eurip. Bacch. 328, as I have shown on Æsch. Suppl. 336 or we may read *ἀπ' ἄλλου του ἢ αὐτὸς*.

Soc. And what would you call him who is able to do this, as you called, of the former characters, one conversant with music, and the other with painting; how (call you) this?

[87.] *Herm.* This name, Socrates, appears to me what we are for some time seeking. For he would be a name-giver.[55]

Soc. If then this is true, as it appears to be, let us consider those names about which you were inquiring; about Ροὴ (flowing), and Ιέναι (to go), and Σχέσις[56] (holding), whether in their letters and syllables a person lays hold[57] of entity, so as to imitate existence or not.

Herm. By all means.

Soc. Come then, let us see whether these alone are a part of the first names, or whether there are many others.

Herm. I think there are many others.

Soc. For it is probable. But what shall be the mode of division from whence the imitator begins to imitate? Is it not, since the imitation happens to be by syllables and letters, the most proper to distribute first the elements? just as those who put their hands to rhythms,[58] distribute first the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables, and thus at length come to consider the rhythms themselves, but previously not?

Herm. Yes.

[88.] *Soc.* Ought we not then to divide thus the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both consonants and mutes?—for so say[59] those who are skilled in these matters—and again, such as are not indeed vowels yet are not mutes? and of the vowels themselves, such as have a different species from each other? and after we have properly distributed

[55] Heindorf vainly attempts to defend *τοῦτο—οὗτος—ὁ ὀνομαστικὸς* by two passages, where, after *τοῦτο*, have been interpolated the word to which it refers; while the third I have corrected at Hipp. Maj. § 54, n. 2, by the aid of Ficinus. Here it is evident that Plato wrote *ἐζητοῦμεν εἶναι ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ ὀνομαστικός.*

[56] By *σχέσις*, says Heindorf, we must understand *δέσις*, as shown by § 81. Ficinus renders it "detentione."

[57] Heindorf understands *ὁ ὀνομαστικὸς* as the nominative to *ἐπιλάμβανεται*. He should have suggested, *τοῦ ὄντος γέ τι λαμβάνεται, ὥστε αὐτῶν*—instead of *τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε*, i. e. "any part of entity is understood, so that it imitates their existence."

[58] Heindorf refers to Rep. iii. p. 400, B

[59] Heindorf refers to Theætet. § 142.

all these [existences][60] it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which, as into elements, these may be referred; and from which it is possible to see both them, and whether there are species in them in the same manner as in the elements;[60] (and) having well and thoroughly looked into all these points, (it behoves us)[61] to know how to bring in each[62] according to its likeness; whether it is necessary to bring in one to one, or to mix[63] many with one; just as painters do, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes introduce only the oyster[64] (a scarlet colour), and sometimes any other pigment whatever; and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they prepare the likeness of a man,[65] or any thing else of this kind; according as, I think, each picture seems to require each colour. In the same manner we will bring the elements (of words) to things, and one to one, wherever it seems to be necessary, and many together,[66] making what persons call syllables; and again, combining those syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed; and again, from these nouns and verbs we will compose something

[60]—[60] Beck, whom Stalbaum follows, would omit *τὰ ὄντα*, as Ficinus had done already. Heindorf more acutely would read, *ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώμεθα πάντα εὖ, τὰ ὄντα αὖθις δεῖ (διελέσθαι) καὶ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι.* Stalbaum however conceives the whole passage to have been originally to this effect: "And after we have properly distributed all these, we must again consider, whether there are not certain genera, to which all the existences are to be referred, as in the case of the elements in letters; from which genera it is possible to perceive the existences themselves, and also to understand this, whether in them there are species and genera in the same manner, as in the elements of letters," thus omitting entirely *ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι*, or rather considering *ἀνόματα* as a corruption of *ὄντα*, and *ἐπιθεῖναι* of *ἐπισκέψασθαι*.

[61] Ficinus has "scire oportet." Stalbaum thinks that *ἐπίστασθαι* depends on the preceding *δεῖ*.

[62] Stalbaum would read *ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ*, "each to each," which he got from Heindorf's note, *ἕκαστον ὄνομα ἑκάστῳ πράγματι.*

[63] The balance of the sentence requires *ἐπιφέρειν* and *συγκεραννύναι*, not *συγκεραννύντα.*

[64] On the scarlet dye obtained from a kind of oyster found near Tyre, see Smith's Greek and Roman Antiquities.

[65] On the word *ἀνδρείκελον* Stalbaum refers to E. H. Barker's dissertation in Wolf. Analect. Literar. T. i. P. 2. p. 388.

[66] So seven MSS. for *σύμβολα* acknowledged by Ficinus. The passage however is not even now correct.

great and beautiful and entire, and like the animal there (described) by the painter's art, discourse by the name-giving, or rhetorical, or whatever art it may be. [89.] Or rather, we will not do it.[67] But I have in speaking been carried out (of the course), for the ancients have put together the words in the way as they lie together. But we must, if we know how to consider them artistically, to distinguish them thus, and to see whether the first and last names were laid down in a proper manner or not; for to connect them otherwise (take care) lest it be wrong, my dear Hermogenes, and not in the road to reason.

Herm. Perhaps so, by Zeus, Socrates.

Soc. What then, can you trust yourself as being able to divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

Herm. I want indeed much of doing this.

Soc. Let us leave it then; or are you willing we should undertake it as we best can, although we are able to look but very little into them; by stating, as we said before,[68] in the case of the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth, we merely conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, on the other hand, we should proceed[69] in our own case by declaring that, [70] if these have been distributed in the best way either by us or by any other, they ought to have been so divided;[70] but now it will be requisite for us to be busy about them as it said,[71] as best we may. Or how say you?

[67] Ficinus alone supplies the ellipse. "Immo nos non istud agemus; modum namque loquendo transgressus sum," which seems to lead to *μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτο—πολλὰ γὰρ λόγων ἐξηνέχθημεν—δράσομεν·* where *ἐξηνέχθημεν* is due to three MSS.

[68] See § 39.

[69] Instead of *ἴωμεν* Heusde wished to read *ἴδωμεν*, similar to the preceding *κατιδεῖν*. But Heindorf renders *ἴωμεν* "pergamus," with Ficinus. But that would be in correct Greek *προΐωμεν* rather, or *πόρρω ἴωμεν*.

[70]—[70] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, which both Heindorf and Stalbaum seem inclined to adopt; although the former once wished to read, *ὅτι εἰ μέντοι, ᾗ χρὴ, ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι*, and the latter would prefer *ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἄριστον ἔδει*, obtained from Buttmann's *ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἄρισα ἔδει*—They should have proposed *ὅτι, εἰ μέν γε χρὴ ἄρισα δὴ αὐτὰ*, which differs but little from *ὅτι εἰ μέν τι χρηστὸν ἔδει αὐτὰ*—

[71] Heindorf considers the proverb alluded to is the line, *Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα*, attributed to Menander, and translated by Terence in Andr. iv. 6, 10, "Ut quimus, aiunt, quando, ut volumus, non licet." But then Plato would have written *κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ θέλησιν*,

[90.] *Herm.* It seems so to me.

Soc. I think, Hermogenes, it will appear ridiculous for things to become manifest through being imitated by letters and syllables. And yet it must be so. For we have not any thing better than this, to which we can refer, touching the truth of the first names; unless, indeed, as the writers of tragedies, when they are in any difficulty, fly to their machinery and introduce the gods,[72] so we shall be released by asserting that the gods founded the first names, and that on this account they exist correctly. Is not this the best of reasons? or the other, that we have got them from some Barbarians? —for the Barbarians are more ancient than us.—Or that, through their antiquity it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with the Barbaric names? But all these would be the (not)[73] very clever evasions on the part of him who is not willing to give a reason for the right imposition of the first names; although he who does not know the propriety of the first names, is surely unable to know that of the subsequent, which must necessarily be made manifest from the former, of which he knows nothing. But it is evident, that he who professes to be skilled in subsequent names ought to be able to explain the first, in the best[74] and clearest manner, or to be well convinced that, as regards the subsequent, he is a mere trifler. Or does it appear otherwise to you?

[91.] *Herm.* Not otherwise, Socrates, in any respect whatever.

Soc. What I formerly fancied about the first names, appear to me now very saucy and ridiculous. If you wish it then, I will communicate them to you; but if you have any thing better to obtain from any quarter, communicate it to me.[75]

Herm. I will do so; but do you speak now boldly.

Soc. In the first place then ρ appears to me to be, as it

and so perhaps he did write. For *οὐ θέλησιν* might easily have dropt out before *δεήσει*.

[72] Erasmus, in Adag. p. 591, compares this passage of Plato with that of Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 20, "Ut tragici poetæ, quum explicare argumentum non potestis, confugitis ad deum." HEIND.

[73] Unless *καὶ μαλὰ κομψαὶ* be said ironically, which could hardly be done here, Plato must have written *οὐ μάλα κομψαὶ*—

[74] Instead of *μάλιστα*, common sense leads to *κάλλιστα*. The two words are constantly confounded, as shown by Porson on Phœn. 878.

[75] So Horace, "si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti."

were, the organ of all motion; although we have not yet stated why Κίνησις has this name. It is evident however that it implies ἴεσις (going); for η was not used formerly, but ει. Its origin is from κίειν (to go), which is a foreign name,[76] and signifies ἰέναι. If then any one could find out its ancient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ἴεσις. But now from the foreign name κίειν, and the change of the η, together with the interposition of the ν, it is called κίνησις, but it ought to be called [77] κίεισις or ἴεσις.[77] But [78] Στάσις (standing) is the negation of ἰέναι (to go); and for the sake of elegance is called στάσις.[78] [92.] The element therefore ρ, as I said, appeared to the founder of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to rushing on; and hence he in many places employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words Ῥεῖν (to flow) and Ῥοὴ (flowing) imitate a rushing-on by this letter; and in the next place, in the words Τρόμος (trembling) and Τραχὺς (rough); also in such verbs as Κρούειν, (to strike), Θραύειν (to break), Ἐρείκειν [79] (to pierce), Θρύπτειν (to fritter), Κερματίζειν (to cut into small pieces), and Ῥυμβεῖν (to rumble): in all these he made for the most part a resemblance to ρ (to a rushing-on).[80] For he saw that the tongue remains quiet for the least time on this letter, but is moved the most; and hence it appears to me that he employed this letter for those words, but the ι for all things attenuated, which especially go through all things. And hence he imitated, by the words ἰέναι (to go) and ἵεσθαι[81] (to be sent), ι, just

[76] As the word κίω is found in Homer, and even in Æschylus, it seems strange that Plato should rank it amongst foreign words; unless he considered all words as foreign that were not used generally at Athens.

[77]—[77] Such is the correction of Cornarius for κιείνησιν—ἢ εἶσιν in some MSS., or κίνησιν—ἴεισιν in others.

[78]—[78] Schleiermacher was the first to remark that there is evidently a lacuna here. For it ought to be told how στάσις, which is the negation of ἴεσις, was formed from ἀ-ίεσις into στάσις, by throwing out ε and prefixing στ.

[79] This was the correction of Buttman, subsequently confirmed by MSS., for ἐρύκειν. On the loss of ἐρείκειν, or rather its confusion with ἐρείδειν, see my note on Eurip. Tro. 88.

[80] Between τοῦ ῥῶ and ἐώρα (which Heindorf has acutely restored ἀ in lieu of ἐῶ) there has dropt out I suspect τῷ φορᾷ, similar to ἀφομοιοῦν τῇ φορᾷ, a little above. Ficinus, "ad similitudinem motionis effingit."

[81] Instead of ἵεσθαι one MS. has ἵενεσθαι; another, ἴε σθαι; which seems to lead to ἀνύεσθαι. At all events ἵεσθαι is superfluous after ἰέναι.

as by φ, ψ, σ, and ζ, because these letters are inflated, the name-giver imitated all such things as Ψυχρὸν (cold), Ζέον (boiling), Σείεσθαι (to be shaken), and universally Σεισμὸν[82] (a shaking). And when the name-founder would imitate any thing inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters. [93.] But he seems to have thought that the power of compression in δ and τ, and the pushing the tongue (against the roof of the mouth),[83] were useful for the imitation of the words Δεσμὸς (bond) and στάσις (standing). But perceiving, on the other hand, that the tongue moves glibly in λ, by means of the resemblance he formed the names Λεῖα (smooth), and the very word Ολισθάνειν (to slide), Λιπαρὸν (oily), Κολλῶδες (glue-like), and all other such-like words. But where the power of γ lays hold of the tongue, sliding through λ, he imitated the Γλισχρὸν (stickiness) in Γλυκὺ (sweet) and Γλοιῶδες (viscous). Perceiving likewise that the sound of the ν was within, he made the names Ἔνδον (the within) and Εντὸς (within), that he might assimilate the acts to the letters. But he assigned α to Μέγας (great) and η to Μῆκος (length), because these letters are great.[84] But requiring for Γογγύλος (round) the sign of ο, he mixed up ο for the most part in that name. And thus too the name-giver[85] appears to have forced, as regards both letters and syllables, other circumstances to each of existing things, making both a mark and name; and from these to

[82] Heindorf justly found fault with ὅλως σεισμὸν, as being superfluous after σείεσθαι; and wished to read ὅλως σισμόν (hissing).

[83] I have introduced all between the lunes, as absolutely requisite for the sense. For unless I am greatly mistaken, πρὸς ὑπερώην has dropt out before ἀπερείσεως. The word ὑπερωην is found in the well-known Homeric, Il. x. 495, Χείλεα μέν τ' ἐδίγν', ὑπερώην δ' οὐκ ἐδιγνε. Stalbaum translates ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης, "innixus linguæ;" but even he would find it difficult to explain the meaning of those words. Ficinus has, what is equally unintelligible, "linguæ velut hærentis retractionem."

[84] How α and η can be said to be greater letters than the rest of the alphabet, I cannot understand. In this passage, as in others, there is doubtless an allusion to notions current at the period when Plato lived, but which have been lost in the lapse of time. To something of this kind is to be referred the nursery-song, "Great A, little a; bouncing B." Here, after μεγάλα τὰ γράμματα, one would expect καὶ μακρά, in allusion to μέγας καὶ μῆκος.

[85] Here, as elsewhere, Heindorf has adopted from MS. Gud. ὀνοματοθέτης, confirmed by "nominum auctor" in Ficinus. Stalbaum sticks as usual to νομοθέτης.

have composed what still[86] remains, by imitating in this way. [94.] Such, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the propriety in names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.

Herm. In truth, Socrates, Cratylus very often gives me much trouble, as I stated at the beginning, by his asserting that there is a propriety in names; but he does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I am unable to know whether he thus obscurely speaks on each occasion willingly or unwillingly. Now then, Cratylus, state before Socrates, whether what Socrates says respecting names is pleasing to you, or whether you have any thing better to produce? and if you have, mention it, so that either you may learn from Socrates, or teach us both.

Crat. But what, Hermogenes, does it appear to you to be an easy matter to learn and teach any thing so suddenly, and much less that which seems to be amongst the greatest?[87]

Herm. To me, by Zeus, it does not. But the saying of Hesiod (Ἐργ. 359) appears to me well said, that, should one a little to a little add, there would be something done of moment. [95.] If then you are able to do any thing at all, although but trifling, do not be faint-hearted, but benefit Socrates here, for[88] you can, and me.

Soc. I would not myself, Cratylus, confidently assert a single point of what I have said above. But I have considered with Hermogenes in the way it seemed good to me; so that, on this account at least, speak boldly, as I am ready to receive it, if you have any thing better to say than this. Nor shall I wonder, if you have something to say better; for you seem to me to have considered things of this kind yourself, and to have learnt them from others. Should you then say any thing better, write me down as one of your disciples respecting the propriety of names.

Crat. And in truth, Socrates, I have, as you say, made this the subject of my meditations; and perhaps I shall cause you to become one of my disciples. And yet I fear that the

[86] In lieu of εἴδη, MS. Gud. alone has in the text ἤδη, which is constantly united to λοιπὸν, as shown by Elmsley on Œd. C. 1619.

[87] On the formula ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 289.

[88] Instead of δὲ, I have substituted γὰρ from Ficinus—"debes enim." The two particles are frequently confounded. See Schæfer's Index to Porson's Euripides, in Γάρ.

very contrary of all this will take place. For somehow it comes into my mind to say to you, what Achilles did to Aias in that part of the poem called Λιταὶ[89] (supplications). For he says,

> "Aias, of Telamon the son, and sprung
> From Zeus, and leader of the people, all
> To my own heart thou seem'st to have well said."

And you too, Socrates, seem to have acted the prophet in a reasonable manner according to my notions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphron, or whether some other muse has been existing in you in secret.[90]

[96.] *Soc.* My good Cratylus, I have for a long time ago been wondering myself at my own wisdom; and still do not believe it. I think it therefore requisite for me to examine again what I am saying. For to be deceived by one's own self is the most terrible of all things; for since the deceiver is never for a moment absent, but always present, how can it not be terrible? It is necessary then, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to what has been said before, and to endeavour, according to the saying of the poet,[91] "to look at the same time before and behind." Let us then now take a view of what has been asserted. We said then, that the propriety of name is that which points out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this is sufficiently laid down?

Crat. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. Names then are spoken for the sake of teaching?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Shall we not therefore say that this is an art, and that there are workmen of it.

Crat. Perfectly so.

Soc. But who are they?

[89] Originally the Iliad was not divided into books, but into subjects. The passage alluded to is in ix. 640, where an embassy is sent to Achilles to entreat him to take again a part in the war, from which he had been so long absent.

[90] From this passage it may be inferred that Socrates was thought to have written something in verse anonymously, in ridicule, I suspect, really, but apparently in praise of Euthyphron, who seems, from p. 409, D. § 57, to have published a poem under the title of Μοῦσα Σοφίας. At least, in the words of Plato there lies hid an heroic distich, Εἴτε παρ' Εὐθύφρονός γε νοήμονος ἦν ἄρ' ἐπίπνους, Εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη Μοῦσα πάλαι μέ γ' ἐνοῦσ' ἐλελήθει.

[91] Hom. Il. iii. 109.

Crat. Those name-givers[92] which you spoke of at the beginning.

[97.] *Soc.* Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts also, or not? I mean to say some such thing as this. Painters are surely some worse, some better.

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not the better exhibit more beautiful pictures of animals as their productions; but the worse, worse?[93] And in like manner, do not builders erect some more beautiful dwellings, others more ugly?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And with respect to name-givers,[94] will not some exhibit their works more beautiful, others more ugly?

Crat. This does not appear to me.

Soc. Does it not therefore appear to you, that some name-workers[95] are better and others worse?

Crat. It certainly does not.

Soc. And does not one name seem to you to be better laid down than another?

Crat. It does not.

Soc. Are all names then correctly laid down?

Crat. As far as they are names.

[92] Ficinus has "legum et nominum conditores." From whence it is evident that he found in his MSS. *νομο* *ὀνοματοθέτας*. Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, here retains *νομοθέτας* on account of § 12 and 13. But there MS. Gud. has, as here, preserved the right reading. For names never were, and never could be, imposed by a legislator, except so far as they related merely to some technical expressions in legal enactments, such as Solon is said to have introduced.

[93] Unlike himself, Heindorf, although he saw that the balance of the sentence required *οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους—καλλίω—οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι φαυλότερα*, says that the common reading *οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα* is preferable; while Stalbaum flies to the modern panacea of an anacolouthon; a figure of speech, which Matthiæ says truly it is very dangerous to apply, except in a very few cases; of which the present is certainly not one, where *φαυλότερα* could have easily been lost before *φαυλότεροι*.

[94] MSS. Gud. and Par. read here correctly *ὀνοματοθέται* from a recent hand.

[95] Had Heindorf remembered the word *ὀνοματουργὸς*, found in § 13, and similar to *δημιουργοί*, both there and in § 96, he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote, not *νόμοι*, but *ὀνοματουργοί*. Stalbaum, in defence of *νόμοι*, says that not all laws are here meant, but laws in the abstract—a distinction which those perhaps will acknowledge, who can understand his German interpretation which I do not.

Soc. But what then shall we say to the name of Hermogenes here, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly given him, unless something of Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως (of the generation of Hermes) belongs to him, or that it was indeed given him, but not correctly?

Crat. It seems to me, Socrates, to be not given to him, but only appears to be given; but that this is the name of some other person, whose nature points out the name.[96]

[91.] *Soc.* Will not then a person say false, who says that he is Hermogenes? [97]for (see), lest on the other hand even this be possible, to call this person Hermogenes,[97] if he is not so.

Crat. How say you?

Soc. Does your reasoning mean this, that it is impossible to speak a falsehood?[98] For there are many, my dear Cratylus, who say this now, and (have said it) of old.

Crat. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not this to speak a falsehood, to speak of things which are not?

Soc. This reasoning, my friend, is more clever than suits me or my time of life. But however tell me thus much. Does it appear to you not possible to speak about a falsehood, but (possible) to pronounce it?

Crat. It appears to me not possible even to pronounce it.

Soc. Nor to speak of, nor to address you. As, for instance, if any one, meeting you, should, through his feeling as an host, take you by the hand, and say, All hail, Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion—would he [99]say this, or pronounce this, or speak of this,[99] or thus address, not you, but Hermogenes here, or no one?

[96] In § 23, it is stated that the name points out the nature. Hence Heindorf would read οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἣν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, whose note Stalbaum reprints; but without passing any judgment upon it.

[97—97] Ficinus has "neque enim hoc est dubitandum, quin eum dicat Hermogenem." From which it is evident that he did not understand the elliptical expression, (ὅρα) μὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ᾖ. But even Heindorf has failed to see that αὖ has no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote ΔΥΝΗ, (you are not able), which might easily have been corrupted into ΑΥ Η.

[98] On this doctrine of the Sophists, see § 5, where Heindorf properly refers to Euthyd. § 37; Sophist, p. 260, C. § 98; and Isocrat. Helen. Encom. § 1.

[99—99] I confess my inability to point out the difference here between

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would pronounce these words in vain.

[99.] *Soc.* With this then let us be contented. But whether would he, who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would a part be true, and a part false? for this last would be sufficient.

Crat. I should say, that such a one would, moving himself in vain, make a noise, as the person would, who should move a piece of brass and strike it.[100]

Soc. Come then, Cratylus, (and see) since[1] we are reconciled somehow, would you not say that the name is one thing, and that, of which it is the name, is another?

Crat. I would.

Soc. And do you not confess, that the name is some imitation of a thing?

Crat. Most of all.

Soc. And do you not say, that pictures are in some other manner imitations of certain things?

Crat. I do.

Soc. Come then—for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you mean, although you are perhaps speaking correctly—is it possible to distribute and assign both these imitations, [2][the pictures and the names,][2] to the things, of which they are imitations, or not?

Crat. It is possible.

[100.] *Soc.* But consider this first. Can any one assign the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. And is it possible, on the contrary, to assign the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

λέξειεν, *φαίη*, and *εἴποι*. Others may perhaps be more acute. Although they seem all required by the preceding, *λέγειν*, *φάναι*, *εἰπεῖν*, and *προσειπεῖν*.

[100] Heindorf refers to Protag. p. 329, A. § 49, *ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ*.

[1] Ficinus translates *Φέρε δή — ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν* by "Animadverte—utrum quoquo modo conveniamus," correctly, as shown by Stalbaum, who quotes Legg. i. p. 660, E., *φέρε δή, ἐὰν ξυνομολογησώμεθα*. Rep. v. p. 453, E., *φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ εὕρωμεν*: iv. p. 434, A., *ἴδε δή, ἐάν—δοκῇ*.

[2—2] The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα*. The same thing has taken place in § 100.

Crat. This also is possible.

Soc. Are then both these assignments correct; or only one of them?

Crat. Only one of them.

Soc. That, I think, which assigns to each, what is suited to it and similar?

Crat. It appears so to me.

Soc. Lest then you and I, who are friends (in fact), should become foes in words, receive from me what I say. For, my friend, I call such a distribution in the case of both imitations [pictures (of animals)[2] and names] correct; but in the case of names, in addition to its being correct, true likewise: but I call the other, [the giving and introduction,][3] relating to the dissimilar, not correct; and, when it takes place in names, false.

Crat. But (consider), Socrates, whether this may not be in the case of paintings, to make an incorrect distribution, but in the case of names, not so; but that in this it is always necessarily correct.

[101.] *Soc.* How say you? In what does this differ from that? May not a person, on meeting a man, say to him, "This is your picture," and show him, it may be, his own likeness, or it may be, that of a woman? by showing, I mean, placing it before the sense of seeing.

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, "This is your name?" for a name, as well as a painting, is an imitation. I mean this. May he not say, "This is your name?" And after this, may he not present to the sense of hearing, it may be, an imitation of himself, by saying that it is a man; and, it may be, an imitation of a female of the human species, by saying that it is a woman?

[2] Ficin. has "distributionem in imitationibus utrisque tam nominibus quam picturis," as if his MS. read *τοῖς τε ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν*. But Heindorf says that *ζώοις* is put here for *ζωγραφήμασι*, as in § 97. But as MS. Gud. and two others offer *ζωγραφήμασι*, it was doubtless so read in the MS. of Ficinus. The words, however, within brackets are here, as in § 99, evidently an interpolation.

[3] The words between brackets are clearly an interpolation. From the preceding use of the verbs *ἀποδοῦναι* and *προσενεγκεῖν*, it is plain that Plato would have written here not *δόσιν* and *ἐπιφορὰν*, but *ἀπόδοσιν* and *προσφοράν*, although *ἐπιφέρειν* is found in § 105.

Does it not appear to you, that it is possible for this to occur sometimes?

Crat. I am willing to concede it, Socrates; and let it be so.

Soc. You do well, my friend, if such be the state of the case; for there is no need at present to contest much about it. If, then, there is a distribution of this kind on this point[4] (in names), we are willing to say[5] that one of these speaks truly, but the other falsely. [102.] And if this be the case, and it is possible to distribute nouns not correctly, and not to assign things adapted to each, [6]and (to assign) what is not adapted,[6] it will be possible to do the very same thing with verbs. And if it is possible to thus put down verbs and nouns, there is a necessity to do so with sentences likewise; for sentences are, I think, but the putting together of those. Or how say you, Cratylus?

Crat. Thus; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

Soc. If then we assimilate the first names to letters, it is possible, as in the pictures of animals, to assign all the fitting colours and figures; and on the other hand, not to assign all, but to leave some and to add others, more and greater.[7] Is it not so?

Crat. It is.

Soc. Does not he then, who assigns every thing (proper),[8] render beautiful both letters and resemblances; but he, who adds or takes away, works out indeed letters and images, but such as are faulty?

Crat. Certainly.

[4] The adverb *ἐνταῦθα* is rarely thus applied to a thing, instead of a place. Plato wrote perhaps *γ' ὀνοματοθέτῃ*, not *καὶ ἐνταῦθα*.

[5] I scarcely understand *βουλόμεθα καλεῖν*, where one would expect *λέγειν*. Ficinus "vere loqui—vocamus." But "voco" can hardly be used in the place of "dico."

[6—6] All between the figures, though found in Ficinus, Taylor omits.

[7] Ficin. "pluraque et pauciora exhibeamus;" which leads to what the sense requires, *πλείω καὶ μείω*, or *ἐλάσσω*, in lieu of *πλείω καὶ μείζω*. Compare Herod. i. 201, *μείζων καὶ ἐλάσσων*. ii. 19, *πλείων—καὶ ἐλάσσων*. Thucyd. ii. 49, *τό τε πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον*. Aristoph. Σφηκ. 489, Ἦν μεῖζον
ἢν τ' ἔλαττον. From *μείω* came *μείζω*.

[8] Ficin. "Qui convenientia omnia tribuit;" who therefore found in his MS. *πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα*, as just above and below, or *πάντα τὰ εὖ*. For thus *εὖ* is united to the article, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 154, and to the instances there given of the loss of *εὖ* or *τὸ εὖ*. I could now add not a few more.

Soc. But what does the person imitating the essence of things through syllables and letters? Will not there be, according to the same reasoning, a beautiful image, when he assigns every thing fitting? Now this is a name. But if he is deficient even in small matters, or sometimes makes an addition, a resemblance will be produced, but not a beautiful one, so that some of the names will be beautifully formed, but others badly?

Crat. Perhaps so.

[103.] *Soc.* Perhaps then the one will be a good artificer of names, but the other a bad one.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. Now was not the name of this person a name-founder?[9]

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Perhaps then, by Zeus, as in other arts, one name-founder is good and another bad, if we agree in what has been said before.

Crat. It is so. But you surely perceive, Socrates, that,[10] when we assign the letters α and β, and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is written by us, yet not properly; or it is not written at all; but there is immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind.

Soc. (See), Cratylus, lest in viewing the matter in this way, we do not view it correctly.

Crat. How then?

Soc. Perhaps such things as must necessarily be or not, when composed of a certain number, suffer what you say; as in the case[11] of ten things, or whatever other number you will, if you take away or add aught, it immediately becomes some other number. But (see) that there is not the same propriety in the case of any certain quality and of every resemblance, but a contrary one; and that it is not necessary to assign to

[9] Here and shortly afterwards, in despite of common sense, Stalbaum still sticks to *νομοθέτης*, although *ὀνοματοθέτης* is found in MS. Gud and supported by Ficinus's "conditor nominum."

[10] Instead of *ὅταν* Heindorf correctly suggested *ὅτι ἀν*. Ficinus "cernis—quod."

[11] Instead of *αὐτὰ*, which has no meaning here, Ast suggested, what Stalbaum approves of, *αὐτίκα*.

an image [12] all such as is that which one represents,[12] if it is about to be a resemblance. [104.] But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would there not be two things, such as Cratylus and the resemblance of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only make a likeness of yourself in colour and figure, as painters do, but should make all the inward parts such as yours are, and infuse into them the same softness, and warmth, and motion, and soul, and intellect, as is in you; and, in one word, fashion every thing as you have, [13] and place such other things close to you,[13] whether would there be one Cratylus, and a resemblance of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. You see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another propriety of a resemblance than what we just now spoke of; and that there is no necessity, that, if any thing is taken away or added, for it to be any longer a resemblance. Or do you not perceive how much resemblances want from being the same as their patterns?

Crat. I do.

Soc. Those things then, [14] of which the names are names,[14] would suffer a ridiculous fate through their names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them; for all things would become double; nor could one [15] tell of either of them, which was the thing itself and which the name.

Crat. You speak the truth.

[105.] *Soc.* Boldly then, my noble fellow, admit that one name is well imposed and another not; nor compel it to have

[12]—[12] I cannot understand the Greek *πάντα—οἷόν ἐστιν ὃ εἰκάζει*, nor the Latin of Ficinus, "omnia—quæcunque illud, cujus imago est." One MS. has *ὦ* for *ὃ*, which leads to *πάντα—οἳ' ἔνεστιν ᾧ εἰκάζεται*, i. e. "all—that exists in that, to which it is a resemblance." And thus we avoid the necessity of supposing that *τινα* is to be supplied before *ἀποδοῦναι* and *εἰκάζει*. Stalbaum's version is, "omnia—talia, quale est quod, quis imitando exprimit," i. e. "all such things as is that, which any one exhibits by an imitation"—

[13]—[13] All the words between the figures are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[14]—[14] This I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood—"of which the names are the imitations," in Greek, *ὧν μιμήματά ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα*. Unless it be said that Plato meant, "of which the names are nouns."

[15] Heindorf acutely saw that *τις* has dropt out after *εἰπεῖν*. For otherwise *ἔχοι* would want its nominative.

every letter, in order that it may be really such as is that, of which it is the name; but suffer it to introduce a letter which is not fitting, and if (you suffer) a letter (to do so, suffer) likewise a noun in a discourse; and if a noun, (suffer) a sentence not suited to things to be introduced in a discourse, and not less a thing to be named and spoken of, so long as the type exists of the thing respecting which there is the discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

Crat. I do remember.

Soc. It is well. For when this (the type)[16] is there, although it may not have all that is fitting, [17]yet the thing itself will be told[18] correctly, when all [19](fitting) things (are there); incorrectly, when only a few.[17] But let us now, blessed man! [20]permit that the thing is spoken of,[20] in order that we may not, like those who walk about late at night in Ægina, (owe a debt); [21]and thus appear to have arrived at the things by the truth itself, later than is becoming.[21] Or at least seek after

[16] For the sake of perspicuity one would expect *οὗτος*, to be referred to *τύπος*.

[17]—[17] In the place of these intelligible words, of which the Latin is to be found in the version of Ficinus, Taylor has, I know not from whence, introduced the following, "Yet the representation may be said to subsist, as it ought." And this he doubtless considered a translation of Plato!

[18] Instead of λελέξεται, all the MSS. read λέξεται: incorrectly, says Stalbaum; for he did not know that, in many verbs, the future middle is used for the future passive. A large list of such verbs was given first by Burney, *alias* Porson, in the Monthly Review for July, 1789, p. 13, and afterwards by Monk on Hippol. 1458.

[19] The antithesis requires not *πάντα*, as opposed to *ὀλίγα*, but *πολλὰ*—

[20]—[20] Stalbaum renders λέγεσθαι—*ἐῶμεν* by "let us permit the thing to be named;" that is, says he, "let us concede that a thing may have a name." But how *τὸ πρᾶγμα*, or *πρᾶγμα*, could be understood, or what is the meaning of the whole sentence, he does not deign to explain.

[21]—[21] Such is the literal and unintelligible translation of the nonsensical Greek; where, since Heindorf and Stalbaum confess themselves equally in the dark, I hope it will be said I have thrown some light on the passage, by reading, Διαλέγεσθαι δ', οἶμαι, ἄκαιρα ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ σφαλῶμεν *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ἐν ἀφόδοις· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τα πράγματα δόξομεν οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δεόντος*: i. e. "Let us leave off conversing, I think, unseasonably; lest we stumble at the very truth, as persons, who walk about late at Ægina do, in the ordure (of the street); for we shall appear to have arrived at the facts, later than is fitting." The Greek is in all the MSS. but one—Λέγεσθαι δ' οὖν ὦ μακάριε ἐῶμεν ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ *οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξ-*

some other propriety of name, and do not confess that an indication by letters and syllables is a name: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

[106.] *Crat.* But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a moderate manner; and I so do put down (my vote).[22]

Soc. Since then the same things[23] seem good to us after these, let us consider this too.[24] We say, that if the name is about to be properly imposed, it ought to have fitting letters.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And it ought (to have) the letters similar to things?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Such then as are beautifully composed are composed in this manner. But if any one is not correctly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of fitting and similar letters, if it shall be a resemblance; but it will have a portion not fitting, through which the name would be neither beautiful nor beautifully formed. Shall we speak[25] in this way, or otherwise?

Crat. There is no need, I think, to quarrel, Socrates; although it does not please me to say, that a name exists, and yet is not beautifully composed.

Soc. Does this too not please you, that the name is an indication of a thing?

Crat. It does please me.

Soc. And does it not seem to you to be well said, that of

ωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθεία οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δεόντος. The best MS. Gud. has, however, *ὀψὲ ἐφ' ὁδοῖς.* From which I have elicited *ὀψὲ ἐν ἀφόδοις*, by the aid of Suidas, *Ἀφοδεῦσαι, Πλάτων Ἀδωνισι, καὶ Ἄφοδος· ὁ ἀπόπατος.* Hence it is fair to infer that the people at Ægina were accustomed, like those of Edinburgh not many years ago, to place, at night-fall, the filth of their dwellings in the street, thus rendered slippery by the accumulation of ordure. A similar practice took place at Athens, as shown by Aristophanes in *Ἤρωσι—Μήποτ' ἀπόνιπτρον θύραζ' ἐκχεῖτε μηδὲ λουτρίον.* With regard to the alteration of *ὀφείλωμεν* into *σφαλῶμεν*, and its union with *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, it may be compared with *ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας* in § 112.

[22] On *τίθεμαι*, with or without *γνώμην*, see at Philoct. 1445.

[23] Instead of *ταῦτα*, common sense requires *ταὐτὰ*—

[24] Ficinus—"quod restat, discutiamus;" as if he had found in his MS. *τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν.*

[25] Although Ficinus has "censemusne," answering to *φάμεν* in all the MSS. but one, yet that one, Gud., has here, as elsewhere, preserved the correct reading, *φῶμεν*, which is the constant formula in Plato, as shown by Heindorf.

names some are formed from the preceding, and others are themselves the first?

Crat. To me it seems so.

[107.] *Soc.* But if the first names should be indications of certain things, have you any better method for their being indications than to make them as nearly as possible such as are the things which they ought to indicate? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of please you more, that names are conventional, and indicate (their meaning) to those who have agreed together and known beforehand the things (so named); and that in this conventionality exists [26] the propriety of names; and that it matters not whether any one agrees to call them, as they are at present imposed, or the contrary, (to call) that which is now [27] small *o* great *ω*, and great *ω* small *o*?[27] Which of these methods is agreeable to you?

Crat. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to indicate by a resemblance what one wishes to indicate, [28] but not by any chance [28] method.

Soc. You speak well. If then the name shall be similar to a thing, is it not necessary for the elements, from which a person shall have composed the first names, to be naturally similar to the things themselves? My meaning is this, Could any one put together a picture, which we have just now said is the resemblance of something existing, unless the pigments, from which the picture of living things is composed, were naturally similar to those which the art of painting imitates? Or is it impossible?

Crat. Impossible.

[108.] *Soc.* In like manner then names would never become similar to any thing, unless the things, from which names are

[23] To preserve the sense we must read, *καὶ εἶναι ἐν ταύτῃ τὴν ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος τῇ ξυνθήκῃ*, in lieu of *καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος ξυνθήκην*: unless it be said that Plato wrote, *καὶ εἶναι ταύτῃ* (in this way) *τὴν ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος*, without *ξυνθήκῃ*, a gl. for *ταύτῃ*.

[27]—[27] Such is the version of what Ficinus found in his MS. and is acknowledged by all the others. Heindorf was the first to adopt from MS. Gud., with which the three oldest agree, *ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρὸν μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα σμικρὸν*, i. e. to call by the name of little, what is now called great, and of great, what is now little."

[28]—[28] Ficinus has, "præstat—quam quovis alio modo." From whence I suspect he found in his MS. *μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ γε τυχόντι*, in lieu of *ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι*. For *ὁ τυχὼν*, not *ὁ ἐπιτυχὼν*, means "fortuitus" in correct Greek.

composed, possessed originally at first [29] some similitude to those of which the names are the imitations. Now elements are the things from which names are to be composed.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. You therefore now take a share in the discourse which Hermogenes did a little before. Come then, do we seem to you to have said correctly, or not, that the letter ρ is similar to a rushing-on, and to motion, and to hardness?

Crat. To me, correctly.

Soc. And that the letter λ (is similar) to the smooth and soft, and to what we just now mentioned?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Do you know then that for the same thing we say Σκληρότης, but the Eretrians Σκληρότηρ?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Do then both ρ and σ seem to be similar to the same thing? and does that word indicate the same thing to them, ending with a ρ, as it does to us ending with a ς? or does it indicate nothing to the others of us.[30]

Crat. It indicates one thing [31] to both.

Soc. Whether in that ρ and ς are similar, or in that they are not?

Crat. In that they are similar.

Soc. Are they then similar in every way?

Crat. At least in indicating a rushing-on.

Soc. But what as regards the inserted λ? Does it not indicate the contrary of hardness?

[109.] *Crat.* Perhaps, Socrates, it is not correctly inserted; just as in the names which you lately mentioned to Hermogenes, by taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me (to act) [32] properly. And now, perhaps, ρ ought to be inserted instead of λ.

Soc. You say well. What then, do we, as we are now speaking, mutually understand nothing, when one pronounces

[29] The word πρῶτον is superfluous after ὑπάρξει, and is correctly omitted by Ficinus.

[30] This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, which Ficinus renders by "quibusdam nostrum;" Stalbaum, by "alterutris," which leads at once to ἑκατέροις, instead of ἑτέροις, as he should have seen, opposed to ἀμφοτέροις in the answer of Cratylus.

[31] Instead of οὖν Plato wrote ἓν, as I have translated.

[32] Ficinus, "facere videbaris," as if he had found δρᾶν before ἐδόκεις

the (hard) word σκληρόν (hard)? And do you not understand what I am saying?

Crat. I do, my very good friend, through custom.

Soc. But in saying custom, do you think you are saying any thing different from convention? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, I understand it, and you know that I understand it? Do you not mean this?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. If then you know this, when I pronounce it, there is an indication (of something)[33] to you through me.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. From that which is dissimilar to what I have in mind, when I pronounce it, if λ is dissimilar[34] to the σκληρότης, which you pronounce. [110.] And if this is the case, what else is it, than that you have made a convention with yourself, and that the propriety of the name is a compact with yourself; since both similar and dissimilar letters, when meeting with custom and compact, indicate (the same thing)[35] to you? But if custom is very far from being a compact, it will be no longer proper to say that similitude is an indication, but custom (rather): for this, as it appears, indicates both by the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we agree in this—for I will put down your silence as consent,[36] it is surely necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the indication of what we have in mind and pronounce; since if, O best of men! you are willing to come to number, from whence do you think you will be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit this consent and compact of yours to possess some authority about the propriety of names? It pleases me, indeed, that names should be, as much as possible, similar to things; but yet I fear, lest per-

[33] After γίγνεται I suspect του has dropt out.

[34] As it would be absurd to say that the letter is dissimilar to σκληρότης (hardness), Plato wrote, no doubt, εἴπερ τὸ τοῦ λ—i. e. if the idea of softness in the letter λ is dissimilar to the idea of hardness in the word σκληρότης.

[35] Ficinus, by his "idem—representant," shows that he found in his MS. ταὐτὸ after γράμματα, as required by the sense.

[36] Compare Eurip. Iph. A. 1142, Αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ σιγᾶν ὁμολογοῦντός ἐστι σοῦ: Plutarch, ii. p. 532, F., Ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ τοῖς σοφοῖσί γ' ἀποκρίσις So in English "Silence gives consent."

chance the attraction of this similitude be really very slight, according to the language of Hermogenes,[37] and that it will be necessary for us to make use of that ridiculous thing, called compact, as regards a propriety of names; since (words) [38] will be spoken perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when they shall be spoken (by letters) either entirely, or for the most part similar,[38] that is, fitting; but in the most ugly manner, when the contrary takes place. But after these still tell me this. What power do names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect must we say they produce?

[111.] *Crat.* To me, Socrates, they appear to teach; and that it is without exception true, that he who knows the names, knows the things likewise.

Soc. Perhaps, Cratylus, you mean some such thing as this; that when any one knows the quality of the name,—now it is of the same quality as the thing,—he then also knows the thing; since it is similar to the name; and that there is one and the same art in all things, which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he, who knows the names, knows also the things.

Crat. You speak most truly.

Soc. Come now, let us see what is this mode of teaching existing things, of which you are now speaking, and whether there is any other method, this however being the better;[39] or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?

Crat. I think thus, that there is no other method; but that this is the only one, and the best.

Soc. But whether do you think that there is likewise the very same invention of things existing, (and)[40] that he, who

[37] In § 67, where γλισχρῶς is used as γλισχρᾷ is here.

[38]—[38] Heindorf says that ὀνόματα is to be thus supplied. He should have corrected λέγοιτο into λέγοι τις, and λέγηται into λέγῃ τι; for the sense would then be—"Since a person would then speak perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when he shall speak any thing in words either wholly or for the most similar, that is to say fitting (to things)." With regard to ὁμοίοις for ὁμοίως, the true reading has been preserved, as Heindorf was the first to notice, by Ficinus alone.

[39] Ficinus has "utrum alius præterea sit, hic tamen potior habeatur;" where there is a proper antithesis between "sit" and "habeatur," not found in the Greek.

[40] The conjunction καὶ has evidently dropt out after εἶναι, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary.

invented the names, invented also the things, of which there are the names? Or that it is necessary to seek and find another method, but to learn this?

Crat. Above all things to seek after and discover the very same method, as regards the same things.

[112.] *Soc.* Come then, let us consider, [41] Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, and looks upon the quality of each, do you not consider[41] that there is no small danger of his being deceived?

Crat. How?

Soc. It is plain, that he, who first founded names, formed them, as we have said, such as he thought the things themselves were. Is it not so?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. If then he did not think rightly, but formed them, as he fancied, [42] what think you shall we suffer, who are his followers?[42] Is it aught else, than for us to be deceived?

Crat. But (see), Socrates, lest this be not the case; but that it is necessary for him, who founded the names, to have founded them knowingly; for otherwise, as I before remarked, names would never have existed. And let this be the greatest proof to you that he, who founded them, did not stumble from the truth. For all things would not have thus chimed in with him. Or, did you not perceive this yourself, when you were saying, that all names were composed [43] according to the same, and for the same?[43]

[113.] *Soc.* But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight. For if the founder of names, after stumbling at

[41]—[41] Neither Heindorf nor Stalbaum have remarked, that, as *ἐννοήσωμεν* could not be thus followed by *ἀρ' ἐννοεῖς*, we must, in lieu of *Φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν*, read *Φέρ' ὧδε ἐννοήσωμεν*, what Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "Age, ita consideremus."

[42]—[42] Although every page of Taylor's translation betrays an ignorance quite marvellous of the original, yet in this passage he has outdone all his former mistakes by his version of the most easy of Greek texts. "What must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him?" And yet this was the person, who presumed to put the Athenian philosopher into an English dress, for the benefit, forsooth, of those, who were to be led to the greater mysteries of Proclus, after they had been initiated by the self-taught hierophant into the lesser of Plato.

[43]—[43] Taylor has anticipated by his "according to the same," the reading *κατὰ ταὐτὸν*, first introduced by Heindorf from MS. Gud., in lieu of *καθ' αὑτό*.

first, forced the rest (of the words) to this point, and compelled them to chime in with himself, there is nothing strange; just as in the case of diagrams, in which sometimes the first mistake being trifling and unapparent, all the remaining parts, although very numerous, follow as they ought,[44] and agree with each other. There ought then at the beginning of every thing to be to every person much discussion and reflection, whether the principle is properly laid down or not; and this being sufficiently examined, the rest, I say, will appear[45] to follow it. And yet I should not wonder if names chime in with each other. For let us again consider, what we discussed before, that of the whole going on, and carried on, and flowing, the names signify to us, we say, the existence. Do they seem to you to indicate any thing else than[46] in this way?

Crat. Very much so; and that they correctly signify this.

[114.] *Soc.* Let us consider then again taking from out of them, in the first place, this name, Ἐπιστήμη (science); since it is doubtful, and seems to signify that ἵστησιν (it stops) our soul in acts, rather than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to enunciate its beginning as now,[47] than by throwing out ε, πιστήμη, and to make an insertion in that of ι[47] in the place of that in ε.[48] In the next place, the word Βεβαιον (firm) is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain βάσις (basis), and στάσις (standing), but not of φορὰ (rushing-on). Again, Ἱστορία (history) indicates surely that ἵστησι τὸν ροῦν (it stops the flowing); and the word (Πιστὸν) (credible) indicates a thing ἱστᾶν (causing to stand).[48] Likewise Μνήμη (memory) indicates surely to every one, that there

[44] Instead of ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα I have translated as if Plato had written, ὄντα, ᾗ δεῖ, ἑπόμενα.

[45] As there is nothing on which φαίνεσθαι can depend, I suspect Plato wrote τὰ λοίπ' ἂν φημὶ φαίνεσθαι, instead of τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι. Ficinus has "cætera jam principium sequi debent."

[46] I have followed Heindorf in adopting ἄλλο τι ἤ, from MS. Gud., with which seven other MSS. agree. Stalbaum omits ἤ.

[47]—[47] Such is the version of Bekker's text; and this of Stalbaum's—"than ἐπιστήμη, by throwing in ε, but to make a throwing-in, instead of that in ε, in that of ι." I can understand neither; nor perceive even what Plato meant to say.

[48]—[48] All between the numerals Stalbaum considers an interpolation. But why any one should have interpolated words which no one can understand, he does not deign to state.

is a μονὴ (abiding) in the soul, but not a rushing-on. Ἀικά, if you will, Ἁμαρτία (error), and Συμφορὰ (contingency), if any one follows them according to their name, will appear to be the same with the aforesaid[49] Σύνεσις (intelligence), and Ἐπιστήμη (science), and all the other names connected with serious matters. [115.] Still further, Ἀμαθία (ignorance), and Ακολασία (intemperance), appear to be similar to these: for ἀμαθία (ignorance) appears to be the march of one going ἅμα θεῷ (with a god); but ἀκολασία (intemperance) appears to be ἀκολουθία (a following) in all respects of things. And thus, the names which we consider applicable to the basest things, would appear to be most similar to those applicable to the most beautiful. And I think that any one would discover many others of this kind, if he busied himself about them; from which he would imagine, that the founder of names did not indicate things going on and borne along, but such as have an abiding.

Crat. And yet you see, Socrates, that he indicated many things by that (notion).[50]

Soc. What is this, Cratylus? Shall we count the number of names as if they were (votes by) pebbles? And will their propriety consist in this, that the truth will be there, to which side soever the greater number of the names appear to point.

Crat. Is not this[51] reasonable?

Soc. Not in the least, my friend. But let us leave these points there,[52] and consider whether you will agree or not with us in this. [116.] Have we not lately acknowledged, that those who founded names on each occasion[53] in cities,

[49] So Stalbaum; but Heindorf prefers Buttmann's *αὐτῇ*, "itself;" I can understand neither. For *ταύτῃ* could not mean "the aforesaid." The proper word would be *ἐκείνῃ*.

[50] Ficinus has "secundum agitationis significationem," as if he had found in his MS. *κατὰ κίνησιν* in lieu of *ἐκείνως*.

[51] Instead of *οὔκουν*, said positively, I have translated as if it were *οὐκ οὖν*, interrogatively, on account of the answer; where Plato very cunningly dismisses the consideration of the question, whether the number of names was, or was not, to decide the truth of the doctrine in dispute.

[52] Instead of *αὐτοῦ*, "there," one would prefer *ταύτῃ*, "in this way," as in Sympos. p. 220, C., *καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ*: in two MSS. correctly.

[53] In lieu of *ἑκάστοτε*, an adverb of time, one would prefer *ἑκασταχοῦ*, an adverb of place.

both Grecian and Barbarian, were name-founders, [54]and that the art, competent for this, is name-founding.[54]

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me now, did they, who were the first name-founders, found the first names, while they knew the things to which they assigned their names, or did not know?

Crat. I think, Socrates, while they knew them.

Soc. For surely, friend Cratylus, (they could not do so) while they did not know.

Crat. It does not appear to me (that they could).

Soc. Let us then return to the point from whence we digressed; for you just now,[55] in what has preceded, (stated,) if you recollect, that he, who founded names, must have previously known the things to which he assigned their names. Are you then of this opinion still, or not?

Crat. Still.

Soc. Say you, that he who founded the first names, founded them knowing (the things)?

Crat. Knowing them.

Soc. From what names then did he either learn or find out the things, if the first names were not yet laid down? But, on the other hand, said we not, that it is impossible to learn and find out the things by any other way,[56] than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

Crat. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

[54]—[54] Here, as elsewhere, I have, with Heindorf, adopted what common sense requires, *ὀνοματοθέτας*, and *ὀνοματοθετικὴν*, and *ὀνοματοθέται*, preserved in MS. Gud. alone, and in the corrected version of Ficinus; for in the ed. pr. all is omitted between *ὦ φίλε*, just before, down to *ἐπανέλθωμεν*.

[55] Schleiermacher suggests, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *ἄρτι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*. For *ἄρτι* would refer to the preceding answer, and *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν* to p. 433, B. § 106. Ficinus omits *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*.

[56] Although even Heindorf failed to see any difficulty here, it is evident that Plato wrote, *ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλων μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας*. For thus *ἄλλοι* and *αὐτοὶ* are perpetually opposed to each other in this formula, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 254 and 356, where I should have stated that in Thucyd. i. 22, Dionysius Hal. in p. 820, found the correct reading in his MS., *οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ, ὅνπερ ἀπελείφθην, παρ' ἄλλων*: and we shall thus obviate the objection started by Poppo against my *ἔκλυον*, as being found only in poetry. To the passages already quoted in defence of the antithesis I could now add full twenty more.

[117.] *Soc.* After what manner then shall we say that they knew (the things) and founded their names? or that there were name-founders before any name whatever was laid down, and that they knew (the things),[57] if indeed it is impossible to learn things otherwise than from names?

Crat. I think, Socrates, that the account respecting these matters is the most true, (which says) that a power greater than that of man assigned the first names to things, so that they must of necessity be in a correct state.

Soc. Do you think then that he who laid down names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god,[58] would lay down things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

Crat. But (see) lest the other sort of these are not names.

Soc. Which sort, thou best of men? those which lead to standing, or those to rushing-on? For, as we just now said, it will not be determined by their number.

Crat. It is thus indeed just,[59] Socrates.

Soc. The names then being divided into factions, and some asserting that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how shall we decide? or to what (tribunal) go? For surely (we cannot go) to other names, different from these;[60] for there are no others. But it is plain that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which will show

[57] After *εἰδέναι* Heindorf understands *τὰ πράγματα*, as did Ficinus, whose version is, "eosque res antea cognovisse." Stalbaum supplies *αὐτὸ*, i. e. *ὄνομα*, as Taylor did. But the sense is, I think, "and they knew them," i. e. that the persons who knew the things, knew the parties who gave the names. For most assuredly *ἐκείνους* cannot be referred to the same persons as *αὐτούς*.

[58] So *δαίμων* and *θεὸς* are opposed in Eurip. Hec. 164.

[59] So all the MSS. and Ficinus. Heindorf suggested, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *Οὕτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε*, in lieu of *Οὕτω δή*—But *δή* never thus follows *οὕτοι δή*. Plato wrote, *Οὐ γὰρ τόδ' ἦν δίκαιόν γε*.

[60] So Taylor translated *ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων*, before Heind. and Stalb. But though *ἕτερος* can and does govern a genitive, *ἄλλος* cannot and does not, except in the passages quoted by Matthiæ and Kühner, which are either corrupt or interpolated. But were the fact otherwise, *ἕτερα* and *ἄλλα* could not be thus united in Plato. The usage was of a later date—a fact not known to Hermann; who would defend, in Eurip. Suppl. 589, *Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὴ χἀτέρους ἄλλους πόνους*: although it is evident that the dramatist wrote, *Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὴ καρτερὸς καλοὺς πόνους*: where *καλοὺς* is due to Markland, and *καρτερὸς* to Musgrave; for which I have substituted *καρτερὸς*, remembering that Ulysses is called *καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ* in Od. Δ. 242. Correctly then did Heusde read in Plato *ἄττα* for *ἄλλα*.

ων, without names, which of these are true, after having pointed out, it is evident that,[61] the truth of things.

[118.] *Crat.* It appears so to me.

Soc. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, if such be the case, to learn, as it seems, existing things without names.

Crat. It appears so.

Soc. Through what else then do you expect to learn them? Is it through any thing else than what is reasonable and most just, through their communion with each other, if they are in any way mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For surely that, which is different from and foreign to these, would indicate something different and foreign,[62] but not them?

Crat. You appear to me to speak the truth.

Soc. But hold, by Zeus. Have we not often confessed that names properly imposed are like the things, of which they are the names laid down, and are the resemblances of the things?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. If then one may learn, as much as possible,[63] the things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the best and clearest method of learning? To learn from a resemblance, both itself, whether it is a beautiful likeness, and likewise the truth, of which it is the resemblance; or from the truth, both itself, and whether its resemblance has been fashioned in a becoming manner?

Crat. There appears to me a necessity (to learn) from the truth.

[119.] *Soc.* After what manner then one must learn, or find out existing things, is perhaps a greater task than for me and you to know; and we must be content to confess this, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from the names, but much rather themselves from themselves?

Crat. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. Still further let us consider this; that these many names tending to the same thing may not deceive us; if,[64] in reality,

[61] In lieu of the nonsensical *δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι*, for which some would read *δηλονότι*, answering to "videlicet" in Ficinus, Plato evidently wrote *δείξαντι ἄδηλον ἔτι*,—"having pointed out the truth, still not evident."

[62] The emendation *ἀλλοῖον* for *ἄλλο ὄν*, suggested by Heusde, has been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

[63] Instead of *μάλιστα*, common sense requires *κάλλιστα*, "as well a possible," similar to the subsequent *καλλίων*.

[64] In thus inserting "if," Taylor has anticipated Wyttenbach; both o. whom found the idea in the "cum" of Ficinus. Stalbaum is conten

they who founded them considered all things as going-on ever and flowing—for they appear to me to have so considered—and if this were the case it would not thus (be well).[65] But these men have fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, and are themselves stirred about,[66] and by dragging us along, hurl us into it. For consider, O wondrous Cratylus, what I often dream about, whether we should say or not that there exists in the abstract the beautiful and the good, and each of the things existing.

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there does exist.

Soc. Let us then consider that very thing, not as if a countenance or any thing of this kind were beautiful—for[67] all these appear to flow—but shall we say that beauty in the abstract is not always such as it is?

Crat. We must.

[120.] *Soc.* Can one then correctly say, if it is always secretly going away, first, that it is, and next, that it is of such a kind? Or is it necessary, while we are speaking about it, for it to become immediately something else, and to secretly withdraw itself, and to be such no longer.

Crat. It is necessary.

Soc. How then can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner? For if it ever subsists[68] in a similar

with *ἐξαπατᾶται· τῷ ὄντι μὲν*—For he takes *ἐξαπατᾶται* in an active sense, misled by a corrupt passage in Aristotle's Problem. § 28; and rejects entirely *τε* after *διανοηθέντες*, and says that *μὲν* is used by an elegant asyndeton for *μὲν γὰρ*. What Plato wrote might perhaps be guessed at; it is however quite certain to me that he did not write *ἐξαπατᾶται. τῷ ὄντι μὲν*—

[65] Instead of *οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ'*, one would expect *οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι ἂν καλῶς, ἀλλ'*—and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is, "quorum tamen opinio, si talis exstitit, falsa habenda est." On the expression *καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 182. Stalbaum, after Heindorf, renders, "quum tamen fortasse non ita sit." But that would be in correct Greek *τὸ δὲ τυχὸν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.*

[66] Instead of *κυκῶνται*, one would prefer *κύκλῳ κινῶνται*, i. e. "are carried about in a circle." Ficinus has "vacillant jactanturque." The verb *κυκᾶν* seems scarcely adapted to *δίνη*; which is connected with the idea of a circular movement, not a stirring about, as a cook stirs a pot of porridge.

[67] Instead of *καὶ* we must read with Heindorf *καὶ γὰρ*—Ficinus has "quippe." Stalbaum absurdly, as usual, defends the common reading.

[68] Bekker and Stalbaum have incorrectly adopted *ἴσχει* from many MSS. in lieu of *ἔχει*. They did not know that *ἴσχει* is never used intransitively, except in Politic. p. 307, F., Legg. viii. p. 846, C., Rep. p. 484, B., and even there it is easy to restore the more usual form Vainly

manner, during that time [69][when it subsists in a similar manner],[69] it is evident that it does not change; but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it change, or be moved, not having started out from its own form of existence?

Crat. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one. For, as soon as that approaches which is about to know it, it becomes something else, and of a different kind, so that it cannot be known of what quality it is, or how it subsists. Now surely no knowledge knows that, which it knows has no manner of subsistence.

Crat. It is as you say.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, is it reasonable to say that knowledge exists, if all things change and fall away, and nothing abides. For if this very thing [I mean knowledge][70] itself does not change and fall away, so as to be not knowledge, it would remain for ever [knowledge],[71] and be knowledge; but if the form itself of knowledge changes and falls away, it will at the same time change and fall away into a form different from knowledge, and will be knowledge no longer; but if it always changes and falls away, it will always be not knowledge: and by this reasoning there would be neither the thing about to know, nor that about to be known. [121.] But if that always subsists which knows, then that which is known subsists, and the beautiful subsists, and the good subsists, and each single thing else of those existing; [72]nor do these appear to me to be really similar to the flowing, or rushing-on, of which we were speaking.[72] But whether these things subsist in this way, or in the way that

then does Buttman attempt to draw a nice distinction between *ἔχειν* and *ἴσχειν*.

[69]—[69] The words within brackets are omitted by twenty MSS. and Ficinus. They are evidently an interpolation.

[70] The words *ἡ γνῶσις* are clearly an explanation of *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*.

[71] Here too the words *ἡ γνῶσις* have been unnecessarily foisted in.

[72]—[72] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδέ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια τῷ ὄντι εἶναι—ῥοῇ οὐδαμὰ οὐδὲ φορα.* For I cannot understand *οὗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ.* After *φαίνεται* the verb *εἶναι* could not be omitted; nor is there any need of *ὄντα*, to say nothing of the asyndeton in *οὗ μοι*. Ficinus has "quæ in præsentia dicimus, fluxus lationis similia non videntur."

the followers of Heraclitus and many others[73] assert, (see) that it is by no means an easy subject of inquiry; nor is it the part of a person possessing much mind, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, (and) confiding[74] in them and those that founded them, to make a bold assertion, as if he knew something, and to give a verdict against himself and existing things, as if nothing of any thing were sound,[75] but that all things did, like (unsound)[76] vessels of clay, let the water run through; and really, like persons labouring under a catarrh, fancy that things are so disposed, and [77]things are seized with a flowing and catarrh.[77] [122.] Perhaps then, Cratylus, this is the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to reflect upon this well and manfully,[78] and not to receive any thing easily:[79] for as yet you are a young man, and possess the vigour of age;[80] and if, after reflecting, you discover any thing, communicate it to me.

Crat. And so I will do. But rest assured, Socrates, that even now I am not without consideration; but to me on reflection, and [81]having had trouble, it appears to be much more on that side[81] as Heraclitus asserts.

[73] Such as Protagoras and Empedocles. See Theætet. § 25. HEIND.

[74] By simply inserting *τε* after *πεπιστευκότα*, I have restored the syntax, that previously laboured not a little. Taylor too has "and confiding."

[75] On *οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς*, Heindorf refers to Phædon. p. 68, A.

[76] As not all clay-vessels, but only the unsound, let the water run through, it is evident that Plato wrote *ὥσπερ κεράμια σαθρὰ ῥεῖ*. Compare Gorg. p. 493, E. § 106, where a person is said to fill with difficulty *ἀγγεῖα σαθρά*. On the word itself see Toup. on Longin. § 18, Heindorf on Theætet. p. 179, D., Stalbaum on Phileb. p. 56, C., and myself on Prom. 966.

[77]—[77] Unless I am greatly mistaken, the words *ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ καταρροῦ* are the explanation of *οὕτως*: while it is impossible to believe that *πάντα χρήματα* would be thus repeated after *τὰ πράγματα*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, καὶ πανταχοῦ ῥεύματί ἔχεσθαι*, i. e. "and are every where seized with a flowing."

[78] Here, as elsewhere, MS. Gud. has alone preserved the true reading, *εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως*.

[79] After *ἀποδέχεσθαι* an accusative could scarcely be omitted. Hence Plato probably wrote *ἀποδέχεσθαί γέ τι*. For *γέ τι* could easily drop out before *ἔτι*.

[80] Ficinus has "atque tibi sufficit ætas." For he perhaps found in his MS. *ἡλικίαν ἱκανὴν ἔχεις*.

[81]—[81] Although *πράγματα ἔχειν* is correct Greek, and so is *πολὺ μᾶλλον*, yet one would prefer *πράγματα ἔχοντι πολλὰ, μᾶλλον εὖ καὶ ἐννόως*

Soc. Do you then hereafter, my friend, when you return[82] hither, instruct me; but now, as you have made preparations, proceed to the country; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

Crat. This shall be, Socrates; and do you also endeavour to think upon these matters, as is meet.[83]

φαίνεται ἔχειν, in lieu of ἐκείνως, or retaining ἐκείνως, φαίνεται εὖ ἔχειν. For ἔχειν could not here stand by itself; and scarcely ἐκείνως, where the usual word is οὕτως.

[82] Ficinus, "quando redieris," which leads to ἐπειδὰν ἀνήκῃς, instead of ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς.

[83] In lieu of ἤδη, which never ends a sentence, one would expect ᾗ δεῖ, as I have translated; or else ταῦτα δή. For δὴ thus closes a sentence in Meno, § 24, καὶ πλοῦτος δή: where Buttmann quotes Demosth. Midian. § 8, καὶ τἆλλα δή. We meet indeed with Λείπομεν ὑμᾶς, λείπομεν ἤδη in Philoct. 1459. But there I have restored—λειπόμενοι δή, which I should have supported by quoting Eurip. El. 1310, Καί σ' ἀπολείψω, σοῦ λειπόμενος.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES.

Of all the Dialogues of Plato the Parmenides is one of the most remarkable. For not only does it turn upon questions relating to the most abstruse abstractions of metaphysics, but the manner too, in which the subject is handled, affords the best illustration of that "sapientiæ insanientis"—cleverness without sound sense—in the meshes of which Horace says he was at one time caught; and to which he might have fairly applied his own graphic verse—

"Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis."
Pulls down, builds up, and changes squares for rounds.

By a chain of reasoning, where subtleties assume the garb of truths, conclusions are arrived at, so as to fully justify the fear, which Socrates is here feigned to feel, that by pursuing metaphysical inquiries, he would fall into the bottomless sea of trifling; from which, as from Hades, according to Virgil, only they,

"quos ardens evexit ad æthera virtus,"
Valour soul-burning to the skies hath borne,

could hope to escape; and, like Ulysses under the guidance of the goddess of wisdom,

"Salvos se superas potuisse evadere ad auras."
In safety could to upper air return.

Such at least seems to have been the fate of every Commentator, who has ventured to enter the maze of mind, which Plato has with such art built up. For neither Proclus and Damascius of the olden time, nor more recently Ficinus, nor, within the last hundred years, Taylor in England, Schleiermacher and others in Germany, nor

Cousin in France, have been able to understand thoroughly themselves, and to explain satisfactorily to others, what is likely to remain for ever an intellectual puzzle.

It is then a fortunate circumstance for such as may be still disposed to enter the labyrinth, that Stalbaum has furnished them with a clue, by prefixing to his edition of the Parmenides, published at Leipsig in 1848, four books of elaborate Prolegomena, running to 343 octavo pages. For the reader will find there an ample and generally satisfactory discussion on various points connected with the doctrines promulgated in the dialogue. Of these perhaps the most startling is the theory of Socher, who would have the world believe that the Parmenides was not written by Plato, but by some anonymous philosopher, to whom is to be attributed likewise the Sophist and Statesman. In defence of this novel notion, which, says Stalbaum, Socher has been unable to support by a single argument of the least weight, Stalbaum himself has produced one, that Socher has omitted. For according to Stalbaum, Aristotle has never made a direct allusion to the Parmenides; although there seem to be two indirect in Physic. i. 3, and as many in Sophist. El. c. ix. But he might have added that, even if there were not a single one of any kind whatever, it is easy to understand why Aristotle would take no notice of Plato. For the Stagirite could not have failed to perceive, that Plato was not so much giving expression to his own opinions, as putting into prose what Parmenides appears to have written in verse; while, as regards the doctrines of Zeno, it was far better for Aristotle to draw them from the discourses of that philosopher himself, than from the representations of a less faithful reporter.

With far greater reason have Schleiermacher and Ast imagined that the dialogue was left in an unfinished state. Perhaps it would be safer to assert that it has come down to us 'shorn of its fair proportions.' For it is hard to believe that Plato wanted either the power or inclination to put the finishing hand to a production, which exhibits the marks of no common mind.

Respecting the object of the Dialogue, Taylor, echoing, as usual, the sentiments of his favourite Proclus, fancies it was intended to exhibit a complete system of a philosophical theology; and hence he has given it the title of "Parmenides, or on the Gods." But here, as indeed through the whole of Plato, the two Neo-Platonists have

preferred to float amidst the mists of mysticism, rather than breathe the generally clear empyreum of Plato's mind. More correctly does Diogenes Laert., in ix. 13, entitle it Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ Ἰδεῶν, and, in iii. 50, class it with the Statesman, the Sophist, and Cratylus, as exhibiting proofs of the philosopher's powers as a dialectician.

Amongst the more recent translations of this Dialogue, is one in French by Schwalbé, Par. 1844, 12, where, in a note at the end of the argument, a reference is made to his "Parmenide, traduit et expliqué." But whether he has been able to overcome any of the difficulties arising from the corruptions of the text, I am unable to state, as I have never seen the work; and a similar remark is applicable to the various publications quoted by Stalbaum, who has seldom taken the least notice of his countrymen's verbal criticism; for, like Poppo in the case of Thucydides, he seems to think that the very words of the author have been miraculously preserved by a certain class of MSS.; and that if they are not found there, it is merely labour in vain to endeavour to seek for them elsewhere; and even in the Latin version of Ficinus, which was evidently made from a MS. frequently superior to all that have been hitherto collated by Bekker and others. I suspect, however, that, like the majority of modern scholars in France, Schwalbé does not feel himself sufficiently strong in Greek to grapple with verbal difficulties; which after all must be first successfully mastered, before a person presumes to talk of that, with which most readers are satisfied, the conventional sense of a passage which is felt to be difficult; but which the genuine verbal critic knows to be difficult generally, only because it is corrupt.

As it is by no means easy, even with an attention constantly exerted, to follow the subtleties that pervade the whole Dialogue, it will be perhaps not without its use to give Stalbaum's summary of the principal questions discussed, and of the conclusions to which they lead.

A. If "the one" be supposed to exist—

In the first place, it is necessary to consider it abstractedly by itself, and likewise in a double point of view, either as existing apart by itself, or united to "being;" from whence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the one" exists, it is nothing, p. 137, C.—142, B.
2. If "the one" exists, it is every thing, p. 142, B.—157, B.

Secondly, we must consider "the others;" by which is meant every thing except "the one" (p. 159, B. § 63); and respecting these there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions: for,

1. If "the one" exists, "the others" are all things, p. 157, B.—159, B.
2. If "the one" exists, "the others" are nothing, p. 159, B.—160, B.

B. If "the not-one" be supposed to exist—

In the first place, we must consider "the not-one" abstractedly by itself, and likewise in a double point of view; from whence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the not-one" exists, and is understood in a relative sense with respect to "the others," it is by itself every thing, p. 160, B.—163, B.
2. If "the not-one" exists abstractedly, it is by itself nothing, p. 163, B.—164, B.

So too we must consider "the others." And hence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the not-one" exists, "the others," as being freed from one-ness, are every thing, p. 164, B.—165, E.
2. If "the not-one" exists, "the others" are nothing, p. 165, E.

Before, however, Parmenides, of whom Plato is the mouth-piece, entered upon these inquiries, there should have been given definitions of the terms employed, or at any rate care should have been taken by Plato to use the same terms in always the same sense. But so far is this from being the case, that, as remarked by Wyttenbach, on Phædon. p. 270, with whom Creuzer, on Plotinus Περὶ Καλλους, p. 169 and 388, agrees, the same meaning is assigned to ἰδέαι and εἴδη; although Stalbaum, on Parmenid. p. 128, E., attempts to draw a nice distinction between them; and so he does too in the case of ἄλλα and ἕτερα, in Prolegom. p. 114, although he fairly confesses that those two words are sometimes used indiscriminately.

PARMENIDES.

OR

ON IDEALITIES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS, ADEIMANTUS, ANTIPHO, GLAUCO, PYTHODORUS, SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES.

[1.] When we arrived at Athens from home, [from Clazomenæ,[1]] we happened to meet with Adeimantus and Glaucon in the place of assembly. And Adeimantus, taking me by the hand, said, Hail, Cephalus;[3] and if you are here in want of any thing over which we have any power, mention it to me. Nay, I replied, I came for this very purpose, to beg of you a favour. Will you then, says he, state your request? And I replied, What was the name of your brother by the same mother? for

[1] Although *οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν* would, no doubt, appear unobjectionable to those, who are satisfied with *ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ἀυτόθεν* in Thucyd. v. 83, *αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ* in Plato Theætet. p. 143, D., *αὐτοῦ—ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ*, Alcibiad. i. p. 105, B., *οἴκοθεν—Φαληρόθεν* in Sympos. p. 172, *ἐν τῇ Τεγέᾳ αὐτοῦ*, Xenoph. K. A. vii. 4. 36, yet as *ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν* is repeated immediately afterwards, it is evident that in this place those words are an interpolation. We meet indeed with *οἴκονδε—Εἰς Ἰθάκην* in Od. A. 17. But the words are properly separated there, not, as here, united.

[2] Of the Adeimantus and Glaucon mentioned here, and introduced as speakers in the Republic, nothing is known, except that they were not the brothers of Plato; although, according to C. F. Hermann, quoted by Stalbaum in Prolegom. p. 302, they were older members of the same family stock; from whom the younger and collateral branches derived their names.

[3] That the Cephalus here alluded to was not the father of Lysias the orator seems to be clearly made out. But beyond that fact, nothing is known satisfactorily.

I do not remember it: for he was a child when I first[4] came here from Clazomenæ; and it is now a long time since then. His father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes.[5] Just so, says he, and (his brother's) was Antipho. But why do you especially ask? These, my fellow-citizens, said I, are much given to philosophy, and have heard that this Antipho had frequently met with one Pythodorus,[6] a friend of Zeno; and that having frequently[7] heard from Pythodorus the conversations which Socrates,[8] Zeno, and Parmenides held with each other, he had remembered them. You speak the truth, says he. These then, said I, we beg to hear. This, says he, is no difficult matter. For, although young, he has exercised himself greatly in them; since[9] he now, after the example of his grandfather, who is his namesake, applies himself much to equestrian affairs. [2.] But, if it seems good,[10] we will go to him: for he is just gone home[11] from hence; and dwells hard by, in Melita.[12] So saying, we went, and caught him at home, giving orders to a coppersmith to make him a bit. But as soon as he was at liberty, and his brothers told him the cause of our coming,

[4] The MSS. vary as usual between *πρότερον* and *πρῶτον*: which is the correct reading Stalbaum says he is unable to decide.

[5] Although Plato in Charmid. § 12, speaks of a Pyrilampes, as the uncle of Charmides, and in Gorg. § 82, as the father of Demus, yet C. F. Hermann conceives that the one here mentioned was of a different family, and related to Plato by his mother's side.

[6] Pythodorus is mentioned as the friend of Zeno in Alcibiad. i. p. 119, A.

[7] Here *πολλὰ* is put for *πολλάκις*. Stalbaum aptly quotes Phædon. p. 61, C., *πολλὰ—ἐντετύχηκα*.

[8] Athenæus in xi. p. 505, F., and Macrob. in Saturnal. i., accuse Plato of an anachronism in making Socrates converse with Parmenides. But they forgot, as remarked by Heindorf, that Socrates here and in the Theætetus, § 101, and Sophist, § 4, speaks of himself as being very young, when Parmenides was an old man.

[9] Instead of *ἐπεί*, which is here absurd, and omitted by Ficinus, one would expect *εἰ καί*, "although—"

[10] In lieu of *ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ*, Heind. suggested *ἀλλ', εἰ δοκεῖ*, which is the phrase constantly in use, as I have shown on Philoct. 1398, and to the passages quoted there I could now add a dozen more. Stalbaum defends *εἰ δεῖ*, acknowledged by Proclus, and translates—"if I must;" as if Adeimantus, who had professed his readiness to do Cephalus a service, would consider it an act of compulsion to go with his friend to Antipho, whose house was close at hand.

[11] Stalbaum justly finds fault with Bekker for omitting *οἴκαδε*, which is required by the tenor of the story.

[12] This Melité was a demus of the tribe of Cecrops.

he recognised me through my previous sojourn at this place, and he embraced me; and on our begging him to go through the conversations, he at first shrunk back, for he said it would be a troublesome task; but afterwards, however, he detailed them.

Antipho then said that Pythodorus had told him that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the great Panathenæa;[13] that Parmenides was then a rather old man, with very hoary locks, but of a handsome and noble aspect, and full sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, very tall and graceful to behold, and was reported to have been the bosom friend of Parmenides; he said, too, that they lodged with Pythodorus, in the Cerameicus,[14] beyond the walls; whither also Socrates came, and many others with him, who were eager to hear the writings of Zeno; for then for the first time they had been brought by the (strangers); but that Socrates was at that time very young. [3.] That Zeno therefore himself read the writings to them; and Pythodorus further related that Parmenides happened to be gone out; and that of the discourses so read there remained only a very small portion, when he himself entered, and Parmenides with him and Aristotle,[15] who was one of the Thirty (Tyrants); and that he heard but a little at that time;[16] but that nevertheless he had (often) heard the (whole)[16] discourse previously from Zeno.

(He added) that Socrates, on hearing (the discourses), entreated him to read again the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when it was read, Socrates said—How do you, Zeno, assert this, that if the things existing are many, the

[13] On the Panathenæa, see Potter's or Smith's Grecian Antiquities.

[14] On the two Cerameici, see Schol. in Aristoph. Ἱππ. 769. They were in fact burial-grounds, and strewed over with fragments of the cinerary urns there deposited in honour of the dead. Of the same kind was doubtless the Potter's Field, near Jerusalem, where the body of Judas Iscariot was thrown.

[15] This Aristotle is numbered by Xenophon, in H. G. ii. 2, amongst the Thirty Tyrants, as they were called, whom Lysander appointed to be the governors of Athens, after it fell into his hands. Stalbaum thinks he was the author of some Forensic speeches, mentioned by Diogenes Laert. v. 34.

[16—16] Heindorf says that in the words οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε ἀλλὰ καὶ, there is an unusual transposition of ἀλλά, which should follow οὐ μήν. But ἀλλὰ καὶ, I suspect, is a corruption of πολλάκις. Taylor, too, has inserted "often" from his own head; and "whole" from "omnia" in Ficinus; unless it be said that Plato wrote γε τὰ ὅλα, which come nearer to γε ἀλλά.

same things must be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert? Zeno answered, It is. [4.] If then it is impossible for dissimilars to be similar, and similars dissimilar, it is impossible likewise for many things to exist? For if there were many, they would undergo impossibilities. Is this what your discourses mean? Is it any thing else than to contest, contrary[17] to all that is (usually) asserted, that "the many" does not exist? And do you fancy that each of your discourses is a proof of this very doctrine? so that you conceive you have produced as many proofs as you have written discourses, (to show) that "the many" does not exist? say you thus, or do I not rightly understand you? No, said Zeno; but you understand quite well the meaning of the whole work. Then said Socrates, I perceive, Parmenides, that Zeno here wishes not only to be familiar with you in other bonds of friendship, but in your writings likewise. For Zeno has, in a certain manner, written the same as yourself; but by some change he endeavours to deceive us, as if asserting something different. For you in your poems assert that the universe is "one;" and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion. [5.] But Zeno says that "the many" does not exist, and he too produces very many and mighty proofs. With regard then to the fact, that you assert that "the one" exists, and he, that "the many" does not exist; and that each of you speak so as to appear to have said not an atom of the same things, although you both assert nearly the same, it seems to me that what has been said by you is above us the rest.[18] It is so, Socrates, said Zeno. But you do not perfectly comprehend the truth of my writings; although, like the dogs of Laconia,[19] you excellently pursue and track out

[17] Heindorf properly translates *παρὰ*, "contrary to;" Ficinus, by "per," "through," which Stalbaum adopts in defiance of the language; for *παρὰ* never has that meaning. To show more clearly what Plato intended, I have inserted "usually," unless it be said that he wrote *παρὰ τὰ παντί τῳ λεγόμενα*, not *παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*.

[18] In lieu of *τοὺς ἄλλου;* one would prefer *τοὺς ἄνους*, "the simpletons." On the change of *ἄνους* and *ἄλλους*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

[19] On the superiority of this breed of dogs, see the Commentators on Soph. Aj. 8, and Virgil. Georg. iii. 345. Hence, says Proclus, that animal was called a philosopher; just as Pope describes the elephant as "half-reasoning."

what is there asserted. But this in the first place lies hid from you, that this discourse is not in every respect of so solemn a cast, that it was written, as you say, with the set purpose[20] of being concealed from mankind,[21] as if effecting something great; yet you have spoken something of what has happened; and in truth, these writings are a kind of support to the doctrine of Parmenides against those who endeavour to ridicule it, (by saying) that if "one" exists, it would follow that such an assertion would suffer many things of a laughable kind, and contrary to itself. This writing therefore contradicts those, who assert that "the many" exists; and it gives in return these[22] and many other reasons; as it intends to show that the hypothesis, which (asserts) the existence of "the many," would suffer things still more laughable than that, which says of [23]if "many" exist, or of "one" existence,[23] should a person go through the question sufficiently. [6.] Through some such love of contention was this discourse composed by me, when a youth; but some one stole it after it was written, so that it was out of my power to deliberate whether it should be brought out into the light or not. [24]Hence it lies hid from you, Socrates, that it was written by a

[20] Perhaps *διανοηθὲν* might be translated, "with a mental reservation." Unless it be said that Plato wrote *ἰδίᾳ νοηθὲν*, "to be understood privately."

[21] Here again one would prefer *τοὺς ἄνους*, "the silly," to *τοὺς ἄνους*, "mankind."

[22] In lieu of *ταῦτα*, Heindorf with Schleiermacher would read *ταὐτὰ*, i. e. *τὰ γελοῖα*. Stalbaum defends *ταῦτα* by saying that it refers to the arguments, brought forward by the opponents of Parmenides. The word is omitted by many MSS., and Ficinus. The sense seems to require *ἄλλα καὶ καλλίω ἔτι*, "other things and better still;" for the question would be decided by the excellence, not the number merely, of the arguments.

[23]—[23] I cannot make out the syntax in, nor see the sense of, *ἢ εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι*. I could have done both had the words been, *ἢ λέγει ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ τοῦτον, ὅτι ἕν*: and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS., for his version is, "ex opinione illorum, quod scilicet multa sint, quam ex opinione Parmenidis, quod sit unum;" in English, "their hypothesis, which says that 'many things exist,' than the hypothesis of this person, that 'one exists.'"

[24]—[24] This is evidently the sense of the passage. But to get at it, we must suppose Plato to have written, *ταύτῃ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σωκρατες, τὸ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας ἕνεκα αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὡς οἴει, ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας*. Ficinus found something different in his MS., for his version is, "Id ergo te fugit, O Socrates, quod existimas, non a juvenili certamine sed a senili ambitione scriptum fuisse."

young person through the love of contention, and not, as you fancy, by an older one, through the love of renown,[24] since,[25] as I have said, you have not made a bad guess. I receive (the account), says Socrates; and I think the case is as you have stated. But tell me this too. Do you not think there is a certain form of similitude, existing itself by itself? and that another is contrary to this, which is dissimilar? and that you and me, and other things, which we call many, participate in these two? and that some things, participating in similitude, become similar in that respect and so far as they participate? but that others, (which participate) in dissimilitude, (become) dissimilar? and that those (which participate in) both (become) both? But if all things participate in both, which are contrary to each other, and that similar and dissimilar to each other exist through participating of both, what is the wonder? [7.] For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy. But if he shows that such things, as participate in both of these, suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should show that all things are one, through their participating in "the one," and that very same things are many, through their participating in multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that what is one, is itself many, and on the other hand, that what are many is one; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest. It would indeed be worthy of wonder, if he should show that both the genera themselves and the species in them suffered these contrary affections. But what is there wonderful, if any one should show that I am both one thing and many, by saying, that when he wishes to prove I am many, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts—for I think that I participate in multitude—but when (he desires to show that) I am one, he will say, that, we being seven in number, I am one man, and participate in "the one"? so that he would by this means prove both to be true. If then any one should en-

[25] Here again ἐπεὶ, "since," is quite unintelligible. Ficinus has "Veruntamen," from which I can elicit nothing except αὐτοῦ δὲ πέρι, ὡς ἄπον.

deavour to show that stones, wood, and all such things, are both many and one, we would say that he shows such things as are many and one, but not that "the one" is many, nor "the many" one; and that he does not say any thing wonderful, but what we should all confess. [8.] But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the species of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them according to their very selves, such as similitude and dissimilitude, and multitude and the one, and standing and motion, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show that these things can in themselves be mixed and separated, I should, Zeno, says he, be marvellously astonished. But it appears to me that you have very manfully made this your business; yet I should be much more astonished if any one could solve this very same difficulty, which is involved on all sides in species themselves; and, as you have gone through in the case of things sensible to the sight, so (should he go through) in the case of things comprehended by reason.

On Socrates saying this, Pythodorus observed that he thought that Parmenides and Zeno were at each remark annoyed;[26] but they gave the greatest attention to him, (Socrates,) and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates. Hence on his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—How worthy, Socrates, are you of admiration[27] for your ardour in what relates to reasoning! Tell me then, have you thus separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise those, that participate in them, apart? And does similitude itself appear to you to be separate from that similitude which we possess,[28] and "one" and "many," and all such other things as you have just now heard of from Zeno? To me, said Socrates, it does. [9.] And does it appear to you, (said Parmenides,) that these things too exist, such as a species of justice, itself by itself, and of the beautiful and the good, and all things of such a kind? Yes, says he. What, is there a species

[26] Instead of ἄχθεσθαι Heindorf suggested, what Stalbaum is disposed to approve, ἀχθέσεσθαι, "would be annoyed."

[27] As the verb ἄγασθαι is never, I believe, used in a passive sense, one would prefer ἀγασθῆναι, found in Herc. F. 847, of which θαυμάζεσθαι, in two MSS., is the interpretation, as in Hesych., Ἀγασθείς· θαυμασθείς.

[28] Ficinus has "cujus nos participes sumus." So too one MS. from a recent hand, μετέχομεν. But Proclus, ἔχομεν, with which Thomson and Heindorf are satisfied.

of man separate from us and all the things, such as we are, [29] some species itself of man,[29] or of fire, or water? I have often, said (Socrates), been in doubt, Parmenides, on this point; whether it is necessary to speak of these in the same manner as of those, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that of each individual thing, as may appear to be ridiculous, such as hair, clay, and filth, or any thing else the most worthless and vile, there is a species apart, as being different from those which we take into our hands? By no means, said Socrates; but (I think)[30] that things are as we see them: but (consider) lest it be not very absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? Already it has at some time disturbed me, lest there be something of the same kind in the case of every thing. But afterwards, when I have been standing[31] in this way, I rapidly take myself off, fearing lest, falling into an abyss of trifling,[32] I should utterly perish and be lost. But, returning from thence[33] to what we have just now asserted as possessing species, I have passed my time in busying myself about them. [10.] For, said Parmenides, you are as yet but a young man, Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet laid hold of you, as she will yet lay hold of you, according to my thinking, when you shall not despise any of these things: but now, through your juvenile age, you still look to the opinions of men. Tell me then this. Does it appear to you, as you

[29]—[29] The words within the numerals I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them.

[30] Heindorf says that there is an ellipse of *οἶμαι*. He ought to have elicited *οἶμαι* from *εἶναι*.

[31] Ficinus has "paulisper institi." Hence one would read *τέως στῶ*, where *τέως* still lies hid in *ἐγὼ*, found before *στῶ* in two MSS., and before *ἱστῶ* in one. On *τέως* see Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 256.

[32] In lieu of *ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν*, Wyttenbach, on Plutarch de S. N. V. p. 72, suggested *ἄβυσσον φλυαρίας*, as quoted by Synesius in Dion. p. 52, A., and *ἄβυσσον* is now found in many MSS., and *φλυαρίας* in one. Stalbaum still sticks to *ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν*, with Schæfer on Plutarch, t. v. p. 181.

[33] Stalbaum seems to think that *ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἃ ἐλέγομεν* is such Greek as Plato would not have disdained to write. Some scholar with better taste would expunge *εἰς*. He should have suggested rather *ἐκεῖθεν*, similar to "unde reversus" in Ficinus; or still better, *ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἀφικόμενος σῶς, ἃ*—For *σῶς* has been constantly lost, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 304; and to the passages quoted there, and corrected, I could now add not a few more.

say, that there are certain species, of which these the rest[34] participating retain their appellations; as, for instance, that such things as participate in similitude are similars; in greatness, are great; and in beauty and justice, are beautiful and just? Entirely so, said Socrates. Does not every thing which participates, either participate in the whole species, or only in a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these? How can there be? said (Socrates). Does it then appear to you that the whole species in each individual of many things is one? Or how? What, said Socrates, prevents it, Parmenides, from being so?[35] Being, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, it will be[36] at the same time whole, and thus it will be separate itself from itself. It would not be so, said (Socrates), if, just as the day, being one and the same, is present in many places at the same time, and yet is not the more separate from itself; in the same manner,[37] if every species may be at once one and the same in all. [11.] Pleasantly indeed, said Parmenides, do you, Socrates, make one and the same thing to be in many places; just as if, covering many men with a sail-cloth, you should say that there is one whole over many; or do you think that you would not assert something of this kind? Perhaps so, said Socrates. Will then the whole sail-cloth be over each person, or one part of it over one person, and another over another? A part. Then, said Parmenides, these species, Socrates, are divisible; and that which participates in them, would participate only in a part of them; and there would no longer be in each a whole, but only a part of each.[38] So it seems. Are you then willing to assert that one species is in truth

[34] I scarcely understand *τάδε τὰ ἄλλα*. Ficinus has "species quædam existere, et ea, quæ illis participant," as if he had found in his MS. *ὧν τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα—*

[35] Instead of *ἓν εἶναι*, Stalbaum has adopted *ἐνεῖναι*, the correction of Schleiermacher.

[36] Heindorf reads *ἔνεσται* for *ἓν ἔσται*.

[37] Ficinus supplies, what makes the sense clearer, "ita nihil prohibet," unless we omit *εἰ*, with Stephens, and read *εἰδῶν ἂν ἐν*—to which *ἓν*, omitted by Bekker, from many MSS., before *ἐν*, seems to lead.

[38] Schleiermacher once wished to read *ἑκάστῳ* for *ἑκάστου*, which Heindorf adopted. He was subsequently content with the old reading. Stalbaum has suggested *ἑκάστοτ' ἂν*. But *ἑκάστοτε* is seldom found in Plato except united to verbs of speaking.

divided, and that it is still one? By no means, said (Socrates). For see, said (Parmenides), whether, if you should divide magnitude itself, and if each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude, less than magnitude itself, it would not appear absurd. Entirely so, said (Socrates).

What then? [39]Will each little thing, by taking a part of the equal, have that, which, to a thing less than the equal itself, will be the thing having equal to some thing?[39] It is impossible. [40]But some one of us will possess a part of the small; and the small itself will be greater than this, inasmuch as it is a part of itself; and thus the small itself will be greater: but that to which the part taken away shall be added, will become smaller, but not greater than before. [12.] This, said Socrates, cannot be.[40] After what manner then, Socrates,

[39]—[39] Such is the literal and nonsensical version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus has, "Ipsius æqualis parte unumquidque parvum participans habebit, quo minore existente quam ipsum æquale, id, quod habet, æquale alicui sit;" which I cannot understand: and I am equally in the dark as regards Heindorf's translation—"Quando quidque parvam aliquam τοῦ ἴσου particulam acceperit, continebitne hoc in se aliquid; quo, quanquam id minus sit quam ipsum τὸ ἴσον, tamen cuiquam rei æquale effici possit?" But to get even at this sense, Heindorf is compelled to acknowledge that the words τὸ ἔχον, in which the principal difficulty lies, might be omitted without any detriment to the sense; as if either Plato or any other correct writer would thus insert words perfectly useless. Stalbaum, who hardly ever pens a note at once original, acute, and satisfactory, is content to reprint Heindorf's, as if it had left nothing to desire. I could, perhaps, have understood the Greek, had it been to this effect—Τί δαί; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολάβον, τί ἕξει; Τῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ἔχειν τοῦ ἴσου τι ἀδύνατον, i. e. "What then? If each small thing obtains a part of the equal, what will it have? It will be impossible for that, which is less than the equal itself, to have any part of the equal." With regard to the general sense, Proclus says, as translated by Taylor, "If any thing has a share in a part of equality, it has a share in something less than the whole; but that which participates in the lesser, is no longer lesser, but equal. This, however, ought not to be; since it has been agreed that forms (εἴδη) give the appellation of themselves to sensibles. Hence that which participates in the lesser, must not be called equal, but lesser; nor must that, which participates in the equal, be called lesser, but equal; nor that, which participates in the greater, be called equal or lesser, but greater."

[40]—[40] According to Proclus, all within the numerals was thought by some persons to be spurious in consequence of the difficulty of perceiving what Plato was aiming at. Tried by this test, nearly the whole of what Proclus has written himself might be rejected as apocryphal. Absurd as the theory is, it has been adopted by some of the modern scholars of Germany,

can the other things participate in species, if they are able to participate neither according to parts, nor according to wholes? It does not, said (Socrates), appear to me, by Zeus, to be at all an easy matter to define in a question of this kind. What then? How stands the case with you in regard to this? To what? I think that you consider every species as one, on some such account as this. When some things many in number seem to you to be great, there seems perhaps to be one and the same idea to you, who survey them all; from whence you consider the great to be one. You speak the truth, said Socrates; but what, as regards the great itself, and the other things which are great, if you look upon them all in like manner through the soul, will not, on the other hand, a certain one thing appear to you great, through which all these necessarily seem to be great? It seems so. Another species of magnitude will then become apparent, besides magnitude itself and its participants: and in addition to all these, another (species), through which all these become great; each of your species will no longer be one, but infinite in number. But,

in the case of Thucydides especially; for they thus found it much easier to cut out corruptions than to cure them. In the present case, however, Stalbaum refuses to admit the notion of an interpolation, and least of all in a passage which, he says, is so clear, that a person must be blind indeed not to understand it. Accordingly he thus translates the first sentence; "Let us suppose that any one of us contains in himself a part of smallness itself." But although he asserts that the use of the future in a hypothetical sense has nothing uncommon in it, he will find it difficult to produce a single similar instance in the whole of Plato. And even if he could find one in every page, yet he ought to have shown likewise how, in a purely abstract question, there could be any allusion to human beings, taken individually; for the expressions *ἐν ἡμῖν* and *παρ' ἡμῖν*, in § 15, are not in point. By observing, however, the balance of the sentences, it is easy to see that as *τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος* is opposed to the preceding *τοῦ ἴσου μέρος*, so ought the latter part of one clause to balance the latter part of the other. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote—*Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος ἕκαστον μέγα ἀπολάβον τι ἕξει; Ὡς οἶμαι, τούτου δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται, ἅτε μέρους αὐτοῦ ὄντος*: i. e. "But if each great thing obtains a part of the small, what will it have? As I think, the small itself will be greater than this (great thing), as being (the great) in a part of it (the small)." And if this be a real restoration of what Plato wrote, we must read—*Καὶ εἰ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται μεγαλου, ᾧ γ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν, τοῦτ' ἔτι σμικρότερον ἔσται, ἀλλ' οὐ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ πρίν.* i. e. "And if the small itself is thus greater than the great thing, that, to which what has been taken away shall be added, will be still smaller, and not greater than before."

said Socrates, (Have a care,) Parmenides, lest each of these species be nothing more than a mental conception, and that it is not meet for it to exist any where but in souls. For thus each would be one, nor would the consequences, just now mentioned, occur. [13.] What then, said (Parmenides), is each of these mental conceptions one, and is there a mental conception of nothing? This, (said Socrates,) is impossible. It is then of something? Yes. Of a being or of a non-being? Of a being. Is it not of some one thing, [41]which that mental conception understands as being a one certain idea over all things?[41] Yes. Will not then that species, which is understood to be one, be always the same over all things? This, on the other hand, seems to be necessary. But what, said Parmenides, Is it not necessary, since you say that the other things participate in species, either that each should seem to you to be from mental conceptions, and that all of them understand, or that being mental conceptions, they understand nothing? But this, said Socrates, has no reason for it. But this appears, Parmenides, to me to be for the most part the case. That these species stand, as it were, patterns in nature; but that the other things are similar to them, and are their resemblances: and that this participation of species by the other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to them. If then any thing, said (Parmenides), becomes similar to the species, can it be possible for that species not to be similar to the assimilated, so far as it is rendered similar? Or is there any method by which the similar would not be similar to the similar? There is not. Is there not, therefore, a great necessity for the similar to participate in one and the same form as the similar? There is a necessity. But will not that, through the participation of which the similars become similars, be species itself? Entirely so. [14.] It is not, therefore, posssible for a thing to be similar to the species, nor the species to another. For otherwise an-

[41]—[41] Instead of *ἐπὸν νοεῖ*, Thomson proposed to read *ἐπινοεῖ*, and so one MS. But *ἐπὶ* would have no meaning here. The three oldest MSS. offer *εἶπουνοεῖν*. Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐπομένην*. For his version is "notionem—sequentem." There is some deep-seated error here. From the subsequent *ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν*, it is evident that Plato did not write *ἐπόν*. He might have written, *ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ, εἰπεῖν τ' ἦν μίαν τιν' οὖσαν ἰδέαν*, i. e. "which that conception understands as being over all, and of which one may speak as being a certain one idea."

other species will always appear by the side of the species; and should this again become similar to another, another (would appear); and a new species would never cease to be continually produced, if the species should be produced similar to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, the other things do not participate in species through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else, through which they do participate. So it seems.

See you then, Socrates, said (Parmenides), how great is the difficulty, should any one define species as existing themselves by themselves? Very much so. Know then well, said (Parmenides), that you do not apprehend at all, so to speak, how great is the difficulty, if, separating each of the things existing, you should lay down one species. How so, said (Socrates)? There are many and other (doubts), said (Parmenides); but this is the greatest. Should any one assert that it is not proper for the species to be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, a person would not have it in his power to demonstrate to the party asserting this, that he is deceived; unless he who doubts is skilled in many things, and is of a good disposition, and willing to follow the demonstrator, while busied in many (proofs), and these far-fetched; while he who holds, as a matter of necessity, that they are not to be known, will be unpersuaded. [15.] In what way, Parmenides? said Socrates. Because, Socrates, I think that both you and (any)[42] other person, who lays down that the essence of each species exists itself by itself, would allow, in the first place, that not one of them exists in us. For, said Socrates, how could it still exist itself by itself? You speak well, (Parmenides) said. But do not such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things existing among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner a person may set them down; by the names of each

[42] This "any" is supported by "quemvis" in Ficinus; who found, I suspect, in his MS. ἄλλον τινα, ὅστις αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τινα τίθεται εἶναι: for his version is, "quicunque essentiam quandam cujusque ipsam secundum se existentem ponit;" and thus we shall get rid of τινα, improperly interposed between αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν, and of αὐτοῦ (omitted likewise in the oldest MS.) before ἑκάστου, and unite τινα closely, as it should be, to οὐσίαν. To these niceties, strange to say, not even Heindorf has paid the least attention.

of which, while we participate in them, we are called? but the things existing among us, and which are synonymous to those, exist, on the other hand, with reference to themselves, and not with relation to the species; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive from them a common appellation. How say you? replied Socrates. As if, said Parmenides, some one of us should be the master or slave of any one; [43] for a slave is surely not the slave of a master, who is abstractedly speaking a master, nor is a master the master of a slave, who is abstractedly speaking a slave; [43] [44] but being a man, both these are of a man; [44] [45] but master itself is that, which it is from its relation to slavery itself; and slavery itself is in a similar manner slavery with reference to mastery itself.[45] But what are in us do not possess any power, as regards those, nor those any, as regards us; but they exist, as I say, from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and those by us in a similar manner with relation to themselves. Or do you not understand what I am saying? I understand, said Socrates, perfectly. [16.] [46] Would not science itself, said (Parmenides), which is a thing science, be a science of that itself which is a thing truth.[46] Certainly. But would each of the sciences which

[43]—[43] This I presume is the meaning of the Greek words, *οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου ὅ ἐστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός εστιν· οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὅ ἐστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης*: where, I confess, I cannot understand *ἐκείνου*: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were, *δοῦλος ὁ δοῦλος*, to balance *δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης*.

[44]—[44] Here again the sense is obscure, because the words are corrupt. Ficinus renders "sed hæc utraque est tanquam homo." For he found in his MS. *ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστι*: where *ἀνθρώπου* was omitted, as it is in five MSS. What Plato even meant to say, I will leave for others to discover.

[45]—[45] Such is nearly Taylor's translation of the Greek words, *αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἔστιν, ὅ ἐστί, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας*: where the balance of the sentence plainly proves that *δουλεία* is an interpolation; although it is acknowledged by the version of Ficinus, "ipsa vero dominatio servitutis ipsius existit id, quod est; et ipsa iterum servitus eodem modo ipsius dominatio est servitus." Heindorf indeed asserts that *δουλεία* here answers to *ὃ ἐστὶ* in the preceding clause; but to those words is to be referred *ὡσαύτως*. From the "iterum" in Ficinus, it is evident he found in his MS. *καὶ—αὖ αὐτὴ*.

[46]—[46] Here again is a mass of Greek words, out of which I can make not an atom of sense. I have given therefore an unintelligible literal translation. Ficinus has, "Nonne et scientia ipsa, quod scientia est, illius ipsius, quod est veritas, scientia?" He therefore found in his MS.

exists really, be the science of each of the things which exist really, or not? Yes, it would. But would not the science which is among us be the science[47] of the truth which is? And again, would not each science that is among us, turn out to be the science of things existing among us? It is necessary. But, as you have admitted, we do not possess species themselves, nor is it possible for them to exist among us. For it is not. But each of the genera, which really exist, are surely known by the species itself of its proper science. Yes. But this species we do not possess. For we do not. No species therefore is known by us, since we do not participate in science itself? It appears it is not. Therefore the beautiful itself, which exists really, and the good itself, and all the things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us? It nearly seems so. [17.] Now look at this, which is yet still more dreadful. What? Would you say, or not,[48] that, if there is a certain species itself of science, it would be[49] much more accurate than the science which is among us? and beauty (itself),[50] and every thing else in the same manner?[51] Certainly. If then any thing else participates in science itself, would you not say that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a god? It is necessary (to say so). But will a god, possessing science itself, be able to know the matters among us? Why not? Because, said Parmenides, it

Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν, ὅ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς ἐκείνης, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, ἐπιστήμη, instead of ἐπιστήμη τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη: while Proclus, in lieu of τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, has τῆς ἀληθείας, correctly as far as the language is concerned; for ὃ ἔστιν cannot be thus inserted between τῆς and ἀλήθεια or ἀληθείας, but must follow the noun or pronoun to which it belongs, as shown by ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ μεν, ὃ ἔστιν, and ἐπιστημῶν ἣ ἔστιν, and τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν. Had the Greek been Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν, ὃ ἔστι, ἀληθείας ὅ ἔστιν, αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, the sense would have been as intelligible in that language as it is in English—"Would not science too itself, said Parmenides, which exists really, be the science of truth itself, which exists really."

[47] The MS. of Ficinus has luckily preserved the word ἐπιστήμη, wanting in all the other MSS., as shown by his version—"Scientia vero nostra nonne veritatis quæ circa nos, scientia erit?"

[48] Ficinus omits ἢ οὔ. His version is "Num fateris, si—"

[49] I have translated as if the Greek were ἂν εἶναι instead of εἶναι.

[50] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "et ipsam pulchritudinem" for he doubtless found in his MS. καὶ αὐτὸ κάλλος, not καὶ κάλλος.

[51] Ficinus, "eodem pacto," which leads to ὡσαύτως in lieu of οὕτως

has been, Socrates, confessed by us, that those species do not possess the power, which they possess, in relation to those among us, nor those among us in relation to them: but that each (possess their power) in relation to themselves. It was so confessed. If then there is this[52] the most exact mastery with the deity, and this the most exact science, their[53] mastery will not rule over us, nor will (their) science know us, nor aught of the things among us; and similarly we do not rule[54] over them by our rule, nor do we know aught of things divine[55] by our science. [18.] [56][And again, according to the same reasoning, they will neither, though gods, be our masters, nor have any knowledge of human affairs].[56] But (have a care), said (Socrates), lest the reasoning be not very wonderful, should it deprive the deity of the power of knowing. These, said Parmenides, and very many others, Socrates, in addition to these, it is necessary for the species to undergo, if there are these ideas of things existing, and if any one shall define each species, as being something itself; so that the hearer may be in a difficulty, and, doubting, contend that such species do not exist; or if they do exist ever so much, that there is a great necessity for them to be unknown by human nature; and that he who says so, seems to say something to the purpose; and to be, as we just now stated,[57] a person wonderfully difficult to be persuaded, and that there is (need)[58] of a person

[52] Heindorf would read twice *αὐτὴ* for *αὕτη*, from Ficinus's version, "suprema ipsa dominatio——ipsa suprema scientia." Stalbaum retains *αὕτη*, which he explains by "illa, quam dixi."

[53] The introduction of the plural *ἐκείνων*, when only a single deity had been just before mentioned, seems very strange. Correctly then has Ficinus omitted *ἐκείνων* here, although he acknowledges the same word a little below.

[54] After the preceding *ἂν δεσπόσειεν*, one would expect here, to preserve the balance of the sentence, *ἄρχοιμεν ἄν*, and *γιγνώσκοιμεν ἄν*, instead of *ἄρχομεν* and *γιγνώσκομεν ἂν*: and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is, "imperabimus—percipiemus."

[55] Here likewise, to preserve the antithesis in *ἡμᾶς οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν*, one would have expected to find before *τοῦ θείου οὐδέν* the words *τὸν θεὸν οὔτε*, or *τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε*.

[56]—[56] All within the brackets is evidently useless after the preceding reasoning; although the whole clause was read by Proclus, who says that the expression "*θεοὶ ὄντες*" being added, affords a considerable demonstration of the difficulty.

[57] In p. 133, B. § 14.

[58] Heindorf was the first to see that *δεῖν* had dropt out here. He

naturally clever to be able to perceive that there is a certain genus of each thing, and an essence existing itself by itself: but of a person still more wonderful, who shall discover (himself),[59] and be able to teach another to distinguish[60] all these in a sufficient manner. I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates, for you speak entirely to my mind.

But however, said Parmenides, If any one, Socrates, on the contrary, will not admit that there are species of existing things, looking to what has been now said, [and to other things of the same kind,[61]] [62] nor will define the species of each thing as being something itself,[62] he will not have where to turn his thoughts, while he does not permit the idea of each existing thing to be always the same; and by this means he will entirely destroy the power of speaking logically. Some such thing as this you seem to me to have perceived even more.[63] You speak the truth, Socrates said. [19.] What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, if these are unknown? Indeed I do not seem to myself to see clearly at present. Before you exercised yourself, said (Parmenides), you endeavoured,[64] Socrates, be-

should have inserted it before *ἀνδρὸς*, not after *εὐφυοῦς*. Ficinus has, "viri admodum ingeniosi esse;" for he found perhaps in his MS. *μὲν εἶναι*, similar to which is *μὲν οὖν* in one of the oldest MSS.

[59] The antithesis in *εὑρήσοντος* and *ἄλλον διδάξαι*, plainly proves that *αὐτοῦ* has dropt out after *εὑρήσοντος*—Ficinus has "postquam invenerit," as if his MS. offered *εὑρόντος* or *εὑρηκότος*.

[60] As the act of distinguishing must be subsequent to, or coincident with, that of teaching, we must read *διευκρινησόμενον*, as I have translated, in lieu of *διευκρινησάμενον*.

[61] Ficinus omits the words *καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα* correctly, for they are not only useless, but actually absurd; as if Plato would thus allude not only to what had been said, but to something similar, which had not.

[62] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; although duly translated by Ficinus—"neque speciem ipsam uniuscujusque distinguat," who therefore found in his MS. not *μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου*, but *μηοὲ αὐτό τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου*, as just above, *ὁριεῖται τις αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον εἶδος*.

[63] Stalbaum says that "although one would easily suspect that *καὶ μάλα* ought to be read, yet we must not alter any thing." He did not perceive however, that as Ficinus has not badly, as he confesses himself, "tu præcipue sensisse mihi videris," we might elicit from thence *καὶ μάλιστα*, in lieu of *καὶ μᾶλλον*: and still less that the sense requires here *κάλλιον νέου ἠσθῆσθαι*, "to have perceived better than a young person;" for that Socrates was then very young, is shown by § 2.

[64] I have adopted *ἐπεχείρεις*, found in two excellent MSS., in lieu of *ἐπεχειρεῖς*, for the allusion is to a past act.

times[65] to define what is the beautiful, the just, and the good, and each of the other species: for I lately perceived, and I heard you discoursing with this Aristotle here. Beautiful and divine, be assured, is that ardour of yours, by which you rush onwards to rational conversations. But draw yourself out,[66] and exercise yourself (still) more while you are yet young, on account of (the ardour) appearing useless to the many, and being called by them a mere idle talking; for if you do not, the truth will escape you completely.

What then, said (Socrates), is the method of the exercise, Parmenides? That, said (Parmenides), which you have heard from Zeno, except this,[67] I admired you while asserting, contrary to Zeno,[68] that you did not permit (a person) in the things seen (by the eye) to look into the aberration about them, but about those, which a person could especially lay hold of by reason, and would consider to be species.[69] For it appears to me, said (Socrates), that in this way it would be not difficult to prove that the things existing are both similar and dissimilar, and suffering any other state whatever. You speak well, said (Parmenides): but it is necessary for you to do this likewise; not only to make a supposition, whether each thing exists, and to consider the consequences from the supposition, but also, if it does not exist, to suppose this same thing,[70] if you wish to be more exercised (in this matter). How say you,

[65] Ruhnken, on Timæus, p. 226, says that *πρῲ* rarely means *πρὸ τοῦ δέοντος*, "too early." It never has that meaning. Heindorf vainly refers to Trach. 630, *δέδοικα γάρ, Μὴ πρῲ λέγοις ἂν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, Πρὶν εἰδέναι τἀκεῖθεν*. For there Sophocles wrote *Μὴ πρὶν—λέγῃς ἂν Πρίν*, for thus *πρὶν* is repeated perpetually in both clauses.

[66] The metaphor in *ἕλκυσον σαυτὸν* "draw yourself out," Heindorf says is taken from weaving; where a thread becomes the finer the more it is drawn out. We have a similar metaphor in English; where a person is said "to draw out the thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of his argument;" quoted from one of Foote's farces by Porson in his Letters to Travis, if I rightly remember. Ficinus has "collige te ipsum."

[67] I cannot understand *πλὴν τοῦτο*. Ficinus has, "Sed etiam illud."

[68] See § 7 and 8.

[69] The reading *εἶδη*, which Heindorf rejected, is found in all the MSS. but two, and confirmed by "Species" in Ficinus. The sense seems however to require *καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο ὄντως εἶναι*, i. e. "and would consider to be in reality species."

[70] I confess I cannot understand what is meant here by *τὸ αὐτο τουτο*. I could have understood *τοιοῦτὸ γ' αὖ τι*—i. e. "some such thing on the other hand."

said (Socrates)? [20.] As if, said (Parmenides), you should wish to (exercise yourself) in the hypothesis which Zeno has laid down, that, "if there are many things," what must happen both to "the many," with respect to themselves, and to "the one;" and to "the one" with respect to itself, and to "the many:" and "if many are not," to consider again what will happen both to "the one" and to "the many," with respect to themselves and to each other: and again, if you made the supposition "if similitude is," or "if it is not," what will on each supposition happen both to the things supposed and to the others, with respect to themselves and to each other; and the same reasoning (must be) concerning "the dissimilar," and "motion" and "standing," and "generation" and "destruction," and "entity" and "non-entity;" and, in one word, concerning every thing which you suppose either to be or not to be, or suffering any other state whatever, it is necessary to consider what will happen both to itself and to each individual of the other things, which you may select, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how the other things are related to themselves, and to another, which you may select, whether you suppose that, which is the subject of your supposition, as existing or not existing; if you are about to be exercised in a masterly manner, and to perceive thoroughly the truth.

You are speaking, Parmenides, of an impossible occupation, said Socrates, nor do I very well understand you. But why do you not go through a certain supposition yourself, that I may learn the better? You enjoin, Socrates, said (Parmenides), a great task upon a man so old as myself. But why do not you then, Zeno, said Socrates, go through it for us? And then (Pythodorus) stated that Zeno laughing said—[21.] Let us, Socrates, request Parmenides himself; for (see) lest it be no trifling matter, as he says; or do you not perceive how great a task you are enjoining? If then we were many it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for a man of such an age, to speak things of this kind before many. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursiveness and wandering through all things, it is impossible for the mind to meet with the truth, and to keep possession of it. I therefore, Parmenides, do, together with Socrates, make the request in order that I too may after a long time hear it. On Zeno so saying, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that

he too, and Aristotle, and the rest, entreated Parmenides to declare what he had said, and not to do otherwise. There is a necessity then, said Parmenides, for me to comply; although I seem to myself to suffer the fate of the horse of Ibycus, to whom as being a competitor and rather old, when about to contend in a chariot race, and fearing through his experience for the event, Ibycus[71] compares himself by saying, "Thus I too, who am so old, am forced to the contests of love to go;" so I, upon recollection, appear to myself to feel a great fear how I, at such an age, must swim through such and so great a sea[72] of words;[73] yet I must gratify you, since, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? [22.] Or are you willing, since it seems good to play a business-like game, for me to begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, by supposing, with respect to "the one itself," if one "is," or "is not," what must happen? By all means, said Zeno. Who then, said (Parmenides), will answer me? Will the youngest? For he will have very little trouble; for[74] he will answer what he thinks; and his answer will be at the same time a resting-place for me. I am prepared, said Aristotle, in this point,[75] for you, Parmenides; for you mean me, when

[71] The fragment preserved by the Scholiast here and Proclus was first edited by F. Ursinus in Fragm. Lyr. p. 115, and reprinted by Schneidewinn in Ibyci Fragm. Gotting. 1833, and restored to a new metrical form by Hermann in Jahn's and Klotz's Pædagog. 1833, p. 380, and by Bergk in Lyrici Græci.

[72] With a want of critical taste and tact, very unusual, Heindorf rejects the reading πέλαγος in lieu of πλῆθος, preserved by Ficinus alone, and which even Fischer was disposed to adopt after he had read what had been written in its support by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 79, and Valckenaer on Hippol. 822, and that Hesychius explains πέλαγος by πλῆθος. Stalbaum however and Koch still stick to πλῆθος.

[73] Stalbaum has edited ὅμως δὲ—δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ Ζήνων λέγει—αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν. But the second γὰρ is properly omitted by Bekker with the five best MSS., although it is found in Legg. viii. p. 836, B., Protag. p. 309, A., Aristoph. Ach. 506, but omitted in the similar phrase in Menex. § 5, σοί γε δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι—ἐπειδή γε μόνω ἐσμὲν. Alcib. i. p. 118, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμὲν, ῥητέον. Stalbaum ought rather to have omitted the first γὰρ with three MSS., and to have read καθ' ὃ instead of καὶ ὁ—

[74] Instead of καὶ Plato evidently wrote καὶ γὰρ—

[75] The MSS. offer here τοῦτο for τοῦτον, to which Heindorf properly objected. But ἕτοιμος τοῦτο is scarcely good Greek. One would expect τοῦτο ποιεῖν, or we must omit τοῦτο with Ficin

speaking of the youngest. Ask me then, as one who will answer you. Be it so, said (Parmenides).

If "one" is, is it not that "the one" will not be many? For how can it be? There must then be of it neither a part nor a whole. How so? Is not a part a part of a whole? Yes. But what is a whole? Would not that, to which no part is wanting, be a whole? Entirely so. On both sides then "the one" would be (composed) of parts, as being a whole and having parts? It is necessary. And so in both ways "the one" will be many, but not one. True. But it must be not many, but one. It must. Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if "the one" is one. It will not. [23.] If then it has no parts, it has neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning are the bounds of each thing? How not? "The one" therefore is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And therefore without figure; for it neither participates of the round nor the straight. How so? For the round figure[75] is that, the extremities of which are on all sides equally distant from the middle. Yes. And the straight is that, the middle of which is situated before both the extremes?[76] It is so. Would not then "the one" have parts, and be many, whether it participates in a straight figure or a round? Entirely so. It is therefore neither straight nor circular, since it has not parts. Right. And being such, it will be no where; for it would be neither in another, nor in itself. How so? Being in another, it would somehow be surrounded circularly by that, in which it might be, and it would be touched by many things in many places. But it is impossible for "the one," being without parts, and not participating in a circle, to be touched in a circle in many places. It is impossible. [24.] But being itself in itself, it would be likewise surrounding itself; since it is no other than itself, [77]if it were in itself:[77] for it is

[75] Thomson appositely refers to Cicero. N. D. ii. 18.

[76] This is a strange definition of a straight line, or figure. In lieu of ἐπίπροσθεν, Proclus has ἐπιπροσθοῦν. From which others may perhaps, what I cannot, elicit the true reading by the aid of Euclid's definition of a straight line—Εὐθεῖα γραμμή ἐστιν, ἥτις ἐξίσου τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ σημείοις κεῖται. Ficinus has "Rectum vero, cujus medium extremis utrisque præcedit," which is just as unintelligible as the Greek.

[77]—[77] The words between the numerals, Stalbaum says, merely repeat

impossible for a thing to be in that, which does not surround it. It is impossible. [24.] Would not then that, which contains, be one thing, and that which is contained, another?[78] For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these:[78] and thus "the one" would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. "The one," therefore, is not any where, being neither in itself nor in another. It is not. But consider, whether, being in this state, it is possible for it to stand or be moved. Why can it not? Because being moved it would be carried on or be changed;[79] for these alone are the kinds of motion. Certainly. But "the one" being changed from itself, it is impossible surely for it to be still one. Impossible. It is not then moved as regards a change. It appears it is not. But is it by being carried on? Perhaps so. And yet if "the one" is carried on, it would be either carried round in the same circle, or it would change from one place to another. Necessarily so. But ought not that, which is carried round in a circle, to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself carried about the middle? But what method is there for that, which has neither a middle nor parts, to be carried circularly about the middle? There is none. But by changing its position it is sometimes here and other times there, and is moved? If indeed it (were moved).[80] Has it not appeared to be impossible for "the one" to be in any thing? It has. [25.] Is it not much more impossible for it to be in the act of being (in any thing)?[81] I do not understand how. If any thing is in the act of being in any thing, is it not necessary for it to be not yet in it, since it is in the act of being; nor yet entirely

the preceding ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν. But he does not say what could induce Plato to introduce so useless a repetition.

[78]—[78] Such is the translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "Nunquam enim idem ipsum totum utraque hæc simul pateretur et ageret," as if he had found in his MS. οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ταὐτὸν ἄμφω τούτω ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει, of which both Heind. and Stalb. approve.

[79] The same idea in Theætet. p. 181, D. § 95.

[80] In lieu of Εἴπερ γε δή, Ficinus found in his MS. Ἴσως, answering to his "Forte." But after Εἴπερ is to be supplied κινεῖται, as remarked by Stalbaum.

[81] Ficinus has "in aliquo fieri," as if he had found in his MS. ἔτι ἔν τῳ γίγνεσθαι, not simply ἔτι γίγνεσθαι: or else ἔτι πῃ, answering to ὅπῃ in the next remark of Aristotle: although ἔν τῳ is supported by the next question of Parmenides.

out of it, if it be already in the act of being? It is necessary. If then any other thing suffers this state, that alone would suffer it, which possesses parts; for one part of it would be in that thing, but another out of it; but it will not be possible for that, which has no parts, to be by any means wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impossible for that, which neither has parts nor happens to be a whole, to be in the act of being in any thing; since it can neither exist in the act of being according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it does not change its place, neither by going any where, nor in the act of being in any thing, nor in being carried round in the same, nor in being changed. It does not appear it does. "The one" therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for "the one" to be in any thing. We have said so. It can never therefore be in "the same." Why so? Because it would be already in that,[83] in which it is (as if) in "the same."[83] Entirely so. But the one itself[84] can neither be in itself nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in "the same." It does not appear that is. But that which is never in "the same," is neither at rest nor stands still.[85] For it cannot. "The one," therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is it moved. [26.] [86]It does not appear indeed.[86] Nor

[83]—[83] Such is Stalbaum's version of *ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν*: where although *τῷ αὐτῷ* thus follows *ἐν ᾧ*, as in § 63, quoted by Heindorf, yet there Ficinus has, "in quo velut in eadem sede," which is much more intelligible than his version here, "in quo eodem est." Taylor's translation is, "in which same is;" who has thus anticipated partially *τὸ αὐτὸ*, found in the text of three MSS., and written thus in three others, *ὸ ὸ τῶ αὐτῶ*. What Plato meant to say is beyond my comprehension.

[84] Instead of *αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι*, Heind. suggested *αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι*, subsequently found in two MSS. and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. But Ficin. has "ipsum unum esse poterat." For he found in his MS., *αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν εἶναι* as, read in two MSS.

[85] I cannot see the difference between *ἡσυχίαν ἄγει* and *ἔστηκεν*.

[86]—[86] To the assertion *ὡς ἔοικεν οὔθ' ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται*, the answer could not be *οὐκ οὖν φαίνεταί γε ὅῃ*, by way of an assent; and if dissent be intended, the grounds of such dissent should be stated by one party and met by the other. Moreover, although *οὖν—γε* thus follow *ἀλλά*, yet these particles do not, and could not, I imagine, follow *οὐκ*. For in § 28, *Οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε*, one MS. correctly omits *γε*. There is therefore either something too much or too little in the text, as it stands at present.

will it be the same either with "different,"[87] or with itself; not again different either from itself or from "different." How so? Being different from itself, it would surely be different from "one," and so would not be "one." True. And if it should be the same with "different," it would be that ("different"), and would not be itself; so that "one" would thus be not what it is, but different from "one." It would not indeed. [88] It will then be not the same with "different" or different from itself? It will not.[88] But it will not be different from "different," while it is "one." For it does not belong to "one" to be different from any thing, but to be "different" alone, and to nothing else. Right. In consequence, then, of its being "one," it will not be "different;" or do you think (it can)? Certainly not. [89] But if it is not (different) through this, neither will it be through itself.[89] But if not different in any way, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the same with itself. How not? [90] The nature of "the one" is surely this of "the same."[90] How? Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not become one. But what then? That, which becomes the same with many things, must necessarily become many, and not one. True. [91] But if "the one" and "the same" differed[91] in no respect, whenever any thing became

[87] Here ἕτερον means not another, as Taylor translated, but "different," as understood by Stalbaum: although when ἕτερον has this meaning elsewhere, it has the article prefixed: which Plato has omitted on this occasion, because ἓν is without its article likewise.

[88]—[88] Here again I cannot understand a single answer given to a bipartite question.

[89]—[89] Stalbaum thus explains this difficult passage, Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἕσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ αὐτό, by supposing that from the preceding speech of Parmenides ἕτερον is to be supplied, and τούτῳ is to be referred to τῷ ἓν εἶναι. But on what ἑαυτῷ is to depend, he does not say; nor has any one observed that the balance of the sentence requires εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ—εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ αὖ τῳ, i. e. "if not by this, then not by itself; and if not by itself, then not by any thing."

Correctly then has one MS. αὐτό.

[90]—[90] Ficinus has, "Non ea est ipsius unius natura, quæ ipsius ejusdem natura." He therefore found in his MS. Οὐχ, ἥπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις ἐστὶ δήπου ἡ ταὐτοῦ, i. e. "The nature of the same itself is not surely that, which is of the one itself." Words somewhat more intelligible as regards the sense, and more correct as regards the language, than the present Greek text, Οὐχ, ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ.

[91]—[91] Ficinus has, "Ac si ipsum unum atque ipsum idem nihil discre-

"the same," it would always become "one," and whenever it (became) "the one" it (would be) "the same." Entirely so. [27.] If then "the one" shall be "the same" to itself, it will not be "one" to itself; and thus "one" will not be "one." But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for "the one" to be either different from "different," or the same with itself. Impossible. And thus "the one" would be neither different nor the same, either with respect to itself or different It would not. But neither will it be similar to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to different. Why so? [92]Because the "similar" somehow has the accident of[92] "same." Certainly. But it has been seen that "the same" is naturally separate from "the one." It has been so seen. But if "the one" should suffer any thing apart from being "the one," it would suffer the being more than one; but this is impossible. Certainly. In no respect then can "the one" suffer the being "the same," either with another or with itself. It does not appear it can. Nor can it therefore be similar either to another or to itself. It seems it cannot. Nor yet has "the one" suffered the being "different;" for thus it would suffer the being more than one. For (it would) more. But that which suffers the being different either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers the being the same is similar. Right. But "the one," as it appears, since it in no respect suffers the being "different," would in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another. It would not. "The one," therefore, would be neither similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself. It does not appear (that it would). [28.] But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another. How so? Being equal, it would be of the same measure as that to which it is equal. Certainly. But being greater or less than the things, with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But of those, with which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one

parent:" from whence Heindorf would read *διέφερε* for *διαφέρει*. He should have read likewise, *Ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν*.

[92]—[92] Ficinus has, "Quia simile est, quod ipsius ejusdem est particeps," and which leads to *Ὅτι αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ἔστι που*, in lieu of *Ὅτι το ταὐτό που*: where one MS. reads *τι* for *που*.

part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not? Is it not therefore impossible for that which does not participate in "the same," to consist either of the same measures, or of any thing else whatever the same? It is impossible. It would therefore be equal neither to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It appears not. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and thus again it will no longer be "one," but as many as there are measures. Right. But even if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure. But it has been seen to be impossible for one (itself)[93] to be equal to any thing. It has been seen. [29.] "The one" therefore neither participates in one measure, nor in many, nor in a few, nor in any way participates in "the same," nor will it ever, as it seems, be equal to itself or to another; nor, on the other hand, greater or less either than itself or "different." It is in every respect so. But what,[94] does "the one" seem (to be) older or younger (than any thing), or to be of the same age (with any thing)? Why should it not? If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate in the similitude and equality of time, in which properties we have asserted "the one"[95] does not participate [96][either similitude or equality].[96] We so asserted. And this also we asserted, that it participates neither in dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How then, being such, can it be either older or younger (than any thing),[97] or of the same age with any thing? By no means. "The one" therefore will be neither younger, nor older, nor of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does

[93] Ficinus has "ipsum unum æquale cuique esse," which leads to *ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ ἓν εἶναι*, in lieu of *ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι*.

[94] Heindorf was the first to see that *εἶναι* had dropt out after *νεώτερον*: and Stalbaum to remark that *τῳ* depends upon *τὴν αὐτὴν*, not on *δοκεῖ*. Hence, as Ficinus has "aut junius aliquo—ipsum unum—" it is plain that Plato wrote *πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερόν του εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν τῳ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν αὐτὸ ἓν δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι*;

[95] Ficinus has "ipsi uni adesse," as if he had found in his MS. *παρεῖναι αὐτῷ ἑνί*, instead of *μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί*.

[96]—[96] The words within brackets were properly omitted by Taylor For they are evidently an interpolation of the preceding relative "which."

[97] Here again Ficinus has correctly, "junius aliquo," in Greek, *νεώτερόν του*. See just above, n. 94

not appear it would. Would it not then be impossible for "the one" to exist at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing exists in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not the older always older than the younger? What then? That which is in the act of being older than itself, is at the same time in the act of being younger than itself, [98]if it is about to have that (through) which it is in the act of being older.[98] [30.] How say you? Thus. It is requisite that nothing should exist in the act of being at variance one with another, [99]when it is already at variance;[99] but that being now at variance, to be so now; and having been, to have been so (formerly), and being about to be, to be so (hereafter); [100]but being in the act, to neither have been, nor to will be, nor to be at all at variance,[100] but to be in the act, and not otherwise to exist. It is necessary. But the older is at variance with the younger, and with nothing else. Certainly. Hence, that which is in the act of being older than itself, must necessarily at the same time be in the act of being younger than itself. It seems so. [1]But likewise to be in the act of being [1]for a time not longer than itself, nor shorter; but for a time equal to itself to be in the act of being, and to be, and to have been, and to be about to be.[1] For these are necessary. It is necessary therefore, as it appears, for such things as are in time, and participate in some such thing, to be, each of them, [itself][2] the same age with itself, and

[98]—[98] Such is Taylor's translation of the Greek, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. Ficinus has "si quidem aliquo senius esse debet;" as if he had found in his MS. εἴπερ μέλλει γέ πρεσβύτερον του γίγνεσθαι.

[99]—[99] Although ἕτερον ἑτέρου might mean "one with another," yet as ἕτερον has hitherto meant "different," the other meaning seems rather strange here.

[100]—[100] All the words within the numerals seem to me to be superfluous; unless it be said that the Latin of Ficinus has preserved the vestiges of what was originally in the Greek, "Oppositum alterum alteri, nihil fieri oportet, opposito altero jam existente; sed, hoc jam existente, jam esse, præterito illo, præteriisse; futuro, fore: dum vero fit unum oppositum, alterum quoque oppositum, nec præteriisse, nec fore, nec esse diversum est, sed fieri, nec aliter esse." I confess myself however unable to perceive what Plato meant to say; and therefore unable to recover what he wrote.

[1]—[1] Here again I am quite at a loss.

[2] I have bracketed "itself," a word to me at least perfectly unintel

to be in the act of being both older at the same time and younger than itself. It nearly seems so. But in none of these accidents is there any share for "the one." There is no share. Neither then has it any share of time, nor does it exist in any time. [31.] It does not, indeed, as the reasoning holds. What then, do not the terms "was," and "has been produced," and "was in the act of being," seem to signify a participation in what formerly existed.[3] Very much so. And do not the terms "will be," and "will be in the act of being," and "will be generated,"[6] (signify a participation in time) that is about to be hereafter?[4] Yes. And do not the terms "is," and "is in the act of being," (signify a participation) in time that is now present?[5] Entirely so. If then "the one" participates not at all in any time, it never has been, nor has been in the act of being, nor was [ever][7] nor [8][has it been now generated, nor][8] is it in the act of being,

ligible, because *αὐτὸ* is omitted in two excellent MSS., and not acknowledged by Ficinus.

[3-4-5] In the expressions *χρόνου—τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος—τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μέλλοντος*, and *τοῦ νῦν παρόντος*, it is strange that Heindorf, who properly objected to *τοῦ* before *μέλλοντος*, should not have seen that *γεγονότος*, and *τοῦ μέλλοντος*, and *τοῦ παρόντος*, were the interpretations respectively of *τοῦ ποτὲ*, and *τοῦ ἔπειτα*, and *τοῦ νῦν*. He appears however to have been misled by finding in Thucyd. i. 123, *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων*: to which he might have added i. 130, *ἐς ἔπειτα ἐμελλε πράξειν*. But both passages are equally corrupt, and admit of easy corrections. Hermann, with his usual want of critical sagacity, proposes, on Iph. T. 1234, to read *οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος*, as if the indefinite *που* could be thus inserted between *ἔπειτα* and *μέλλοντος*. The absurdity is however swallowed of course by Stalbaum. Ficinus has "an non futurum nobis designant? Futurum:" which is not sufficiently literal to enable one to see what he found in his MS.

[6] Instead of *γενηθήσεται*, which is not found, Schleiermacher wished to *γεγενήσεται*, which is a solecism equally. Plato wrote *γεννηθήσεται* here, and again shortly afterwards. Had Stalbaum known this fact, it would have saved him the trouble of writing a long and unsatisfactory note.

[7] This repetition of *ποτὲ* after *ἦν*, when it had been already introduced before *γέγονεν*, is evidently not from the hand of Plato. In fact, the second *ποτὲ*, and *νῦν*, and *ἔπειτα*, have been probably interpolated. For they are not found in the version of Ficinus—"Si ergo ipsum unum nullo participat tempore, nec fuit unquam nec fit, nec est, neque fiet, neque factum erit, neque erit."

[8—8] The words between the numerals are properly rejected by Ast, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary; who fancies that *νῦν γέγονεν* here means the present time of an action completed; as if such an idea

nor is, nor will be in the act of being hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be. It is most true. Is it possible then for any thing to participate in being, except according to some one of these? It is not. In no way then does "the one"[9] participate in being. It appears not. "The one" therefore in no way is. It seems not. Nor is it then in such a state as to be one; for it would be a being, and participate in being; but, as it seems, the one neither is one, nor is it at all, if one must trust to reasoning of this kind. It seems nearly so. But to that which is not, can there be any thing either for itself or from itself? How can there? Hence there is not for it a name, or discourse, or any science, or perception, or opinion. It appears not. Hence it cannot either be named, or spoken of, or conceived by opinion, or known, nor does it perceive[10] any thing of those really existing. So it seems. Is it possible then for this to be the case respecting "the one?" It seems to me not possible.

[32.] Are you then willing for us to return again from the beginning to our supposition, if by chance any thing shall appear to us, on returning, in a different light? I am very willing. Did we not say then, that[11] if "one is," whatever[12] may be the consequences from that supposition, we must admit them. Is it not so? Yes. Consider now from the beginning. If "one is," is it possible for it to be, and yet not participate in being? It is not. Would not being then be a property of "the one," although not the same as "the one?"

could be possibly introduced in a passage, where especial care is taken to mark distinctly the three periods into which all time is divisible—the past, present, and future. Stalbaum was perhaps misled by the words of Proclus, on the Timæus, quoted by Thomson—*τὸ γίγνεσθαί ποτε ἢ νῦν γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι*: but it is evident that we must read there—*τὸ γίγνεσθαι νῦν, ἢ ποτὲ γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι.* For *νῦν* indicates the present, *ποτε* the past, and *ἐσαῦθις* the future.

[9] Here, as every where else, Ficinus has "ipsum unum," i. e. *αὐτὸ ἕν*.

[10] Deceived by the preceding passive verbs, Ficinus translated *αἰσθάνεται*—"sentitur," forgetting that *αἰσθάνεσθαι* is a deponent.

[11] From "confessi sumus" in Ficinus, Heindorf suggested *ἔφαμεν* for *φαμὲν*, as there is here a reference to what had been stated in § 22. Stalbaum however says that though *φαμὲν* is constantly used parenthetically, *ἔφαμεν* is never so, or very rarely. Of course he did not see that *ὅτι* had dropt out before *τὰ*—

[12] Heindorf's *ὅποια* for *ποῖα* is indisputably correct, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 147, and 306 To the passages there corrected, I could now add many more.

for, [13](if it were the same,)[13] it [14]would not be the being of it,[14] nor would "the one" participate in being; but it would be all one to say "one is," and "one one." But now our supposition is not, "if one (is) one," what must be the consequence, but "if one is." Is it not so? Entirely so. Is it not then that[15] the term "is" means something different from the term "one?" Necessarily. If then a person summarily asserts that "one is," would this be no other assertion than that the one participates in being. Certainly. Let us say then again, if "one is," what will be the consequence? Consider then, if it is not necessary for this supposition to signify that "one" is existing of such a kind as to possess parts? How? Thus. If the term "it is" is said of "the one being," and "the one" (said) of "the being which is one," and both being and the one are not[16] the same, [17]but belong to that same thing which we have supposed to be "the one,"[17] is it not necessary that the whole being one should be it,[18] but that its parts should be "one" and "being?" It is necessary. [33.] Whether then should we call each of these

[13]—[13] The words within lunes are supplied by Ficinus, "alioquin si idem"—

[14]—[14] I do not believe that another passage can be produced where ἐκεῖνος is thus applied to two different nouns. I know indeed that the same thing is said to take place in the case of αὐτός. But all the instances I have noticed in Thucydides and Plato admit of an easy correction. Ficinus has, "non utique illius essentia esset, neque ipsum unum illa participâsset." From which it is evident that he omitted, either from his MS. or his own good sense, ἐκείνη and ἐκεῖνο: the latter of which is perfectly superfluous, despite the defence of Stalbaum, who says that τὸ ἓν is added to ἐκεῖνο as an explanation. But correct writers are not thus wont to put down some words superfluously and then explain them by another. Perhaps Plato wrote, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκοινώνει ἐνὸς οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκοινοῦτο ἓν ἐκείνης. For μετεῖχεν would be thus the interpretation of ἐκοινώνει and ἐκοινοῦτο.

[15] Ast was justly offended with ὡς. But he incorrectly wished to read οὕτως—σημαίνει for ὡς—σημαῖνον. Ficinus has, "Nonne ita dicitur tanquam aliud," where "dicitur" was inserted to complete the sense. Stalbaum understands αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσίς ἐστι. Perhaps Plato wrote Οὐκ οὖν ἦν πως ἄλλο—

[16] This negative is omitted in eight MSS. and by Ficinus, who has "est autem idem essentia et unum"—

[17]—[17] Ficinus has "eodem existente uno quod supposuimus," as if he had found in his MS. τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα ἑνὸς ὄντος, without ἐκείνου, which is certainly superfluous, or else τοῦ ἑνὸς is an interpolation

[18] In lieu of αὐτοῦ Thomson was the first to suggest αὐτό: which he got perhaps from Ficinus, "totum quidem unum ens ipsum esse."

parts a part alone? [19] Or must we call a part a part of the whole? Of the whole.[19] Whatever then is one, is a whole, and possesses a part. Entirely so. What then, [20]of these parts of the one being both "one" and "being," do either desert each the other, so that "one" is wanting to "being," and "being" wanting to "one"?[20] It would not be. Again, each of the parts contains both "one" and "being;" [21] and the least part is composed of two parts;[21] and thus perpetually by the same reasoning, whatever becomes a part possesses these two parts perpetually; for "one" always contains "being," and "being, one;" [22] so that, two things being produced, one never is.[22] Entirely so. Would not then "the one" existing thus become an infinite multitude. So it seems.

Proceed still further by this road. By what? We have said that the one participates in "being," so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account "one being" appears to be "many." It does so. What then? If one itself, which we say participates in being, we receive mentally, alone by itself, and apart from that in which we say it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this very thing be many? I think it will be one. [34.] But let us likewise look to another thing.[23] It is necessary for its "being" to be one thing, and itself another, if "the one" itself is not "be-

[19]—[19] The correct arrangement of the speeches as suggested by Heindorf, Ficinus had already given in his version.

[20]—[20] Such is the English for the Latin of Ficinus, "Num hæ partes unius entis, scilicet unum et ens, ita se invicem deserunt, ut ipsi enti unum, et ipsi uni ens desit:" which is certainly more intelligible than the Greek, but not a translation of the words, *τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον, ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μόριον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόριον*: words that Schleiermacher could not understand; and hence he wished, with the approbation of Heindorf, to reject both the *μόριον*: while Stalbaum would read *μορίου* with ed. Bas. 2, and in some MSS. But what is gained by the alteration on the ground of either sense or syntax he does not state, nor can I discover.

[21]—[21] Stalbaum quotes the version of Ficinus, "adeo ut pars quælibet ex duabus saltem particulis constituatur." But there is nothing in the Greek to answer to "quælibet," nor could *τὸ ἐλαχιστον* be rendered "saltem."

[22]—[22] I confess I cannot see the syntax in *ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι.*

[23] So Ficinus renders, *Ἰδωμεν δὴ ἄλλο τι*, "Consideremus jam et aliud quiddam," which leads to *Ἰδωμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ*—. Heindorf objected to this version, not perceiving that in *ἄλλο τι* there was a reference to the preceding *Ἰθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.*

ing;" but as being one[24] it participated in "being." It is necessary. If then "being" is one thing, and "one" another, neither is "one" by its existence as one different from "being," nor "being" by its existence as "being" different from "one;" but they are different from each other[25] through that which is different and another.[25] Entirely so. So that "the different" is the same neither with "the one" nor with "the being." How can it? What then, if we should select from them, whether if you will "the being" and "the different," or "the being" and "the one," or "the one" and "the different," should we not, in each selection, select certain two things, which it is proper to denominate both? How so? Thus. It is possible to speak of "being." It is. And again, to speak of "one." And this likewise. Are not then either spoken of? Yes. But what, when I say "being," and "one," do I not pronounce both? Entirely so. And if I should say "being" and "different," or "different" and "one," should I not in each of these pronounce both perfectly?[26] Yes. But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And is there any method for each of things, that are two, not to be one? There is not. Of these then, since each two exist together, each would be one. It appears so. [35.] But if each of them is one, and any one whatever is placed together with them, by any kind of union whatever, do not they all become three? Certainly. But are not three odd, and two even? How should they not be? What then, being two, is it not necessary for twice to be? and being three, thrice; since twice one exists in two, and thrice one in three? It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How not? But what, if there are three and twice, and there are two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be [27]twice

[24] Here, by the aid of Ficinus, "sed ut unum essentia participat," Heindorf elicited ὡς ἓν ὂν οὐσίας from ὡς ἓν οὐσίας, which Stalbaum has unwisely rejected.

[25—25] Ficinus has "per id quod est ipsum per se alterum et ipsum per se aliud," which points to something else than τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ.

[26] Such is Taylor's translation of πανταχῶς. Perhaps he had in his mind παντελῶς: which would be certainly more correct, or rather πανταχῶς εὖ, as shown by the following ὀρθῶς.

[27—27] Instead of τρία τε δὶς εἶναι καὶ δὶς τρία, Schleiermacher suggested, what Heindorf and Stalbaum have adopted, τρία τε δὶς εἶναι καὶ

three and thrice two?[27] Entirely so. Hence, there would be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It is so. If then this is the case, do you think that any number is left, which is not necessarily there? By no means. If then "one" exists, it is necessary for number to exist likewise. It is necessary. But if number exists, the many would exist, and an infinite multitude of beings; or is there not a number, infinite in multitude, and participating in "being?" There is, by all means. If then every number participates in "being," would not each part also of number participate in "being?" Yes. "Being" then has been distributed through all things, being many, and stands apart from nothing existing, whether the least or the greatest. Or is it not absurd even to ask this question?[28] For how could "being" stand apart from any thing existing? By no means. [36.] "Being" then is cut up into fractions the smallest possible, and the greatest, and existing in every degree,[29] and is divided the most of all things,[29] and the parts of "being" are infinite.[30] Such is the case. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed.[30] What then, is there any one of these, which is a part of "being," and yet is not one part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think there must always be a necessity for it, as long as it exists, to be a certain one thing; but that it cannot possibly be nothing. There is a necessity.[31] "The one," therefor, is present to all (and) each part of "being,"[31] deficient in neither a less or

δύο τρίς. Taylor perhaps led the way to the right reading by his translation, "thrice two and twice three."

[28] Ficinus has "Atque id dubitare absurdum est:" as if he had found in his MS. *αἴρεσθαι*, read in another MS. likewise. The whole clause was omitted by Taylor.

[29]—[29] Of the clause between the numerals *καὶ μερίσται πάντων μάλιστα* (or as one MS. reads, *μέγιστα*) the words *ἢ μερίσται* seem to be a gl. for *κεκερμάτισται*, and *πάντων μάλιστα* for *ὡς οἷόντε—μέγιστα*; or else there is some derangement of the text here.

[30]—[30] Here again there seems to be another interpolation. For all the words between the numerals are perfectly superfluous after the preceding *ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας*. Unless it be said that the dialogue ought to be thus arranged, by reading after *πανταχῶς ὄντα*. *Ἔχει οὕτως. Πλεῖστα ἄρα ἔστι τὰ μέρη τῆς οὐσίας. Πλεῖστα μέντοι. Καὶ μερίσται πάντων μάλιστα, ἃ ἐστι μέρη αὐτῆς ἀπέραντα. Ὡς οἷον τε.*

[31]—[31] Ficinus has, "Non solum ergo universæ essentiæ, sed illius etiam singulis partibus unum adest." From whence Heindorf elicited *Πρὸς τῷ—παντὶ ἄρα καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῷ—μέρει*. He should have suggested *Πρός*

a greater part, or in any thing else. It is so. Is then "one" a whole, existing in many places at the same time? Look into this. I do look, and I see it is impossible. It is divided then, since it is not a whole; for it will not otherwise than in a divided state, be present to all the parts of "being." Certainly. But there is a great necessity for that, which is divisible, to be as many as are the parts. There is a necessity. [37.] We did not then just now say truly, when we said that "being" was distributed into very many parts. For it is not divided into more parts than "one" itself,[32] but into parts equal to those of "the one:" for neither is "being" wanting to "the one," nor "the one" to "being;" but being two are always equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely so. "One itself," therefore, having been cut up into fractions by "being," becomes many and infinite in multitude. So it appears. Not only then is "the being"[33] many, but it is likewise necessary for "the one," when distributed by "being," to be many. Entirely so. Moreover, because the parts are parts of a whole, "the one" will be finite according as it is a whole. Or are not the parts included in the whole? Necessarily so. But that which includes would be a bound. How not? "The one" therefore is somehow both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so. As it is bounded then, has it not likewise extremes? Of necessity. But what, if it be a whole, would it not have likewise a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one whatever of these be wanting[34] to any thing, will that thing be willing to be any longer a whole? It will not. "The one" then, as it seems, would possess a beginning, and end, and a middle. It would. [38.] But the middle is equally distant from the ex-

τε παντι ἁρα ἑκάστῳ τε—as I have translated. Stalbaum would read, Πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστοτε. But ἑκάστοτε, "on every occasion," would be here absurd. For ἑκάστοτε is seldom found except with verbs of speaking.

[32] Ficinus has, "ipsum unum," i. e. αὐτοῦ, not τοῦ; or else we must omit τοῦ with three MSS.

[33] Instead of τὸ ὂν ἕν, Thomson would read, from Proclus, τὸ ἓν ὄν. But as ὄν is omitted by many MSS., Stalbaum correctly rejects ἕν—for thus τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἓν are properly opposed to each other.

[34] Influenced by the syntax, Ficinus translated τοῦ ἓν as if it were τοῦ ἑνὸς; but Taylor more correctly omitted those words entirely, and thus perhaps led Schleiermacher to read του ἕν—adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb. But then we ought to read ἐθελήσει αὐτὸ, in lieu of ἐθελήσαι ἂν. For thus αὐτὸ would refer to του.

tremes; for it would not otherwise be the middle. It would not. And "the one" being such would, as it appears, participate in a certain figure, either straight or round, or mixed up of both. It would so. Will it then, being such, not exist itself in itself and in another? How? Each of the parts is surely in the whole, nor is any one out of the whole. It is so. But all the parts are surrounded by the whole. Yes. But "the one" is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all. Certainly. Is not then the one the whole? How not? If then all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are the one, and the whole itself and all the parts are surrounded by the whole, "the one" would be surrounded by "the one," and thus "the one" would be already in itself. It appears so. But on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in any one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a portion of all the parts, and the whole is not in this, how can it be[35] any longer in all the parts? Not at all. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible. It is impossible. [39.] But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary for it to be either in some other, or no where? It is necessary. But if no where, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary for it to be in another? Entirely so. So far therefore as "the one" is a whole, it is in another; but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself; and thus "the one" will necessarily be in itself and in another. Necessarily.

But as "the one" is naturally such, is it not necessary for it to be both moved and to stand still? How? It stands still, if it be in itself. For being in one and not departing from this, it will be in the same, through being in itself. It will. But that which is always in the same must somehow necessarily stand still always. Entirely so. What then, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily be never in the same? But if it be never in the same, can it

[35] Instead of ἓν ἐσται, acknowledged by "erit unum" in Ficinus, Taylor was the first to read tacitly ἐνεσται, as suggested subsequently by Heindorf, and confirmed by two MSS.

ever stand still; and if it does not stand still, must it not be moved? Certainly. It is necessary therefore for "the one," being always in itself and in another, to be always moved and to stand still. It appears so.

It ought moreover to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with and different from others, if it suffers what has been (mentioned) before. [40.] How? Every thing somehow is in this state with relation to every thing. It is either the same or different: or if not the same or different, it will be a part of that, to which it is so related, or, it will be with respect to a part a whole. It appears so. Is then "the one" a part of itself? By no means. [36]It will not then with respect to a part of itself be a whole, nor with respect to itself a part.[36] For it cannot. But is "one" therefore different from "the one?" By no means. It will not then be different from itself. Certainly not. If then it is neither different, nor a whole, nor yet a part, with respect to itself, is it not necessary for it to be the same with itself? It is necessary. What then, is it not necessary for that, which is elsewhere than itself,[37] while existing in the same with itself, to be different from itself, if indeed it shall be elsewhere?[38] It appears so to me. In this state does "the one" appear to be existing at the same time both in itself and

[36]—[36] Such is evidently what the balance of the sentence requires. The Greek is, Οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν: which Stalbaum, with Schmidt, says is to be thus taken, Οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτὸ (τὸ ἓν) αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη ὡς πρὸς μέρος, and thus translated, "It will then be neither a whole of itself, as if in relation to a part:" out of which I must leave others to make what sense they can. It is beyond my comprehension. And even were the sense as clear as it is now obscure, the syntax would be inadmissible. For in the expression αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ, those two words must go together; nor could αὐτοῦ ὅλον mean in genuine Greek "a whole of itself;" for the expression ὅλον ὡς μορίον, in § 41, is corrupt, and is there corrected. The proper phrase is in § 44, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ. Plato probably wrote, as I have translated, Οὐ δ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἄν. Correctly then has one MS. αὐτοῦ αὐτό. Heindorf was near the mark, when he explained πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν by οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἂν εἴη.

[37] As ἑτέρωθι is an adverb it should be opposed to another adverb, and thus united to ἑαυτοῦ, a pronoun.

[38] Ficinus has "Si quidem alibi quam ipsummet existat." But the whole clause would thus be only a repetition of what has been just enunciated. I suspect that εἴπερ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται is merely an explanation of τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὄν.

in another. So it seems. In this way then it appears that "the one" will be different from itself. It does so. What then, if any thing[39] is different from any thing, will it not be different from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are not all such things, as are not one, different from "the one?" And is not "the one" (different from such things as) are not one? How not? "The one" therefore will be different from the rest. Different. See then, are not "the different" and "the same" contrary to each other. How not? Is the same ever wont to be in the different, or the different in the same? It is not wont. [41.] If therefore the different is never in the same, there is not one of existing things, in which the different exists for any time; for if it existed in any thing during any time whatever, during that time the different would be in the same. Is it not so? It is so. But since it is never in the same, the different would never exist in any of existing things. True. Neither therefore would the different exist in things which are not one, nor in "the one." It would not. Through "the different" therefore the one will not be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one be different from "the one." Not indeed. Nor through themselves will they be different from each other, since they do not participate in "the different." For how can they? But if they are different neither through themselves, nor through "the different," would they not escape entirely from being different from each other? They would escape. But neither do things, which are not one, participate in "the one:" for they would be no longer not one, but in some way one. True. Nor would things, which are not one, be number; for possessing number, they would thus be altogether not one. They would not. But what, can things which are not one be parts of one? Or would not things, which are not one, in this way participate in "the one?" They would participate. If then this is entirely "one," but those not one, "the one" would not be a part of things, which are not one, [40]nor a whole, as if they were a part;[40] nor, on the contrary, would things, which

[39] Instead of *εἰ τουτὶ* two MSS. *εἴ του τι*, as suggested by Heindorf. And so Ficinus, "Si quid vero ab aliquo alterum est."

[40—40] The Greek in most MSS. is *οὔθ' ὅλον ὡς μορίου*—and ([41—41]) *οὔθ' ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί*. Now as the two clauses ought evidently to balance each other. Plato probably wrote *ὡς μορίων*, (i. e. *τῶν μὴ ἕν*—) and *ὡς*

are not one, be parts of "the one," nor wholes [41] as if the one were a part.[41] They will not. [42.] But we have said that things, which are neither parts, nor wholes, nor different from each other, will be the same with each other. We have said so. Shall we then assert that "the one," since it is in this state with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them? Let us say so. "The one" then, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself. It appears very nearly so, at least from this reasoning.

But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others? Perhaps so. Since then it appears to be different from the others, the others likewise will be somehow different from it. But what then? Will it not then be different from the others in the same manner as the others from it? And this neither more nor less? For what should it be? If then neither more nor less, it (will be) similarly. Certainly. In the manner then through which "the one" [42] suffers to become different from the others, and the others similarly from it, in that manner would the one be suffering similarly to the others, and the others (similarly) to the one? How say you? Thus. Do not you apply each name to something? I do; what then? Could you pronounce the same name often or once? I could.[43] When therefore you pronounce (a name) once, do you speak of the thing, to which the name belongs; but not, if often? Or, is there not a great necessity for you always to speak of the same thing, whether you pronounce the same name once or often? What then? [43.] Is not "different" a name applied to some thing? Entirely so. When therefore you pronounce it, whether once or often, you do not apply this name to any other thing,[44]

μορίου (i. e. *τοῦ ἑνός*). Opportunely then does one MS. offer *μορίων*. And thus we shall get rid of the incorrect expression objected to in § 40.

[42] Ficinus has "si uni contigit, ut alterum sit ab aliis." For he probably found in his MS. *πέπονθε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων*. At least *τὸ ἓν* might easily have dropt out before *τῶν*.

[43] This is a strange answer to a bipartite question. Hence Taylor inserted "once." But that is at variance with the subsequent question of Parmenides. Perhaps Plato wrote *Ἐγωγ' ἑκατέρως*, i. e. "I could either way." For *ἑκατέρως* might have been lost through the following *πότερον*. Ficin., "vel sæpius vel semel."

[44] As *ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ὀνομάζειν* and *ἄλλο ὀνομάζειν* are synonymous, it is evident that Plato did not write both here. Correctly then has Ficinus omitted one by rendering "ad aliud quiddam significandum."

but that of which it is the name. Necessarily so. When we say then that "the others" are different from "the one," and "the one" different from "the others," twice pronouncing the name "different," we do not at all apply the expression to any other nature but that of which it is the name. Entirely so. In the way then that "the one" is different from "the others," and "the others" from "the one," [45]according to the very thing which "the different" has, "the one" would suffer nothing else than what the others do, but just the same:[45] but that which somehow suffers the same (is) similar. Is it not? Yes. But in the way that "the one" suffers so as to be different from the others, according to that very way[46] every thing would be similar to every thing; for every thing is different from every thing. It appears so. Moreover the similar is contrary to the dissimilar. It is. Is not "the different" too contrary to "the same?"[47] This also. Moreover this likewise has been made apparent, that "the one" is the same with [and different from[48]] "the others." It has been made apparent. But to be the same with "others" is a contrary suffering to the being different from "the others." Entirely so. As far as it was different, it appeared to be similar. Yes. So far then as it is the same, it will be dissimilar according to its suffering the contrary to that suffering which produces the similar:[49] but did the different produce the similar?[49] Yes. The

[45]—[45] Such is the English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation of the Greek text, where all previous commentators have been equally in the dark, *κατὰ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι, κ. τ. λ.* For so Stalbaum has, with Thomson, adopted *τὸ ἕτερον* found in an Oxford MS. of Damascius *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, and subsequently in one MS. of Plato. But upon what *πεπονθέναι* is to depend Stalbaum does not say himself, nor could any one else. The whole passage is desperately corrupt. From the version of Ficinus it would seem as if there was in his MS. a different, though not more intelligible, arrangement of the words.

[46] Ficin., "secundum hoc idem," i. e. *κατὰ ταὐτο τοῦτο*, found subsequently in a single MS., which I have adopted in lieu of *κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο*.

[47] Ficinus, "Nonne et ipsum alterum ipsi eidem," which leads to *Οὐκ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕτερον αὐτῷ ταὐτῷ*. Whatever Stalbaum may say, the article could not be prefixed to *τὸ αὐτὸ*. Identity in Greek is *ταυτότης*, not *τὸ ταὐτόν*.

[48] The words within brackets all the MSS. and Ficinus omit.

[49]—[49] Ficinus has "simile autem nonne faciebat ipsum alterum," which leads to *ὡμοίου δέ τι οὐ τὸ ἕτερον*, in lieu of *ὡμοίου δὲ που τὸ ἕτερον*. For *ὁμοιοῦν* requires its case. And hence, just before, one would prefer *-ῷ ὁμοιοῦντί τι πάθει* to *τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει*. Hence too just afterwards

same therefore will render something dissimilar; or it will not be contrary to the different. So it appears. [44.] "The one" therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to "the others;" so far as it is different it will be similar; but so far as it is the same, dissimilar. [49] It has, it seems, such reasoning.[49] And it has this likewise. What? So far as it suffers the same, it does not suffer what is of a different kind; and not suffering what is of a different kind, it is not dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it is similar: but so far as it suffers another thing, it is of a different kind; and being of a different kind, it is dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since then "the one" is both the same with and different from "the others," according to both and each of these cases, it will be similar and dissimilar to "the others." Entirely so. And will it not in a similar manner, since it has appeared to be both different from, and the same with, itself, appear, according to both these, and each, to be similar and dissimilar to itself? Necessarily so.

But consider now how "the one" subsists with respect to touching and not touching itself and "the others." I consider. For "the one" has somehow appeared to be in itself a whole. Right. But is not "the one" in "the others" likewise? Yes. So far then as "the one" is in "the others," it will touch "the others;" but so far as it is in itself, it will be prevented from touching "the others;" but being in itself it will touch itself. So it appears. And thus, indeed, "the one" will both touch itself and "the others." It will touch. But what (will it be) in this view? Must not every thing, which is about to touch any thing, lie close to that, which it is about to touch, and occupy that seat, [50] which may be after that seat, in which that may lie,

we must read Ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τι ταὐτὸν in lieu of τό ταὐτὸν, where the five best MSS. omit τὸ.

[49]—[49] I cannot understand Ἔχει γαρ οὖν δὴ—καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. For though τὸ ἓν might be the nominative to ἔχει, yet οὖν δὴ and καὶ have not the least force here; nor could τοιοῦτον be opposed to τόνδε. Ficin. has, "Talem, ut videtur, rationem habet," omitting γὰρ οὖν δὲ, while in καὶ lies hid ἔοικε.

[50]—[50] Such is the unintelligible version of Stalbaum's text, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον, ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ᾖ ἕδραν; ἢ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται. But ἕδραν could not be thus repeated, nor could μετ' ἐκείνην thus follow ᾖ, a verb of rest. We meet indeed just after with ἐφεξῆς μεθ' ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι. But there Plato wrote ἐφεξῆς ἑαυτῷ, similar to the preceding and following ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ: while here the words ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ᾖ ἕδρα are

which it touches?[50] It is necessary. "The one," therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to lie close to itself, and occupy the place close to that in which it is. It ought so. [45.] Would not "the one," if it were two, do this, and be in two places at once? But as long as it is one, it will not be wont to do so. It will not. The same necessity therefore belongs to "the one," to be neither two nor to touch itself. The same. But neither will it touch the others. Why? Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing, which is separate from it, it ought to be placed close to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things therefore at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place. Certainly. But if a third is added close upon the two terms,[51] there will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be likewise added; and the result is that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers. For by how much the two first things exceeded the contacts, [52][so as to be more in number than the contacts,][52] by just so much does all the following number exceed the multitude of the contacts. For already hereafter[53] one is added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. As many then as are in number the things existing, (by so many,) less by one, are the contacts always. True. If then there is only one thing, and not a pair, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that the other things, different from "the one," are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different? We have. [46.]

evidently the interpretation of *τὴν ἐχομενην*. For thus the expression *τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον τὴν ἐχομένην* in the first clause is the counterpart of *τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον* in the second; and so too by the aid of *ἐκείνης ἐν ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν* in the second, we may correct the first by reading *ἧς, ἵν' ἂν κέηται ἅπτοιτ' ἄν*. The sense would then be, "occupying the seat close upon that which, where should it lie perchance, it would touch."

[51] Heindorf was justly offended with *ὅροιν*. But incorrectly suggested *Ἐὰν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν*—For in this formula the article cannot be omitted. Compare Legg. iii. p. 685, A., p. 692, D., Lysid. p. 220, C., Thucyd. i. 104, which I should have quoted in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 156, to confirm my correction in Thucyd. i. 36, *τούτων δεῖ, εἰ περιόψεσθ' ἓν, τὰ δύο εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν*. Sauppe happily reads here *ὁμόροιν*, "contiguous." I prefer *παρόντοιν* to *ὅροιν*—

[52]—[52] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[53] As *τὸ λοιπὸν* cannot be united to *προσγίγνεται*, read *κατὰ τὸν λόγον*.

Number therefore is not in the others, since one is not in them. How can it? The others, therefore, are not one or two, or [54]any thing possessing the name of another number.[54] No. "The one," therefore, is one alone, and could not be two. It appears not. Contact, therefore, is not, when two are not. It is not. "The one" therefore will neither touch "the others," nor will "the others" touch "the one," as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, therefore, "the one" will both touch and not touch others and itself. So it appears.

Is it not therefore equal and unequal to itself and "the others?" How? If "the one" were greater or less than "the others," or "the others" greater or less than "the one," would it not follow that by "the one" being one, and "the others" different from "the one," they would be not an atom greater or an atom less than each other, by those very existences? But if, in addition to their being such as they are, each possessed equality, they would be equal to each other. But if "the one" possessed magnitude, and "the others" smallness, or "the one" magnitude, but "the others" smallness, would not that, to whatever species magnitude was present, be the greater; and that, to whatever (species) smallness (was present), be the less. Necessarily so. Are there not therefore these two species, magnitude and smallness? For if they had no existence they surely could never be contrary to each other, and be inherent in things existing. [47.] How should they? If then smallness is inherent in "the one," it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But what if it be inherent in the whole? Will it not either be extended on an equality through the whole of "the one," or surround "the one?" Plainly so. If smallness then is inherent on an equality in "the one," will it not be equal to "the one;" but if it surrounds "the one," will it not be greater? How not? Can then smallness be equal to or greater than any thing, and produce the effects of magnitude and equality, but not on itself? It is impossible. Smallness then will not be inherent in the whole of "the one;" but, if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor

[54]—[54] From Taylor's translation of the Greek *οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν*, it would seem he wished to read, what the sense requires, *οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχον τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν*, in lieu of *ἔχοντα ὄνομα*, I should however prefer *οὔτε ἄλλο ἀριθμοῦ ἔχον τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν*, i. e. "nor any thing else possessing the name of number."

yet, on the other hand, in the whole part; for if not, it would produce the same effect as in the case of the whole; (for)[55] it would either be equal to, or greater than, the part in which it is inherent. It is necessary. Smallness then will not be in any thing existing, being inherent in neither a part nor a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself. It seems not. [56]Neither will magnitude be in it. For there would be some other thing greater, and, besides magnitude itself, that in which magnitude is inherent, and this too, although it being not small, which it ought to exceed, if indeed it be great;[56] but which in this case is impossible, since smallness is not inherent in any thing existing. True. But magnitude itself is not greater than any thing else but smallness itself; nor is smallness less than any thing else but magnitude itself. [48.] It is not. Neither then would "the others" be greater than "the one," nor less, since they possess neither magnitude nor smallness; nor do these two possess any power either of exceeding or of being exceeded with respect to "the one," but only with respect to each other; nor, on the contrary, will "the one" be either greater or less than these two, or "the others," as it possesses neither magnitude nor smallness. So indeed it appears. If then "the one" is neither greater nor less than "the others," is it not necessary for it to neither exceed nor be exceeded by them? It is necessary. Is there not also a great necessity for that, which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, to be on an equality? and if on an equality, to be equal? How not? "The one" therefore will be in this state with respect to itself. Possessing neither magnitude nor smallness in itself, it would neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself; but being on an equality, it would be equal to itself. Entirely so. "The one" therefore will be equal both to itself and "the others." So it appears.

But being itself in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and surrounding itself, it would be greater than itself;

[55] Ficinus has "quippe." From whence Thomson suggested *γὰρ ἴση ἔσται, ἢ*—The asyndeton is however supported by Heind. and Stalb.

[56]—[56] I must leave for others to understand, if they can, all the words between the numerals. Ficinus has, "Sed neque etiam magnitudo inerit; quippe aliud quidquam, præter ipsammet magnitudinem, majus esset, ut puta id, cui inerit magnitudo; veruntamen nihil est parvum, quod quidem superari oportet a magno si quid magnum sit;" which is no more intelligible than the Greek

but being surrounded, less than itself; and thus "the one" would be both greater and less than itself. It would so. Is not this also necessary, that there is nothing beyond "the one" and "the others?" How should it be otherwise? But ought not that, which has a being, to be always some where? Yes. And does not that, which exists in another, exist as the less in the greater? For one thing cannot otherwise exist in another. [49.] It cannot. But since there is nothing else apart from "the one" and "the others," and it is necessary for these to be in something, is it not necessary for them to be in one another, [57][the others in "the one," and "the one" in the others];[57] or that they should be no where? It appears so. Because then "the one" is in "the others," "the others" will be greater than "the one," through surrounding it; and "the one" will be less than "the others," by being surrounded. But because "the others" are in "the one," "the one," by the same reasoning, would be greater than "the others;" and "the others" less than "the one." It appears so. "The one," therefore, is equal to, greater and less, than both itself and others. It seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and less, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and "the others;" and if of measures, also of the parts. How should it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also in number be more and less than itself and "the others;" and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and "the others." How? It would surely be of greater measures than are those things, than which it is greater; and (it would be) of as many parts as measures; and in the same manner, (in the case of those) than which it is less; and similarly (in the case of those) to which it is equal. It is so. Since then "the one" is both greater, less, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more, and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How not? If then it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself; but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. [50.] But will not "the one" be in a similar state as regards "the others?" Because it appears to be greater in magnitude than them, is it not necessary for it to be more in number than "the

[57]—[57] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation

others?" and, because less in magnitude, fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, equal likewise in multitude to "the others?" It is necessary. And thus again, as it seems, "the one" will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and "the others." It will so.

Does "the one," then, participate in time? And is it, and does it become, younger and older, itself than itself and "the others?" And again,[58] neither younger nor older than itself and the others, although participating of time? How? "To be" is surely its property, since it "is the one." Certainly. But what else is "to be" than a participation in "being" in conjunction with the present? Just as "it was" is a participation in "being" in conjunction with the past, and "it will be" with the future? It is so. It must participate then in time, if it participates in "being." Entirely so. Must it not therefore participate in time while progressing? Certainly. It is always, therefore, in the act of being older than itself, if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we then remember that the older is (always)[59] becoming older than that which is becoming younger?[60] We remember. Would not then "the one," since it is becoming older than itself, become older than itself, while it is thus becoming younger? Necessarily so. It becomes then both younger and older than itself. Certainly. [51.] But is it not then older, when it is in the act of being according to the present time, which is between the "was" and the "will be:" for in proceeding from the "then" to "the hereafter," it will not pass over "the now?" It will not. Will it not then stop in the act of being older, when it arrives at "the now," and is no longer in the act of being, but is already[61] older? For as it proceeds

[58] Ficinus has "et rursus contra," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον αὖ*, or simply *καὶ αὖ*—

[59] This "always" is from "sæpe" in Ficinus; who perhaps found *ἀεὶ* before *τὸ πρεσβύτερον*—

[60] This proposition was discussed in § 29 and 30.

[61] By no process can *τότ' ἤδη* be thus united, as I long since stated, on Prom. 947. Wherever those words are combined in prose, we may generally read *τότε δὴ*. Sometimes however the correction is not quite so easy, yet even here it is nearer at hand than one would expect to find it. For Ficinus has "nec tum fit, sed est jam senius," which leads to *καὶ οὐ γιγνέται τότ', ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη πρεσβύτερον*. With regard to Prom. 947, I should have corrected *πατρὸς δ' ἀρὰ Κρόνου τό τ', οἰδ' εὖ, παντελῶς κοανθησεται*: and similarly in Agam. 940, *Ὅταν δε τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ' ὄμφα-*

it will never be laid hold of by "the now." For that which is proceeding is in such a state as to touch both "the now" and "the hereafter," leaving hold of "the now," but laying hold of "the hereafter," because it is in the act of being between "the hereafter" and "the now." True. But if it is necessary for whatever is in the act of being not to pass by "the now," when it arrives at that point, it always stops in the act of being, and "is" then whatever it may happen to become. It appears so. "The one," then, when, in becoming older, it arrives at "the now," stops in the act of being, and then "is" older. Entirely so. "Is" it not then older than what it was becoming older? And was it not becoming (older) than itself? Certainly. Now the older is older than the younger. It is. "The one" then is younger than itself, when in becoming older, it arrives at "the now." Of necessity. But "the now" is always present with "the one," through the whole of its being; for it is always "now," as long as it "is." How not? "The one," therefore, always is, and is in the act of being younger and older than itself. So it appears. But "is the one," or is it in the act of being, [62]for a time longer than or equal to itself?[62] An equal time. [52.] But that which either is in the act of being, or is for an equal time, has the same age. How not? But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger. It is neither. "The one," therefore, since it is in the act of being, and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor is in the act of being younger or older than itself. It appears to me not.

But what of "the others?"[63] I have not what to say. But this at least you have to say, that "the others," if they are different things from "the one,"[64] and not a different thing, are more than "one." For that which is different would be one; but those that are different are more than one, and would possess multitude. They would. But being a multitude

κος πικρᾶς Οἶνον, τόθ' ἂν οἶδ' ψῦχος ἐν δόμοις πέλειν, quoted by Paley to gainsay my canon. Render, "Then know I upon the house there will be cold."

[62]—[62] Ficinus has "Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut fit, quam ipsummet; an potius æquum." From whence Cornarius would supply ἢ ἐλάττω after χρόνον; which Heindorf felt half disposed to adopt; for the flow of the ideas appears thus to be more natural.

[63] The genitive τῶν ἄλλων has nothing to depend on. The syntax requires τὰ τῶν ἄλλων—

[64] Here τοῦ ἑνὸς depends not on τὰ ἄλλα, but on ἕτερον.

they would participate in a greater number than "the one?" How not? What then? Shall we say that the things more in number are, or have been, generated prior, or the less? The less. The least then is the first. Now is not this "the one?" Certainly. "The one," therefore, was generated the first of all things possessing number: but all "the others" have number, if they are others and not another. They have. But that which was first generated was, I think, prior in existence: but the others are posterior. But such as have been generated posterior, are younger than that which was generated prior; and thus "the others" would be younger than "the one,' and "the one" would be older than "the others." It would. But what is this? Could "the one" be generated contrary to its nature? or is this impossible? Impossible. But "the one" has appeared to possess parts; and, if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle. Yes. Is not then the beginning generated first of all, both of "the one" and of each of "the others;" and after the beginning all "the others," as far as the end? What then? [53.] We will say moreover, that all the others are parts of the whole and of one; but that "the one," together with the end, has been generated one and a whole. We will say so. Now the end, I think, is generated the last of all, but "the one" is naturally generated together with this; so that, if it is necessary for "the one" to be generated not contrary to nature, it would, having been generated together with the end, be naturally generated the last of "the others." It appears so. "The one," therefore, is younger than "the others," but "the others" are older than "the one." So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning or any other part whatever of "the one," or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts, be necessarily one, [since it is a part]?[65] Necessarily. "The one," therefore, would be generated together with the first (part), while in the act of being, and together with the second; and is never wanting to any one of the other parts, while in the act of being, until, arriving at the extremity, it becomes one whole, having been left out neither from the middle, nor from the last nor the first, nor from any other (part) whatever in its generation. True. "The one," therefore, will have the same age with "the others," so that, if it be

[65] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

not "the one" contrary to its own nature, it would be generated neither prior nor posterior to "the others," but together with them; and according to this reasoning, "the one" will neither be older nor younger than "the others," nor "the others" than "the one:" but, according to the former reasoning, "the one" was both older and younger than "the others," and they in a similar manner than it. Entirely so.

[54.] After this manner, then, "the one" is and has been generated. But what again shall we say of its becoming older and younger than the others, and of the others than "the one;" and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? (As we said) respecting its being, (shall we say) in the same manner respecting its becoming to be? or otherwise? I am not able to say. But I am able (to say) this; that, although one thing is older than another, yet it cannot become still older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was produced; nor, on the other hand, can that which is younger become younger. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same degree as that, by which they were distant at first. How not? "That which is" therefore would never become older or younger than any being,[66] if it is always different by an equal quantity from it in age: but (this)[67] is and was older, and that younger; but is not becoming so. True. "The one" likewise will never become either older or younger than "the others," it being so already. Never. But see whether in this way (they) become younger and older.[68] In what way? The same as that through which "the

[66] Instead of *τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος*, Schleiermacher, with whom Heindorf, Bekker, and Stalbaum agree, would read *τοῦ ὄντος*—One would prefer *ὄντος ὁτουοῦν*, i. e. "any being whatever."

[67] On the omission of *τὸ μὲν* in the first clause, answering to *τὸ δὲ* in the second, Heindorf refers to his note on Theætetus, § 96, which Stalbaum has, according to custom, transcribed on Protagor. p. 330, A., Rep. v. p. 451, E. But there, as here, Ficinus probably found the correct reading in his MS., as shown by his version, "hoc quidem senius, illud autem junius."

[68] As there is nothing to which the plurals *πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα* can be referred, Heindorf wished to read *πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον*. But Stalbaum would understand *αὐτὰ*, i. e. *τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα*. Taylor translated "other things," misled by the version of Ficinus: "Sed aspice posthac, utrum alia quadam ratione et juniora hæc et seniora fiant," where "alia" is the ablative case, not nominative. He should have elicited

one" was made to appear older than "the others," and "the others" (older) than "the one." [55.] What then? Since "the one" is older than "the others," it has been generated during a longer time than "the others." Certainly. Now consider again, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part? By a smaller. [69] Will not then "the one" differ from "the others" by an age as great subsequently as it did at first? but, receiving an equal time with "the others," it will differ always in age less than before.[69] Will it not be so? Yes. But would not that, which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those, than which it was before older? Younger. But if that is younger, will not, on the other hand, "the others" be older with respect to "the one" than before? Entirely so. That, therefore, which was generated younger, would be in the act of becoming older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never is older, but is always in the act of becoming older than it; for the one advances to a younger, but the other to an older, state; and on the other hand, that which is older is in the act of becoming younger in the same manner than the younger. For both tending to that which is contrary to themselves, they are in the act of becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they would not be able to become so. For should they become so, they would no longer be in the act of becoming, but would be (now).[70] But now they are in the act of becoming younger and older than each other; and "the one" indeed is in the act of becoming younger than "the others,"

rather from "posthac," and "alia," and "hæc," "Ορα δ' ἔτι, εἰ ἄλλῃ ὁδῷ ταὐτὰ πρεσβύτερα, although Ficinus found in his MS. ταῦτα, "hæc," not ταὐτὰ, "eadem." The sense would then be—"But see further, whether by another road the same things become older and younger."

[69]—[69] This is well explained by Heindorf; who says that this is not, although it seems at first sight to be so, at variance with the preceding assertion in § 54, that if equals be added to unequals, the two quantities will not differ more than they did originally. For here the proposition may be understood by supposing that, if the ages of A and B are respectively 20 and 18 years, A is older than B by $\frac{1}{10}$ of the longer period; but if 4 years be added to each, then A will be older than B by only $\frac{1}{12}$ of the longer period.

[70] Ficinus, "sed jam essent," which leads to ἀλλ' εἶεν ἂν νῦν· νῦν δὲ—

because it has been made to appear to be older, and to have had a prior generation: but "the others" (have been made to appear to be) older than "the one," because they have had a posterior generation. [56.] According to the same reasoning, "the others" likewise are similarly related with respect to "the one," since they were made to appear to be older and to have had a prior generation. So indeed it appears. So far then as neither becomes younger or older than the other, through their differing by an equal number from each other, "the one" will not become older or younger than "the others," nor the others than "the one." But so far as it is necessary for the prior[71] to differ[72] by a part ever another[72] from the posterior, and the posterior from the prior, so far it is necessary for them to become older and younger than each other, and "the others" than "the one," and "the one" than "the others?" Entirely so. On all these accounts then "the one" is, and is in the act of becoming older and younger both than itself and "the others;" and again, it neither is nor is in the act of "becoming" older or younger than itself and "the others." It is perfectly so. But since "the one" participates in time, and in the act of becoming older and younger, is it not necessary for it to participate in "the then," and "the hereafter," and "the now," if it participates in time? It is necessary. "The one," therefore, was, and will be, and is; and has been in the act of becoming, and is in the act of becoming, and will be in the act of becoming. What then? And there would be something for it, and of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely so. [57.] Now there would be the knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if we now[73] do all these things[73] relating to it. You speak rightly. There is likewise for it a name and a discourse; and it may be named and spoken of:

[71] Ficinus has "differre necesse priora posterioribus;" as if his MS. correctly omitted *γενόμενα* (for which two MSS. read *γινόμενα*) after *τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων—*

[72—72] Ficinus, "altera semper parte." But I confess I hardly understand *ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ*, although I am quite aware of the meaning of *ἀεὶ* thus placed between *ἄλλῳ* and *μορίῳ*, after what Scaliger has written on Propertius i. 18, 15. Hudson on Thucyd. iv. 68, Valckenaer on Theocrit. Adoniaz. p. 197, C., and Elmsley on Œd. C. 1532, who alluded, I suspect, to Barker in Classical Recreations, p. 182. as I stated on Prom. 973.

[73—73] Namely, know think, and perceive

and whatever circumstances of such a kind take place with regard to "the others," take place with regard likewise to "the one." Such is entirely the case.

Let us then speak of the third point. If "the one" is such as we have discussed, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating in time, that because it is one, it should participate at one time in "being;" but that because it is not one, it should participate at no time in "being?" It is necessary. Will it then be possible for it not to participate, when it does; or to participate, when it does not? It will not be possible. It participates then at one time, and does not participate at another; for thus alone can it participate and not participate in the same. Right. Is not this then the time when it participates in "being," and again is freed from it? Or how is it possible for it to possess at one time the same thing, and at another time not, unless at some time it both receives and dismisses it? Not otherwise. Do you not call the receiving of "being" by the term to be generated? I do. And to be freed from "being" (by the term) to be destroyed? Entirely so. "The one" then, as it seems, by receiving and dismissing "being," is generated and destroyed. Necessarily so. [58.] But since it is one and many, and is generated and destroyed, when it becomes one, is not the being many destroyed, and when it becomes many, is not the being one destroyed? Entirely so. But, when it becomes one and many, must it not be separated and united? It must. And when it becomes unlike and like, must it not be made like and unlike? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, less, and equal, must it not be increased, and wasted away,[74] and equalized? It must so. But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it changes into being moved, [75] it is requisite surely for it to be not in one time.[75] How should it? But that which stood still before and is afterwards moved, and that which was moved before

[74] Instead *φθίνειν* one would have expected *ἐλαττοῦσθαι*, to answer to *ἔλαττον* or *μειοῦσθαι*, just as *ἰσοῦσθαι* does to *ἴσον*.

[75]—[75] The words between the numerals I cannot understand. The train of ideas evidently is, "it is requisite surely for those two things not to exist at one time;" in Greek, *δεῖ δή που αὐτά γε μὴ δύο ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι*. Ficinus has "oportet hoc non uno in tempore esse?" He therefore found in his MS. *τοῦτο*, not *αὐτό*. Stalbaum however translates *μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι*, "to be in no time at all."

and afterwards stands still, cannot be thus affected without a change. For how can it? But there is no time, in which any thing can at once be neither moved nor stand still. There is not. But it cannot change without a change. It is probable not. When, therefore, does it change? For it would change, neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, nor while it is in time. It would not. Is there then that strange thing, in which it would be, when it changes? What thing? "The sudden."[76] [77]For "the sudden" seems to signify some such thing as [77]changing from it to either.[77] For there is no change from standing, while standing; nor a change from motion, while in motion; but that wonderful nature "the sudden" is situated between motion and standing, and is in no time;[78] and into this and from this that, which is moved, changes for the purpose of standing still; and that which stands, for the purpose of being moved. It nearly appears so. [59.] "The one," therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must change into either; for thus alone would it produce both these effects. But in changing, it changes suddenly; and when it changes, it would be in no time, and would neither stand still nor be moved. It would not. Is then "the one" in this state also with respect to the other changes? and when it changes from being into being destroyed, or from non-being into the act of becoming, does it not then become a medium between certain movements and standings? and then it neither is nor is not, nor is in the act of becoming, nor is destroyed? It appears so. And by

[76] Ficinus strangely translates *τὸ ἐξαίφνης*, "momentum individuum."

[77]—[77] In explanation of these unintelligible words, Heindorf says that *ἐκείνου* is to be referred to *τὸ ἐξαίφνης*, as if it were correct Greek to say *τὸ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλον ἐξ ἐξαίφνης*. But to what can *εἰς ἑκάτερον* be referred? Stalbaum's version is, "The sudden seems to signify this, to turn something from it to either;" which I presume he understands; for if not, he has written a mass of rubbish. The sense required is to this effect, "The sudden seems to signify something of this kind, that by quickly moving it can change a thing that is, from one state to another." In Greek, *Τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ὀξὺ κινοῦν μεταβάλλοι ἄν, ὃ ἔστιν, ἑτέρωθεν ἑτέρωσε*, as in § 68, *μεθίσταιτο ποθέν ποι*. On the loss or corruption of *ὀξύ*, see myself on Æsch. Suppl. 901, and Poppo's Prolegom. p. 144, where Poppo should have noticed in his second ed. my restoration of Thucyd. iii. 37, *οἱ δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ὀξείᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει*, which I could confirm by a dozen passages.

[78] Instead of *οὐδέν*, Thomson was the first to suggest *οὐδενί*; for he found in Ficinus "nullo prorsus in tempore." The credit of the restoration is given by Heindorf and Stalbaum to Schleiermacher.

the same reasoning, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor united; and in passing from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it made like nor unlike; [79]and while it passes from small into great, and into equal and the contraries,[79] it will be neither small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor wasting away, nor equalized. It appears not. But all these accidents "the one" would suffer, if it is. How not?

But must we not consider what it is meet for "the others" to suffer, if "one" exists? We must consider. Shall we state then, if "one" exists, what "the other" must suffer from[80] "the one?" Let us state. Since then "the others" are different from "the one," they are not "the one:" for otherwise they would not be different from "the one?" Right. Nor yet are "the others" entirely deprived of "the one," but somehow participate in it. In what way? Because "the others," having parts, are different from "the one:" for if they had not parts, they would be entirely one. Right. But parts, we have said,[81] belong to that, which is a whole. We said[81] so. But it is necessary for a whole to be one (composed) of many, of which one the parts are parts: for each of the parts must not be a part of many, but of a whole. How is this? [60.] If any thing should be a part of many, amongst which it is itself, it would surely be both a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these, it will be a part of the others, with the exception of this; and thus it will not be a part of each one; and not being a part of each, it will be a part of not one of the many; and being a part of not one of these (the many), it is impossible for it to be any thing belonging to all those,

[79]—[79] Whatever Heindorf and Stalbaum may assert, I cannot believe that Plato expressed himself in so loose a manner, when the very balance of the sentence shows he would have written only *καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου καὶ ἴσου εἰς τἀναντία ἰὸν*, while the words *οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον* have been evidently interpolated from § 58.

[80] Ficinus, "alia ab uno pati," which would seem to lead to *τὰ ἄλλα ἐπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς—πεπονθέναι*, in lieu of *τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς*. But *τοῦ ἑνὸς* follows here *τὰ ἄλλα*, as in § 63, *τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι*.

[81] From "asseruimus" twice in Ficinus, Heindorf corrected *ἔφαμεν*: for there is an allusion to § 22. Stalbaum however still sticks to *φαμέν*.

of not one of which it is either [82]a part, or[82] any thing else. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of the many nor of all; but of some one idea and of some one thing, which we call a whole, having become from all one thing complete. [83][Of this a part would be a part].[83] Entirely so. If therefore the others have parts, they too would participate in a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole then possessing parts, must necessarily be different[84] from "the one." It is necessary. There is moreover the same reasoning respecting each of the parts: for it is necessary that this[85] (each part) should participate in "the one." For, if each of these is a part, the very being each signifies surely one thing, separated indeed from others, but existing by itself, if it shall be truly each. Right. But it would participate in "the one," as being evidently something else than "the one;" for (otherwise)[86] it would not have participated, but would have been "the one itself." But now it is surely impossible for any thing to be "the one," except "the one itself." Impossible. [61.] But it is necessary for both the whole and the part to participate in "the one." [87]For the whole will be one thing[87] of which the parts are parts; but on the other hand each (part will be) a part of the whole,[87] of whatever whole it may be a part.[88] It is so. Will not then

[82]—[82] Ficinus, "vel pars vel aliud quodlibet." He therefore found in his MS. ἢ—ἢ, not καὶ—καὶ. On the confusion of those words see Bast, Palæograph. p. 815. Damascius however, quoted by Stalbaum, acknowledges the doubled καὶ; and so he does the εἶναι after ἀδύνατον, which Heindorf wished to expunge, as it has nothing on which it can depend, and is omitted by Ficinus, either from his MS. or his own good sense. Stalbaum is nevertheless satisfied with the want of syntax.

[83]—[83] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[84] Ficinus, "alia ipsa," as if his MS. had αὐτὰ τὰ ἄλλα—

[85] So Heind., whom Stalb. follows, reads τοῦτο for τούτου. But the best MSS. have ἐὰν τοῦτο: where ἐὰν τοῦτο perhaps conceal ἕκαστον αὐτό. Ficinus acknowledges τούτου by his "hujus unius."

[86] Ficinus has alone "alioquin haud quaquam participaret."

[87]—[87] Heind., whom Stalb. follows, renders, "For one (i. e. the whole) will be some one whole; but the other (i. e. a part) will be some part of the whole." I have translated with Taylor, as if the Greek were τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον ἓν ἔσται—not τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ὅλον ἔσται.

[88] Instead of οὗ ἂν ᾖ μόριον ὅλον, Heindorf would read ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόριον ὅλον; and so probably found Ficinus in his MS., whose version is "quæcunque pars totius existat." Stalbaum however, with Schmidt, would adopt Schleiermacher's conjecture, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μορίου (or rather μορίων) ὅλον, i. e. "whatever may be a whole of the parts," referring to

those things, which participate in "the one," participate in it as being different from "the one?"[89] How not? But things different from "the one," will surely be many. For if the things different from "the one" were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since the things, which participate in the one part and in the one whole, are more than one, is it not necessary for those very things, which participate in "the one," to be infinite in multitude? How? Let us look at the matter in this way. Being neither one, nor participating in "the one," do they then not participate in it when they do participate? Certainly. Are[90] not multitudes those in which "the one" is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then, if we should be willing in imagination to take away from these the least quantity we can, must not this quantity so taken away, be a multitude, and not one, since it does not participate in "the one?" It must. To him then, who thus surveys ever the different nature of the species itself by itself, will not as much of it, as we may behold,[91] be infinite in multitude? Entirely so. And moreover, since each part becomes one part,[92] (the parts)[93] have a bound with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It results then, to the things different from "the one," as it seems, that, from "the

p. 147, B. § 4. But *ὅλον μορίων*, as I have there stated, could not be said in correct Greek.

[89] Ficinus has "Nonne igitur, cum alia sint, quam unum, uno participant omnia. quæ participant." From whence Stephens wished to read, "*Οὐκ οὖν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς, τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ.*" He should have read likewise *πάντα τὰ μετέχοντα.*

[90] Ficinus, "Nonne multitudines sunt," which leads to *Οὐκ οὖν πλήθη ἔστι τινὰ*, unless it be said that *πλήθη ὄντα* is here opposed to the preceding *οὐχ ἓν ὄντα.* But in that case *ἀλλὰ* would have been written, not *οὖκ οὖν.* Stalbaum explains *πλήθη ὄντα* by "infinite." But how the same word could mean "multitude" and "infinity," he does not state, nor can I understand.

[91] How this *ὁρῶμεν* can follow the preceding *σκοποῦντι*, I must leave for others to explain. Ficinus has, what is far preferable, "Nonne tibi sic semper consideranti—quantumcunque illius inspexeris."

[92] Cornarius was the first to repeat *μόριον*, which, though rejected by Heindorf, has been adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the best MSS.

[93] To preserve the balance of the sentence, Heindorf suggested *πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τὰ μόρια καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.* And so Ficinus, "terminum jam partes invicem et ad totum habent." Stalbaum still sticks to the common reading.

one" and themselves having a communion, something different is produced in themselves, which furnished them indeed a bound with respect to each other, but their own nature would be with respect to themselves infinity.[94] It appears so. [62.] Thus the things different from "the one," both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate in bound. Entirely so. Are they not therefore similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves? Why? Because, so far as all of them are somehow infinite, according to their own nature, they would all in this way suffer the same. Entirely. [95]And so far as they all participate in a bound, they would in this way too suffer the same.[95] But so far as they suffer the being bounded and infinite, [96]they suffer [these very] accidents, [being accidents] contrary to each other. Certainly. But contrary things are as much as possible dissimilar.[96] What then? According to each accident they would be similar to themselves and to each other; but according to both they are on both sides[97] most contrary and dissimilar. It nearly appears so. And thus "the others" themselves[98] would be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other. They would so. And they (would be) the same to, and different from, each other, and be moved and stand still; and we should without difficulty find the things different from "the one," suffering all contrary accidents, since they have been shown to suffer these. You speak rightly.

[63.] Shall we not then dismiss these things as evident, and again consider if "the one" is, whether the others differ-

[94] Instead of *ἀπειρίαν*, which, says Stalbaum, depends upon *ἔχει*, to be got out of *παρέσχε*, the five best MSS. read *ἀπειρία*. Hence Plato evidently wrote *ἀπειρία ἂν ἦν*, as I have translated.

[95]—[95] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

[96]—[96] Ficinus has "quæ sunt contrariæ passiones, quam maxime fieri potest, dissimilia sunt," thus showing that there was something wanting in his MS., which has been supplied by others; where however *πάθη*, *ὄντα*, and *ταῦτα*, are all equally superfluous, and hence included here in brackets.

[97] One good although a modern MS. has *ἀμφοτέροις*, the conjecture of Heindorf, who understood by it "both themselves and each other."

[98] Although the best MSS. confirm *αὐτὰ*, the conjecture of Schleiermacher, for *ταῦτα* in Stephens, and *ταὐτὰ*, which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "eadem," yet I confess I cannot understand it. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἅμα τε αὐτοῖς*, where *τε* would precede instead of following *αὐτοῖς*.

ent from "the one" are not likewise in this state, or after this manner alone? Entirely so. Let us then say again as at the beginning, if "the one" is, what must the things different from "the one" suffer. Let us say it. Is not then "the one" separate from "the others," and are not "the others" separate from "the one?" Why? Because there is nothing else "different" except these, (namely,) that which is different from "the one," and that which is "different" from "the others;" for all is said, when "the one" and "the others" are said. All, indeed. There is nothing else therefore except these, in which, as being the same, "the one" and "the others" would exist. Nothing. "The one" and "the others" are therefore never in the same. They are not. Are they then separate? Yes. We have said moreover that "the truly one" has not any parts. For how can it? Neither therefore will the whole of "the one" nor its parts be in "the others," if it is separate from "the others," and has no parts. How not? In no way then will "the others" participate in "the one;" since they participate neither according to a certain part, nor according to the whole. It seems not. By no means then are "the others" "one," nor have they any one in themselves. [64.] They have not. Neither, then, are "the others" many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one; but now the things different from "the one" are neither one nor many, nor a whole nor parts, since they in no respect participate in "the one." Right. "The others" then [99]are of themselves[99] neither two nor three, nor one in them, because they are entirely deprived of "the one." So it is. "The others," therefore, are of themselves[100] neither similar nor dissimilar to "the one," nor are similitude and dissimilitude in them. For if they were similar and dissimilar, or[1] possessed in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, the things different from "the one" would possess in themselves two species contrary to each other. So it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate in any two things, which do not participate even in one. Im-

[99]—[99] Ficinus, "nec duo nec tria sunt nec unum illis inest." He therefore found in his MS. neither the *αὐτα* of other MSS. nor the *ταὐτὰ* of Stephens' text; while he acknowledges *ἓν ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς*, for which Heindorf suggested *ἔνεστιν*, found subsequently in three MSS.

[100] Ficinus, "nec eadem sunt alia uni," i. e. *οὔτε ταὐτὰ ἔστι τῷ ἑνὶ.*

[1] Instead of *ᾗ ἔχοι*, which is unintelligible, the four best MSS. have , adopted by Stalbaum.

possible. "The others" therefore are neither similar nor dissimilar, nor both. For, if they were similar or dissimilar, they would participate in one species of the different; and if they were both, they would participate in two contrary species: but this has been shown to be impossible. True. They are therefore neither same nor different, nor moved, nor standing still, nor generated, nor destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, (nor unequal,)[2] nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind. For, if the others could endure to suffer any such accident, they would participate in one, and two, and three, and in even and odd; in all which it has been shown it is impossible for them to participate; since they are in every way and entirely deprived of "the one." Most true. Hence, then, if "the one" exists, "the one" is all things and nothing, both as regards itself, and as regards "the others" [3]in like manner.[3] Entirely so.

[65.] Be it so. But if "the one" is not, must we not consider after this what ought to happen? We must consider. What then would be this supposition, if "one is not?" Does it differ from this, "If that, which is not one, is non-existing?" It does differ. Does it differ merely from, or is the saying, "If that which is not one, is non-existing," entirely contrary (to the saying), "If the one is not?" Entirely the contrary. But what, should any one say, if magnitude is not, or if smallness is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not show in each of these cases that he is speaking of that, which is not, as something different? Entirely so. Would he not therefore now show that he is speaking of that which is not as something different from "the others," when he says "if the one is not;" and do we understand what he is saying? We do understand. In the first place then he speaks of something which may be known; and next of something different from "the others," when he says "one;" whether he adds to it the term of "being" or "not being;" [4]for that which is said not to be, is known none the less, and that it is different from "the

[2] How strange that not a single commentator should have seen that *οὐδὲ ἄνισα* is evidently to be supplied after *οὐδὲ ἴσα*, to complete the climax of the series of contraries.

[3—3] As there is nothing to which *ὡσαυτως* can be referred, Heindorf wished to read, what Stalbaum feels half-inclined to adopt, *καὶ πρὸς τἄλλα, καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως*.

[4—4] I am here quite in the dark; and so was Ficinus, as is evident

others:[7][4] is it not so? Necessarily so. Let us then say (as) at the beginning, "If the one is not," what ought to occur. In the first place then this, as it seems, ought to occur to it; that either there should be a knowledge of it, or that nothing of what is said can be known, when any one says, "If one is non-existing." True. (Must not this too happen), either that "the others" are different from it, or that even it cannot be said to be different from "the others?" Entirely so. It has therefore diversity in addition to knowledge. For he does not speak of the diversity of "the others," when he says that "the one" is different from "the others," but of the diversity of "the one." It appears so. And yet the one which is non-existing, participates in "that," and "some," and "this,"[5] and "these," and every thing of this kind. For neither could "the one" be spoken of, nor things different from "the one," nor would there be any thing for it, or belonging to it, nor could it be called any thing, if it had no share in something, or in the other things of this kind.[6] Right. [66.] But to be cannot be present to "the one," if it non-exists; though nothing prevents it from participating in the many; nay, it must (participate), if "the one" is that, [7]and not another thing is not existing.[7] [8]If however it will not be either "the one" nor that, but the discourse about something else, it is meet to say nothing.[8] But if "the one" is supposed (as) that thing

from his unintelligible version, "nihilominus cognoscitur, quid non esse dicatur, quodque differens quiddam est ab aliis." So too was Heindorf, who wished to read *γιγνώσκεται, ὥς τι τὸ λεγόμενον*: and so lastly was Stalbaum, who has laid hold of Heindorf's *ὡς*, as a drowning man does of a straw, and with the same unhappy result.

[5] After *καὶ τούτου*, there is in the Greek *καὶ τούτῳ*, answering to "huic" in Ficinus' version. But amongst a mass of genitives dependent on *μετέχει*, a dative could not be thus inserted. Hence Heindorf once wished to read *τοῦ τούτῳ*, but was restrained by meeting with something similar in § 71. But that passage is wretchedly corrupt. Taylor more correctly has tacitly omitted *καὶ τούτῳ*.

[6] Ficinus has "ceterorum talium." He therefore found in his MS not *τούτων*, but *τοιούτων*.

[7—7] Such is the English version of *καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν*, similar to the Latin of Ficinus, "nec aliud non est;" which Stalbaum, I presume, unable to explain, has thought proper to give a paraphrase of it in German. But whether the German is more intelligible than the Greek, Latin, and English, I am unable to state.

[8—8] Here again is a passage which, says Stalbaum, Damascius did not understand, and Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Schmidt have vainly at-

and not as another to non-exist, it is necessary for it to participate in that and many other things. Entirely so. Dissimilitude, therefore, is present to it with respect to "the others;" for "the others," being different from "the one," will also be foreign (from it). Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How not? And are not things various dissimilars? Dissimilars. If then they are dissimilars to "the one," it is evident they would be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar. It is evident. There would then be present to "the one" a dissimilitude with respect to which "the others" are dissimilar to it. It seems so. But if there is to it a dissimilitude from "the others," must there not be to it a similitude of itself? How? If there be a dissimilitude of "the one" to "the one," no discourse would take place about a thing of such a kind as "the one;" nor would the supposition be about "the one," but about something different from "the one." Entirely so. But it ought not. Certainly. There ought, then, to be a similitude of itself to "the one." There ought. But neither is "the one" equal to "the others." For, if it were equal, *it would be according to equality, similar to them;* but both these are impossible, if "the one" is not. Impossible. [67.] But since it is not equal to "the others," is it not necessary for "the others" also to be not equal to it? It is necessary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal by that which is unequal? How not? "The one," therefore, participates in the inequality, according to which "the others" are unequal to it. It does participate. But magnitude and smallness belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and smallness then belong to one of this kind? It nearly appears so. But magnitude and

tempted to emend. Accordingly he proposes to read *εἰ μέντοι μὴ τὸ ἓν μόνον μὴ μόνον ἔσται*, as if by any process *μόνον* could be corrupted into *μήτ' ἐκεῖνο*. For this idea however respecting the introduction of *μόνον*, Stalbaum was indebted to "ipsum unum illud duntaxat" in Ficinus, to whom he should have given the honour of the discovery.

— Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "jam profecto etiam simile illis secundum æqualitatem existeret;" who therefore found in his MS. *εἰη ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα*, not the unintelligible *εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα*, where *τε* couples nothing, and *ἂν εἴη* is repeated in all the MSS. but the two best. Stalbaum thus explains the words, *εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη, καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη* — "jam affirmante prædicato ornatum esset"—from which the reader is left to draw what conclusion he can.

smallness are always separated from each other. Entirely so. There is then always something between them. Certainly. Can you mention any thing else between these, except equality? Nothing else. To whatever thing therefore there is magnitude and smallness, to this there is equality also as a medium between the two. It appears so. To "the one" then which is non-existing, equality, magnitude, and smallness, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought likewise to participate in a certain way in "being." How so? It ought to be in the state which we have mentioned? for, unless it be in that state, we should not speak the truth in saying that "the one" is not; but if (we speak) the truth, it is evident that we have spoken of things that exist. Is it not so? It is so. But since we assert that we speak the truth, it is necessary for us to assert that we are speaking of things which exist. It is necessary. [9]"The one," therefore, which does not exist, as it appears, does exist; for if it should non-exist while non-existing, but remit something of existence with respect to non-existence, it will immediately become existing.[9] Entirely so. [68.] [10]It ought therefore to have, as the bond of non-existence, an existence not existing, if it is about to non-exist; just as existence (ought) to have (as a bond of existence) a non-existence existing,[10] in order that it may be perfectly to be.[11] For thus especially existence would exist, and non-

[9]—[9] Of all the words between the numerals, I confess my inability to understand an atom. The reader will therefore be glad perhaps to see Taylor's explanation of this difficult passage, which is equally unintelligible in the Latin of Heindorf, and, I suspect, too in the German of Stalbaum.—Any remission of "being" is attended with "non-being," which is the same with "is not;" and if any thing of "is" be taken away, "is not" is immediately introduced; and so it will immediately become "is not non-being," that is, "it is being."

[10]—[10] The balance of the sentences evidently requires, as I have translated, Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ (i. e. τὸ μὴ ὂν) δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, and τὸ ὂν (δεσμὸν ἔχειν) τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄν. For thus τὸ μὴ ὂν would be opposed to τὸ ὂν, and τοῦ μὴ εἶναι to τοῦ εἶναι, and τὸ εἶναι to τὸ μὴ εἶναι, and μὴ ὂν to ὄν. The edd. have τὸ ὂν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, in the second clause, which I cannot understand; nor could Stalbaum, who proposes to read ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν μὴ ὂν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι; or with the omission of ἔχειν entirely.

[11] Here again I am quite at a loss. Ficinus has "ut perfecte rursus esse liceat." But as in the Greek words ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ᾖ, there should be a balance to the subsequent—εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται, it is evident that αὖ ἵνα could not be found in the first clause; and even if it

existence not exist, [12]participating (respectively) the former in existence (for the sake) of "being" existing; but in non-existence (for the sake) of "non-being" existing, if it is about to exist completely; the latter (participating) in non-existence (for the sake) of "non-being" not existing; but (participating) in existence for the sake of "being" existing; if non-existence is to non-exist completely.[12] Most truly so. Since then both to existence there is a share of non-existence, and to non-existence a share of existence, is it not necessary for "the one" also, since it does not exist, to participate in existence for the purpose of non-existence? It is necessary. Existence therefore appears to be "the one," if it does not exist. So it seems. And non-existence, if it does not exist. How not? Can any thing then, which is in some state, be not in that state, when it does not change from that state? It cannot. Every thing then of such a kind, which is and is not in such a state, indicates some change. How not? Is change motion? or what shall we call it? It is motion. But has not "the one" appeared to be both "being" and "not-being?" Yes. It appears then to be and not to be in such a state. It seems so. "The non-existing one" appears then to be moved, since it has a change from "being" into "not-being." It appears so. But if it be no where among beings, as it is not, since it is a not-being, it cannot change its place from any where to any where. For it cannot. It will not then be moved by changing its place. For it will not. Neither will it revolve in "the same;" for

could, by no process could *εἶναι ᾗ* mean "it may be lawful to be." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἵνα τελέως ἂν ᾗ τὸ εἶναι*: to which would lead *αὖ ᾗ εἶναι* in one MS. and *ἂν εἴη εἶναι* in another; for thus *τὸ εἶναι* would answer to *τὸ μὴ ὂν*, (or, as it should be read, *τὸ μὴ εἶναι*,) and *ἂν ᾗ* to *μὴ ἔσται*.

[12]—[12] By attending here, as before, to the balance of the sentences, I have been able, I trust, to perceive, what nobody else seems to have done, the flow of ideas; which leads to *μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὂν οὐσίας μέν, τοῦ εἶναι ὂν ἕνεκα ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν—τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν μὴ οὐσίας μέν, τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ, τοῦ εἶναι ὂν*: where *μὲν* is inserted after the first *οὐσίας* to preserve the antithesis, and *ἕνεκα* for the syntax; and *μὴ* is omitted before the concluding *ὄν*. For the words are thus opposed to each other, *τὸ μὲν ὂν*, to *τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν*, and *οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι ὂν* to *μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὂν*, and *μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὂν* to *οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι ὄν*. With regard to the insertion of *ἕνεκα*, although that adverb may be omitted before an infinitive, in the case of a negative sentence, it cannot be in the case of a positive one—a distinction first pointed out by Hermann, and supported by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 268.

it will never touch "the same," since the same is "being." But it is impossible for "not-being" to reside in any "being." Impossible. [69.] "The one," therefore, "which is not," cannot revolve in that, in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will "the one" be altered from itself, either into "being" or "not-being:" for our discourse would no longer be concerning the one, if it were altered from itself, but concerning something else. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in the same, nor changes its place, can it still be moved in any way? How can it? But it is necessary for that, which is unmoved, to be at rest; and for that, which is at rest, to stand still.[13] It is necessary. As it seems, therefore, "the one" which is not, both stands still and is moved. It appears so. And yet if it be moved, there is a great necessity for it to be altered; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer in the same state that it was, but in a different one. So it is. "The one," therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Yes. And yet being moved not at all, it would be not at all altered. It would not. So far then as "the one" which is not, is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved, it is not altered. Certainly not. "The one," therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not necessary for any thing, when it is altered, to be in the act of being different from what it was before, and to die away from its former state; but for a nature, which is not altered, to be neither in the act of being, nor of dying away? It is necessary. "The one," therefore, which is not, by being altered, is in the act of being, and of dying away; but at the same time, from its not being altered, it is not in the act of being or of dying away. [70.] And thus "the one," which is not, is in the act of being and of dying, and is neither in the act of being nor of dying away. For it is not (otherwise).

But let us again return to the beginning, about to see whether these things will appear to us as they do now, or otherwise. It is necessary. Have we not already said,[14] "If 'the one is not, what ought to happen concerning it?" Cer-

[13] Here, as in § 25, I am unable to see the difference between *ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν* and *ἑστάναι*.

[14] Here, as in § 32, Heindorf adopted *ἔφαμεν* for *φαμὲν*, from "diximus" in Ficinus; and so did Stephens tacitly, no doubt from the same source.

tainly. But when we say "it is not," do we intend any thing else than the absence of "being" from that which we say is not? Nothing else. Whether therefore, when we say that a thing "is not,"[14] do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is?[15] or does the term "is not" simply signify that, what is not, is no where at all, and that it does not in any way participate in "being," if it is not? It signifies this most distinctly. Neither then can that, which is not, be, nor in any other way participate in "being." It cannot. But are the terms "to be generated" and "to be destroyed," any thing else than for one thing to participate in "being," and for another to lose "being?" It is nothing else. The thing therefore to which no atom of "being" is present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it? "The one" therefore, since it is not at all, can neither possess, be freed from, nor participate in "being," in any manner whatever. This seems reasonable. "The one" which is not, is then neither destroyed nor in the act of being, if it participates not at all in being. It appears not. Neither therefore is it at all altered; for if it thus suffered it would be in the act of being destroyed. True. But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary for it to be not moved? It is necessary. But that, which in no respect is, we will say cannot stand still; for that which stands still ought to be in some (spot) ever the same? In the same;[16] for how not? [71.] Thus then let us say, that "not-being" at no time either stands or is moved. For it does not. Moreover not any of things existing is present to it; for participating in any of things existing[17] it would participate in "being." It is evident

[15]—[15] Such is evidently what the train of ideas demands. But in that case the Greek should be, *οὐκ εἶναι τι ὡς φαμὲν αὐτὸ, εἶναι δέ πως*, not *πῶς οὐκ εἶναι—πῶς δὲ εἶναι*. For *πῶς*, the interrogative, could not thus follow *πότερον*, despite what Heindorf says about the double interrogative, *πῶς τί*, in Hipp. Maj. § 40.

[16] Heindorf has acutely restored the passage, where Stephens was at a loss; and so too was Ficinus, who consequently omitted the repeated *τῷ αὐτῷ*: which does not however require the preposition inserted by Heindorf; for Stalbaum shows by numerous examples, that a preposition in the answer is to be supplied from the one in the question.

[17] Instead of *τούτου μετέχον ὄντος*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ὄντος του μετέχον*, as shown by his version, "alicujus existentis—particeps." From whence Schleiermacher suggested *του* for *τούτου*. But as two MSS. offer *ὄντως* for *ὄντος* we may read *του τῶν ὄντων μετέχον*, in allusion to the *τι τῶν ὄντων*, immediately preceding: where *του* is due to one MS. Stal-

It has therefore neither magnitude, nor smallness, nor equality. It has not. It has moreover neither similitude nor diversity, either with respect to itself or to others. It appears not. What then, is it possible for it to have the other things, if nothing must be present to it? It is not possible. To it then there are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same nor different. There are not. But what, will there be, respecting a thing that is not, the term "at it," or "to it,"[18] or "of this," or "to this," or "of another," or "to another," or "formerly," or "hereafter," or "now," or "knowledge," or "opinion," or "perception," or "discourse," or "a name," or any thing else belonging to things existing? There will not.[19] A not-one then is in this state. What state? Not being seems to be in no state. In no state.[19]

But let us still (again)[20] say, if "one" is not, what must "the others" suffer. Let us say. In a certain way "others" must exist themselves; for, if "others" do not exist, there would be nothing[21] said about "the others." True. But if there is the discourse about "the others," "the others" will be different: or do you not apply to the same thing the word "other" and the word "different?" I do. But we surely say that[22] the "different" is different from "different," and "the other" is other than "other?"[22] Yes. To "the others," therefore, if there are about to be "others," there is something from which they will be "others." It is necessary. But what would this be? For they will not be different from "the one," since it is not.

baum, however, prefers *τούτου μετέχον του ὄντος*. He should have suggested *τοιούτου μετέχον του ὄντος*. For the definite *τούτου τοῦ ὄντος* could hardly be referred, as he fancies, to the indefinite *τι τῶν ὄντων*.

[18] After *ἐκείνῳ* is inserted *ἢ τὸ τί*. But from the surrounding genitives and datives it is evident that no nominative could be introduced here; and hence I have translated as if the Greek were not *ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου*, but *ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ τὸ τούτῳ*, to which *τούτῳ* for *τούτου* in one MS. evidently leads. And even if a nominative were admissible, the indefinite *τι* would not be, and still less the interrogative *τί*.

[19]—[19] Since some of the best MSS. assign *οὐδαμῆ* to Aristotle, I have translated as if the Greek were, *Οὕτως δὴ ἓν ὂν οὐκ ἔχει; Πῶς; Οὐκ ὂν δὴ ἔοικέ γε οὐδαμῆ ἔχειν. Οὐδαμῆ.* For thus the answers would be given, as they always are, in the fewest possible words.

[20] Ficinus, "Est ne iterum disputandum," which leads to *δ' αὖ* for *δὴ*.

[21] Instead of *λέγοιτο* sense and syntax require *λέγοιτό τι*.

[22]—[22] Others may, but I cannot, understand all between the numerals could have understood the passage, had it been to this effect: "The different is different from something, and the other is other than something

They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be[23] different from nothing. Right. [72.] According to multitudes therefore, each is different from each other; for they cannot be different according to one, since "one" is not. But each mass of them, as it appears, is infinite in multitude; even although one should lay hold of that which appears to be the least, [24]like a dream in sleep, many appear on a sudden, instead of one seeming to be; and[24] instead of the smallest, a quantity very great as compared with the fractions formed out of it. Most right. Masses of such kind existing,[25] others will be mutually different from one another, if "others" are, while "one" is not. Completely so. Will there not then be many masses, each appearing as one, but not being so, since "one" is not? There will. There will likewise appear to be a number of them, if each is one, while there are many. Entirely so. But the even and odd among them will appear[26] not truly, if "one" shall not exist. They will not. But likewise the smallest, as we have said,[27] will seem to be in them. But this (the smallest) will appear to be many and[28] great, as compared with each of the many and small. How not? And each mass will be imagined to be equal to many and small quantities; for it will not appear to change from a greater to a less quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between them; and this would be a fancied notion of equality. It is likely. Will it not also (appear) to have a bound with respect to another mass, having itself, with respect to itself, neither a beginning, nor a middle, nor an end? In what way? Because

[23] Stalbaum says that *εἶναι* is governed by *ἀναγκαῖον* understood. He should have suggested *τὸ εἶναι*; for thus *τὸ εἶναι* would be opposed to *τοῦτο*, and both depend upon *λείπεται*.

[24]—[24] Although Heindorf justly objected to *ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ*, he unjustly wished to omit *ὄναρ*, misled by his copy of the version of Ficinus; which, he says, has simply "velut in somno." But the ed. pr. has "in somno somnium." He should have suggested *καὶ, ὥσπερ ὀνειρώττοντί τῳ*, i. e. "and like to a person dreaming." The verb *ὀνειρώττειν* is found seven times at least in Plato.

[25] Heindorf correctly saw that *ὄντων* has dropt out after *ὄγκων*.

[26] Ficinus, "videbitur;" from whence Thomson suggested *φανεῖται* for *φαίνεται*.

[27] Heindorf prefers *ἔφαμεν* to *φαμὲν*, for Ficinus has "ut dictum est," and there is an allusion to what had been stated a little above.

[28] Instead of *ὡς*, Plato wrote *καὶ*, as shown by the sentence following

when a person takes hold by his intellect of some one of these, [29]⌈as being one of these,⌉[29] there will always, prior to the beginning, appear another beginning, and after the end another end will be left behind; but in the middle (there will be) other things more in the middle than the middle; but smaller, on account of their not being able to take hold of each one of them, since "the one" is not. This is most true. [73.] But every thing which a person can lay hold of by his intellect, must, I think, be broken into small pieces; for a mass would be (ever)[30] laid hold of (mentally) without a one. Entirely so. But is it not necessary for such a mass to appear to him, who beholds it at a distance and with a dull eye, to be one; but to him who surveys it near and with an acute mind, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, if it is deprived of "the one," not existing. It is most necessary. Thus then each of "the others" ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if one does not exist, and "the others" (besides)[31] "the one" do exist. They ought. Will they then appear also to be similars and dissimilars? In what way? Just as objects in a shaded picture appear all to be one to a person standing at a distance, (they will seem) to suffer the same accident, and to be similar. Entirely so. But to him, who approaches nearer, (they will appear) to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the fancied notion of diversity. It is so. It is therefore necessary for the masses to appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other. Entirely so. And to be the same with, and different from, each other, and to touch and be apart[32] from themselves, and be moved through all possible movements, and standing still every where, and be in the act of being and of destruction,

[29]—[29] I cannot understand all within the brackets; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them. Heindorf says those words refer to *ἀρχὴν, πέρας μέσον*. But if so, to what do *αὐτῶν τι* refer?

[30] Ficinus, "Semper—excipitur." He found therefore in his MS., what three others offer, *ἀεὶ λαμβάνοιτο*.

[31] The Greek is *τἆλλα δὲ ἑνὸς*, where I cannot discover on what *ἑνὸς* depends. Ficinus has "sed alia præter unum sunt," as if he had found in his MS. *τἆλλὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς*.

[32] Some one, as appears from Stalbaum's note, wished to read *χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν ὄντας*, which is absolutely requisite on account of the other participles. So too in § 74, one would prefer *οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς ὄντα*, where *ὄντα* is at present wanting.

and [32]neither of these, and all of this kind,[33] which it were easy for us to go through, if, though one does not exist, many do exist? Most true.

[74.] Once more then, returning again to the beginning, let us say, "If one is not," but the things different from "the one," what ought to happen. Let us say. "The others" then are not one. How should they be? Nor yet are they many; for in many there would be one likewise. For if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that there would be not even many. True. One therefore not being in the others, the others are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor do they appear to be either one or many. Why not? Because "the others" have not in any way any communication at all with any of the things which are not, nor is any one of the non-existing present to "the others;" for there is no part[34] to non-beings. True. Neither therefore is there any opinion about that, which is not in "the others," nor any fancied notion; nor does that "which is not," become in any way the subject of opinion applicable to "the others."[35] It does not. If therefore one does not exist, not any of "the others" is conceived in opinion to be one or many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without one. It is impossible. If one therefore does not exist, neither do "the others" exist; nor is one or many conceived by opinion. It seems not. Neither therefore do similars or dissimilars exist. They do not. Nor the same nor different, nor things touching nor apart, [36]nor such others, as we have already discussed, as appearing themselves;[36]

[33]—[33] As there is nothing on which *μηδέτερα καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα* can depend, Heindorf says he should have expected to find here *πεπονθότας*.

[34] Heindorf justly objects to *μέρος*, which, meaning only "a part," has no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐδ' ἓν γὰρ ἀμερὲς ἔστι*, "for there is not a single atom." Stalbaum would read, with three modern MSS *οὐδὲ μέρος*, "for not even a part." But this does not get rid of the difficulty started by Heindorf.

[35] Instead of *δοξάζεται—ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων*, which could be said only of persons, Schleiermacher proposed *ἐπὶ*, adopted by Heindorf and Stalbaum.

[36]—[36] In the words within the numerals I cannot discover an atom of meaning; nor, it appears, could Ficinus; whose version is, "neque reliqua quotcunque in superioribus, tanquam quæ ad alia spectare viderentur, enarravimus, jam ad ipsa alia spectaret vel spectare videntur, unum si minime est." From which I willingly leave to others to elicit what he found in his MS., unless he supplied from his own head what he conceived the sense to require.

of these there neither is any one, nor do "the others" appear, if the one does not exist. True. If then we summarily say, that "if one is not, nothing is," shall we not rightly say? Entirely so. Let both this then be asserted by us, and this also, as is reasonable, that whether one is or is not, both itself, and the others, are, with respect to themselves and to each other, all things entirely, and are not, and appear to be, and do not appear. It is most true.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BANQUET.

If the beauty of a dialogue of Plato is to be estimated by the number of separate Editions to which it has given rise, and by the quantity of Annotations written upon it, the Banquet would be fairly deemed to be second only to the Phædo, if not superior to it. For during the last seventy-four years it has been edited by Fischer, Wolf, Ast, Sommer, Dindorf, Reynders, Rückert, Hommel, twice by Stalbaum and the triumvirate of the Scholars at Zurich; and it has been commented upon by Wyttenbach, Schütz, Bast, Heusde, Thiersch, Orelli, Creuzer, and Voegelin: and to these must be added the pamphlets of Hartmann and C. F. Hermann, (of which I know nothing but the titles,) together with the Academical Dissertations of different Professors and embryo Critics in Germany, and the articles written in various periodicals of that country, devoted wholly or in part to classical literature.

Nor is this all; for during the same period the dialogue has been translated twice into English, thrice into German, and once into French. But even here it has been the misfortune of the philosopher to have his ideas travestied, rather than transferred to modern tongues. Such at least is the case in the miscalled versions of Sydenham and Shelley; the latter of whom has never looked beyond the Latin of Ficinus

while the former, disdaining to follow as closely a generally faithful guide, has given a paraphrase rather than a translation; and this to such an extent, that more than a third of what he has put down is the mere coinage of his own brain, and not a vestige of it is to be found in the original Greek.

Nor is it amongst the moderns alone that this dialogue has met with a marked attention. For it seems to have been no less a favourite with the Moral Philosophers of the Pagan world, and the Fathers of the Christian Church, and of those too, who, like the Neo-Platonists, occupied the neutral ground between the rising and decaying forms of faith. Of this the edition of Reynders affords abundant proof; who has either collected himself, or found in the notes of Wyttenbach, perhaps all the references to this dialogue to be met with in the series of authors alluded to; and after their united labours in this field, a very scanty gleaning has been left, I suspect, for such as may be disposed to go over the same ground. Far different, however, is the case as regards the verbal difficulties of the text. For there, after all the labours of the learned, I have found not a little to exercise my own ingenuity; and where I have failed, others will, I hope, be led to try their hands; for it is only by such continued efforts that we can expect to recover what has been lost, or to correct what has become corrupted, in one of the most fanciful, and, despite a portion of its matter, happily abhorrent from our finer feelings, one of the most beautiful dialogues of Plato.

With regard to the object which Plato had in view in writing the Banquet, they who are desirous of seeing the conflicting and equally untenable notions of some of the scholars of Germany, must turn to Stalbaum's Prolegomena, p. 35—39, where they will find a sensible rejection of the theory of Schleiermacher; who with a perversity of judgment for which it is difficult to account, considered the Banquet as being closely connected with the Sophist and Statesman, with which it has not an atom in common, instead of being rather a companion to the Phædrus, but written if not in a more chaste, at least a more chastened, style, than that misunderstood rhapsody

THE BANQUET.

OR, ON LOVE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS, FRIEND OF APOLLODORUS, GLAUCO, ARISTODEMUS, SOCRATES, AGATHO, PAUSANIAS, ARISTOPHANES, ERYXIMACHUS, PHÆDRUS, DIOTIMA, ALCIBIADES.

APOLLODORUS.

[1.] [1] RESPECTING the matters, about which you are inquiring,[1] I think myself to be not unprepared. For I happened yesterday to be coming up to the city from my house at Phalērus ;[2] when one of my acquaintances, who was behind, seeing me at distance, called out to me; and playing upon my name, said, at the same time, Hollo![3] Apollodorus, you Phalerean,[4] will you not stop? Upon which I stopped, and waited

[1]—[1] As nothing is stated at the commencement of the dialogue respecting the persons addressed, one would be inclined to believe that something has been lost.

[2] Phalērus was a sea-port about twenty stadia or two miles from Athens.

[3] On this use of *οὗτος*, see Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 476, *a*.

[4] The play in the word *Φαληρεύς*, Ast would explain by an allusion to the word *Φαλαρὶς*, or *Φαληρὶς*, which was the name of an aquatic bird with a bald pate, in Greek *φαλακρός*, and was here said in reference to the baldness of Apollodorus. Other interpretations are to be found in Stalbaum's note. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὦ Φαληρὶς*. For the Schol. on Aristoph. *Ὄρν.* 565, says, *ὁ δὲ φαληρὶς ὀρνέον ἐστὶ λιμναῖον εὐπρεπές· ἐσχημάτισε δὲ παρὰ τὸν φάλλον*: where we must evidently read—*ἀπρεπές· ἐσχημάτισται*—For nothing connected with the *φάλλος* could be *εὐπρεπές*. A similar pun was made upon Alcibiades, as shown by Hesychius, *Ἐπὶ Φαληνίου· τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος* (read *Ἀριστοφάνης*) *ἐπὶ*

for him. He then said, Apollodorus, I was just now looking after you, being desirous of hearing fully about the meeting between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were present at the supper, which took place then, when there were[5] some speeches on the subject of love. For another person narrated a part,[6] having heard it from Phœnix, the son of Philip; and he said that you knew (all): but that he had it not in his power to state any thing clearly. Do you then tell me; for you have the best right to narrate the conversation of your friend. But first, said he, tell me, were you present yourself at the meeting or not?—It appears, said I, that your informant has by no means given you a clear account, if you suppose that the meeting, about which you are asking, took place recently, so that I could be present at it. —I (thought so), said he.—How, Glauco, (could it be,) said I? —Know you not, that Agatho has not sojourned here for many years?[7] whereas, since I first passed my time with Socrates, and made it my care each day to know what he said and did, it is not yet three years. Before that time, running about wherever chance led me, and fancying I was doing something, I was more wretched than any being whatever, and not less so than you are now in thinking that you must do every thing rather

Φαληνίου γεγενῆσθαι σκώπτων παρὰ Φάληται· ἐπ' ἀναισχυντίᾳ γὰρ ὁ Φάλης. The bird was a species of water-wagtail, in Greek *σεισοπυγὶς*, applied, in a similar manner, to a lascivious person. Opportunely then has Hesychius, *Φαληρίς· ὄρνις λιμναῖος, κατὰ τὸ Φάλης* (read *Φάλητος*) *δερμάτινον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον.* Of the names of birds, thus given to persons at Athens, Aristophanes has given a list in *Ὄρν.* 1288—1298.

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *διαπυθέσθαι τὴν—ξυνουσίαν —τῶν τότε——ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγοι τινες ἦσαν*—and not *τῶν τότε—περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἦσαν.* For the *ξυνουσία* was not *περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων.* The *λόγοι* took place merely accidentally at the banquet. Moreover, *τότε* evidently requires its correlative *ὅτε*, which I have inserted before *περὶ*. Lastly, as there were no *λόγοι* called especially *ἐρωτικοὶ*, by *τῶν ἐρωτικῶν* are meant "things relating to love."

[6] Since some MSS. read *διηγεῖτο τι*, others *διηγεῖται*, Plato doubtless wrote *διηγεῖτό τι*, and instead of *καὶ*, which has no meaning here, *πᾶν*, to balance *τι*.

[7] According to Ritschel, De Agathonis Vita, p. 19, quoted by Stalbaum, Agatho retired to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, not later than Ol. 93. 1; but not, I suspect, as the Scholiast, on Aristoph. *Βατρ.* 85, says, with the view of enjoying the luxurious living to be found there, but of meeting with his friend Euripides, who had been invited thither by Archelaus; whose countrymen thought more highly than did the Athenians of the talents of the dramatist

than philosophize.—Do not scoff, said he, but tell me when the meeting took place.—When we were still children, said I, it was that Agatho won the prize[8] with the first tragedy, and the day after that in which he and his performers in the Chorus had made the sacrifice for his victory.—It is then, said he, a long time since, it seems; but who was the relater? Was it Socrates himself?—Not Socrates, by Zeus, replied I; but he who told it to Phœnix. It was one Aristodemus,[9] a Cydathenæan, a man of small size, and who always went without sandals.[10] He was present at the meeting, being, it seems to me, an admirer the greatest amongst those then living, of Socrates. Nevertheless, I inquired of Socrates himself about some of the things I had heard from him (Aristodemus); and he (Socrates) confessed to all he had reported.—Why then, said he, (Glauco,) do not you tell me? The road to the city is very convenient for persons, as they walk along, to speak and hear.[11] Proceeding in this way we entered into conversation together, so that I am now, as I said at the commencement, not quite unprepared. If then I must relate these matters (over again) to you, I must do so.[12] Besides, for in other respects, when I am either making myself, or hearing from others, any discourse on philosophy, I feel, independent of considering myself benefited, a delight beyond all bounds. But when (I hear) some other conversation, and especially yours, who are wealthy, and engaged in money-making, I feel a weariness myself, and pity for you my friends, who fancy you are doing something, while you are in fact doing nothing. But perhaps, on the other hand, you consider me possessed with an evil genius; and I think that you think correctly. I do not however think so of you; but I know it full well.

[8] It was at the festival of the Lenēa, celebrated in Ol. 90. 4, says Athenæus, v. p. 217, that Agatho obtained the first prize.

[9] Xenophon, in Mem. Socr. i. 4. 2, informs us, that Aristodemus was surnamed "the Little," and that he was an atheist, until he was taught better by Socrates.

[10] This was done in imitation of his master, Socrates.

[11] There is an allusion to the fact of persons walking along a road and entering into conversation in Pseudo-Babr. Fab., which I have restored, what no one else has been able to do, in The Surplice, No. 37, 1846.

[12] Ficinus has, "Quod si iterum vobis recenseri hæc vultis, iterum recensebo," as if he had found in his MS. *εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθα αὖθις ταῦτα, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν*

[2.] *Friend.* You are always the same man, Apollodorus, ever railing at yourself and others, and you seem to me as if you really thought all men, commencing from yourself, to be, with the exception of Socrates, miserable. Now, from whence you acquired the surname of a madman,[13] I know not;[14] for in your discourses, you are ever in such a mood, and are savage against yourself[15] and all others, Socrates excepted.

Apol. And is it,[16] my dearest friend, evident then that by so thinking of myself, and you, I am mad and talk at random?[17]

Friend. It is not worth while, Apollodorus, to dispute about this now. But as to what we have requested, do not do otherwise, but tell us what the speeches were.

Apol. The speeches then were of some such kind as this. But I will rather endeavour to relate, as he (Aristodemus) related to me (all)[18] from the beginning.

For he told me that Socrates, having washed himself and put on his slippers, which he was wont to do very seldom,[19] met him; and that he asked him, whither he was going, after he had made himself so smart; when Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's to supper; for yesterday (said he) at the sacri-

[13] Apollodorus was not really mad, but only as violent as a madman in all he did and said. For such is the meaning of *μανικὸς*, as shown by Stalbaum.

[14] The sense requires, what Bast was the first to remark, "I know very well," in Greek, *εὖ κάτοιδ' ἔγωγε*.

[15] Hommel quotes opportunely from Plautus, "Non sanus satis, Menæchme, qui nunc ipsus maledicas tibi."

[16] Stalbaum says that Apollodorus ironically confesses himself to be mad. But in what word, or words, the irony is to be found, he does not deign to tell us. The sentence is interrogative, as remarked by Hommel, whom Stalbaum should have followed.

[17] On the use of *παραπαίειν*, see my note in Æsch. Prom. 1092, where, in illustration of my restoration of a fragment of Æschylus—*Εἰ δ' οὖν σοφιστής; Μὴ ἀλλὰ παραπαίω χέλυν*—I should have referred to Troilus and Cressida, iii. 2; "Nell, he is full of harmony. No truly, lady, no; Rude, in good soothe; in good soothe, very rude."

[18] Here again one would prefer *πᾶν* to *καὶ*. On the confusion in *καὶ* and *παῖ*, see Porson, Orest. 614.

[19] Despite this assertion, we are told by Ælian, in Var. Hist. iv. 18, that Socrates was accused of being nice about his personal appearance. And so perhaps he was, as compared with some of the philosophers, who, in the language of Aristophanes, "were for six years unwashed"

fit e for the victory, I avoided him, for fear of the crowd; but agreed to be with him to-day. I have therefore made myself smart to go to a handsome man in a handsome manner.[20] But how, said he, Aristodemus, have you the disposition to be willing to go with me,[21] uninvited, to a supper?—And I replied, said (Aristodemus), that I will do as you may command. —Follow me then, said (Socrates), that we may by a change pervert the proverb,[22] that

> To the feasts of the good will go
> The good of their own accord

Homer, however, nearly seems to have not merely perverted the proverb, but to have done violence to it. For after describing Agamemnon as pre-eminently good in the affairs of war, and Menelaus as "a soft-hearted spearman," (in Iλ. P. 588,) yet, when Agamemnon had made a sacrifice and was feasting, he has introduced (in Iλ. B. 408) Menelaus as coming to the feast uninvited, an inferior man to the banquet of his betters. On hearing this, said (Aristodemus), Perhaps I too shall run a risk, not Socrates, as you say, but as in Homer, if I, a person of no parts, go to the banquet of a clever man uninvited. Will you then make an apology for bringing me? for, as to myself, I will not confess that I came uninvited, but invited by you.

> "[23] We two together going will consult,
> The one for the other," [23] what we have to say,

[20] Stalbaum conceives, with Hermann and Rost, that ἵν' ἴω could follow ἐκαλλωπισάμην, contrary to the canon of Dawes. Had he looked to the readings of the MSS. he would have seen that two offer καλῶ, which leads to Καλῶς ἴοιμι παρὰ καλὸν καλούμενος, a verse probably of Euripides. At all events Socrates, who was as ugly as Silenus, would scarcely speak of himself as a handsome man, although he might speak of his doing a thing in a handsome manner.

[21] In lieu of ἂν ἴέναι—which could not follow ἐθέλειν, common sense manifestly points to ἅμ' ἴέναι—a fact that has escaped the notice of every editor, despite the subsequent Σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω.

[22] The proverb was originally, as stated by the Scholiast, Αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασι, i. e. "To the feasts of the coward will go the brave of their own accord," and was applied to Hercules when he appeared before Ceyx, as the latter was enjoying a feast. It is alluded to in a fragment of Bacchylides, and of Cratinus and Eupolis, quoted respectively by Athenæus and the Scholiast here.

[23]—[23] In the words within the numerals, Σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ τοῦ βουλευσόμεθα, there is an allusion to Homer, Iλ. K. 224, Σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω καί τι πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν. From whence, strange to say, Fischer

replied (Socrates). But come, let us be going. [3.] After conversing a little in this way, he said, on they went. But on the way, Socrates, attending to something in his own mind, was left behind in the walk; and that he, (Socrates,) bade him, (Aristodemus,) who was waiting, to go on; but that when he arrived at Agatho's dwelling he found the door open, and there, he said, happened a ludicrous incident. For a servant from within, straightway meeting him, led him to where the rest were reclining (at the table); and that Agatho, on seeing him, said immediately, Aristodemus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us; but if you are come for any other purpose, defer it to another time; for (know that) I was looking about for you yesterday, that I might invite you, but I could not see you. But how are you not bringing Socrates to us?—And I, turning round, said he, saw no where Socrates following me. I stated however that I had come with Socrates, having been invited hither by him to supper.—You did well, said Agatho; but where is he himself?—He was coming behind me just now, said I; and I too wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho to one of his servants, will you not make inquiry for Socrates, and bring him in? but do you, Aristodemus, said he, recline near Eryximachus. [24] And he said that a servant washed him,[24] that he might take his place upon the couch; but that some other of the servants came and brought word, that this[25] Socrates had withdrawn himself, and was standing in the porch of a

was the first to correct ὁ τοῦ for ὁδοῦ, found in all the MSS., and in the version of Ficinus, "in ipso itinere," and still more strangely Wyttenbach, in Biblioth. Crit. i. p. 117, rejected the only successful restoration made by Fischer in the whole of Plato.

[24]—[24] The old edd. have, Καὶ ἐμὲ ἔφη ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα που κατακέοιτο: out of which Ficinus was unable to make the least sense; and hence he has given, what the train of ideas seemed to require, "Heus tu, dato huic manibus aquam, ut jam sedeat." Stephens however was the first to suggest that ἔ lay hid here; from whence Bast, in Specimen Critic. p. 10, was led to ἔ μὲν, adopted by Bekk., Ast., Stalb. But in the first place, although οὗ and οἵ are frequently found in pure Attic Greek, ἔ never is, except in two doubtful passages, one in § 4, and the other in Rep. i. p. 327, A. Secondly, the article could not be thus introduced before παῖδα. And, lastly, it is in vain to say with Stalbaum that που, omitted in the majority of MSS., owes its origin to ἵνα ὅπου, found in five MSS., as if ὅπου would be employed to explain ἵνα. There is some deep-seated disorder here, which I could perhaps by a bold conjecture cure.

[25] Instead of οὗτος, Plato evidently wrote αὐτὸς: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "Socratem ipsum."

neighbouring house; and when I called to him,[26] (said the boy,) he refused to come in.—Absurd! said (Agatho), will you not call him? and do not leave him there.—But (Aristodemus) told me, that he said, By no means; but let him alone, for he had such a habit of withdrawing himself. He sometimes stands still, said he, wherever he may happen to be. He will be here presently, as I guess. Do not then disturb him, but let him alone. Nay then, if you think it best, said (Agatho), so we must do. But, slaves, said he, prepare the feast for us the rest. By all means[27] put before us what you like; since there is nobody to superintend—an act which I never do myself. Conceiving then myself and the rest here to be invited by you to supper, entertain us so that we may commend you.—[4.] After this, he said, they went to supper; but Socrates had not come in. Agatho, therefore, gave frequent orders to send for Socrates; [28] but he (Aristodemus) would not permit it. That he (Socrates) therefore came, having waited as usual, a not long time,[28] but at furthest, when they were in the middle of supper. Agatho then, who hap-

[26] Stalbaum, strange to say, still sticks to *κἀμοῦ*, found it seems in not a single MS., and which is intelligible only by inserting, as Sydenham has done, the words "said the boy." The MSS. vary between *καὶ οὔ* and *καὶ σοῦ*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ του καλοῦντος*, i. e. "and on some one calling."

[27] Thiersch, justly offended with *πάντως*, wished to read *ἑστιᾶτε πάντας*, with two MSS.; and so Rynders and Ruckert. Stalbaum attempts to defend *πάντως* by passages not in point. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἑστιᾶτε πεινῶντας· παρατίθετ' οὖν—*. For thus, by the mention of hunger, the slaves would know that they were to place an abundance on the table.

[28—28] Here Stalbaum was the first to introduce *ἔ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν*, found in three MSS., in lieu of *αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν* in some, or *τὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν* in others, or *ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν*, adopted by Bekker, from four MSS. Ficinus has evidently abridged the whole passage, either because there was something wanting in his MS., or because he could not make out the syntax. Plato wrote, I suspect, *αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνεῖναι*, i. e. "but that Socrates did not give in," and *ἥκειν δ' αὐτὸν οὔ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὡς εἰώθει, διατρίψαντα*, i. e. "and that he now came not, having wasted, as he was wont, some considerable time." This would be at least intelligible, which the Greek at present is not. Bekker, however, would in lieu of *ἔ* read *ἵ*, which is said to be an obsolete form of the nominative of the reciprocal pronoun *οὔ*: nor has he felt the least repugnance to defile the pure Greek of Plato in a way to satisfy Donaldson indeed in The New Cratylus, p. 171, but nobody else, that I have heard of. For the smallest particle of common sense would enable any one to see that a reciprocal pronoun could not have a nominative.

pened to be lying on the couch at the lower (end of the table) alone, said, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me; in order [29]that, by touching you,[29] I may enjoy that wise thought, which has occurred to you in the porch. For it is plain that you have found out and possess it; for you would not have previously stood aloof.[30]—Socrates then, sitting down, observed, It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a kind, as to flow from the party filled with it, to the one who is less so, when they touch each other; like water in vessels running by means of a thread of wool[31] from the fuller vessel into the emptier. For if wisdom were in this state, I should value[32] highly a reclining near you. For I think I should be filled by you with wisdom abundant and beautiful. For mine would be mean and questionable, being as it were a dream. But yours is brilliant, and has a great

[29]—[29] As the words *ἀπτόμενος σου* are omitted in what are called the four best MSS., they are considered an interpolation by Hommel. It is certainly difficult to understand how Agatho could better enjoy the wisdom of Socrates by touching him than by not touching.

[30] The Greek is *οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης*, which Ficinus renders "Alioquin non tam diu restitisses." But he thus lost sight of the doubled prepositions, *προ* and *απο*. Sydenham has, "For otherwise you would never have desisted from your pursuit." Shelley, "You would not have departed till you had discovered and secured it." And so Stalbaum; who says that we must supply *εἰ μὴ εὗρες αὐτό*, after *προαπέστης*. The sense evidently required is, "You would not have stood apart in a state of doubt;" in Greek, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσας ἀπέστης*.

[31] De Geel, in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. t. ii. p. 274, was the first to explain the allusion in the words, *διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου*, by showing that if a thread of wool be so placed, that one end of it is in a glass full of water, and the other in an empty one, the water will by a kind of capillary attraction rise from the fuller vessel and fall into the emptier one, until the quantity in each is equal. The same idea seems to have presented itself to Shelley, who thus translates the passage, "Like the water in two chalices, which will flow through a flock of wool from the fuller into the emptier, until both are equal." But De Geel failed to remark, that as *διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου* could not be found in correct Greek, Plato probably wrote *διὰ λινέου ἐρίου*, or even without *διὰ*, if to this passage is to be referred the gl. in Hesych. *Λινέω ἐρίῳ*. With regard to the preceding sentence, it is alluded to by Plutarch, in Sympos. ii. p. 818, E., *ὥσπερ ἐκ πλήρους κύλικος εἰς κενὴν ἀπορροή τις γίγνεται*.

[32] As the three so-called best MSS. read *τιμῶμεν*, Stalbaum suggested *τιμῶ μέν*, observing that the apodosis of the sentence might be understood. But after the preceding *εἰ οὕτως ἔχει*, there could be no apodosis, and even if there could, that in correct Greek *τιμᾶσθαι*, not *τιμᾶν*, means "to set a value" Correctly then does he add that "there is need of the alteration."

(hope for an)[32] increase, since already it has shone out from you so vehemently, and became conspicuous the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand[33] Greeks, its witnesses. You are saucy, Socrates, said Agatho. But I and you will shortly afterwards try the question touching our wisdom, and Bacchus shall decide the cause, but for the present turn yourself to the supper. Upon this he told me that Socrates reclined himself, and took his supper, and so did the rest, and that they made libations, [34]and sung the praises of the god, and (after performing) the other rites,[34] they turned themselves to drinking; when Pausanias,[35] he said, opened the conversation thus:—

Well then, gentlemen, said he, after what fashion shall we drink the easiest (and best)?[36] For my part, I confess to you that I really feel myself not very well from yesterday's de-

[32] Although *πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα* would mean "having made a great progress," yet such an idea would be inapplicable in the case of Agatho, whose early success gave the promise of future progress. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *πολλὴν ἐλπίδ' ἐς ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα*, for *ἐλπίδ' ἐς* might easily have dropt out before *ἐπίδοσιν*. Hence, too, we can understand the origin of *ἐπίτασιν*, found in the margin of a Vienna MS.

[33] This number is mentioned not without reason. For Aristophanes says in *Ἐκκλ.* 1134, there were more than 30,000 citizens; and so does Herodotus in v. 99; and Æschines in *Περὶ Παραπρ.* p. 316, that there were just as many disreputable persons, as Demosthenes at Athens. The number would have been increased, had not Agatho's victory been gained at the Lenæa, the dramatic festival, at which Athenians alone were present, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ἀχ.* 478, *Αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμὲν, ἐπί τε Ληναίῳ 'στ' ἀγὼν, Κοὔπωξένοι πάρεισιν.*

[34—34] The Greek is *καὶ ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.* But as there is nothing to tell what god is here alluded to, and nothing to govern *τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα*, opportunely has Athenæus, in v. p. 179, D., *ἅπερ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ Συμπόσιον· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δειπνῆσαι σπονδάς τέ φησιν ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν παωνίσαντας τοῖς νομιζομένοις γέρασι.* From whence it is easy to see that Plato wrote—*καὶ τὸν θεὸν παιανίσαντας καὶ λύσαντας τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα*—i. e. "hymning with a pæan the god (Apollo), and paying the other rites." For thus *λύσαντας τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα* would be similar to *θεοῖς—τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα—δωσομεν*, in Pseudo-Platon. Alcibiad. ii. p. 151, B., and *παανίσαντες* with *ἐσπείσαντο καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν* in Xenoph. Sympos. ii. 1.

[35] On this Pausanias, who was a lover of Agatho, see Protagor. p. 315, D. § 18.

[36] The old edd. *ἥδιστα*. The MSS. *ῥᾷστα*. Ficinus unites both—"levius suaviusque." Perhaps Plato wrote here *ὡς* (for so two MSS.) *ῥᾷστα τε καὶ ἄριστα.*

bauch, and I have need of some respite, and so I think the most of you have; for you were here yesterday. Consider then in what way we may drink the easiest.[37]—Aristophanes[38] then said, You speak however[39] well, Pausanias, on this point, that we should by all means procure for ourselves an easy method in our drinking. For I am one of those, who were thoroughly drenched yesterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryximachus,[41] the son of Acūmĕnus, said, Both of you say well: but I want to hear from one of you, how does Agatho bear up with strength in drinking.—I am by no means very strong, said (Agatho).—It would be a god-send, said Eryximachus, for us, both myself, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus,[42] and these here, if you, the stouter men at the bottle, have on the present occasion flinched. For we are at all times weak. Socrates indeed I put out of the account; for he is all-sufficient on both points,[43] so that it matters not to him, whichsoever we may do. Since then none of the persons present seem inclined to drink much wine, I may be perhaps the less disagreeable, if I tell the truth about getting drunk. For from the physician's art, I conceive that this has become a matter quite evident to myself, that drunkenness is for men a very bad thing; and I would neither willingly myself [44] be willing to drink far on,[44] nor advise any other person (to do so), especially when still suffering with a head-ache from the night before.—As for me, said Phædrus of Myrrhinous,[45] taking up the discourse, I am accustomed to attend to you in other

[37] The repetition of *ὡς ῥᾷστα* is rather jejune. Ficinus has "levius salubriusque."

[38] This was the Comic poet; as shown by § 43, where is quoted a verse from *Νεφ.* 361.

[39] Instead of *τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις*, where Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend *μέντοι* by passages not in point, one would prefer *Τοῦτ' ἐμόν γε νοῦν, εὖ λεγεις.* For thus *ἐμὸν νοῦν* is found without *κατά*, similar to *γνώμην γ' ἐμὴν* in Aristoph. *Ἐκκλ.* 349, (372,) *Εἰρ.* 232.

[41] On this Eryximachus, see Protagor. p. 315, C. § 18.

[42] This Phædrus gave the name to Plato's earliest Dialogue.

[43] In lieu of *καὶ ἀμφότερα*, where *καὶ* is unintelligible, Ficinus found *κατ' ἀμφότερα*, as shown by his version, "ad utrumque,"—i. e. "to drink or not."

[44—44] By no process could *ἑκὼν εἶναι—ἐθελήσαιμι* be thus found in one sentence; nor could *πόρρω* be united to *ἐθελήσαιμι* or *πιεῖν*. There is some error here, which I could correct, satisfactorily to myself, but not so perhaps to others.

[45] Myrrhinous was a parish belonging to the Pandion tribe at Athens.

respects, and in whatever you say about the physician's art, and so would the rest here, if they are well-advised.[46]—[5.] On hearing this, they all agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink thus[47] as they pleased.—Since then this has been decreed, said Eryximachus, that we are to drink as each one pleases, and that there is to be no compulsion, the next thing I have to propose is, to let the flute-playing damsel, who has just come in, go away and play to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women within; but for us to mix with each other to-day in conversation: and on what kind of conversation I am willing, if you wish it, to explain.—This, they all said, they wished, and bade him explain accordingly.

Hereupon Eryximachus said, The commencement then of my speech is in the style of the Melanippe of Euripides,

The tale I have to tell is not my own,[48]

but from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is on every occasion saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not a shocking thing, says he, Eryximachus, for hymns and pæans to be made by poets in honour of some other deities; and yet not one amongst so many poets who have been born,[49] has ever composed a panegyric upon Love, who is a deity of such an age,[50] and of such a power? But if, on the other hand, you are willing to look carefully into the utilitarian[51] sophists, (you

[46] I have translated as if the Greek were *νῦν δ' ἂν, εἰ εὖ βουλεύοιντο, καὶ οἱ λοιποί*: where *ἂν* is due to eight MSS., *εἰ* to Orelli on Isocrat. *Περὶ Ἀντιδοσ.* p. 32, *εὖ* to Bast, Epist. Crit. p. 13, and to *βουλεύοιντο* I have been led by *ἂν εὖ βουλεύωνται*, the conjecture of Winckelmann on Euthydem. p. 140. The old edd. have *νῦν δ' αὖ εὖ βούλονται*. Ficinus, "nunc similiter modo cæteri quoque consentiant."

[47] Stalbaum asserts that *οὕτως* is spoken *δεικτικῶς*. But how any one could by any gesture show that each of the party was to drink as he liked, he does not, nor could he, explain. Plato wrote *αὑτως*, "of his own will." See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 141.

[48] The whole verse, of which Plato has quoted only the first half, was *Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα*, as shown by Dionys. Hal. t. ii. p. 58 and 103. Otherwise one might have elicited *Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθός ἐστιν, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν*, as Sydenham partly suggested.

[49] The introduction of *γεγονότων* is due to the notion that "Poeta nascitur, non fit"—

[50] This is said with reference to the fiction of Cupid being a child and a god at the same time.

[51] This is the exact rendering of *χρηστούς*: for the Sophists in the

will find that some)[52] have composed encomiums in prose on Hercules, and other persons, as the best of them, Prodicus,[53] has done. This, however, is the less wonderful.[54] But I have lately met with a little book, by a wise man, in which salt has a wondrous praise for its utility; and upon many other things of such a kind you may see encomiums.[55]

time of Plato were, like the Pantologists of the present day, constantly directing public attention to what was useful in a pecuniary view, and laughing down every other pursuit of a more intellectual character. See my article "On the New School of Superficial Pantology," in The Church of England Quarterly Review, vol. i. p. 446—474.

[52] For the preservation of *εὑρήσεις* we are indebted to Ficinus, who has "Atqui, si vis quærere, invenies profecto Sophistas disertos—laudasse." Hence I suspect that *εὕροις τινας ἂν* has dropt out after *σοφιστὰς*—for *φ* and *ερ* are easily confounded in MSS., as shown by Schow on Hesych., where in *Αἰνὸν* the MS. has *τήμφον* for *τήμερον*. Stalbaum says that *ξυγγράφειν* is governed by *δεινόν*. But he adds, as if half ashamed of the absurdity, that Ficinus has "invenies sophistas—laudasse," and seems to have read in his MS. *εὑρήσεις—ξυγγράφειν*, with *αὐτοὺς* understood.

[53] Plato alludes to the dissertation of Prodicus, entitled Ὧραι, so much admired, as we learn from Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists, and from Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates. The allegorical story of the Judgment of Hercules is related by the last-mentioned writer, although, as he tells us himself, not in the pompous words of the original author, but in his own more simple style. S.

[54] In defence of *καὶ* after *μᾶλλον*, to which Bast and Thiersch objected, and which is omitted by two MSS., Stalbaum has produced, as usual, passages not in point.

[55] Tzetzes in Chiliad. ii. 385; and Erasmus in the commencement of his "Stultitiæ Laus," and in the letter to Sir Thomas More prefixed to it, has given a list of similar treatises; to some of which Wolf has alluded in his Prolegomen. p. xxxv. to the Leptinean oration of Demosthenes; and Wyttenbach on Plutarch Moral. t. i. p. 385, ed. Lips., and to the authors quoted by both, may be added Pseudo-Demetr. Περὶ Ἑρμην. § 172. Fronto's Encomium on Smoke and Dust, and Carelessness, published by Maii, who, in p. 361, refers to the praise of Poverty in Xenophon's Banquet, iv. 29, and to that of the Gnat, by Dio Chrysostom, who likewise wrote the praise of a parrot, as stated by Synesius; while Fronto, in p. 41, alludes to M. Cæsar's praise of Sleep. Appion's Encomium on Adultery is given by Clemens Romanus, i. p. 665, ed. Coteler.; while amongst the unedited works of Michael Psellus, says Fabricius in Biblioth. Græc. T. x. p. 71, are to be found Encomiums on Bugs, Lice, Fleas, and Wine. With regard to the praise of salt, this probably came from the school of Pythagoras. At least in the Timæus, p. 60, E., there is the remarkable expression *ἁλῶν—Θεοφιλὲς σῶμα*: while by comparing Clemens Alexandrin. in Cohortat. p. 13, Plutarch in Sympos. ii. p. 685, E. and Athen. viii. p. 359, E., some idea may be formed of the matter contained in the praise of salt, the anonymous author of which was, I suspect, no less a person than Socrates.

·[6](Strange) that about such subjects many should have bestowed great care,[56] but that not a single person should ever to this day have dared to hymn Love worthily; and thus has a deity so great been neglected. Now, in all this, Phædrus seems to me to speak correctly. I am desirous, therefore to bring at the same time my contribution to this subject, and to gratify him; and at the same time it seems to me becoming for the persons here on the present occasion to give glory to the god. If then this seems good to you likewise, there will be a sufficient subject of discussion before us. For I vote that each of us shall speak in praise of Love, an oration, the most beautiful he can, proceeding on the right-hand side; and that Phædrus shall begin, as he is reclining at the top, and is, moreover, the father of the discussion.—Not a single person, Eryximachus, said Socrates, will give a contrary vote.[57] For neither would I say no, who say that I know nothing else than the matters relating to love; nor would Agatho, nor Pausanias,[58] nor would, I ween,[59] Aristophanes, whose whole occupation is relating to Dionysus and Aphrodité;[60] nor

[56]—[56] The Greek is, *τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι*, where *τὸ—ποιήσασθαι* is compared with the passages quoted by critics from Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 5 and 7, *Βατρ.* 741, *Νεφ.* 816, Plato Phædon. p. 99, B., to prove that *τὸ* with an infinitive is expressive of astonishment. But in that case, as Stephens was the first to remark, one would have expected *ἀλλ' οὕτως ἠμελῆσθαι τὸν θεὸν* in the next clause. And so Ficinus has translated, "In his itaque studiose versari, Amorem vero, tantum deum, a nullo adhuc in hunc usque diem pro dignitate laudari, sed usque contemni, cui non gravissimum videtur," as if his MS. had *τίνι οὐ πάνδεινον εἶναι δοκοίη ἄν*; words that might have easily dropt out from their similarity to *ταῦτα δή μοι δοκεῖ εὖ*. Be this however as it may, it is evident that *τοιούτων* could not be separated from *περὶ* by *μὲν*, and that the antithesis in *μηδ' ἕνα* requires *πολλοὺς*, which is requisite likewise before *ποιήσασθαι*: for in this formula the accusative is and must be found with the verb. And so I have translated. Plato wrote *τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων πέρι πολλοὺς σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι*, where *τῶν* is due to two MSS.

[57] The Greek is *ψηφιεῖται*, in allusion to the pebble which was used for voting in public meetings.

[58] Ficinus has "nec etiam Agathon et Pausanias adversabuntur." For he probably found in his MS., *οὔτ' ἀντείποιεν ἄν*, in lieu of *οὔτε που*, where *που* has no meaning, and rarely, if ever, follows *οὔτε*.

[59] In defence of *οὐδὲ μήν* after *οὔτε*,—*οὔτε*, Stalbaum refers to Herbst on Xenophon's Symposium, p. 17. He ought rather to have suggested, *οὐδ', οἶμ', ἄν*, as I have translated.

[60] Stalbaum appositely refers to Lucian's *Κρονικά*, § 34, where Dionysus, Aphrodité, and the Graces are similarly united with the idea of "a feast of reason and a flow of soul."

would any one else of these whom I see here. And yet it is not fair and equal for us who are reclining the lowest down. However, if those who are before us shall speak sufficiently and well, it will be enough for us. Let Phædrus then, with fortune favouring, begin and make a panegyric upon Love. [6.] To this all the rest assented, and bade him do, as Socrates (had said). Of all then which each person said, neither had Aristodemus a perfect recollection, nor have I of all that he told me: but[61] what was said, and by whom, that seemed to be[61] worth remembering on these points, I will detail the speech of each individual.

He told me then, as I say, that Phædrus first began somewhat after this way, and said—Love is a deity mighty and wonderful amongst men and gods, on many other accounts, and not the least as regards his origin. For to be one of the oldest of the gods, is a thing (said he)[62] of honour. And there is

[61]—[61] Misled as usual by his superstitious reverence for what he considers the best MSS., Stalbaum would omit, as they do, *εἶναι* after *ἀξιομνημόνευτον*, as if *ἔδοξε* could thus stand by itself in any but incorrect Greek. Had he not been misled likewise by Ast, who fancies that *ἃ—ἀξιομνημόνευτον* is an admissible construction, he might perhaps have seen that Plato wrote, *ἃ δὲ κάλλιστα ἀκούειν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιομνημονευτέα τ' εἶναι*, i. e. "But what seemed to me the most beautiful to hear, and worthy to be remembered:" which makes a somewhat better sense than the rubbish of the received text, *ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιομνημονεύτων εἶναι*. For thus *μάλιστα* and *κάλλιστα* are frequently confounded, as shown by Porson on Phœn. 878: and while *κάλλιστ' ἀκούειν* may be compared with *Ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀκούειν—καλὰ* in Soph. Aj. 1209, very luckily has *ἀξιομνημόνευτα* been found in three MSS.; for it leads to *ἀξιομνημονευτέα*: and thus *ἔδοξε—ἀξιομνημονευτέα εἶναι* will be similar to *ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα εἶναι* in Thucyd. i. 72, and a similar union of *δοκεῖν* with a verbal adjective in—*τέος* and *εἶναι* will be found in i. 118, ii. 13, v. 15, vi. 25, vii. 73; in Xenophon, K. A. iv. 4, 14, iv. 5, 1; in Arrian, E. A. ii. 26, 3; in Suidas' Ἐξαιρετέα and Πολεμητέα, and here in § 40, *ἐδοξέ μοι ἐπιθετέον εἶναι*. Sometimes the *εἶναι* is wrongly omitted, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 60, *βουλευτέα ἐδόκει*. Appian i. p. 67, Schw., *Πύρρῳ πολεμητέα—ἐδόκει*. Agathias ii. p. 60, *ἀποπορευτέα—αὐτῷ—ἐδόκει*: and Suidas in Ἀπρέα, and Ἀποπορευτέα. In Thucyd. i. 140, MS. g. has correctly *ξυμβουλευτέα μοι εἶναι* instead of *ὄντα*.

[62] Bast was the first to object to *ἢ δ' ὅς*, which could not be thus introduced in a direct speech. It is however partially supported by *εἶδος* in Stobæus Physic. p. 154, by the aid of which Creuzer on Plotinus Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 521, proposed to read *τίμιον ὄνειδος*, similar to *καλὸν ὄνειδος* in Soph. Phil. 476, *κάλλιστον ὄνειδος* in Phœn. 828. But such an oxymoron would be here out of place. Accordingly in a Vienna periodical he suggested that *ἦδος* was an abbreviation for *ἡσίοδος*, quoted just after

a proof of this. For the parents of Love neither exist, nor are said by any individual [63] or poet to exist.[64] Now Hesiod says, (in Theogon. 116,)

> Chaos was first produced; Earth rose the next,
> Wide-bosomed, a firm seat for all; then Love—

[65] the poet says that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love.[65] And Parmenides says of [66] Generation, that it [66]

> Plann'd that of all the gods Love should be first.[65]

Acusilaus too agrees with Hesiod. Thus on many sides it is confessed that Love is among the most ancient (of things). And being the most ancient,[67] he is the cause to us of the greatest good.[67] For to a person [68] being now young,[68] I cannot men-

wards. He should have proposed *τιμιον ἕδος*, "a seat of honour." Timæus has "Εδος· *τὸ ἄγαλμα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἵδρυται.* See Heindorf on Phædon. p. 111, B.

[63] Both Hemsterhuis on Lucian Necyom. p. 484, and Ruhnken on Longin. § 34. I understand by *ἰδιώτης*, "a prose writer," as opposed to a poet. But in Greek *λόγιος* is a prose writer.

[64] This is not quite true to the letter, as may be seen in the learned, ingenious, and elegant "Diatribe in Euripid." of Valckenaer, p. 154—161.

[65]—[65] As all the words within the numerals are omitted by Stobæus, Heyne, in Memoires de l' Academ. Paris, t. i. p. 377, wished to expunge them, conceiving they had been interpolated from Aristot. Metaphys. 3, 4, *καὶ γὰρ οὗτος* (*ὁ Παρμενίδης*) *κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν, Πρώτιστον μὲν, φησὶν, Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.* But Hommel more correctly rejects only, *φησὶ μετὰ—Ἔρωτα*: unless it be said that from *Ἔρως φησὶν μετὰ* is to be elicited *Ἔρος καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ᾄσε μετὰ*. For we thus obtain an additional testimony to the truth of the theory, and can now understand, better than before, why Plato should speak shortly afterwards of the number of the witnesses.

[66]—[66] Hermann, as stated by Koch in his Preface to Additament. in Timæi Lex. p. xii., quoted by Stalbaum, was the first to see that *Γένεσις* was personified by Parmenides. But he did not see that *ὅτι* had dropt out between *λέγει* and *πρώτιστον*, which even Stalbaum has stumbled upon; and still less that, as Simplicius on Aristot. Physic. p. 127, testifies to Parmenides holding that there was *θεῶν αἰτίαν δαίμονα ἐν μέσῳ πάντων ἠ πάντα κυβερνᾷ*. Plato probably wrote, *Παρμενίδες δὲ αἰτίαν τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει ὅτι Πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων, Δαίμονα δ' ἐν μέσσῳ πάντων, ἠ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.*

[67]—[67] In the words *Πρεσβυτατος δὲ ὢν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἠμῖν αἴτιός ἐστιν*, lies hid, I suspect, a verse of Parmenides, *Πρεσβύτατος δ' ἀγαθῶν νῦν αἴτιός ἐστι μεγίστων.*

[68]—[68] In the words *εὐθὺς νέῳ ὄντι* there is a corruption which I could easily correct, if this were the place for a lengthened discussion.

tion what is a greater good than a useful lover, or[63] to a lover than an object of affection. For that, which should lead persons who are to live correctly through the whole of life, neither consanguinity[70] is able to produce in us, nor honours, nor wealth, nor any thing else, so well as love; [71] I mean some such thing as[71] the shame for base acts, and the love of glory for honourable deeds. For without these (two) it is not possible for a state or individual to accomplish any thing great or honourable. I assert therefore that he, who loves, if he is found committing any base act, or suffering one from any body, and failing through cowardice to revenge himself, would not be in so much pain, when seen by his father and friends or any one else, as by the object of his affection. In the very same manner, we see that the party loved is vehemently ashamed before the parties loving, if discovered doing any dishonourable act. If then there could be any contrivance to form a city or an army of persons loving and loved, it is not possible for them to regulate [72]their own country better[72] than by abstaining from every thing base, and having a desire to be honoured by one another [73](for what is noble);[73] and fighting side by side, such persons, although few in number, would conquer, so to say, the whole world. For a lover would less endure to be seen by his beloved, when deserting his post, or throwing away his arms, than by all the others; and in preference to this, [74]either to leave behind his beloved (when

[69] Hommel reads ἢ for καὶ, to balance the sentence.

[70] In lieu of συγγένεια, Wyttenbach, in Epist. Crit. p. 9, suggested εὐγένεια. But Ast refers to Rep. vi. p. 491, C., κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια. But there Reynders would read εὐγένεια, similar to οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος οὔτε κάλλος οὔτε εὐγένεια in Musonius.

[71—71] As two things are mentioned, αἰσχύνη and φιλοτιμία, it is evident that Plato wrote, λέγω δὴ δύο τὼ τούτω, not λέγω δὲ δή τι τοῦτο—and just before, not ὃ χρὴ, but ἃ χρὴ, and just after, τούτοιν instead of τούτων. The passages produced by Ast in defence of λέγω δὲ δή τί τοῦτο are not in point.

[72—72] Stalbaum says, that after τὴν ἑαυτῶν is to be understood πολιν. But Ficinus has, what is better suited to the train of thought—"fortiter agerent administrarentque singula."

[73—73] Ficinus has, what is evidently required by the balance of the sentences—"dum per verecundiam a turpibus abstinerent, et ad honesta, quasi quadam emulatione contenderent." From which Ast was led to read καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, similar to ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν, a little above.

[74—74] Instead of καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ, where καὶ μὴν

he has fallen,)[74] or not to assist him when in danger, he would rather die many deaths. There is not a man so much of a coward as that Love would not divinely inspire him to deeds of valour, and make him equal to the very best by birth. [7.] And in good truth, what Homer says,[75] that a god did into some heroes breathe a spirit, this, from himself produced, does Love to (all)[76] lovers furnish. Moreover, to die (for another)[77] lovers alone are ready, not only men, but women too. Of this Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, affords a sufficient proof amongst the Hellenes in behalf of this reasoning, in being alone willing to die for her husband, although his father and mother were then living; whom she so much excelled in affection through love as to prove them to be aliens (in blood) to their own son, and relations only in name. And having done this deed so noble, she was thought by not only men, but the gods likewise, to have effected that, although many had achieved many and noble acts, to only some,[78] to be easily counted, did the gods grant this as a gift, for the soul to return from Hades; but[79] they sent her back, struck with admiration of the deed. Thus do even the gods especially honour the zeal bestowed on Love and valour. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, did the gods send back from Hades with his object unaccomplished, by showing him the phantom merely of his

—γε and ἐν before καταλιπεῖν are equally unintelligible, I have translated, as if the Greek were—ἢ κείμενον καταλιπεῖν αὐτοῦ τὰ παιδικά: for κείμενον is properly opposed to the subsequent κινδυνεύοντι, and both are united to τὰ παιδικά, as in Phædrus, p. 239, A., et 240, A. With regard to the introduction of κείμενον, they who remember the battle in the Iliad over the fallen body of Patroclus, will see at once that it is the very word here required to complete the sense.

[75] The passages alluded to are, Il. K. 482, and O. 262, where the heroes are respectively Diomed and Hector.

[76] To balance the preceding ἐνίοις, Orelli on Isocrat. Περὶ Ἀντιδοσ. p. 325, corrected τοῖς into πᾶσιν.

[77] Ficinus has alone "pro alio mori amantes soli," what the sense requires. Perhaps Plato wrote ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γ' ἐρωμένων—οἱ ἐρῶντες.

[78] The whole list of those who, after dying, were said to have come back to earth, is confined to Eurydice, Alcestis, and Sisyphus.

[79] The ἀλλὰ here is so manifestly absurd, that one would have expected even Stalbaum would not have ventured to defend it. Ficinus has "continuo," which would lead to αὐτίκα, or rather αὐτίκα μάλα. For so those words are constantly united; and we should thus perceive the peculiarity in the fate of Alcestis, who, as we learn from the play of Euripides, was restored to life on the very day of her death.

wife, for whom he went, and not restoring her real self; because he appeared to act the coward, as being a harper, and not daring, like Alcestis, to die for Love, but contriving to go alive to Hades. Hence on this very account did the gods impose on him a punishment, and caused his death to take place at the hands of women. Not so did they honour him, as they did Achilles, the son of Thetis, whom they sent even to the islands of the blest,[80] because, having heard from his mother, that he would die himself, after he had slain Hector, but that if he slew not Hector, he would return home and die an old man, he dared to prefer, after aiding his lover Patroclus and avenging his fate, not only to die for him, but over him when dead. From whence the gods, being amazingly struck with admiration, honoured him exceedingly, because he had valued so highly the person who had loved him. For Æschylus[81] talks idly, in saying that Achilles was in love with Patroclus; for Achilles was more handsome not only than Patroclus, but all the other heroes, and still beardless, and moreover, as Homer says,[82] much younger. But in reality the gods honour most the valour, which is shown in behalf of love: they still feel a greater wonder and admiration, and act more kindly, when the person loved has an affection for the lover, than when the lover has for the loved. For the lover is more of a godlike thing than the loved, as being inspired by a god. On this account did (the gods) honour Achilles even more than Alcestis, by sending him to the islands of the blest. Thus then do I assert that Love is the most ancient, and most honoured, and most powerful of the gods, for the attainment of valour and happiness by man both during life and in the grave.

[8.] Some such speech as this, Aristodemus told me, did Phædrus pronounce. But after Phædrus, there were some others, which he did not well remember; and omitting these, he repeated that of Pausanias, who said:—

The subject, Phædrus, does not seem to me to have been fairly set before us, when it was simply proposed to make an

[80] On the islands of the blest, see Gorg. p. 523, A. § 106, Menex. p. 235, D. § 2, Horat. Epod. 16.

[81] This was doubtless, as Fischer remarks, in the "Myrmidons;" in the fragments of which play there are passages relating to this very point.

[82] In Il. A. 787

encomium upon Love. This would have been well had there been but one Love; [83]but now it is not, for one there is not.[83] Since then one there is not, the better way is for it to be stated beforehand which kind of love we ought to praise. I will endeavour then to put the question on a right footing, and to state first what Love we ought to praise; and then to praise in a manner worthy of the god. We all know that without Love Venus is not. If then there were only one Venus, there would have been only one Love. But since there are two, there must be likewise two Loves. And how are there not two,[84] one the elder, and who had no mother, a daughter of Uranus, (Heaven,) whom we name the celestial; the other, younger, a daughter of Jupiter and Dione, whom we call the vulgar. It is necessary then for the Love who works with the latter Venus to be called the vulgar, but the other, the celestial. All the gods, indeed, we ought to praise; but we must endeavour to state what each has obtained by lot. For every action is in this state; it is itself by itself neither honourable nor base; as for instance, what we are now doing, either drinking, or singing, or discoursing, there is not one of these acts which is good, itself by itself, but it turns out such in the doing. Rightly performed [85][according as it may be done][85] it is right and honourably; not rightly performed, it is dishonourable. So in the case of loving, not every Love is honourable, and worthy to be highly praised, but that which impels to loving honourably. The one then belonging to the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, and works out

[83]—[83] Ficinus omits all between the numerals; and so does Shelley, who here, as elsewhere, has looked rather to the Latin translation than to the original Greek; which is *νῦν δὲ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς*. But Plato wrote, both here and in Apolog. p. 38, B., *νῦν δὲ οὐ· οὐ γαρ ἐστιν εἷς*. For thus *οὐ* is found at the end of one sentence, and followed by *οὐ* at the commencement of another in Criton, p. 46, D. § 6, *τὰς μὲν, τὰς δὲ οὔ οὐδε*, or by another vowel, as in Phædon. p. 73, B., *ἀπιστῶ—οὔ αὐτο δὲ*.

[84] This distinction between the two kinds of Venus was a part of ancient mythology, as shown by the Banquet of Xenophon, where Socrates says, "Whether there be one Venus only, or two, both celestial and vulgar, I know not; but this I do know, that there are altars and temples and sacrifices to each apart; to the vulgar, such as are rather trivial, to the celestial, such as are more holy. And you may fairly conjecture that the vulgar sends upon us sensual loves; but the celestial, those of the soul and of friendship, and of honourable acts.—S.

[85]—[85] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

whatever may happen; and this it is which inspires the worthless love; and such persons in the first place love women not less than boys; and next, of such as they love, (they love) the bodies rather than the minds; [86]and then of persons the most silly that can be,[86] through their looking only to the act of enjoyment, and disregarding the doing so honourably or not. And hence it results that they do whatever they may have in their power,[87] whether good or the reverse. [88]For there is even from the younger deity much than from the other, and partaking of the female and male in its generation.[88] But that from the celestial Venus, [89]in the first place, not partaking of the female, but only of the male, [and this is the love of boys]: next of the elder, and a not sharing in lust;[89] and hence they who are inspired by this love, turn

[86]—[86] Instead of the nonsensical Greek *ἔπειτα, ὡς ἂν δύνωνται, ἀνοητάτων*, Ficinus has, what the sense manifestly requires, "et sine mente homines potius quam prudentes," which Shelley has adopted. To soften the absurdity in *ὡς ἂν δύνωνται*, Sydenham translates, "the silliest creatures they can light on," which would be in Greek *ὧν ἂν δύνωνται εὑρεῖν, τῶν ἀνοητάτων*: while Schütz suggested, what has been found subsequently in two MSS., *ἀνοητάτως*, adopted originally by Stalbaum, despite the sensible remark of Ast, that it was at variance with the chain of thought.

[87] In lieu of *τύχωσι*, which could not be thus applied, I have translated as if the Greek were *γ' ἔχωσι*.

[88]—[88] The Greek for this mass of nonsense is, *Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θεοῦ νεωτέρας τε οὔσης πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας καὶ μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ γενέσει καὶ θηλέος καὶ ἄρρενος*: where, says Stalbaum, *πολὺ* is to be referred to *νεωτέρας*, for *πολὺ* thus follows the comparative elsewhere in Plato. But it could not do so after the intervention of two words, *τε οὔσης*. And even if it could, the point at issue has nothing to do with the age of the two kinds of Venus respectively. The passage has evidently been tampered with, as shown by two MSS. omitting *καὶ*, and one reading *ἄρεος* for *ἄρρενος*. Ficinus has "Affectus enim hujus modi a Venere illa juniore et utriusque sexus in generatione participe profluit:" who has thus omitted *καὶ* and *πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας*.

[89]—[89] Here again is a mass of nonsense, which Ast and Stalbaum have indeed been able to swallow; but Wolf and Schütz more correctly rejected the words between brackets as a manifest interpolation; while Ruckert as correctly objected to *πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετεχούσης*, which would require *οὔσης* after *πρεσβυτέρας*, to say nothing of *ὁ δὲ* thus standing without its logical copula, in the shape of a verb. In the place of all this rubbish how clear is the language of Ficinus, "Amor autem, qui cœlestem sequitur Venerem, quæ non fœminei, sed masculi tantum sexus in generatione est particeps ipse quoque genus respicit masculum; deinde quoniam antiquioris Veneris pudicæque est comes, et ipse petulantiæ

themselves to the male, feeling an affection for that which is naturally of greater strength and possesses more of mind. [9.] And any one would in the boy-love itself discover those sincerely impelled by this passion. For they do not love boys, but (youths),[90] when they are beginning to possess mind. [91] Now this is near the time of their obtaining a beard.[91] But they who begin from this date to love, are, I think, prepared, as if about to associate through the whole of life together, and to live in common, [92] and not, after having obtained an object in an hour of imprudence, through cheating him as a youth, to go away, laughing at him, and to run to another one.[92] There ought then to be a law not to love a boy, in order that much care may not be wasted upon an uncertainty; for it is uncertain to what end may come that relating to boys, whether of vice or virtue, as regards the body or soul. Such a law do men of virtue indeed lay down, themselves for themselves, of their own accord; but we ought to compel in some such way as this those vulgar lovers; just as we compel them, as far as we can, not to fall in love with free-born women. For it is such lovers as these who give rise to the reproach, that, as some dare to say, it is shameful to gratify a lover. Now they say so with a view to lovers of this kind, from witnessing their conduct at once unseasonable and unjust. For certainly no act done decently and lawfully can bring with it justly blame. And indeed the law relating to love in other states is easy to be understood, for it has been defined with simplicity; but that one here, and that at Sparta, are com-

omnis est expers." But that he found in his MS. the Greek words answering to this version may fairly admit of doubt.

[90] Ficinus has alone "pueros non amant, sed adolescentes, cum mente valere jam cœperint," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων ἀλλ', ἐπειδὰν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἔχειν, νέων.* Bekker has adopted *ἀλλ' ἤ* from Stephens's conjecture, from which nothing however is gained.

[91—91] The words within the numerals Schütz proposed to reject. In their stead Ficinus has a remarkable supplement—"Hujuscemodi vero genus exercendæ menti propinquius est, ad eamque exercendam familiaritas inter illos initur," as if his MS. had not only, in lieu of *γενειάσκειν*, the reading *γένει ἀσκεῖν*, found in seven MSS., but something else not found there, nor any where else at present. But *τὸ γενειάσκειν*, as Stalbaum observes, answers to *ἤβη χαριεστάτη* in Hom. Od. x. 279.

[92—92] Here again the version of Ficinus offers a remarkable variation, "neque amatum decipere, neque ab uno in alterum amandum abire neque enim pueros adhuc mentis expertes amant, quos deinde exoletos irrideant et relinquant." . . . . . .

plex. For in Elis, and amongst the Bœotians, and wherever there are not persons clever in speaking, the law is laid down simply, that it is honourable to gratify a lover; nor would any one there, either young or old, say that it is disgraceful, in order, I presume, that they who endeavour to persuade over the youths, may not be put to trouble, as being unskilled in speaking. But by those[93] in Ionia, and many other places, [94][where persons live under the barbarians,][94] it is held to be dishonourable. For through their tyrannical governments this, and the love of wisdom and of gymnastic exercises,[95] (are considered) disgraceful. For it is not, I conceive, to the interest of the rulers that high thoughts should be engendered in their subjects, nor strong friendships formed, nor societies in common; all which[96] those other things and love especially is wont to introduce. And thus by experience learnt the tyrants here. For the love of Aristogeiton and the firm friendship of Harmodius dissolved their power.[97] [10.] And thus, wherever it has been held disgraceful to gratify a lover, it has been so laid down through the depravity of the legislators, and the desire of possession in the rulers, and the want of manliness in the ruled; but wherever it is simply enjoined, it is through the listlessness of soul in the legislators. But here the law is placed upon a better footing; although, as I said before, it is not easy to understand it. For to a person considering[98] that it is reputed more honourable to love openly

[93] In lieu of *τῆς δ' Ἰωνίας*, which Bast and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend, Ast would read *τοῖς δ' Ἰωνίας*. For *η* and *οι* are frequently confounded in MSS. as shown in Orest. 1127, and 1694. I should however prefer *τοῖς δ' ἀπ' Ἰωνίας*, similar to "Pastor ab Amphryso," in Virgil, and in the other passages quoted by Blomfield on Æsch. S. Th. 259.

[94] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[95] The gymnastic exercises are thus united to philosophy, because it was at the gymnasia that the young men became acquainted with their clever, but frequently profligate instructors, as remarked by Cicero in Tuscul iv. 33.

[96] The Greek is *ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν*, where Schleiermacher was the first to object correctly to *πάντα* But he incorrectly suggested *ταῦτα*. He should have proposed, as I have translated, *ἃ δὴ πάντα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν*, similar to the version of Ficinus, "quæ cum ab aliis tum vel maxime ab amore gigni consueverunt," although *πάν-τα* is there omitted.

[97] On the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, see Thucyd. vi. 54, and the authors quoted in the dissertation of Meursius De Peisistrato, § 13.

[98] As there is nothing to which the dative *ἐνθυμηθέντι* can be referred,

than secretly, and especially the most nobly born and the best, even though they be uglier than others; and on the other hand, that [99]the exhortation to a lover from all parties is wonderful, as if he were not doing something disgraceful, and that it appears to be honourable to the party obtaining, but not obtaining disgraceful; and that towards making the attempt to obtain, the law grants a permission to the lover, while doing wonderful[100] acts, to be commended, such acts as, should a person dare to do when pursuing any thing else whatever, and desirous to accomplish it, except this, he would obtain as the fruit of his doings, the greatest reproaches of philosophy.[1] For if with a desire either to obtain money from any one, or an office in the government, or a power of any other kind, a person would be willing to do what lovers do towards their boy-loves, by making supplications, and urgent requests [in their beggings],[2] and swearing oaths, [3]lying down at their doors, and willingly enduring a servitude[3] such as not even a slave would endure, he would be

we may adopt *ἐνεθυμήθην*, found in three MSS., or read from conjecture *ἐνθυμήθητε*, addressed to the parties present.

[99, 100] To others I must leave to understand, what I cannot, *θαυμαστὴ* and *θαυμαστά*. Wyttenbach, according to Reynders, would render *θαυμαστὸς* "agreeable," a meaning which that word never has nor could have. I could have understood *θεμιστὴ* and *θεμιστὰ*, for the whole question is about what may be legally done. Ficinus has "communis omnium cohortatio." For he either did not understand *θαυμαστὴ*, or his MS. omitted it.

[1] Instead of *φιλοσοφίας*, which Schleiermacher, Bekker, and Hommel would reject as having dropt from the clouds, Creuzer would read *φλυαρίας*, but another scholar, says Stalbaum, *φιλαυτίας*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐ φαύλης ἀσοφίας*, i. e. "of not a little folly." Compare Rep. v. p. 457, A., *ἀτελῆ δὴ τοῦ γελοίου οὐ σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν*: iii. p. 403, *ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα*. Or we may read *ἀφιλοσοφίας*, formed from *ἀφιλόσοφος*, found in Phædr. p. 256, C., *ἐὰν δὲ διαίτῃ φορτικωτέρῳ τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ—χρήσωνται*.

[2] The words *ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσιν* are evidently superfluous after *ἱκετείας* and *ἀντιβολήσεις*, as shown by Lex. Bekker, Anecd. i. p. 407. *Ἀντιβόλησις· δέησις καὶ ἱκεσία—πλάτων ἐν Συμποσίῳ*. What the author really wrote, may be guessed from a celebrated story in Petronius.

[3—3] The Greek is *κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν*. But as there is nothing to govern *κοιμήσεις*, and *ἐθέλοντες* is superfluous after the preceding *ἐθέλοι*, Plato wrote perhaps *κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις καταθλεύοντες δουλείας τε δουλεύειν*, where *τε* would couple *ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν* and *δουλεύειν*. Ficinus either found in his MS or formed out of his own head something more than is in the Greek text at present—"supplex oret et obtestetur, ad fores noctu jaceat et sedula quadam ob-

stopped from acting in this way both by friends and enemies the latter reproaching him for his fawning and want of spirit, and the former giving him advice, and feeling ashamed on his behalf. But even a grace follows[4] the lover when doing all this; and he is allowed by the law to do so without reproach, as performing some very honourable act. But the most terrible thing is what the multitude say, that there is to him alone, after swearing an oath, a pardon from the gods for transgressing it. [5]"For an oath, they say, of Venus is no oath."[5] Thus both gods and men give all kinds of licence to the lover, as says the law here. In this way then a person would imagine that in this state it is held a very honourable thing both to love and to be the friend to a lover. [11.] But when we see that parents, after appointing instructors over the loved, do not permit them to have any intercourse with their lovers, and that orders are given to this effect to the instructor, and when their equals in age and companions censure them, if they see any such thing taking place, and when the old folks do not stop the censurers, nor abuse them for speaking not correctly, a person, looking to such acts, would imagine, on the contrary, that love of this kind is here held to be disgraceful. But the case I conceive stands thus. As it was stated at the beginning, (to love) is not a simple thing. Taken itself by itself I conceive it to be[6] neither honourable nor disgraceful; but if carried on honourably, it is honour-

servantia serviat, et in omnibus obsequatur, quæ servus aliquis nec agere vellet nec etiam cogeretur." The introduction of ἐθέλοντες here is owing to δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα—δουλείαν in § 11.

[4] I have adopted what every critic, with the Zurich editors, has neglected, the elegant reading ἔπεται for ἕπεσται, furnished by three capital MSS. For thus Χάρις ἕπεται is similar to "subsequitur Pudor" in Tibullus.

ἕπεσ

Another MS. has ἔπ<ται. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 175.

[5—5] As in the Greek words Ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὅρκον οὔ φασιν εἶναι, there lies hid a Choliambic verse, Ἀφροδίσιον γάρ φασιν, ὅρκον οὐκ εἶναι, I have given a metrical version; unless it be said that Plato wrote Ἀφροδίσιος γὰρ ὅρκος οὐκ ἔμποινιμος, a line quoted by Suidas in Ἀφροδίσιος and Ταχυβάμονας. So Shakspeare—"At lovers' perjuries they say Jove laughs."

[6] Although three MSS. omit εἶναι, which is without regimen here, I think that νοοῦμαι has dropt out after εἶναι, and so I have translated. Had Stalbaum been aware that the difficulty lay in εἶναι, he would not have followed Bast in rejecting οὐχ before ἁπλοῦν in the sentence preceding.

able; if disgracefully, disgraceful. Now to gratify a vicious person in a vicious manner is (to carry it on) disgracefully; but (to gratify) a virtuous person in a virtuous manner (is to carry it on) honourably. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar kind, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lasting; since, with the decaying flower of the body, of which he is enamoured,[7] he goes away on wing,[8] putting to shame all his speeches and promises. But he who is enamoured of a virtuous character, abides a lover through life, as being closely united with what is itself abiding. Now these our law is desirous to test well and truly, and (to permit)[9] persons to gratify some, and to fly from others. On this account therefore it exhorts some to pursue, but others to fly; by appointing itself the judge in a contest, and testing of what kind is the lover, and of what the loved. And thus[10] by this very reason[10] it is held by law to be disgraceful, in the first place, for a person to be captivated quickly; in order that time may intervene, which seems to be of many things the fairest test; in the next place, it is held disgraceful for a person to be caught by considerations of money or political power; whether he crouch on being ill used and do not bear up manfully, or whether, being kindly treated as regards pecuniary and political transactions, he does not feel a contempt. For none of these things appear to be firm and abiding, without a generous friendship being produced from them. [12.] There is left then one only way for our law, if the object in view is to gratify honourably the lover.

[7] Ficinus has "corporis species, quam cupierat, deflorescit," thus showing that he found in his MS. *τοῦ σώματος, οὗπερ ἤρα, ἄνθει λήγοντι*, and thus too obviating the change proposed by Sydenham, of λήγοντι into *λήγοντος*, which even Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.

[8] In the words *ὤχετ' ἀποπτάμενος*, there is an allusion to Hom. Il. B. 71, as Sydenham was the first to remark.

[9] As the law could not of itself gratify one party and fly from another, it is evident that, after *διαφεύγειν*, *ἐᾶν* has dropt out, as it has done in Plato and Thucydides, as I have shown on Criton, § 15, n. 27, and in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121, and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

[10—10] To prevent the tautology in *Οὕτω δὴ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας*, I should prefer *Οὕτω δὴ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐτάσεως*, i. e. "after this inquiry," where *ἔτασις* would answer to the preceding *βασανίζειν*. Baiter proposes to omit *ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας*, as if those words had dropt from the clouds.

For our law is, as it was in the case of lovers, that for a person willing to endure any servitude whatever for his beloved youth, it is not an act of fawning nor worthy of reproach. [11] Thus then there is left only one other willing servitude not worthy of reproach; [11] and this is that which relates to virtue. For it is a settled law with us, that whoever wishes to pay court to any one, conceiving that through that person he shall become better as regards wisdom, or any other part of virtue, such voluntary servitude again [12] is neither disgraceful nor an act of fawning. Now these two laws ought to come to the same point, and both the one relating to the love of youths, and the other relating to philosophy and the other parts of virtue, if indeed it is about to be agreed that it is honourable to gratify a lover. For, when the lover and the beloved youth come together, each having their (respective) laws, the one in ministering to the beloved youth, who is complying, [13] would justly minister any thing whatever, and the other (being subservient) to the person making him both wise and good, would on the other hand be justly subservient [13] in any thing whatever. For the one being able to make a collision [14] for the attainment of prudence and the other parts of virtue, and the

[11]—[11] I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the connexion in the train of thought; nor indeed could Schütz or Bast; who wished to make some alterations in the text, by which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained.

[12] Instead of *αὖ*, which has no meaning here, one MS. has *οὖν*, which seems to lead to *μόνη*.

[13]—[13] I have translated as if the Greek were, *ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετοίη*, and *ὑπουργῶν δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργοίη*, in lieu of *ὑπηρετῶν—ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν*—and *δικαίως—ὑπουργεῖν*. For it is evident, from the balance of the sentences, that as *ὑπηρετῶν—ὑπηρετοίη* is found in the former, so ought *ὑπουργῶν—ὑπουργοίη* to be found in the latter; and as there is nothing to govern the infinitives, *ὑπηρετεῖν* and *ὑπουργεῖν*, it is equally evident that Plato wrote *ὑπηρετῶν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετοίη*, and *ὑπουργῶν δικαίως ἂν ὑπουργοίη*—a form of expression similar to *θεὸν ὑμνοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν* below in p. 193, D. § 19. Menex. p. 244, *εἴ τις βούλοιτο κατηγορῆσαι—ὀρθῶς ἂν κατηγοροίη*, and the host of examples produced by Ast on Legg. iii. p. 682, A. By such easy alterations have I restored both sense and syntax to a passage, where neither is to be seen at present. Baiter too would insert *ὑπουργῶν*, to balance the preceding *ὑπηρετῶν*.

[14] From *ξυμβαλέσθαι*, found in seven MSS., it is easy to elicit *ξυμβολὰς θέσθαι*; where *ξυμβολὰς* is used here to indicate at one and the same time a mental and bodily collision. Stalbaum's German translation of *ξυμβάλλεσθαι* is left for those who can understand that language.

other being desirous to acquire instruction[15] and the other parts of wisdom, then only indeed while these two parties [16]come to the same spot,[16] do (the matters relating to) the two laws fall to the same point, (so that) it is honourable for the boy to gratify a lover? And in this case it is no disgrace to be deceived; [17]but in the others it brings on shame (equally) to the party deceived or not.[17] For if any one for the sake of money gratifies a lover as being wealthy, and is disappointed, and obtains no money, through the lover being found to be poor, the act is not at all the less disgraceful; for such a person seems to lay open his character, and that for the sake of money he would minister in any thing to any person. Now this is not honourable. By parity of reasoning, should any one gratify a person, as if he were virtuous, and with the view of becoming himself better through the friendship of the lover, and be disappointed through his being found to be a bad man, and not possessed of virtue, the disappointment nevertheless is still honourable: for on the other hand, this person too seems to have laid open his character, and that for the sake of virtue, and to be made better, he would be ready to (minister)[18] in every thing to every one. Now this, on the other hand, is of all acts the most honourable. So entirely honourable is it to gratify for the sake of virtue. This is that love, the (co-worker) of the celestial Venus, (himself)[19] celestial, and of great value to both the state and individuals, through compelling, both the lover himself and the party

[15] Schütz was the first to reject *εἰς* before *παίδευσιν*. For it could not follow *κτᾶσθαι*. It came from *ἐστι*, which was inserted to prevent the sentence from being taken absolutely.

[16]—[16] Ast correctly saw that *τούτων* is to be referred to the two persons, and not to the laws, as shown by the preceding, *ὅταν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά*: but he did not see that Plato wrote *τὰ τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐς ταὐτὰ ξυμπίπτει, ὥστε τὸ*—not *τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ξυμπίπτει, τὸ*—as shown by the preceding *τῷ νόμῳ ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ*—

[17]—[17] Stalbaum would supply *τὸ χαρίσασθαι* as the nominative to *αἰσχύνην φέρει*. And so Ficinus, "in aliis autem omnibus obsequium hujuscemodi turpe censetur, sive obsequentem fallat opinio sive non fallat." Instead however of *πᾶσι*, one would prefer *ἐπ' ἴσα*. Sydenham too has "equally."

[18] The balance of the sentences evidently shows that *ὑπουργεῖν* has dropt out between *παντὶ* and *προθυμηθείη*. For thus *ὑπηρετεῖν* and *ὑπουργεῖν* are applied to two different parties a little before. Ficinus has "paratum ad omnia ministeria—toleranda."

[19] Ficinus alone has "cœlestis et ipse," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ αὐτος οὐράνιος*.

beloved by him, to pay considerable attention to virtue; but all the others belong to the other Venus, the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute, said he, on the instant, upon the subject of love.

[13.] On Pausanias pausing,—for the wise teach me to talk thus in parities,[20]—Aristodemus told me, that Aristophanes should have spoken: but either from repletion, or some other cause, a fit of the hiccups happened to come upon him, and he became unable to speak; and he said to the physician, Eryximachus, who was reclining lower, You are the proper person, Eryximachus, either to stop my hiccups, or to speak in my turn, until I cease from them myself.—To which Eryximachus replied, I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and when your hiccups are gone you shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, should the hiccups cease, through your keeping yourself without breathing for some time, (it is well,)[21] but if not, gargle your throat with water; and if they are very violent, take some such thing as this, with which you can tickle[22] your nose and then sneeze; and when you have done so once or twice the hiccups will cease,[23] be they ever so violent.—You will not say a word, says Aristophanes, before I do so.—Eryximachus then said—

Since then Pausanias, after setting out so well on the sub-

[20] This is Sydenham's version of ἴσα. Ast compares the idea with what is now called alliteration, and aptly refers to Empedocles, p. 532, who wrote the following epitaph on Acron, a physician of Agrigentum in Sicily—Ἄκρον ἰητρὸν Ἄκρων' Ἀκραγαντῖνον, πατρὸς ἀκροῦ, Κρύπτει κρημνὸς ἀκρὸς πατρίδος ἀκροτάτης: a couplet that surpasses the single line of Pope, "How high his honour holds his haughty head!" Instead however of ἴσα, which the passages quoted by Stalbaum do not defend, I should prefer διδάσκουσι γὰρ μ' εὔμουσα, in English, "may teach them prettinesses." Julian, quoted by Stephens, Χαρίτων γέμοντα καὶ εὐμουσίας.

[21] On this ellipse see Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. Attic. § 13.

[22] All the MSS. of Plato read κινήσαις. But Stobæus, in xcviii. p. 542, has κνήσαις, thus confirming what Sydenham saw the sense required. Bekker however and Stalbaum have adopted κνήσαιο, the conjecture of Luzac, De Digamia Socratis, p. 125. But κνήσαις is here required on account of τὴν ῥῖνα.

[23] So Hippocrates, in Aphorism. vi. 13, and Celsus, l. ii. c. 8, tell us, that "if sneezing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end to the disorder." Stahl, however, says, in his Collegium Minus, cas. 53, that the rule was true, where the sneezing was spontaneous, but when procured by art, it was never recommended. But he is there speaking, not of accidental hiccups merely, but of such as accompany fever and other dangerous diseases. S

ject has ended imperfectly, [24] it seems that I must of neces sity [24] endeavour to put the finish to the speech. In dis tinguishing Love into two kinds, he appears to me to have correctly divided. And that the Love exists not only in the soul of man for beautiful persons, but for many other objects in other beings likewise, in the bodies of all animals as well as in the productions of the earth, and, so to speak, in all existing things I seem to myself to see clearly from my own healing art; and how great [and wonderful] [25] a god is Love, who extends his sway over all, as regards things human and divine. And I will commence with the healing art in order that I may give the highest honours to my own profession. [14.] Now the very nature of our bodies partakes of this twofold love. For health and disease in the body are confessedly different and unlike. Now the unlike longs for and loves the unlike. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diseased body is of another. Now it is, as Pausanias just stated, honourable to gratify the good amongst men, but dishonourable the vicious; so in the case of bodies themselves, to gratify the good and healthy parts of each is well and necessary, and this it is from which there is the name of the healing art. But (to gratify) the bad and diseased is disgraceful; and he who would act according to art, must deny the gratification.[26] For medical science, to speak summarily, is the knowledge of the feelings of love in the body relating to repletion and evacuation; [27] and he, who in these appetites can distinguish

[24]—[24] This will doubtless appear to some a sufficiently accurate translation of *Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δεῖν ἐμέ*. But whatever Schæfer and Ast may say, Plato would not have written such a tautology as *ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι* and *δεῖν*. He probably wrote *ἀπετέλεσεν, οὐ δεινὸν ἐμὲ*— For thus Eryximachus would naturally say of himself, that being "not skilled in oratory" he would attempt to speak. The error is to be traced to the fact that *δεινὸν* would be written in MSS. *δειν*". See my note on Æsch. Eum. Ficinus has briefly "quod deest a me nunc impleri."

[25] Stalbaum rejects *καὶ θαυμαστὸς* omitted in the generality of MSS. They were found however in that of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "magnum quoque atque mirabilem."

[26] According to Hippocrates, *Περὶ Ἱερᾶς Νόσου*, sub. fin., "the physician ought to apply to each disease that, which is the most hostile to it, not that which is friendly: for by the latter it acquires vigour; by the former it decays." And in Epidem. v. 5, 7, he says that "to cure is to act against, not to agree with, a disorder." S.

[27] So Hippocrates, De Flat. p. 296, ed. Foes., says that "the healing art consists in the drawing off of what is over-abundant, and the supply-

the right love and wrong, is the best physician; while he who causes a change, so as to obtain one in the place of the other, and knows how to infuse a love into those bodies in which it is not, but ought to be, and how to expel a love which is there, but ought not to be, would be a skilful practitioner. For he should be able to cause things in the body, that are most hostile, to be friendly and to love each other. Now the things most hostile are such as are the most contrary, as cold is to hot, [bitter to sweet,][28] dry to moist, (and)[29] all things of that sort. Into these things our ancestor Æsculapius, knowing how to introduce love and concord, as say the poets here,[30] and as I believe, put together our art. And the present[31] art of healing is, as I state, entirely regulated by this very deity. And in like manner[32] is the gymnastic art, and agriculture.[33] And it is evident to every one, who gives even a little attention to the subject, that music is in the same state as the others, as Heracleitus perhaps meant to say; for he expresses himself not clearly in his language. For he

ing what is deficient; and that whoever can do these things best, is the best physician." S.

[28] As Eryximachus, in § 15, omits all mention of bitter and sweet, Ast, with whom Stalbaum agrees, considers the words within brackets to be interpolated, although there is a similar enumeration of opposites in Lysid. p. 216, A.

[29] Ficinus has "cæteraque hujuscemodi." From whence Wolf would read *καὶ πάντα*—But in this formula *καὶ* is omitted, as shown by Heind. on Gorg. p. 517.

[30] The poets alluded to, says Wolf, whom Stalbaum follows, were Agathon and Aristophanes. But in that case Plato would have written, *οἷδε δύο ποιηταί*. Moreover as neither the Tragic nor Comic poet had written a philosophical poem, as Empedocles did on the theory of two antagonistic principles in the Universe, it is evident that neither of them would be here alluded to. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οἱ θεῖοι ποιηταὶ*, similar to *οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ*, in Legg. ii. p. 366, B.

[31] Hommel and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend *ἥ τε οὖν*: for they did not see that the sense evidently requires *ἡ δὲ νῦν*—

[32] The object of the medical art is the health of the body; that of the gymnastic, its strength. And as they gain their several ends by favouring what is right in the body, and correcting what is wrong, those arts are analogous the one to the other. S.

[33] The soil bears an analogy to the body; and the different kinds of manure and cultivation are similar to food and medicine. A good soil is improved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad soil, by an opposite method of cultivation, altering its nature. As regards the metaphor, we even now say that such a soil loves such a manure, and that such a plant loves such a soil, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other. S.

says that the one disagreeing with itself,[34] is carried on like the harmony of the bow and lyre.[35] Now it is very irrational to say that harmony differs (from itself); or that it exists from things that differ: but perhaps he meant to say this; that from a sharp and flat, different originally, (a harmony)[36] is produced from their subsequent agreement through the art of musicians. For harmony cannot assuredly consist of sharp and flat sounds, while still disagreeing; because harmony is consonance, and consonance is a kind of agreement; and it is impossible for any agreement to exist between things disa-

[34] Pseud-Aristotle, in the treatise Περὶ Κόσμου, quotes from Heracleitus what may serve to illustrate this passage. "You must connect the whole and the not whole; the agreeing and the disagreeing; the consonant and the dissonant; and from all things the one, and from the one all things." T.

[35] Although much has been written on this dictum of Heracleitus, *ὥσπερ ἁρμονία τόξου τε καὶ λύρας*, not a single person, as far as I know, has seen that, from the expression in Plutarch ii. p. 369, A., *παλίντονος ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὥσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον*, and in ii. p. 1026, B., *Ἡράκλειτος δὲ παλίντροπον ἁρμονίην κόσμου, ὅκως περ λύρης καὶ τόξου*, the dark philosopher wrote *παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὥσπερ τόξου καὶ νευρῆς*: by which he meant that in using a bow, while the stick is pushed from the body of the archer, the string is drawn to it, and thus the two are *παλίντονα*. For Heracleitus had doubtless a recollection of the Homeric *Νευρὴν μὲν μαζῷ πέλασεν τόξῳ δὲ σίδηρον*, in Il. Δ. 123; and so too had Plato in Rep. iv. p. 439, B., where he describes the attitude of an archer—*αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται—ἄλλη μὲν ἀπωθοῦσα, ἑτέρα δὲ προσαγομένη*; and so too had Virgil in Æn. ix. 623, "Contendit telum diversaque brachia ducens;" and it is by this act that we can understand the phrase *παλίντονα τόξα*, properly explained by Hesychius, *τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα τρεπόμενα*. As regards the confusion between *νευρᾶς* and *λύρας*, I have written something worth reading in my Excursus on Plato's Hip. Maj. p. 201. Should it, however, be said, that from the subsequent mention of sharp and flat notes, there must have been some allusion to a musical instrument, it may be replied, that the word *νευρά*, "a string," which, according as it is longer or shorter, varies the quality of the tone, is equally applicable to the string of the lyre and that of the bow.

[36] The word *ἁρμονία*, omitted by all the MSS., has been preserved by Ficinus alone, "deinde per artem musicam consonantibus harmonia conficitur." If, however, it is to be omitted, as perhaps it ought, we must alter *ἔπειτα* into *εὖ τὰ ὄντα*, not only that *γέγονεν* may recover its nominative, but that the sentence may be similar to the subsequent—*ὡς—ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος διενηνεγκομένων πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμολογησάντων, γέγονε*: where *ἔπειτα* is omitted, as it should be, while *εὖ τὰ ὄντα* is supported by *διὰ τῆς ἐναντιοτροπῆς ἡρμόσθαι τὰ ὄντα* in Diog. Laert. ix. 7, and *ἐκ μαχομένων καὶ ἐναντίων συνέστη τὰ ὄντα* in Nicomach. Arithmet., ii. p. 59, ed. Ast

greeing, so long as they disagree ; [37] [and on the other hand, it is impossible to fit a thing disagreeing and not agreeing].[37] So too rhythm[38] is produced from notes quick and slow previously disagreeing, but subsequently agreeing. As there the medical art, so here the musical art, introduces in all these[39] an agreement, by affecting a love of and a concord with each other; and thus music is the knowledge of amorous (unions) relating to harmony and rhythm. [15.] Now in this combination itself of harmony and rhythm, it is not at all difficult to know thoroughly the amorous (unions); for the twofold love exists there not at all. But when it shall be necessary to misuse[40] rhythm and harmony, applied to mankind, by a person composing, what is called setting to music, or in making a right use of melodies and measure composed already, which is called instruction, there indeed the thing is very difficult, and requires a skilful practitioner. For here recurs the same reasoning (as before), that we must gratify the well-ordered, and those who would be, but are not as yet, better ordered, and we must guard their love. For this is the honourable, the heavenly, the (co-worker with) the heavenly muse. But the (co-worker with) Polyhymnia is the vulgar love, whom a

[37]—[37] The words between brackets are evidently an interpolation or corruption. For as *διαφερόμενον* and *μὴ ὁμολογοῦν* mean the same thing, the proposition contains a tautology merely, instead of two things being mentioned different from each other. Moreover, *ἁρμόσαι* would require a dative as well as an accusative to follow it. Ficinus has, "quod vero discrepat neque est concors, concinere nequit,"—which Shelley translates "Between things which are discordant and dissimilar there is then no harmony." But this would be merely a repetition of the preceding remark, that "it is impossible for an agreement to exist between things disagreeing, as long as they disagree."

[38] By rhythm is here meant, what is now called in music, the time in which a movement is played, either quick or slow.

[39] In lieu of *πᾶσι τούτοις*, Ficinus seems to have found something else better suited to the train of thought. For his version is "quem admodum *humoribus* medicina concordiam, ita *vocibus* musica consonantium tribuens." Shelley's translation is, "So does medicine, no less than music, establish a concord between the objects of its art, producing a love and agreement between adverse things."

[40] This introduction of *καταχρῆσθαι*, "to misuse," where the sense requires *χρῆσθαι*, "to use," seems very strange. Ficinus has "cum ad alios rhythmo et harmonia utendum est," as if he had found in his MS. *πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους χρῆσθαι*—where *ἄλλους* was written for *ἀνοῦς*, the abbreviated form of *ἀνθρώπους*. Plato probably wrote *καλῶς χρῆσθαι* as he has a little below *ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι*.

person ought with caution[41] to bring to whom he may bring it, in order that men may enjoy[42] the pleasure from it, and that he may not introduce any intemperance; just as in our own art it is a matter of moment to use correctly the appetites relating to the confectioner's art, so that a person may enjoy the pleasure without detriment to health. Thus, in music, and in medicine, and in all other things, both human and divine, we must, as far as is permissible, watch each of those Loves: for both exist. Since even the constitution of the seasons of the year is full of both these; and when the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, which I mentioned before, meet in opposition to each other, with a well-regulated love, and receive a temperate fitting-together and combination, they come bringing in their train a year of good seasons and health to men, and the rest of[43] animals, and plants, and do no injury.[44] But when the love which is mixed up with ungovernable passion becomes rather violent as regards the seasons of the year, it destroys or injures many things. For from such seasons are wont to be produced plagues and many other unequal[45] disorders on wild beasts and plants. For hoar-frosts, and hail-storms, and mildews are generated from the excessive and disorderly state of such feelings of love with respect to each other; the knowledge of which, as re-

[41] As there is nothing to which *εὐλαβούμενον* can be referred, I suspect that *ἄοιδὸν* has dropt out after *ὃν δεῖ*—

[42] As Ficinus has "ut voluptatem quidem homines hauriant," it is evident that he found in his MS. *καρπώσωνται*, as required by the preceding *οἷς*, not *καρπώσηται*, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain.

[43] Ficinus has "animantibus omnibus." Perhaps Plato wrote *πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις*.

[44] Instead of *ἠδίκησε*, which can hardly follow *ἥκει*, we must read *ἀδικεῖ*—just as we find in the following sentence in some MSS. and Stobæus, *διαφθείρει καὶ ἀδικεῖ*. For after *ἐπειδὰν* with a subjunctive correct Greek requires either the present or future—a fact unknown to Stalbaum; who has rejected *διαφθείρει*, furnished by the MSS. which he considers the best, and confirmed by "corrumpit" in Ficinus.

[45] Stalbaum renders *ἀνόμοια* by "inter se dissimilia ac diversa." But though the disorders might be unlike each other, yet how any effect could be produced by such dissimilarity, he neither does nor could tell. Ficin. has, "aliique morbi permulti et *varii*," which, if not a translation of *ἀνόμοια*, is an error for *virulenti*. For Plato wrote *ἄλλα βίαια καὶ πολλὰ*, similar to *ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βίαια*, in p. 195, C. On the loss and confusion of *βίαια* I have written something, to which the editors of Thucydides should have attended, in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 261 and 337, and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

gards the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year, is called astronomy.[46] Further still, all kinds of sacrifice, and the things over which the diviner's art presides—now these are the reciprocal intercourse between gods and men—are conversant about nothing else than the guardianship and the healing[47] of Love. For every kind of impiety is wont to be generated, if one does not gratify the well-ordered Love, and honour him, and hold him as the chief,—but serve[48] rather the other,—in every act relating to parents living and dead, and to the gods,[49] according as it has been ordained for the divining art to superintend the Loves and to heal them.[49] And again, the divining art is the artificer, skilled (in promoting) friendship between gods and men, through knowing what things relating to Love amongst mortals tend to justice and impiety (respectively). So various and vast, or rather universal, a power does every kind, to speak in one word, of Love possess. But that which is conversant about the good, and is effected in union with temperance and justice, both towards us and the gods, this is the one that has the greatest power, and procures for us every kind of happiness, so as[50] to enable us to associate with each other, and to be dear to beings superior to

[46] On this application of the word astronomy, which was subsequently called astrology, Ast aptly refers to Rep. vii. p. 527, D.

[47] I confess I cannot understand *ἴασιν*. Ficinus has "curationem. But that is ambiguous, and translated by Shelley, "right government. Plato wrote perhaps here *περὶ Ἔριδος φυλακήν τε καὶ ἴασιν*, i. e. "the guarding against and cure of quarrel;" and similarly just above, *ἐριστικῶν* for *ἐρωτικῶν*, and just below, *τὰ τῆς Ἔριδος* for *τοὺς Ἔρωτας*: where there would be an allusion to the doctrine of Empedocles respecting the Ἔρως and Ἔρις of the Universe.

[48] The Greek is, *ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸν ἕτερον—*: where Sydenham was the first to reject *περὶ*, which is omitted by Stobæus and one Vienna MS. Ficinus has "sed circa Amorem alterum pervagatur." From whence Sauppe elicited, as stated by Koch on Antonin. Liberal. p. lvii. *ἀλλ' ἀλᾶται περὶ τὸν ἕτερον*. But no person could be said *ἀλᾶσθαι περὶ τινα* in the sense of attending. I suspect that in *ἀλλὰ περὶ* lies hid *ἀλλὰ λατρεύῃ*. For Suid. has *Λατρεύω· τιμῶ*, and Hesych. *Λατρεύω· σέβω*: or we may read, *ἀλλὰ λιπαρῇ*, "vehemently pray to." But I prefer the other conjecture.

[49—49] Or we may translate, "which it has been ordained by the divining art that the Loves look upon and heal—." But in either case I am equally in the dark. Ficinus has, "hos amores discernere atque curare vaticinii propositum est—," which Shelley translates, "it is the object of divination to distinguish and remedy the effects of these opposite Loves."

[50] Ruckert was the first to find fault with *καὶ*, which he should not have expelled, but have altered into *ὥστε*, to support the syntax.

ourselves, [the gods].[51] It is possible, indeed, that I too, in praising Love, have omitted many things; not, however, intentionally. But if I have left out aught, it is your business, Aristophanes, to fill it up; or, if you have it in your mind to praise the god in any other way,[52] praise him, now that your hiccups have ceased.

[16.] He said then that Aristophanes, taking up the discourse, observed that—the hiccups had very much[53] ceased, not however before the sneezing was applied to them, so that I wonder how a well-ordered part of the body should be in love with such noises and ticklings, such as sneezing is: for when I brought to it a sneezing it immediately ceased entirely.—Upon this said Eryximachus, My good (friend) Aristophanes, consider what you are doing. For being about to speak, you are acting the buffoon,[54] and compel me to keep a watch over your speech,[55] lest you say aught to excite a laugh, when you might speak in peace.—To which Aristophanes, with a smile, replied, You have spoken correctly, Eryximachus; and let what I said just now be considered as unsaid. But do not watch me. Since I have a fear of what is about to be said, lest I should say not what will be laughable—for that would be an advantage and indigenous to my muse—but to be laughed down.—Having shot your bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryximachus, think you to escape? But have a care, and so speak, as if about to give an account for it. Perhaps, however, if it seem good to me, I shall dismiss you (unhurt).[56]

[51] The word *θεοῖς* is evidently the interpretation of *τοῖς κρείττοσιν*. See Blomfield on Prom. 935.

[52] Instead of *εἴ πως ἄλλως*, correct Greek requires *εἰ ἄλλως πως*—similar to *ἄλλῃ γέ πῃ*, a little below.

[53] The union of *μάλα* and *ἐπαύσατο* would be admissible here only if the hiccups had greatly subsided. But as they had ceased entirely, instead of *μάλα* we must read *μὰ Δί'*—

[54] This is the correct meaning of *γελωτοποιεῖς*. For Aristophanes had just been alluding in ridicule to the theory of Eryximachus. Ficinus was mistaken in rendering, "risum contra te moves." Shelley, scarcely more correctly, "you predispose us to laughter."

[55] *τοῦ λόγου—τοῦ σεαυτοῦ* is rendered by Ficinus, "sermonis tui." But that would be, in correct Greek, *τοῦ σοῦ*. But as Eryximachus was evidently sore at being made the butt of Aristophanes, it is quite clear that *τοῦ σεαυτοῦ* conceals *τοῦ σοῦ οὐ τλητοῦ*, i. e. "your speech, not to be borne." Compare Hec. 159 *τᾶς οὐ τλατᾶς*. And hence Aristophanes was led to make an apology in the words—*ἐμοὶ ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα*.

[56] I have inserted "unhurt," because the train of thought evidently

In good truth, Eryximachus, said Aristophanes, I have it in my mind to speak in some other way than you and Pausanias have spoken. For to me men appear to be utterly insensible of the power of Love. Since, being sensible of it, they would have instituted most important sacred rites, and (built) altars, and made to him the greatest sacrifices;[57] nor, as now, would any thing of this kind have occurred, at a time when it ought to have occurred the least. For he is, of all the gods, the most friendly to [58]man, the aider of man, and the healer of those (wounds)[59] which, being healed, there would be the greatest happiness to the human [58]race. I will, therefore, endeavour to explain to you his power, and you shall be the teacher of it to others. But you must first learn the nature of man, and what sufferings it has undergone. For our nature of old was not the same as it is now. In the first place, there were three kinds of human beings, not as at present, only two, male and female; but there was also a third common to both of those; the name only of which now remains, it has itself disappeared. It was then [one][60] man-woman,[61] whose form and name partook of and was common to both the male and the female. But it is now nothing but a name, given by way of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human race was rounded, having the back and sides as in a circle. It had four hands, and legs equal in number to the hands; and two faces upon the circular neck, alike in every way, and one head on both the faces placed opposite,[62] and four ears, and two kinds

shows that, after *μέντοι*, *ἅνατον* has dropt out; a word elsewhere lost and restored by myself to Aristophanes and Demosthenes. See the Glossary appended to my translation of the Midian oration in *Ἄθω*, p. 65. Shelley has here, "I may dismiss you without question."

[57] There were, however, sacred rites to Love, as shown by Valckenaer in Diatrib. c. xi.

[58—58] This repetition of *φιλανθρωπότατος—ἀνθρώπων* and *ἀνθρωπείῳ* is extremely inelegant.

[59] This is Shelley's happy introduction of the very word required here, and which has led me to suggest *τραυμάτων* for *τούτων*.

[60] This *ἓν* Stalbaum still retains, and attempts to explain, although omitted by Stobæus and Eusebius, and many MSS. and Ficinus.

[61] I have coined this word, in lieu of hermaphrodite, for the sake of showing its derivation from *ἀνδρ*, "man," and *γυν-ή*, "woman."

[62] Shelley, unable to understand how the faces were placed opposite, has omitted the words *ἐναντίοις κειμένοις*, and translated incorrectly the preceding by "one head *between* the two faces," instead of "upon." Unless

of sexual organs, and from these it is easy to conjecture how all the other parts were (doubled).[63] They walked, as now, upright, whithersoever they pleased. And when it made haste to run, it did, [64] in the manner of tumblers, who after turning their legs (upward) in a circle, place them accurately in an upright position,[64] support itself on its eight limbs,[65] and afterwards turn itself over quickly in a circle. Now these three and such kinds of beings existed on this account, [66] because the male kind was the produce originally of the sun, the female of the earth, and that which partook of the other two, of the moon;[66] for the moon partakes of both the others (the sun and the earth). The bodies thus were round, and the manner of their running was circular, through their being like their parents. [17.] They were terrible in force and strength and had high aspirations, and they made an attempt against the gods; and what Homer (in Οδ. λ. 307) says of Ephialtus and Otus, was told of them likewise; that they attempted to ascend to heaven with the view of attacking the gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other gods consulted together what they should do to them; but they were in a difficulty. They had not the mind to destroy them by making the race to disappear with the thunderbolt, as they did the giants; for then the honours and the holy rites paid them by that race would have been extinct,[67] nor yet could they suffer them to act wantonly. At length Jupiter, on reflection, said, I seem to myself to have a plan, so that men may exist, and still be stopt by becom-

I am mistaken, Plato wrote *ἀπ' ἐναντίας δερκομένοις*, i. e. looking from opposite quarters, like the figure of Janus, described by Ovid.

[63] So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *καὶ διπλᾶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα* instead of *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα*.

[64—64] Such is the meaning which I think Plato meant to convey; who probably wrote, *ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες εἰς ὀρθὸν, ἄνω τῷ σκελη περιφερόμενοι κύκλῳ, ἀκριβῶς ἱστᾶσι*, not, as the present text has, *εἰς ὀρθὸν τῷ σκέλη περιφερόμενοι κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ*, where I have elicited *ἄνω*, by the aid of "sursum circumferentes," in Ficinus, from *εἰς ὀρθὰ ὄντα σκέλη* in Stobæus. The whole description will be intelligible to those, who have seen tumblers walking on their hands and feet alternately.

[65] By the eight limbs are meant the four hands and four feet.

[66—66] On this theory Ast refers to Aristot. Metaphys. i. 3, 6, Phys. i. 6, De Generat. i. 3, ii. 3, Ciceron. Academ. iv. 37, Tim. Locr. p. 99, D. E., Menag. in Diogen. L. p. 74, 317.

[67] So Orestes in Æsch. Cho. 252, prays to Jove not to destroy him, lest he should no longer be able to set up his altar on the days of sacrifice.

ing weaker from their unbridled licentiousness. For now, said he, I will divide each of them into two; and they will at the same time become weaker, and at the same time more useful to us, through their becoming more in number; and they shall walk upright upon two legs; but if they shall think fit to behave licentiously, and are not willing to keep quiet, I will again, said he, divide them, each into two, so that they shall go upon one leg, hopping. So saying, he cut men into two parts, as people cut medlars[68] when about to pickle them, or as they cut eggs with hairs. But whomsoever he cut, he ordered Apollo [69]to turn the face and the half of the neck to that part where the section had taken place, in order that the man might, on seeing the cutting off,[69] be better behaved than before, and he ordered[70] him to heal the other parts. And he (Apollo) turned the face; and [71]pulling the skin together on every side like a contracted purse,[71] over that which is now called the belly, he did, after making a single orifice, tie up (the skin) at the middle of the belly, now called the navel. He then smoothed the greater part of the remainder of the wrinkles of the skin, and jointed the breast, having an instrument such as shoemakers use when they smooth wrinkles of the leather on the last. But he left a few wrinkles on the belly and navel as a memorial of their original suffering. Now when their nature had been bisected, each half perceived with a longing its other self;[72] and throwing their arms around each other and becoming entwined, they had a great desire to grow together, but they died through famine and idleness.[73] And when one of

[68] On Ruhnken's elegant and certain emendation, *ὅα* for *ὠὰ*, see his note on Timæus, p. 189, while to this passage of Plato Taup on Suid. in *Ταριχεύειν* has referred that in Plutarch Erot. ii. p. 770, B., *ὥσπερ ὠὸν τριχὶ διαρεῖσθαι τὴν φιλίαν*, which Hommel acutely conjectures to have been a kind of children's game.

[69]—[69] Whatever others may pretend to do, I certainly cannot understand what Plato meant by this description of the operation.

[70] This repetition of the verb *ἐκέλευεν* at the end of the sentence is evidently an interpolation.

[71]—[71] Here again I confess I do not quite understand the mention of the contracted purse. I suspect there is an allusion to an operation still performed in India, to enable a person to wear an artificial nose; unless it be said that Plato in this fictitious account, to which Julian alludes, in Epist. lx. p. 448, C., was caricaturing some theory of the day.

[72] Instead of *τὸ αὐτοῦ* one would prefer *τὸ ἄλλο αὐτοῦ*, although the common reading is found in Priscian xvii. p. 1100, ed. Putsch.

[73] Stalbaum translates *τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας*, "and moreover by idleness."

these halves died, and the other was left, the surviving half sought another, and was entwined with it, whether it met with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with (the half of a whole) man. And thus they were in the act of perishing. [18.] But Jupiter in pity devised another plan, and placed the organs of generation in front,[74] for [75]hitherto they had been on the outside, and they begot and bred, not with one another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. And therefore he changed them [76] to the front; and by them he caused the generation to be with each other, from the female through the male, on this account, that should a male meet with a female, they might in the embrace at one time generate, and the race be thus propagated; but if at another time a male met with a male, a surfeit might take place from the connexion, and that they might cease and turn themselves to their business, and attend to the other affairs of

But such a sense those words could never bear in correct Greek. In all the passages where ἄλλος is said to be used pleonastically there is some error, which it is not difficult to correct. Thus in Eurip. Med. 298, Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας, Φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφανοῦσι δυσμενῆ, we may read Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄτης,—ἧς λάχωσιν, ἀργίας, as I have stated in the Surplice, No. 11, Feb. 7, 1846, p. 153, where I completed the restoration commenced in Tro. Append. p. 125, B. So too here, since two MSS. read ὑπὸ τῆς λιμοῦ, Plato wrote, I suspect, ὑπὸ τῆς λίχνου κοίτης παλαιᾶς λαιμαργίας, i. e. "From the lascivious and hungry longing for their former bed:" where ὑπὸ κοίτης λαιμαργίας may be compared with ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς in Legg. x. p. 888, A.; while λίχνου, which Hesychius explains by λαιμάργου, is found in somewhat a similar sense in Eurip. Hipp. 916, Ἡ γὰρ ποθοῦσα πάντα καρδία κλύειν Κἀν τοῖς κακοῖσι λίχνος οὖσ' ἀλίσκεται: and thus the introduction of κοίτης παλαιᾶς carries out the allusion to παλαιοῦ πάθους: and the two halves would suffer the fate of Narcissus, who died by constantly viewing in the water the reflexion of his body, with which he had fallen in love.

[74] Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, "et quæ prius retro erant, ad anteriores partes transtulit;" in Greek, εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἃ ὄπισθεν ἦν τῷ πρίν.

[75] Here again Ficinus has preserved the vestiges of the right reading in his version, "Antea siquidem, cum ad nates hæc haberent, non invicem sed in terram spargentes semina, cicadarum instar concipiebant, atque generabant."

[76] Stalbaum says that Sommer properly unites αὐτῶν with εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. But as αὐτὰ is found in many MSS., as Stephens conjectured, Ast has properly adopted it; and properly too did he object to τε after μετέθηκε; but improperly suggest δὲ—for he should have read τοίνυν instead of τε οὖν while in lieu of οὕτως, omitted in eleven MSS., one would prefer εὖ πως—

life. From this[77] (period) has been implanted by nature in mankind a mutual love, which is the bringer together of their ancient nature, and which endeavours to make one out of two, and to heal the nature[78] of man. Each of us then is but the counterpart[79] of a human creature, as having been cut like the Psettæ[80] from one into two. Hence each one is in search of his counterpart. As many men then as are sections of the form common to men, which was then called Man-Woman, are lovers of women; and from this race are sprung the majority of adulterers: and on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men, and are adulteresses, are sprung from the same[81] race. But such women as are sections of the female, do not pay much attention to men, but turn themselves rather to women; and from this race are the (Lesbian) courtesans. Such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are young, being fragments of men, they love men and are delighted in being with them; and these are the best of boys and youths, as being the most manly in their disposition. Yet some say, indeed, they are shameless. But in this they say false; for it is not through shamelessness, but through assurance, and a manly temper and manly look, that they embrace what resembles themselves. And of this there is a great proof. For when they are full grown, such alone turn

[77] There is some error in ἐκ τόσου, which is never used for ἐκ τούτου. Stalbaum's German version is, "seit so langer Zeit." Plato probably wrote ἐκ τότ' ἴσως, i. e. "perhaps from that time." On the phrase ἐκ τότε, see Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 644, ed. Jelf. Shelley has, "From this period," which he got from Ficinus, "ex illo tempore."

[78] Shelley has, what the sense requires, "and to heal the divided nature of man." This has led me to suggest σχίσιν for φύσιν, which is extremely inelegant after the preceding φύσεως.

[79] This was the doctrine of Empedocles, as we learn from Aristotle, Περὶ Φύσεως Ζώων, i. 18. In the word σύμβολον is an allusion to the symbol of friendship cut into two parts, one of which was preserved by the host, and the other by the guest; and when the two were brought together by the two parties or their friends, a recognition of acquaintance took place. See Schol. on Eurip. Med. 6.

[80] As it is not known what kind of flat-fish is meant by ψῆττα, I have left the original word in the text. Sydenham compares it with the polypus. The simile is well put by Plato into the mouth of Aristophanes, who has alluded to the same circumstance in Lysistr. 115, Ἐγὼ δ' ἐκοῦσ' ἂν ὥσπερεὶ ψῆτταν, δυκῷ Δοῦναι ἂν ἐμαυτῆς παρταμοῦσα θῴμισυ, where I have changed Ἐγὼ δὲ γ' ἄν, κἀν—into Ἐγὼ δ' ἐκοῦσ' ἂν—

[81] So Sydenham. As if he wished to read ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, instead of ἐκ τούτου, which is however repeated just afterwards.

out men as regards political affairs: but when they have become men, they feel a love for young persons, and do not turn their thoughts to marriage and child-getting naturally, but are led by the force of custom and law,[82] although it would be sufficient for them to continue to live unmarried. Altogether then such a person is both a lover of youths and a lover of those who love him, and ever embraces what is from the same race as himself. [19.] Now, whenever [83] the lover of youths, and every one else,[83] meet with that very thing, the half of himself, they are both smitten with a friendship in a wondrous manner, and (attracted)[84] by an intimacy and love, and are unwilling to be separated from each other for even, so to say, a brief period. And these are they, who continue to live together through life; and yet they could not tell what they wish to take place to themselves from each other; for it does not seem to be sexual intercourse, that the one should, for the sake of that, be delighted with the company of the other, and (seek it) with so much trouble; but the soul of each being evidently desirous of something else, which it is unable to tell, it divines what it wishes, and hints at it.[85] And if while they are lying down in the same place, Vulcan were to stand over them with his tools in his hand, and ask them "What is it do ye, mortals, desire to take place, the one by the other?" and if, finding them in a difficulty, were he to demand them again, "Do ye desire this, to be as much as possible in the same place with each other, so as never, by night or day, to be apart from each other? [86] for if ye long for this, I am willing to melt you down together, and to mould you into the same mass, so that

[82] There is probably an allusion here to a law at Sparta, which compelled persons under certain circumstances to marry, as we learn from Stobæus, lxv. p. 410, for nothing of the same kind was known at Athens.

[83—83] Instead of ὁ παιδεραστὴς καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς, Ficinus has "cujuscunque sexus avidus sit," which was evidently an abortive attempt made by the translator to supply some words obliterated in his MS., and of which those in the text are an evident corruption. For Plato wrote καὶ ὁ καλὸς παῖς—

[84] Sydenham has introduced the verb "attracted," which has led me to suggest that ἕλκονται has dropt out before οἰκειότητι—which would lead to καίονται—: Ficinus has "amicitiaque et familiaritate ardent."

[85] In lieu of the single word αἰνίττεται, Ficinus has "et affectum in situm vestigiis signat obscuris;" thus translated by Shelley "and traces obscurely the footsteps of its obscure desire."

ye two may become one,[86] and as long as ye live, may live both of you in common, as one person; and when ye die, may, having died in common, [87]remain for ever[87] in Hades, one (soul) instead of two. See then whether ye desire this, and it is sufficient for you, should ye obtain it." On hearing this not a single person, I know that, would refuse, nor would he appear to wish for any thing else; but (every one)[88] would in reality conceive he had heard that which he had long ago wished for, and that having come into the company of, and being melted with, his beloved, he would out of two become one. And of this[89] the cause is, that this was our original nature. We were once whole. To the desire then and pursuit of this whole, the name of Love is given. And we were, as I said, formerly one. But now, for our iniquity, [90]we have been cut in twain[90] by the deity, and have been made, like the Arcadians by the Lacedæmonians, to dwell asunder.[90] There is therefore a fear, that, unless we are well-behaved towards the gods, we shall be again cleft in twain, and go about with our noses split down, as those have, who are modelled on pillars in profile,[91] and become, [92]as it were, pebbles cut through

[86]—[86] To this celebrated passage there are allusions in Aristotle, Polit. ii. 1, 16, Synesius, Epist. p. 151, and the other authors, quoted by Wyttenbach in the notes of Rynders.

[87]—[87] Instead of *αὖ—εἶναι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀεὶ—μεῖναι*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "apud inferos unum semper perseveretis." On this wish of friends and lovers to live and die together, it will be sufficient to refer to Eurip. Iph. T. 984, *Καὶ ζῆν θέλοιμ' ἂν καὶ θανεῖν, λαχών γ' ἴσον*: and Horace, "Tecum vivere amem, tecum obeam libens."

[88] On *πᾶς*, thus obtained from the opposite *οὐδὲ εἷς*, see Stalbaum.

[89] Instead of *τοῦτο*, Bast, with whom Ast agrees, suggested *τούτου*—And so Ficinus, "Hujus causa est."

[90] The Greek is *διῳκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *διεσχίσθημεν*, as shown by his version—"a deo scissi sumus." I have therefore united the two, *διεσχίσθημεν—καὶ καθάπερ—διῳκίσθημεν*. For in the former verb there is an allusion to the cutting in two, mentioned in § 15, and in the latter to the fact of the Helots, who were originally Arcadians, being compelled to live apart in villages after they had been conquered by the Lacedæmonians. By so slight and obvious a correction have I got rid of the mass of notes written on this passage.

[91] Such is the interpretation of the words *κατὰ γραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι* given by Hermann in Programm. De Veter. Græcor. Pictura Parietum, p. 8, Opuscul. where he has reference to Hipparchus on Aratus, i. 6, p

and rubbed smooth. On this account then,[92] it is meet to exhort every man to behave in all things piously towards the gods, that we may on the one hand escape from the ills, [93] and on the other obtain the good,[93] to which Love is our guide and general; to whom let no one act in opposition. For he who acts in opposition, is an enemy to the gods. But by becoming friends and being reconciled to the god, we shall, what few of those now living do, find and meet with our beloved, the halves[94] of ourselves. And let not Eryximachus take me up, and ridicule my speech, as if I meant Pausanias and Agatho. For perhaps they are amongst such, (the fortunate

180, who uses *κατάγραφον* in the sense noticed by Pliny on H. N. xxxv. 34, who says of Cimon the Clenean, "Hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est, obliquas imagines." But in that case the preposition *εἰς* or *κατὰ* should precede *καταγραφὴν*, and *τὸ κατάγραφον* be written instead of *καταγραφήν*. I am therefore more disposed to adopt Hommel's ingenious alteration—*κατὰ ῥαφὴν*. For he supposes that figures of human beings were so placed at the corners of the walls of temples, that one half of the face was seen on one side, and the other half on the adjoining side; and they must therefore have appeared with the nose split down.

[92] The Greek is, *ὥσπερ λίσπαι ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα*—But *ἀλλὰ* could not thus be used before *τούτων ἕνεκα*, unless there had been something said previously, to which *ἀλλὰ* would indicate the opposite idea. Such however is not the case here. Besides, as *λίσπος* is an adjective, it requires a substantive. Hence I have translated as if the Greek were—*ὥσπερ λίσπαι λάλλαι· τούτων οὖν ἕνεκα*—For Hesychius has *Λάλλαι· λάλλας λέγουσι τὰς παραθαλασσίους καὶ παραποταμίους ψήφους*, i. e. "pebbles found along seas and rivers," which became smooth by the action of the water, and which, when cut lengthways or crossways, present two halves, the counterparts of each other. The same fact is found in the case of Scotch pebbles, when detached from the granite in which they are imbedded. To this restoration of Theocritus in Hesych. T. i. Auctar., and we can now perceive why Suidas and Hesychius, and the Scholiast here, explain *Λίσποι* by *διαπεπρισμένοι ἀστράγαλοι*, or, as Ruhnken correctly reads, *δίχα πεπρισμένοι*, both in Plato and in the Lexicons that referred to Plato. Timæus has *Λίσποι· οἱ δίχα πεπρισμένοι*.

[93]—[93] The Greek is *τὰ μὲν ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ τύχωμεν*. But as two MSS. offer *φύγωμεν*, it is evident that Plato wrote *τὰ μὲν κακὰ φύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ εὖ τύχωμεν*. For thus *κακὰ* and *εὖ* properly balance each other; while *εὖ* has been lost here, as in the passages corrected by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 154.

[94] Instead of *ἡμετέρους*, which Ast and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend, Bast suggested *ἡμιτόμους*, answering to "dimidium" in Ficinus; and the emendation is adopted by Creuzer in his work on the worship of Dionysus, P. i. p. 169, as stated by Ast.

few,) and are both of them males in nature.[95] I say then of all in general, both men and women, that the whole of our race would be happy, if we worked out Love perfectly; and if each were to meet with his beloved, having returned[96] to his original nature. If this then be the best, it necessarily follows, that of the things now present, that which is nearest to this is the best; and that is, to meet with y uthful objects of love that are naturally suited to one's ideas. In celebrating then the deity who is the cause of this fitness, we should justly celebrate Love; who both at the present time benefits us the most, by leading us to our own; and for hereafter gives us the greatest hopes, that, if we pay the debt of piety to the gods, he will restore us to our original nature, and, by healing us, render us happy.

[20.] Such, Eryximachus, said he, is my speech, in behalf of Love, of a different kind from yours. As then I requested, do not ridicule it, in order that we may hear what each of the rest will say; or rather what both will; for the rest are only Agatho and Socrates.

He stated then that Eryximachus said, I will be obedient; for the speech has been spoken in a delightful manner; and if I were not conscious that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in affairs of Love, I should have greatly feared they would be at a loss for reasons through there having been said so much, and of all kinds. But now I have every confidence. —(This,) said Socrates,(is all very well for you,) Eryximachus; since you have already gone through the ordeal yourself with honour. But if you were, where I am now, or rather perhaps where I shall be, when Agatho shall have spoken his speech cleverly,[97] you would be in a very great fright, and in every (kind of heart-sinking),[98] as I am now.—You wish, So-

[95] To preserve the train of thought, and thus elicit something like sense out of these words, Orelli on Isocrat. de Permutat. p. 330, suggested *ἄρρενος ἑνὸς*, i. e. "both from one male."

[96] Ficinus has "in antiquam naturam—restitutus," which leads to *ἀνελθὼν* in lieu of *ἀπελθὼν*—

[97] Ficinus has "scite dixerit," thus uniting *εὖ* to *εἴπῃ*, and not, as al. others have done, to *καὶ μάλ'*.

[98] Instead of *ἐν παντὶ εἴῃς*, which is perfectly unintelligible, even Fischer had the good sense to propose *ἐν παντὶ εἶῃς ἀπορίας ὥσπερ*, to which he was led by "angustiis undique premereris," in Ficinus. Besides

crates, said Agatho, to drug me, in order that I may be confused through thinking that the spectators have a great expectation of my being about to make a clever speech.—I should have been, Agatho, forgetful indeed, if, after witnessing your courage and high spirit, when you came upon the stage with the performers and looking so numerous an audience in the face, you were about to exhibit your compositions without being in the least daunted, I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, so few in number.—Surely, Socrates, said Agatho, you do not think me so inflated by a theatrical audience,[99] as not to know that to a man, who has any mind, a few persons of sense are more awful than a multitude of fools.—I should be acting not at all correctly, said Socrates, if I thought there was any thing about you, Agatho, of a boorish nature. But I know very well, that if you met with any whom you considered wise, you would think more of them than of the multitude. But I fear we are not such; for we were there likewise, and made a part of that multitude. But if you had met with other wise men, you would perhaps have felt a shame before them, had you thought you were doing an act really[100] disgraceful. Is it not so? or how say you?—It is true, said Agatho.—But before the multitude, said Socrates, would you not feel a shame, if you thought you were doing any thing base?—Hereupon Phædrus, taking up the discourse, said, If, dear Agatho, you will give Socrates an answer, it will be no manner of concern to him what becomes of any thing whatever here, or if he can only have somebody to converse with, and especially one who is handsome. I confess I do

he perhaps remembered *ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας* in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and *ἐν παντὶ κακῷ εἴη* in Rep. ix. p. 505, C. But in the former Plato wrote *ἐν παντί τῳ ἀπορίας ἐγενόμην*, and in the latter *ἐν παντί τῳ κακοῦ*, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 55, *ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας*, where I should prefer *ἐν παντί τῳ*, as in Philoct. 174, *ἐν παντί τῳ χρείας*, were it not that Dionys. H. A. R. vi. 70, *ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας*, seems to support the common reading. Wyttenbach indeed on Plutarch de S. N. V., p. 127, quotes from Xenoph. H. Gr. v. 4, 29, *ἐν παντὶ ἦσαν μὴ—εἴη*. But it is easy to read here *ἐν παντί τῳ ἄσης εἴη*, and there *ἐν παντί τῳ ἄσης ἦσαν*: for *ἄση* has been elsewhere lost or corrupted, as I have shown on Æsch. Eum. 116, and I could now show still more.

[99] Of this passage there is a palpable imitation in Themistius, Or. xxxvi. p. 311, B., and a covert one in Aristænetus, Ep. i. 19.

[100] Instead of *ὄν*, which has no meaning here, Plato wrote, as I have translated, *ὄντως*. Ast wished to expunge *ὄν* entirely; for it is not found in the correlative sentence just afterwards.

with much pleasure hear Socrates conversing: but it is necessary for me to take care of the panegyric upon Love, and to receive[1] a speech from every one of you. But do both of you pay[1] thus your tribute to the god, and then converse. You say well, Phædrus, (said Agatho); and there is nothing to prevent me from beginning my speech. For I shall have frequently the means of conversing again with Socrates.

[21.] I wish in the first place to state how I ought to speak; and I will then so speak.[2] For all of those who have spoken before me, appear to me to have celebrated not the god, but to felicitate mankind upon the good, of which the god is the cause. But what he is himself, who has bestowed these gifts, not one of them has explained. Now upon each subject of every panegyric, there is only one correct method; and that is, to detail in a rational way of how great things how great a cause is he, respecting whom the discourse may be.[3] In this way then it is meet for us to make the encomium upon Love, (by showing,) first, how great he is, and afterwards his gifts. I assert then, that of all the gods (in reality)[4] blessed, Love is, if it is lawful to say so, and without calling down vengeance, the most blessed of all the gods, and at once[5] the most beautiful and the best. [6]But such he is, being the most beautiful.[6] In the first place, he is, Phædrus, the youngest of the gods. Of this asser-

[1] On the meaning of *ἀποδέχεσθαι* and *ἀποδοῦναι*, "to receive" and "pay" a debt, Stalbaum refers to Politic. p. 173, B., and Rep. p. 612, B.

[2] Ficinus has "postea dicam," which leads to *εἴποιμ' ἄν*, in lieu of *εἰπεῖν*, which makes nonsense here.

[3] Ficinus either found something different in his MS., or formed something out of his own head, which he did not find there. For his version is, "Sic et in præsentia, qualis ipse sit Amor, primum ostendere decet; deinde munera illius exponere."

[4] Unless I am grievously mistaken, Plato wrote *ὄντως ὄντων*, for *ὄντων* by itself would be perfectly useless.

[5] Although, as Stalbaum shows, *αὐτῶν* might perhaps stand at the end of a sentence, of which I have my doubts, yet since Stobæus offers here *αὐτὸν*, it is evident that Plato wrote *ἅμα τὸν κάλλιστον*. For the article could hardly be omitted.

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the words, *Ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὢν τοιόσδε*: which others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote: especially when Ficinus has, "Quod vero pulcherrimus sit, ex eo primum patet—" from which, however, one can easily discover that he did not find in his MS. *ὢν τοιόσδε*. Perhaps Plato wrote, *ἐς δὲ τὸ κάλλος, παῖς ὢν, ποῖος δή*; i. e But as regards his beauty, being a boy, of what kind is he?

tion he affords himself a powerful proof, by running away in haste from Old Age, who is quick-footed, it is plain, at least it approaches quicker than is necessary; and which, indeed, Love naturally hates, nor does he come near to it within a great (distance);[7] but he is ever with the young, and is.[8] For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always doth approach to like."[9] Now, though I agree with Phædrus in many other points, I do not agree in this, that Love is older than Saturn and Japetus; but of gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and is ever young, and that the doings[10] of the olden time, which Hesiod and Parmenides detail, were produced, if indeed they say true, by the power of Necessity, and not Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations,[11] nor bindings,[12] nor those many other acts of violence, but friendship and peace, as now, from the time when Love came to be the ruler of the gods. Thus then he is young, and in addition to being young is a tender being. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express the ten-

[7] All the MSS. read, *οὐδ' ὄντος πολλοῦ*. Gesner on Stobæus, lxi. p. 269, was the first to suggest *οὐδ' ἐντὸς*, and so too Sydenham: as if *χωρίου* were understood, which is supplied in Thucyd. ii. 77, *ἐντὸς πολλοῦ χωρίου—πελάσαι*. They, however, who know how constantly Plato alludes covertly to Homer, will read *ἐντὸς τοῦ ὁλοοῦ οὐδοῦ*—similar to *ὁλοῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ*, in Il. Ω. 487: and in Axioch. § 9, *ἀλλ' οἱ ἐπ' οὐδῷ γήραος*, in lieu of *ἄλλοι πολυγήρως*: for *γήραος οὐδὸν* is found there in § 10, and in Plato Rep. i. p. 328, F.

[8] In lieu of the nonsensical *ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν*, which Ast and Stalbaum vainly, as usual, attempt to defend, Bast once proposed to read, what he afterwards retracted, *ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστιν*. He should have read, *ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται*, "he is and ever will be." On this union of the present and future, compare Thucyd. v. 105, *τὸν νόμον—ὄντα—ἐσόμενον δὲ*—Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. § 11, p. 105, *ἔστι καὶ ἔσται*. Menander in Stob. xxxviii., *Πεπόηκε καὶ ποήσει καὶ ποεῖ*—Anstid. H. in Jov. p. 21. Jebb. *ὅδε (ὁ Ζεὺς) ἔστι—ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται*. The passage of Plutarch in ii. p. 352, A., quoted by Wyttenbach on Ş. N. V. p. 36, is not in point, *παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα*. Winckelmann in Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft, 1840. p. 1282, would read *ξύνεστι καὶ ἔπεται*.

[9] The proverb is quoted at length in Lysid., p. 214, A., *Αἰεί τοι τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον* from Od. xvii. 218. *Ὡς ἀεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον—*

[10] Instead of *πράγματα*, the best MSS., as they are called, offer *γράμματα*. Plato wrote *ταράγματα*.

[11] To these castrations there is an allusion in Euthyph. § 6.

[12] The binding of Saturn by his son is mentioned by Æsch. in Eum. 627, and Aristoph. in Νεφ. 898, and Plato in Cratyl. § 45.

derness of the god. Now Homer describes Ate as a goddess, and of a tender frame. At least he speaks of her feet as being tender:

> Her feet are tender; not on ground she stalks,
> But on the top[13] of human heads she walks.

The poet then seems to me to show by such a proof her tenderness; because she walks not upon a hard place, but a soft one. And the same proof we shall use respecting Love, that he too is tender. For he neither walks on the ground, nor upon (human) skulls, which in truth are places not very soft; but on the softest of all existing things, he walks and dwells there. For he has fixed his abode in the dispositions and souls of gods and men:[14] and yet not in all souls indiscriminately: but whenever he meets with a soul possessing a harsh disposition, away he goes, and takes up his abode with a tender one. Since, then, he is ever touching with his feet, and in every way the softest parts in the softest persons, he must needs be extremely tender. Thus then he is very young and very tender; and in addition to these qualities he is of a flexible form. For he would not be able to entwine himself around every thing, nor to pass through every soul, at first unperceived, and to go out (again),[15] if he were of a hard substance. And a great proof of his form being in proportion[16] and flexible, is in its gracefulness, which Love confessedly possesses in a manner superior to all. For between Ungracefulness and Love there is always a war. His diet too on flowers points out the beauty of his colour. [17]For Love does not settle upon a body,

[13] I have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλ' ἄκρ' ἄρ' ἤγε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει, and not ἀλλ' ἄρα ἤγε—although instead of ἄρ' ἤγε I should prefer ἀνυξι, for ὑπαλοὶ means here not "tender," but "slim." With regard, however, to my ἄκρ', it is put beyond all doubt by Rhianus Fragm. i. Ἡ δ' Ἄτη ἀπαλοῖσι μετατρωχῶσα πόδεσσι Ἄκρης ἐν κεφαλῇσι ἐφίσταται.

[14] On this sentiment see Valckenaer in Diatrib. Euripid. p. 157.

[15] The antithesis in εἰσιὼν τὸ πρῶτον evidently requires ἐξιὼν αὖ—

[16] What the idea of proportion has to do with that of flexibility, it is hard to say. The passage was, however, so read by Aristænetus, when describing the σύμμετρα καὶ τρυφερὰ μέλη of Lais, in Epist. i. 1. Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote συμμέτρου δὲ ΣΚΩΛΗΚΙ, a word which might easily have dropt out through—ΟΥΔΕΚΑΙ—for of all animals the worm-tribe is the most flexible.

[17]—[17] Aristænetus, Ep. ii. 1, seems to have found in his MS. of Plato οὐ πεφυκε προσιζάνειν instead of οὐκ ἐνίζε

or any other spot where flowers are not, or where they have fallen off; but wherever is a spot flowery and fragrant, there he settles and fixes his abode.[17] [22.] As regards then the beauty of the god [18]thus much is sufficient; although much still remains.[18] I must speak after this on virtue of Love. Now is the highest (praise); that he does no injury to a god or man, nor by a god or man is he injured. Nor, if he suffers aught, does he suffer by violence; for violence touches not Love; nor if he does aught, does he it with violence;[19] for every one willingly ministers in every thing to Love.[20] But whatever one party agrees (to do) of his own accord for another party of his own accord, such acts the laws, that are the rulers in a state, say are justly done. In addition to justice, Love has the greatest share of temperance. For to be superior to pleasures and to passions, is every where confessed to be temperance. But no pleasure is superior to Love. If then they are inferior, they will be Love's subjects; and he will be their master; and being thus superior to pleasures and passions, he will be pre-eminently temperate. Moreover, as regards valour, not Arēs (Mars) himself can stand up against Love.[21] [22]For it is not Arēs that holds Love, but Love Arēs,

[18]—[18] Ficinus has, "permulta insuper afferri possent; sed ista sufficient," which would lead to *ἔτι καὶ πολλὰ λείπεται· ἔστω δὲ ταῦθ' ἱκανά*, in lieu of *καὶ ταῦθ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται*—

[19] Ficinus correctly, "neque vi facit, si quid faciat." He therefore found in his MS. *οὔτε τι ποιῶν ποιεῖ βίᾳ*—which is required to balance *βίᾳ πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει*. Stalbaum, however, says there is no need of *βίᾳ*, found in Bas. 2, and one MS., and in Stobæus.—But here, as elsewhere, the proverb is true—"Many men of many minds; Many birds of many kinds."

[20] In the words *Πᾶς γὰρ ἑκὼν Ἔρωτι πᾶν* (Stob. *πάνθ'*) *ὑπηρετεῖ*, there lies hid an Iambic verse, probably of Agatho himself, *Ἔρωτι γὰρ πᾶς πάνθ' ἑκὼν ὑπηρετεῖ*. So too from the following words, *ἃ δ' ἄν τις ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι δίκαια, εἶναι*, it is easy to elicit the distich, *Ἃ τις δ' ἑκὼν ἑκόντα δρᾶν ἂν ὁμολογῇ, Βασιλῆς πόλεως, δίκαια φασὶν οἱ νόμοι.*

[21] Blomfield, in Mus. Crit. No. 2, p. 144, has aptly compared Soph. Thyest. Fr. *Πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται*. But he did not see that in this passage of Plato there lies hid a distich, probably of Agatho, *Καὶ μὴν ἐς ἀνδρίαν γ' Ἔρωτι, παιδὶ δὴ, Πύκτης ἀνὴρ ὥς, οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται*, where I have introduced *Πύκτης* from Soph. Trach. 441, *Ἔρωτι μὲν νῦν ὅστις ἀντανίσταται, Πύκτης ὅπως ἐς χεῖρας, οὐ καλως φρονεῖ*: while, to preserve the antithesis, in which Agatho, as we learn from Aristotle, indulged, I have added likewise *παιδὶ δὴ—ἀνὴρ ὥς*—

[22] Here again it is easy to elicit another distich of Agatho, from the

(the son,) as the saying is, of Aphrodite[22] (Venus). Now he who holds is superior to the party held; and he who is the master of the party more valiant than all the rest, will be the most valiant. Thus then have we spoken of the justice, and temperance, and valour of the god; and it is left (to speak) of his wisdom. As far then as we can, we must endeavour to be in no way wanting. And in the first place, that I too may do honour to my own art, as Eryximachus did to his, the god is so clever a poet, that he is able to make even another person one.

[23] For each becomes a poet, though before
He was not musical, when Love touches him.[23]

This testimony it is fitting for us to use, (to prove) that the poet Love is excellent for all the creative power connected with the Muse. For that, which one has not, or does not know, he can not either give to another or teach. Moreover who will gainsay (the assertion) that the making of all animals is through the wisdom of Love, by which all living things are generated and produced?[24] Then as regards handicraft-skill in arts, know we not that he, whose teacher is the deity, turns out a person of repute and illustrious; but he on whom Love does not lay his hands, remains in obscurity? The art of the archer, and of the physician, and of the prophet, did Apollo invent,[25] under the

words Οὐ γὰρ ἔχει Ἔρωτα Ἄρης, ἀλλ' Ἔρως Ἄρη, Ἀφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος, by reading Ἔχει γὰρ οὐκ Ἄρης Ἔρωτ', Ἄρη δ' Ἔρως, Παῖς Ἀφροδίτης σμικρὸς ὤν, ὡς δὴ λόγος. And hence we may read, Ἀφροδίτης υἱός, ὡς λόγος; and thus obtain the very word required to govern Ἀφροδίτης, which Stalbaum says depends upon Ἔρως, and appeals to Monk on Alc. 50, where there is not a word bearing on the question. From his reference to Od. Θ. 266, Stalbaum seems to think that there is an allusion to the story told by Homer. But the remark of Agatho was of a wider kind, and applicable to the loves of Arēs generally.

[23]—[23] Here too lies hid another distich of Agathon, Πᾶς γὰρ ποητὴς γίγνεται, κἂν ᾖ τὸ πρὶν Ἀμουσος ἐς πᾶν, οὗ γ' Ἔρως ποθ' ἅψεται, where he imitated his beloved Euripides in Sthenob. Fr. iii. μουσικὴν δ' ἄρα Ἔρως διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν—while ἐς πᾶν is similar to the expression in Longinus, § 39, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ παντάπασι. With regard to Love making a person a poet, Shakspeare alludes to it, where he speaks of a lover "with his woeful ballad, made to his mistress' eye-brow."

[24] To get rid of the tautology in γίγνεται and φύεται, we must read, what Plato wrote, φαίνεται, "make their appearance."

[25]—[25] The edd. have ἐπιθυμίας καὶ Ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος. But ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are here out of place, where the whole question is about the deity called Love. The words ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are a corruption of ἐπιθυμίας ἕνεκα, and should be inserted between καὶ and Μοῦσαι: while

guidance of Love; so that he would be disciple of Love; and (through desire) the Muses (became the inventors) of music, and Hephæstus (Vulcan), of brass-working, and Athena (Minerva), of weaving, and Zeus (Jupiter), of governing gods and men.[25] From whence[26] then were the affairs of the gods put into order? Through the birth, it is plain, of the love of beauty; for Love does not follow[27] ugliness. For previously, as I stated at the commencement, many and terrible things befell, as they say, the gods, through the rule of necessity.[28] But when this god was born, through his loving all things of beauty, "to gods and men did all good things arise."[29]—[23.] Thus, Phædrus, Love appears to me to be, in the first place,[30] himself the most beautiful and best; in the next, to be the cause of such like beautiful things[31] in other beings. And it comes into my mind to speak something in verse, because he it is, who produces

> Peace amongst men, upon the sea a calm;
> Stillness on winds,[32] on joyless bed sweet sleep.[33]

after Μοῦσαι has dropt out ἦσαν, and after ἀνθρώπων, ἐυρέται. For thus only can we get rid of all the difficulties of the passage, which Ast and Stalbaum have vainly attempted to soften down.

[26] In lieu of ὅθεν, I have translated as if the Greek were πόθεν, and the sentence interrogative instead of being affirmative.

[27] The MSS. vary between ἔστιν, ἔνεστιν, and ἔπεστιν, which last leads to ἕπεται, as shown by the version of Ficinus. "deformitatem quippe non sequitur Amor." The very same confusion is found in the Cratylus, § 10, where the Zurich editors have adopted from MS. Bodl. alone ἕπεται for ἔπεστι.

[28] For, as Prometheus says in Æschylus, "Necessity is greater than Zeus himself." So too Simonides, Fr. 139, ἀνάγκῃ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

[29] Here again is another verse of Agatho, Πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γέγονε θεοῖσί τ ἀνθρώποις ἅμα.

[30] Instead of πρῶτος, vainly defended by Stalbaum, one MS. and Stobæus offer πρῶτον, absolutely requisite to balance μετὰ τοῦτο. Ficinus too "primum—deinde."

[31] Instead of ἄλλων, which is scarcely intelligible, Plato wrote καλῶν, as shown by the preceding κάλλιστος: and so I have translated.

[32] Hermogenes T. i. p. 321, ed. Walz., ἀνέμοις for ἀνέμων: and so too four MSS. as required by the preceding ἀνθρώποις and πελάγει.

[33] From the variations of MSS. it is probable that Plato wrote, as I have translated, κοίτῃ θ' ὕπνον ἡδὺ ἀηδεῖ. On the loss and corruption of ὕπνον ἡδύν, I have given another instance in The Surplice, No. 25, p. 385, for May 16, 1846, by restoring to Apollon. Rh. iii. 763, ὕπνον δ' ἔχεκαί τις ὀδίτης Ἡδύν. Stalbaum says that Dindorf's κοίτῃ θ' ὕπνον νηκηδῆ scarcely admits of doubt: for though νηκηδῆ has not been hitherto found

It is he who divests us of all feelings of alienation; and fills us with those of intimacy; who establishes all[34] meetings such as these, and in festivals, in dances, (and) in sacrifices,[35] he becomes the leader; introducing mildness, and banishing a harshness of manners; the friendly giver of good-will, the non-giver of enmity; gracious to the good; looked up to by the wise, admired by the gods; envied by those who have no lot in life, possessed by those who have; the parent of luxury, of tenderness, of elegance, of grace, of desire, and regret; careful of the good, regardless of the bad; in labour, in fear, in wishes, and in speech,[36] the pilot, the encourager,[37] the by-stander, and best saviour:[38] of gods and men, taken all together, the ornament; a leader the most beautiful and best;[39] in whose train it is the duty of every one to follow, hymning well his praise, and bearing a part in that sweet song which he sings himself when soothing the mind of every god and man.—Let this my speech be offered up, Phædrus, said he, to

in any Greek writer, yet it is sufficiently supported by the analogy of *νηπενθής*. Nor is he altogether displeased with Hommel's *κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήτει*: for Hesychius has Κῆτος—*ἀπορια*. But this is a manifest error for *χῆτος*, as those scholars should have known. Or we might read *κραδίην θ' ὑπνῶν ἐνὶ κήδει*, i. e. "and bringing to the heart In sadness sleep." For Plato might have had in mind Od. xvi. 450, Κλαῖεν ἔπειτ' (read *ἄπλητσ'*) *Ὀδυσῆα, φίλον πόσιν, ὄφρα οἱ ὕπνον Ἠδὺν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι βάλε γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.* Shelley has "repose and sleep in sadness." But the hendyadis would be extremely tame.

[34] The text is *πάσας τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι*: where Hommel objects to *πάσας* and would read *πάντας*. But he still leaves untouched *τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι*, which could not be said in correct Greek. There is some error, which others may perhaps, but I cannot, satisfactorily correct.

[35] Instead of *ἐν θυσίαις*, Stobæus offers *ἐνθυμίαις*: which leads to *ἐν θοίναις, ἐν θυσίαις.*

[36] Schütz was the first to object to *λογῳ*, for which he proposed to read *μόγῳ*. But that word is never found in prose, and rarely even in poetry. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐν χόλῳ*, "in anger."

[37] I cannot understand *ἐπιβάτης*, which Ficinus translates "præfectus," which is quite as incorrect as Sydenham's "encourager." For the *ἐπιβάτης* was the name given to the person, who fought on board a vessel, but did not row, answering to "a marine" in the English navy. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὑπασπιστής*, for such a person is required in a case of fear. Hesych. *Ὑπαπιστής· βοηθός.*

[38] If I have rightly restored *χόλῳ* for *λόγω*, we must read *Ἰατὼρ ἄριστος*, in allusion to *Ἰητρὸς ἄριστος* in Homer, quoted here in § 38.

[39] Although *κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος* are perpetually united, yet here the repetition of *ἄριστος* is extremely disagreeable. One would expect rather *καὶ χαριέστατος*, "most agreeable."

Love, partaking, as best I could, in some parts of what is gay, in others of what is grave.

[24.] When Agatho had done speaking, all present, said Aristodemus, roared out (applause), for he had spoken in a manner worthy of himself and the god.—Upon which Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said, Do I appear to you, son of Acūmĕnus, to have felt just now a fear that was no fear,[40] when I spoke prophetically, what I asserted lately, that Agatho would speak marvellously well, and that I should be placed in a difficulty?—One portion, replied Eryximachus, you appear to have foretold truly, that Agatho would speak excellently, but the other, that you would be in a difficulty, I do not consider (true). And how, O happy man, said Socrates, am I not likely to be in a difficulty, and any one else too, who is to speak after a speech so full of beauty and variety? [41] In other respects it was not equally admirable,[41] but who, that heard the conclusion, would not have been struck with the beauty [42] of the nouns and verbs?[42] For when I consider how unable I shall be to say any thing beautiful approaching to this, I should run away for very shame, had I in any way the power. For the speech put me in mind of Gorgias: so that I suffered what is told in Homer.[43] For I feared that Agatho would at last send in his speech the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias against my speech; and, through my inability to say a word, turn me into stone! And I perceived how ridiculous I was then, when I agreed that I would in my turn after you make an encomium upon Love, and asserted that I had some skill in the matter of Love, yet knowing nothing of it, nor how it was necessary to praise any thing whatever. For in my stupidity I thought

[40] Suidas in *Ἀδεές*—*Ἀδεὲς δέδιας δέος*.

[41]—[41] Ficinus has "et cetera quidem, quamvis apte composita non adeo miranda videntur." He therefore found something in his MS. answering to "quamvis apte composita," wanting at present in the Greek.

[42]—[42] In thus alluding to the beauty of the nouns and verbs, Socrates is supposed to be speaking ironically in praise of that which he really considered reprehensible. For, unlike the rhetoricians and sophists, he looked rather to the matter of a speech than the manner. There is a similar sneer at fine words merely in the Menexenus, p. 234, C.

[43] The passage alluded to is in *Od.* Λ. 636—

> "Then pale fear seized me, lest the Gorgon's head
> Should Proserpine of hallowed mien send out,
> A prodigy great and terrible, from Hell

one ought to speak truths respecting each subject praised, and that these were to be the substratum, and that selecting out of these very matters the most beautiful, to put them together in the most becoming manner. And I had a great notion that I should speak well, as knowing well the truths relating to the praising of any thing whatever. But this it seems is not the way to praise correctly, but (we must) attribute to the subject qualities the greatest and the best possible, whether they are such or not; and if the encomiums are untrue, that is an affair quite immaterial. For it was stated before, as it seems, that each of us [44] should appear to praise Love, and not merely to praise.[44] On this account, I suppose, you [45] turn over every topic and attribute to Love,[45] and assert that he is of such a kind, and the cause of things so great, as to appear the most beautiful and best—to those it is clear who know him not—for he certainly would not (appear so) to those who did know him. And thus the praise becomes fine and pompous. But for my part, I know nothing of this kind of praise; and through not knowing, I agreed to compose myself in my turn a panegyric. "But my tongue only[46] promised, not my mind." And so farewell to it. For I should not be able (to say any thing), not I indeed.[47] But

[41]—[44] The words between the numerals I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, as is evident from his equally unintelligible version—"cum propositum sit, quomodo Amor ipse laudetur, immo ut quisque Amorem laudare quam maxime videatur." I could have understood, what Plato probably wrote,—ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάσεται, οὐχ ὅπως ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει, i. e. "that each of us should praise Love, and not merely be thought to praise him." For thus there would be a proper antithesis between real and seeming praise. On this antithesis I have said something worth reading on Hipp. Maj. § 29, n. 3, and on Philoct. 1271.

[45]—[45] In the words πάντα λόγον κινοῦντες there is an allusion to the proverbial expression πάντα λίθον κινεῖν, as shown by Wyttenbach on Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 83. Here however Ficinus has "universa Amori tribuitis," omitting λόγον κινοῦντες. From whence I suspect that Plato wrote πάντα λίθον κινοῦντες, πάντα ἀνατίθετε, i. e. "moving every stone, you attribute every thing to Love." For thus we shall recover the object required after the verb ἀνατίθετε.

[46] In the words ἡ γλωττα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὔ, there is an allusion to Eurip. Hippol. 612, Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, translated by Cicero De Offic. iii. 29, "Juravi lingua; mentem injuratam gerc," as remarked by Stalbaum, who did not, however, see that, as οὖν is here unintelligible, Plato wrote ἡ γλῶττα μὲν ὑπέσχετο—

[47] On this repetition of οὐ μὲν τοι after οὐ, Stalbaum refers to Od. Γ

I am ready to speak the truth according to my own notions, if you are willing (to hear), but not by way of comparison with yours, in order that I may not pay the debt of laughter. Do you then, Phædrus, consider, if indeed you are in want at all of such a speech, [48](whether you wish)[48] to hear the truth spoken about Love with such an arrangement of nouns and verbs[49] as may happen to come (into my mind).[50] [25.] Phædrus then, he said, and the rest requested him to speak in the manner which he thought he ought to speak. Permit me, Phædrus, however, said Socrates, to ask Agatho still some trifling questions; that, [51]after having obtained a confession from him, I may then speak[51] in this way. I permit you, said Phædrus. Question him. Hereupon he said, that Socrates began somewhat after this fashion:

In good truth, friend Agatho, you seem to me to have begun your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth what is the nature of Love, and afterwards his doings. With this introduction I am quite delighted. Come, then, touching this Love; since you have gone through the other points in a beautiful and splendid manner, tell me this also. Is Love a being of such a kind as to be (the love) of something or nothing? I do not ask, whether it is of some father or mother;

27, *Οὐ γὰρ δίω οὐ*, and Hipp. Maj. p. 292, B., *οὔμοι δοκεῖ—οὔκ*: but *μέντοι* is not thus introduced, except in the case of a confirmation by another speaker, as I have shown in Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2. There is some error here.

[48]—[48] The words within the numerals have been inserted to complete the sense and syntax, which are both equally neglected in the original; where Plato wrote, I suspect, *πότερον περὶ Ἔρωτος τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀρέσκει ἀκούειν*, in lieu of *περὶ Ἔρωτος τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν*. Ficinus, "utrum vobis placeat—audire."

[49] Instead of *ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων*, one would have expected *ὀνομάτων δὲ καὶ ῥημάτων θέσει*, similar to *τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτω καὶ ῥημάτων*, a little before. Ficinus, "verborum nominumque—com positione."

[50] As all the MSS. but one read *ὁποία δ' ἄν τις*, Stalbaum suggeste *ὁποία δὴ τις*. He should have proposed *ὁποία μοι*, for *μοι* could scarcely be omitted after *ἐπελθοῦσα*.

[51]—[51] Such is the interpretation of Budæus. But Ficinus has "ut confirmatus ab illo loquar." The sense required is, "that, having reflected upon some trifling point, I may speak as is fitting," in Greek, *ἵνα ἀναλογισάμενος περί του, οὕτως, ἥ δεῖ, λέγω*. For though *οὕτως ἤδη* is found here in § 20, and in Phædo, p. 61, D., yet in both these cases the same alteration is requisite. To the recovery of the sense three MSS. have led the way by reading *ἀναλογισάμενος*.

—for the question, whether love is the love of a father or mother, would be ridiculous—but as if I had asked this respecting a father, Is a father a father; and the father of something, or not? In this case you would surely have said, if you wished to answer correctly, that a father is the father of a son or daughter, would you not?—Certainly, said Agatho.—And is not a mother in the same predicament?—To this too Agatho assented.—Answer me still further, said Socrates, to a question a little larger, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. If I had asked, What, then, of a brother—whatever that very thing may be—is he a brother of some person, or not?—(Agatho) said, He is.—Is he not of a brother or a sister?—Agatho assented.—Try then, said (Socrates), to tell me about love. Is it the love of nothing, or of something?—Of something,[52] by all means, (replied Agatho).—This, therefore,[53] said Socrates, keep to yourself, remembering what it is; but tell me so much as this. Does love desire that very thing, of which it is the love, or does it not?—Desires it, certainly.—Whether, when possessing what it desires and loves, does it then desire and love it? or only when not possessing it?—It would seem, he replied, only when not possessing it.—[26.] Instead of seeming,[54] said Socrates, consider if it be not of necessity thus, that desire desires only that, of which it is in want; and that it does not desire, if it be from want. For to me, Agatho, this seems to be marvellously necessary. But how does it to you?—To me too it seems, replied (Agatho).—You say well, said (Socrates). Would then a big man, being big already, wish to be big? or a man being strong, wish to be strong?—This is, from what has been just now stated, impossible (replied Agatho). For, being so,[55] he would not

[52] In lieu of *ἐστιν* we must read *ἐστί τινος*, as shown by "Alicujus certe," in Ficinus.

[53] Sydenham has, "for the present keep," which is what the sense requires; and so Plato wrote in Greek, *Τοῦτο μὲν τὰ νῦν*, not *Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν*, where *τοίνυν* is unintelligible.

[54] There is a similar play on the word "seeming," in Hamlet, where to the Queen's inquiry, "Why seems it so particular with thee?" the Prince replies "Seems, Madam; nay, it is. I know not seems." See my note on Cratyl. p. 400, B. § 37.

[55] Ficinus has "Neque enim indigus esset eorum, quæ in se ipso jam contineret." He therefore found in his MS. not *ὅ γε ἂν*, but *ἃ γε ἔχων ἦν*, which is far more correct; for *ἔχων* is opposed to *ἐνδεὴς*, and not *ἂν*, and better chimes in with the preceding *ἔχων, οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ—ἢ οὐκ ἔχων*.

be wanting on those points.—You say true, replied Socrates; for, if a person, being already strong, should wish to be strong, and being swift, (wish to be) swift, and (being) healthy, (wish to be) healthy,[57] one might perhaps imagine [58]that those who are such, as regards these and such-like points, and possess these, would desire those things which they already possess.[58] That we may not therefore be deceived, it is for this that I speak. For if you consider the matter, Agatho, (you will see) that they, who possess at present any of those things, must possess them, whether they will or not; and of such a thing, how can any one ever have a desire? But when a person says thus—"I, who am now in health, desire to be in health; and I, who am now wealthy, desire to be wealthy; and I long for those very things, which I possess;" we should say to him thus: "You mean, my man, that you, who now possess wealth, and health, and strength, are desirous to possess those things for the time to come; since at the present time you possess them, whether you will or not." When you say, therefore, thus—"I desire what is present," consider whether you are saying any thing else than this—"I wish that what are now present may be present for the time to come." Would aught else but this be acknowledged?[59]—Agatho agreed that it would not.—[60]Is not this then, said Socrates, to love (to desire)[60]

[57] After "healthy," Stalbaum fancies that the apodosis is wanting; for he did not perceive that γὰρ is a corruption merely for γ' ἄρ'—

[58]—[58] Instead of the horrible verbiage in the Greek text, ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων, ἅπερ ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν—how terse and to the purpose is the translation of Ficinus—"forte quispiam crederet et hos et alios quoslibet ea, quæ habent, appetere," i. e. "perhaps any one would believe that both these, and any others, would desire what they possess."

[59] Sydenham was the first to bring back ὁμολογοῖτ' ἄν, found in the three earliest edd. Ficinus too, "Censes hunc hominem—responsurum." Bekk. and Stalbaum, from MSS., ὁμολογοῖ: which would be in Attic Greek ὁμολογοίη.

[60]—[60] Such seems to be a part of the meaning required by the context; but even this cannot be got out of the Greek—Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ἐρᾷν ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστιν. For where there is no syntax, there is no sense. Ficinus has, "Amor profecto, hujusmodi illud *respicit*, quod nondum in promptu est nec habetur," as if he had found in his MS. ὁρᾶν, which has been furnished by a solitary one subsequently examined. I have followed Sydenham in part, who supplied "to desire," although I suspect Plato wrote something else, which I could easily restore by the aid of an Æsopic fable.

that which is not at hand to him, and which he does not possess; and that what are now present should be preserved for him for the time to come.—Certainly so, (replied Agatho).—Both this man, therefore, (said Socrates,) and every one else who feels a desire, desires that which lies not at hand, and which is not present, and which he has not, and which he himself is not, and of which he is in want of; such things only are those of which there is the desire and the love.—Certainly, said he.—[61] Come then, said Socrates, let us agree upon what has been said.[61] Is Love any thing else than, in the first place, the love of something? next, of those things of which there is a want?—Clearly (not), replied Agatho.—In addition to these, said Socrates, recollect, of what things you asserted in your speech there was a Love. But, if you wish it, I will remind you. For, I think, you said something like this—"that their affairs were put into order by the gods, through a love of things beautiful: for that of things ugly there could be no love." Did you not say some such thing? I did say so, answered Agatho.—And you spoke reasonably, friend, replied Socrates. Now, if such be the case, would Love be any thing else than the love of beauty, and not of ugliness?—He confessed it.—And has it not been confessed, said Socrates, that a person loves that thing of which he is in want, and which he does not possess?—Yes, said (Agatho).—Love then, (said Socrates,) is in want of, and does not possess, beauty.—It is so of necessity, said (Agatho).—What then, (said Socrates,) do you call that beautiful, to which beauty is wanting, and does not possess it at all?—Certainly not, (replied Agatho).—Do you then, said Socrates, still confess that Love is beautiful, if such be the case?—And Agatho then said, I seem nearly, Socrates, to know nothing of what I then asserted.—And you have, Agatho, spoken fairly, said Socrates. But tell me still one little thing. Do not things good seem to you to be also beautiful?—They do, said Agatho).—If then, (said Socrates,) Love is in want of

[61]—[61] Stalbaum, perceiving the evident absurdity of these words, would render *ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα* by "de quibus convenit, paucis repetamus." But there is nothing in the Greek to answer to "paucis," nor to "repetamus," which last he took from Ficinus—"quæ supra dicta repetamus." Plato wrote here, as before, in § 25, *ἀναλογισώμεθα κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα*, i. e. "let us reason according to what has been said."

things beautiful, and if good things are beautiful, Love will be in want of good things likewise.—I am not able, replied (Agatho), to argue against you, Socrates; let then the case be as you say.—You are not able, my beloved Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the truth: for (to argue) against Socrates is by no means difficult. [27.] And now here I will leave you. But as regards the discourse about Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima of Mantinea,[62] who was a clever person on these and many other points—for when the Athenians were making sacrifices on account of the plague,[63] she effected its being put off for ten years—she it was who instructed even me in Love affairs. The speech then which she spoke I will endeavour to go through before you on the principles agreed upon by myself and Agatho, (relying) as well as I can, myself upon myself.[64] It is then, Agatho,

[62] The MSS. vary between Μαντικῆς and Μαντινικῆς. The former was found in the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his version "Fatidica;" the latter is quoted by Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxiv. § 4, and 7. According to the Scholiast on Aristid. T. p. 468, ed. Dind., she was a priestess of the temple of Zeus Lyceus in Arcadia; while Aristides himself, in the speech against Demosthenes in Maii's Scriptor. Vet. Collect. t. ii. p. 30, describes her ἐκ Μυλίτου: where De Geel in Biblioth. Crit. Nov. t. iv. p. 93, would read, with the approbation of Stalbaum, Μιλήτου. I conceive, however, that as the talented Aspasia, who is similarly introduced in the Menexenus, was the mistress of Pericles, so Diotima was another of the same profession, and one of the three λαικάστριαι alluded to in Aristoph. Ach. 529, as being the real cause of the Peloponnesian war, just as Helen had been of the Trojan. Maximus Tyrius too seems to have had some such notion; for his words are, εἴτε Μαντινικὴ εἴτε καὶ Λεσβία τις ἦν. And if such be the fact, it is easy to see, that although the ladies of Miletus were quite as notorious as those of Lesbos, yet here one may read in Aristides ἐκ μύλης του, "from the mill of some:" for to the tread-mill in ancient times disorderly females were sent, as they were lately in England. Proclus indeed on Republ. p. 420, ranks her amongst the Pythagoræans; and so were many of her sex, for reasons it would not be difficult to explain. With regard to her name Μαντι-νίκη, there is not, I suspect, any allusion to Mantinea—for a female of that town would have been called Μαντινίς—but to the circumstance of her having stayed the plague, and was thus a victor over soothsayers by doing that, which they could not accomplish; and as she was thus god-honoured, her name was properly Διό-τιμα Μαντι-νικη.

[63] The plague alluded to is the one so graphically described by Thucydides ii. 47; while with this feat of Diotima may be compared the one attributed to Empedocles, who, from his supposed power over the winds, was called Παυσανεμας.

[64] This is said, because Socrates used to pretend that he had a bad memory.

very meet to declare, first, as you have stated, who Love is, and of what kind, and then his doings. Now it seems to me a thing the most easy to go through the subject, as the stranger went through it, while sifting myself. For I spoke to her in other words, but on nearly such points as Agatho just now did to me, (by saying) that Love was a god of goodness,[65] and was also (one) of things beautiful.[66] But she refuted me with the same arguments[67] as I did this person (Agatho); (by showing) that, according to my own reasoning, Love was neither beautiful nor good. How say you, Diotima? said I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being?—Will you not speak words of good omen? she replied; or do you imagine that every thing which is not beautiful, must of necessity be ugly?—Most certainly.—And is every thing that is not wise, ignorant? Or do you not perceive, there is something between wisdom and ignorance?—What is that?—To think correctly, and without being able to give a reason, know you not, said she, is neither to know—for how can knowledge exist without a reason?[68]—nor yet is it ignorance; for how can that which hits the truth be ignorance?[69] There is then some such thing as correct opinion between intelligence and ignorance.[70]—You say truly, said I.—Do not then compel what is not beautiful to be ugly; or what is not good to be evil. And thus, since you have confessed that Love is neither good nor beautiful, do not fancy a whit the more that he is ugly and evil; but something, she said, between those two.—However, said I, he is acknowledged by all to be a

[65] Instead of *μέγας θεὸς*, Sydenham translated "a deity excellent in goodness," as if he wished to read, *ἀγαθὸς θεὸς*, which Wolf adopted, to chime in with the subsequent *οὔτε καλὸς,—οὔτε ἀγαθός*. Stalbaum, however, without a shadow of reason, or a particle of taste, still sticks to *μέγας*.

[66] Stalbaum says that *τῶν καλῶν* depends upon *Ἔρως*, and that the sense is "the love of things beautiful." But in that case the subsequent *οὔτε καλὸς οὔτε ἀγαθὸς* would be perfectly unconnected with what precedes.

[67] Ficinus—"iisdem," which leads to *τοῖς αὐτοις* in lieu of *τούτοις τοῖς*.

[68] So Aristotle in Ethic. Nicomach. vi. 6, *μετὰ λόγου ἡ ἐπ στήμη*, quoted by Sydenham.

[69] By *τοῦ ὄντος* is meant, as Sydenham translated, "the truth." Stalbaum refers to Rep. i. p. 334, E. and Xenoph. Anab. iii. 2, 39.

[70] Stalbaum refers to Theætet. p. 190, A. Phileb. p. 37, A. Sophist. p. 263. Rep. v. p. 477, A.; vi. p. 506, C.

god of might.—By all who do not know him, said she, or by those who do likewise?—By all universally. [28.] And she said with a smile, How, Socrates, can he be acknowledged a god of might by those, who say he is no god at all?—Who are they? said I.—You yourself, replied she, are one, and I am one.—How say you this? I replied.[71]—Easily, said she. For tell me. Say you not that all the gods are blest and beautiful? or would you dare assert that any one of the gods is not beautiful and blest?—Not I, indeed, by Zeus, said I.—Say you not that those who possess things good and beautiful are happy?—Certainly.—But you have confessed that, through the want of things good and beautiful, Love has a desire for those very things of which he is in want.—I have confessed. —But how can he be a god, who has no share in things beautiful and good?—It seems, by no means.—You see then, said she, that even you do not consider Love as a god.—What then, said I, is Love a mortal?—Least of all.—What then?—As in the case before mentioned, she replied, between a mortal and immortal.—What is this, Diotima?—A great dæmon,[72] Socrates. For the whole dæmon-kind is between a god[73] and mortal.—What power has it, said I?—It interprets for, and transmits to, the gods what is sent from men; and for and to men what (is sent) from the gods; from men, their petitions and sacrifices; from the gods, their commands [74]and returns for sacrifices;[74] and being in the middle space between both (gods and men)[75] it fills up the whole. So that by it all have been bound together into one.[75] Through them

[71] As *εἶπον* and *ἔφη* could not be thus found united, Ficinus has very opportunely, "Quonam pacto me dixisse hoc asseris," which leads to *Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτό μεφάναι λέγεις*, in lieu of *τοῦτο ἔφην*.

[72] On the subject of dæmons, the mass of authors quoted here by Ast and Stalbaum will give all the information required. According to an Orphic fragment preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 724, it would seem that the doctrine promulgated by Diotima emanated from the disciples of the Orphic school.

[73] Instead of *θεοῦ* one would prefer *θείου*, to answer to *θνητοῦ*.

[74—74] In lieu of these words Ficinus has "sacrosque solennes institutiones et ordinem." But *ἀμοιβὰς* was found here by Pollux, who, however, in vi. 187, says that the meaning is uncertain. For *ἀμείβεσθαι*, as applied to the gods, would signify rather "to requite evil" than "to return good."

[75—75] Such is evidently what the train of thought requires. The Greek is *συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ξυνδεδέσθαι*. But as Ficinus has "totum complet, ut universum secum ipso tali vinculo connectatur,"

proceeds every kind of prophecy, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and initiations and incantations, and the whole of magic[76] and sorcery. For a god is not mixed up with man, but through that (middle nature) is carried on all intercourse and converse between gods and men,[77] whether awake or asleep. Now he who is wise in things of this kind is a dæmon-like man; but he who is wise in any other matter, whether arts or handicrafts, is an operative merely. But these dæmons are many and various, and one of them is Love.—[29.] But, said I, from what father or mother is he?—It is a rather long story, said she, to tell. However, I will relate it. When Venus was born[78] the gods had a feast, all the rest, and likewise Plenty, the son of Planning. And when they had supped, Poverty came[79] to beg, as there was good cheer[79]

Orelli, on Isocrat. Περὶ Ἀντιδοσ. p. 331, suggested ξυμπληροῖ τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε αὐτό. But Rynders more correctly, τὰ ὅλα ξυμπληροῖ, ὥστε αὐτὸ—For Proclus, on Alcibiad. i. p. 69, has τὰ τε μέσα τῶν δαιμόνων γένη ξυμπληροῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ συνδεῖ. There is, however, still a difficulty in αὐτὸ αὐτῷ. For the question is not what the Universe can do towards binding itself with itself, but what the middle dæmon power can. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, ξυμπληροῖ τὰ ὅλα, ὥστε εἰς ἓν πάντα αὐτῷ ξυνδεδέσθαι, as I have translated. Stalbaum, however, still sticks to the common text, of which he gives a brief German version. I wish he had expressed his ideas in a longer Latin note.

[76] Instead of μαντείαν, which has been already mentioned, Plato evidently wrote μαγείαν—καὶ γοητείαν or μαγγανείαν, which is united to ἐπῳδαῖς in Legg. xi. p. 933, while μαγείαν is found in Alcib. i. p. 122, A.

[77] By the aid of Proclus on Parmenides, t. iv. p. 60, ed. Cousin, Heusde in Specim. Crit. p. 60, wished to supply, after ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἄνθρωποις πρὸς θεούς: for otherwise the gods and not men would be said to be asleep and awake. The idea is rejected point blank by Ast, nor fully adopted by Stalbaum.

[78] Of the different writers who have alluded to this story, Ast has given a very full list, both ancient and modern, to which Stalbaum adds Damascius Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, p. 302, ed. Kopp., and Reynders says that it was turned into verse by D. Heinsius in Monobibl. Eleg. ix.

[79]—[79] The Greek is προσαιτήσουσα οἷον δὴ εὐωχίας. Now, though οἷον δὴ might be used as οἷα δὴ in Menexen. § 2, yet as the object is wanting after προσαιτήσουσα, Ficinus has "mendicatura cibum," as if he had found in his MS. CITON, which might have dropt out before OION. But the word was, I suspect, σκύβαλον. For Suidas has Σκυβαλίζεται—κυρίως δὲ ἀκύβαλον, κυσὶ βαλόν τι ὂν ἢ τὸ ταῖς κυσὶ βαλλόμενον· ἐν Ἐπιγράμματι, (Leonid. Alex. 30.) Οὐδ' ἀπὸ δειπνιδίου γευσόμενος σκυβάλου. Compare too Phocylid., Μηδ' ἄλλου παρὰ δαιτὸς ἔδοις σκυβάλισμα τραπέζης. So Ulysses is compared, in Od. xvi. 221, to a person who is πολλῇσι φλιῇσι παραστὰς Αἰτίζων ἀκόλους: and so too

there, and she staid about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar,—for as yet wine was not,—went into the garden of Zeus, and being drowsy with liquor, fell asleep. Poverty therefore laid a plot against him, so as to have a child by Plenty, and placed herself down by him, and became pregnant with Love. Hence Love has become the follower of and attendant upon Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that deity, and being also naturally fond of the beautiful and of Aphrodité,[80] as being beautiful. As Love then is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, he is in this state of fortune. In the first place, he is always poor; and so far from being either tender or fair, as the multitude fancy, he is rough and dirty, and shoeless, and houseless, ever stretched on the bare ground, and bedless, and lying at doors, and in the road under the sky alone; (and) as partaking of his mother's nature, dwelling ever with indigence. On the other hand, taking after his father, he is a plotter against the beautiful and good; courageous and bold, and on the stretch[81] (to act); a skilful hunter, for ever weaving some contrivance; [82] eagerly desirous of intellect, and

Œdipus in Col. 5, is described as *Σμικρὸν μὲν ἐξαιτῶν* and *τοῦ σμικροῦ ἔτι μεῖον φέρων.*

[80] As there is nothing to which *καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης* can be referred, it is evident that Plato wrote *περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης.* Stalbaum renders, "ac simul naturâ suâ pulchri amans, quum etiam Venus pulchra sit:" which he got from Ficinus, "quinetiam naturâ pulchri desiderio capitur, cum Venus ipsa sit pulchra." But Love does not love the beautiful, because Aphrodité is beautiful; but loves the beautiful Aphrodité, because he loves the beautiful.

[81] Although Themistius, in Or. xiii. p. 162, D., has *σύντονος* only, yet from Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. p. 14, ed. Creuzer, *πᾶς γὰρ ἔρως σύντονός· ἐστι μανία,* one might elicit *σύντονος ὡς τῇ μανίᾳ.* For *σύντονος* can hardly stand here by itself. On the madness of love, see my note in Bailey's Hermesianax, p. 79, to which I could now add much more.

[82—82] I cannot well understand *πλέαων μηχανὰς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς καὶ πορίμος.* I could have understood *πλέκων μηκανὰς φρονήσεως, ὡς Προμηθεύς τις, καὶ εἰς ἄπορα πόριμος ὤν*· i. e. "weaving contrivances of intellect, as some Prometheus, and finding a path along the pathless." For so Prometheus is described by Æschylus in v. 59, *Δεινὸς γὰρ εὑρεῖν κἀξ ἀμηχάνων πόρους*: where, to the passages already quoted, I should have added Eurip. Hippol. Fr. 3, *Ἐν τοῖς ἀμηχάνοισιν εὐπορώτατον Ἔρωτα.* Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxvi. p. 309, *καὶ τὰ ἄπορα αὐτῷ* (Ἔρωτι) *εὐπορώτατα.* Theophrast. in Athen. p. 362, F., *εὐπόρους Ἐν τοῖς ἀπόροις.* Of which the most apposite is Ælian. H. A. iii. 30, *σοφώτατος πλέκειν εὐπόρους ἐξ ἀπόρων μηχανάς.* Themistius, however, has *ἐπιθυμητὴν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς,* in Or. xiii. p. 163, B.

finding a way for himself;[82] acting the philosopher[83] through the whole of life; [84]a clever sorcerer and a drug-employer, and sophist;[84] and naturally neither an immortal nor a mortal; but at one time in the same day [85]he blooms and lives, when he is faring well; and at another time he dies;[85] but revives again[86] through his father's nature. Whatever is furnished to him, is ever secretly flowing out; so that Love is never either in want or in wealth. He is likewise in a middle place between wisdom and ignorance. For the case is this :—No god philosophizes, or desires to become wise; for they are so; and if there is any other being who is wise, neither does he philosophize. Nor yet are the ignorant philosophers, nor do they desire to become wise. For on this very account,[87] Ignor-

[83] Stalbaum, after Jacobs on Achill. Tat. p. 449, refers to Xenoph. Cyrop. vi. 1, 41, *τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος*. Add Chariton. ii. 4, *τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἔρωτι φιλοσοφοῦσαν*.

[84]—[84] In the words, *Δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής*, evidently lies hid an Iambic verse. In fact, nearly the whole of this description, like the greater part of the poetical passages in Plato, has been merely put into prose from a lost play, I suspect, of Aristophanes. At least it is easy to elicit the pentastich following: *Ἀνδρεῖος ὢν ἴτης τε σύντονος τ' ἰὼν Μανία, κύων ὥς, χαρμόνης θήραν ἔπι· Πλέκων τ' ἀεὶ τὰς μηχανὰς φρονήσεως, Ὡς τις Προμηθεὺς, καὶ πόριμος εἰς τάπορ', ὢν Δεινὸς σοφιστὴς, καὶ γόης, καὶ φαρμακεύς*: where I have introduced *θήραν ἔπι* from Themistius, who found in his MS. *θηρευτὴς δεινὸς τοῦ κάλλους*, as shown by his *μηχανὰς ἐπὶ τῇ θήρᾳ πεπλεγμένας τοῦ κάλλους*.

[85]—[85] The Greek text is *θάλλει καὶ ζῇ*—by an *ὕστερον πρότερον*, which Euripides has correctly avoided in Iph. A. 1226, *Ζῶσάν τε καὶ θάλλουσαν*. It is not, however, quite certain that *καὶ* (i. e. *ἢ*) *ζῇ* is not a gloss for *θάλλει*. At least, Maximus Tyr. in Dissert. xxiv. p. 297, ed. 2 Davis, has *θάλλει μὲν ἔρως εὐπορῶν, ἀποθνήσκει δὲ ἀπορῶν*: and thus luckily supplies *ἀπορῶν*, which, although requisite for the balance of the sentence, had dropt out before *ἀποθνήσκει*. If, however, *ζῇ* is to be retained, we must, for a similar reason, supply likewise *φθίνει καὶ* between *ἀπορῶν* and *ἀποθνήσκει*: for thus *ζῇ καὶ θάλλει, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ*, will be the antithesis to *ἀπορῶν φθίνει καὶ ἀποθνήσκει*, i. e. "when faring ill, he droops and dies."

[86] With this passage of Plato may be compared the lines of Pope in the Rape of the Lock:

> When bold Sir Plume had thrown Clarissa down,
> Chloe stept in and kill'd him with a frown.
> She smiled, to see the doughty hero slain;
> But at her smile the beau revived again.

[87] The Greek is *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία*—Where since *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* have nothing to depend upon, it is evident that *Δι'* has dropt out after *Αι* at the end of *γενέσθαι*, as it has in Thucydides, as shown by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 116. The preposition, however, was

ance is in a hard case, in that a person,[88] being neither beautiful, nor good, nor wise, still appears to himself to be all-sufficient. Hence he who fancies himself to be not wanting, does not desire that, of which he fancies he is not in want. —Who then, Diotima, said I, are they who philosophize? if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?—This, said she, is surely clear even to a child, that they are those between both of these; of whom Love too (is one).[89] For of the things most beautiful is wisdom. Now Love is conversant with the beautiful. So that it is of necessity for Love to be a lover of wisdom, and for a lover of wisdom to be between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too the cause is in his birth; for he is from a father wise and in abundance, but from a mother unwise and in want. [30.] Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But as to whom you fancied to be Love, you have suffered nothing to be wondered at. For you fancied, as it seems to me, making a guess from what you are saying, that Love is the thing loved, and not the loving; and hence, I think, Love appeared to you to be all-beautiful. For the thing loved is in reality beautiful and delicate and perfect and blest. But the thing loving possesses another nature, and such as I have described.—Be it so, stranger lady, said I; for you have spoken well. But if Love be of such a nature, of what advantage is he to mankind?—This, Socrates, said she, I will subsequently endeavour to teach you. Love then is of such a nature, and has been so begotten; and he is, as you assert, the love of things beautiful. Now should any one ask us, What is, O Socrates and Diotima, the Love of things beautiful?—but I will speak more clearly in this way—What does the lover of things beautiful long for?—For them to be his, said I.—This answer, said she, seeks still

wanting in the MS. used by Proclus, who quotes *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ διπλῆ* (thus) *ἀμαθία*. Ficinus has "hoc enim habet ignorantia pessimum," as if he had found in his MS. *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀμαθίᾳ*, where *ἀμαθίᾳ*, first proposed by Sydenham, is furnished by two MSS.

[88] To preserve the syntax Ast correctly saw that *ἀνὰ*, which might easily have dropt out after *ὄντα*, is here required.

[89] The Greek was *ὧν ἂν καὶ ὁ ἔρως*. Bekker, whom Hommel and Stalbaum follow, has edited *αὖ*, from two MSS. But Rückert correctly objects to *αὖ*, as being perfectly absurd. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὧν εἷς*— Ficinus has "e quibus est Amor," omitting both *ἂν* and *καί*—

such a question as this. What will there be to that man, who shall possess things beautiful?—To this question I said, I had it not in my power to give an answer very ready at hand.—But, said she, should a person making a change, and putting good in the place of beautiful, inquire of you (by saying), Come (tell me), Socrates, what does the lover of good things long for?—For them to be his, I answered.—And what will there be to a man, who shall possess good things?—This, said I, is more easy to answer: that he will be happy.—(Right,) said she; for by the possession of good things the happy are happy, nor is there any need to ask, Why does he, who wishes to be happy, wish so; but the answer appears to be conclusive.—You say true, I replied.—Now do you conceive, said she, that this wishing and this longing is common to all men, and that all wish for good things to be in their possession always; or how say you?—I think in this way, said I; that it is common to all.—Why then, Socrates, said she, do we not say that all men are in love, if all love the same things, and always? but say (rather),[90] that some are in love, and some are not?—I too[91] am in a wonderment, said I.—Do not wonder, said she; [92]for after we have taken away a certain species of love, we call it love, adding the name of the whole; but as regards the rest, we make an improper use of other names.[92]—As how, for example? said I.—As this, said she. You know that creation is a thing of extensive meaning. For that which is the cause of any thing coming out of non-existence into existence, is altogether a creation. So that all the operations effected by all the arts, are creations; and all the workers of them are creators.—You say true, said I.—And yet you know, continued she, they are not called creators, but have other names; but from all kinds of creation one portion has been separated, relating to the musical art and to metres;

[90] After ἀλλὰ I suspect that μᾶλλον has dropt out, for thus ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον are constantly opposed to τί οὐ—

[91] This "too" has no meaning here.

[92]—[92] Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which may be compared κατὰ ἕν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἴσχουσιν in § 31 Shelley's translation is—"Wonder not, said Diotima; for we select a particular species of love, and apply to it distinctively the appellation of that which is universal." But he omits the next clause, although found in Ficinus. For he probably saw the want of connexion in the train of thought. There is some error here, which I could without much difficulty correct.

and is called by the name belonging to the whole. For it alone is called poesy (i. e. making);[93] and they, who possess this portion of the creative power, are poets (i. e. makers):—You say true, said I.—[31.] Just so it is with Love, said she. Universally all long after good things; and a state of good fortune is to every one a Love [94] the greatest and deceitful.[94] But some persons, turning themselves towards him [95] in many and various ways,[95] either through money-making, or a love of gymnastic exercises, or of wisdom, are neither (said) to be in love nor are called lovers; while others who [96] go, and are seriously occupied,[96] according to one kind of love, have the name of the whole, and love, and are (said) to be in love, and are called lovers.—You are very near the truth, said I.—[97] There is a story told, she said, that they who are in love are in search of their other half.[97] But my doctrine is, that a person loves neither the half nor the whole of

[93] The word "make" was adopted by Spenser in the sense of "making verses," to answer to the Greek *ποιεῖν* in the hackneyed quotation, "Who taught me as I can to make."

[94]—[94] How the universal longing after happiness could be called "deceitful," except in a religious point of view, one cannot understand; unless indeed it be said that Plato was here thinking, not of Love, but Hope, which is called "credula" by Horace; and that, since Hope is the daughter of Desire, what is true of the offspring may be predicated of the parent, just as we say conversely in English, "Like father like son," and was said in Greece, *ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν*. But even thus Plato would scarcely have united *μέγιστος* and *δολερός*. Hence Stalbaum now wishes to read *δολερώτατος*: although he once considered the whole clause, *ὁ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς Ἔρως πάντι*, as an interpolation. There has been rather an excision of some words and an alteration of others, which only a dashing conjecturist would attempt to restore. Creuzer in a Vienna periodical would read, *ὀρμητικός τε καὶ τολμηρὸς ἔρως παντί*. Hommel—*καὶ κοινὸς*—Shelley translates "the greatest and subtlest;" for he perhaps remembered some of the passages quoted by myself on Æsch. Suppl. 1035, where the epithet of deceitful is applied to Love and Venus.

[95]—[95] These words are omitted by Ficinus. The phrase however is in p. 178, A. § 6, and in Menex. p. 237, C., *πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ*, and so it should be written here.

[96]—[96] Ficinus has simply "contendunt," as if his MS. omitted *ἐσπουδακότες*. Plato wrote *καὶ ἐσπουδακότες ἐρωτικὰ, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἔχουσι*: where *ἔχουσι* is due to three MSS. and *ἐρωτικὰ* is substituted for *ἐρωτά τε*, which, as shown by the balance of the sentence, could not precede *καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί*, nor could *ἐσπουδακότες* dispense with its object; and still less could *ἐρωτά τε* follow *τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα*.

[97]—[97] Hence it appears that the speech of Aristophanes was founded on some old story. See § 16.

any thing, unless it happens, my friend, to be somehow a good. Since men are willing to have their feet and hands cut off, if their own limbs are deemed to be an evil.[98] For each person does not hug his own, I fancy, unless he calls good his own property,[99] but evil the property of another: since there is nothing else of which men are in love, but good alone. How do they seem to you?—By Zeus, said I, to me at least not (otherwise).—May we not then say simply, she replied, that men love the good?—Yes, said I.—What, said she, must we not add that they desire the good to be present to them?—This, said I, must be added.—And not only, she said, to be present, but to be present always?—This too must be added.—There is then, to speak comprehensively, said she, the desire that the good should be present to a person for ever.—You speak most truly, said I.—Since then, said she, there is the love of this, (the good,) of those who pursue it in any manner,[100] and by any act, the eagerness and the stretch for it would be called love. [1]But can you state what this act would happen to be?[1]—I should not however[2] have wondered, Diotima, said I, at your wisdom, nor have frequented (your school) to learn these very things, (had I been able to tell.)—Well then, said she, I will tell you. The act is of breeding upon a beautiful thing, as

[98] So Christ said, "If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off."

[99] I cannot understand *οἰκεῖον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ*. The words *καὶ* (i. e. *ἢ*) *ἑαυτοῦ* are from a gl., as shown by the balance of the sentence, where *ἀλλότριον* alone is opposed to *οἰκεῖον*. Of this Shelley was perhaps aware; and he has therefore filled out the idea by his version, "Nor do they cherish and embrace that, which may belong to themselves, merely because it is their own; unless indeed any one should choose to say, that what is good is attached to his own nature and is his own, while that which is evil is foreign and accidental."

[100] Although I am aware that a double interrogative is to be found occasionally in Plato, as Heindorf was the first to remark on Hipp. Maj. § 40, yet there I have taken *τιν* and *τινι* in an indefinite sense, despite even the collocation of the pronouns, which ought to follow rather than precede the nouns *τρόπον* and *πράξει*. Diotima did not intend to ask a question, but to state a fact, the groundwork of the subsequent questions.

[1]—[1] I confess I cannot understand the words *τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει τὸ ἔργον*. I could have understood *τί ταῦτα κινγχάνοι ἂν τὸ ἔργον*, i. e. At what act would these (eagerness and stretching) arrive?

[2] The Greek is, *Οὐ μέντοι ἂν—ἐθαύμαζον*, without the apodosis to the sentence. But in that case *γὰρ* is used, not *μέντοι*: which means "however," a meaning here totally out of place. Plato wrote *Οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὸν*, without the name of a deity. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 281, 2.

regards both the body and soul.—What you are saying, I replied, has need of divination. For I do not understand.—I will speak then, said she, more clearly. All human beings, Socrates, said she, yearn, as regards the body and soul; and when they arrive at maturity our nature longs to beget. But it is unable to beget upon an ugly thing, but only upon a beautiful one. [3]For the begetting is through the connexion of a man and woman.[3] But this is a god-like act, and this [4][the yearning and generation][4] is in a mortal animal an immortal act. But these it is impossible to take place in a thing unsuitable. Now what is ugly is ill-suited to every thing that is divine? But what is beautiful is suited. [5]For Beauty is Fate and Eileithuia, who presides over child-birth.[5] Hence when what is yearning comes close to what is beautiful, it becomes joyous, and being delighted it pours itself out and [6]breeds and begets.[6] But when

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are rejected by Ast and Rückert. Stalbaum defends them by scarcely the shadow of an argument. For he did not perceive that Plato wrote *τίκτειν—οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ καλῷ· ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία ἄτοκός ἐστι νοῦ*, i. e. for the intercourse between a man and woman is unproductive of mind. In a similar strain the philosopher says in Rep. vi. p. 496, A., that *οἱ ἀνάξιοι παιδεύσεως* are unable *γεννᾷν διανοήματα*; but in p. 490, B., that *ὁ φιλομαθὴς —μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως* is able *γεννᾷν νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν*.

[4]—[4] The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of *τοῦτο*.

[5]—[5] How Beauty can be Fate and the goddess who presides over child-birth, called *Εἰλείθυια*, one of the titles of Athené, as we learn from Eurip. Ion, Stalbaum attempts to explain in a way I cannot understand. I suspect that instead of the unintelligible *Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἡ καλλόνη ἐστὶ τῇ γενέσει*, Plato wrote the very intelligible *Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια καὶ Καλλόνη τρεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει εἰσί*, i. e. "Fate then, and Eileithuia, and Beauty, are three powers that preside over generation." For thus *τρεῖς* is perpetually introduced, where three things are mentioned, as I have shown in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, where I have supported the reading furnished by Stobæus, liv. p. 364, in Thucydides v. 9, *Νομίσατε τρία εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν*, and acknowledged by the Scholiast, *ἐκ τριῶν γίνεται τὸ καλλῶς πολεμεῖν*, by quoting fifty similar passages, and I could now add half as many more.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾶ*. But as in the corresponding clause there is only one verb, *γεννᾷ*, it is evident that Plato did not write here two with the same meaning. He might however have written here *τίκτει τέκνα γενναῖα*, and afterwards *οὐδ' ἓν γεννᾶ*. For thus *οὐδ' ἕν* is properly opposed to the plural *τέκνα*. It is true that *τῆς γεννήσεως* and *τοῦ τόκου* are found united just below. But there *καὶ τοῦ τόκου* is an evident interpolation, as shown by the subsequent conversation, which turns entirely upon the mention of *γέννησις* alone. So in § 33, *τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ* is to be twice corrected similarly.

it (comes close) to what is ugly, it assumes a sour look, and is vexed [7]and coils itself up, and turns away, and unrolls itself,[7] and does not beget, but restraining the swelling, it takes the matter grievously to heart. Hence to the party yearning and swelling with desire, there is an excessive fluttering of mind respecting the beautiful; on account of its being able to deliver him who has[8] it from his great agony. But, Socrates, said she, this is not, as you fancied, the love of the beautiful.—Of [9]what then is it? said I.—It is the love, replied she, of generation [and of begetting][10] in a beautiful thing.—Be it so, said I.—By all means, she replied.—But why, said I, of generation?—[11]Because generation is a thing ever producing, and immortal, as far as it can be for a mortal. [12]Now from what has been agreed upon it is necessary to desire immortality with a good, if there is to Love the desire of the good being ever present to himself. It is necessary then from this reasoning, that there is a love likewise of immortality.[12]

[32.] All this did Diotima teach me, when she was discoursing upon love matters. And once upon a time she asked me, What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love and desire? Do you not perceive how vehemently all brute animals are affected, when they feel such a desire to breed, both beasts and birds? [13]how they are all sick and lovingly disposed,[13] in the first place, to have a connexion with

[7]—[7] As the idea in *συσπειρᾶται* is the converse of that in *ἀνείλλεται*, both could not have been thus applied to the same thing at the same time. Moreover *ἀποτρέπεται* should follow *σκυθρωπὸν* and *λυπούμενον*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀποτρέπεται καὶ, ὃ συνεσπείραται, ἀνείλλεται*, i. e. "and that, which had coiled itself up, is unrolled." The idea is taken from a snake, which, previous to making an attack, coils itself up; but when frightened, unfolds itself, and slinks away. It was not then without reason that two MSS. offer *συνσπείρεται*.

[8] I cannot understand *τὸν ἔχοντα*. I could have understood *τὸν ἐγγιοῦντα*, "about to approach it," similar to the preceding *προσπελάζῃ*.

[9] Instead of *τί μὴν*, which Stalbaum attempts to defend by passages not in point, Stephens suggested *τίνος*, from "cujus" in Ficinus; for the genitive is required by the preceding remark, and subsequent reply of Diotima.

[10] See at n. 2.

[11] Ficinus, "Quia Amor sempiternum quiddam est et immortale, quemadmodum in ipso mortali generatio," as if he had found in his MS. *Οτι ἀειγενές ἐστι τι καὶ ἀθάνατον Ἔρως, ὡς καὶ ἐν θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις*, at least *ἐν* is read in two MSS.

[12]—[12] I must leave for others to perceive the connexion of the reasoning in all the words between the numerals. "Davus sum non Œdipus."

[13]—[13] Ficinus has "toto impetu proferuntur et amoris ardore inca-

each other; and afterwards to rear their offspring; and how ready in their behalf the weakest are to fight against the strongest, and to die for them, and though they are themselves pining away with hunger, [14]they do not faint in doing every thing, so as to bring them up.[14] Human beings indeed, she said, one might fancy, acted thus from reflection, but what reason is there for wild animals to be so lovingly disposed. Can you state?—And I said again that I did not know.—And do you think, said she, ever to become a person of power in questions of love, if you do not understand this?—It is for this very reason, said I, Diotima, as I just now stated, that I come to you, being well aware that I have need of teachers. Do you then tell me the cause both of this and of all the rest relating to questions of love.—If you believe then, said she, that there is naturally the love of that, which we have often confessed, do not wonder. For here, on the same ground as that, the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be ever and immortal.[15]

niunt," which is infinitely more graphic than the lifeless Greek—*νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα*: where *διατιθέμενα* is most inelegantly repeated after *διατίθεται* in the preceding sentence. The passage has evidently been tampered with.

[14]—[14] The Greek is, *ὥστ' ἐκεῖνα ἐκ τρέφειν καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα*, i. e. "So as to bring them up, and are doing every thing else—" But in the formula *πᾶν ποιεῖν* the word *ἄλλο* never is, nor could be found. Hence in lieu of *καὶ ἄλλο*, Plato wrote either, as I have translated, *οὐκ ἀλύει*, a verb peculiarly appropriate here, as may be seen in my note on Philoct. 174, where I should have quoted Perizonius on Ælian. V. H. ix. 5, and Wyttenbach's on Plutarch. de Audiend. Poet. c. v.; or since the neuter plural *ζῶα*, signifying a thing of life, would require a verb plural *ἀλύουσι*, we may read *αἰκάλλει τι*, i. e. "a certain feeling cheats them into the doing every thing so as to bring up their young." For thus we find in Aristoph. Thesm. 870, Ἀλλ', *ἥπερ αἰκάλλει τι καρδίαν ἐμὴν*, *Μὴ ψευστὸν ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆσδε ποήσῃς μ' ἐλπίδος*. For by the slight change of *ψεῦσον* into *ψευστὸν*, and of *τῆς ἐπιούσης* into *τῆσδε ποήσῃς μ'*, we get rid of all the rubbish heaped up by the Scholiasts, who did not know that Sophocles wrote likewise in Peleus, *Μὴ ψευστὸν, ὦ Ζεῦ, μή μ' ἔλῃς ἄνευ δορός*, not *Μὴ ψεῦσον*, in defiance of the language. In the passage of Plato, however, there is, I suspect, an error in *παρατεινόμενα*. For the effect of hunger is to contract, not extend, the muscles of the body. In fact, *παρατείνεσθαι* is applied rather to the fulness than emptiness of the stomach, as shown by "Αλις *ἀφύης· παρατέταμαι γὰρ ἐσθίων*, quoted from Aristophanes by Suid. in *Παρατέταμαι· ἐξώγκωμαι*. One would have expected rather *λιμῷ ἀπορίᾳ τε τειρόμενα*, i. e. "wasted with hunger and with want." Ficinus has, "parata sunt fame deficere, modo filios nutriant, et aliud quodlibet audacter aggrediuntur."

[15] In what way *ἀεὶ εἶναι* differs from *ἀθάνατος*, I must leave for others

Now this it effects only by generation; when it leaves another new thing in the place of the old; since at the time when each individual animal [16]is said to live, and to be the same;[16] as for instance, a person is called the same from childhood, until he becomes an old man; and though he never possesses the same things in himself, he is nevertheless called the same person, [17]being perpetually altered, (by obtaining some new things,) and losing (the old),[17] as regards the hair and flesh, and bones and blood, and the whole body. And not only as regards the body, but the soul likewise; his manners, morals, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, all these never remain the same to any man; but some are produced, and some destroyed. And there is something still more strange than this; since not only are some sciences produced, and some lost by us, but we are never the same, not even as regards sciences in general; but each single science suffers in a similar way. For what we call to practise oneself is to act, as if a science were about to depart; and indeed oblivion is the departure of science; but practice, introducing again a fresh remembrance in the place of the departing one, preserves the science, so that it seems to be the same. In this manner every thing mortal is preserved, not by its being in every respect the same for ever,

to explain. Nor just before do I see how ἐνταῦθα, an adverb of time or place, can be opposed to ἐκείνῳ, a pronoun relating to a thing or person. Hence, since nearly all the MSS. read τὸ εἶναι, perhaps Plato wrote ἀειγενές τι εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατον, as just before in § 31, ἀειγενὲς—καὶ ἀθάνατον: where, to avoid the tautology, I have rendered ἀειγενὲς "ever producing."

[16]—[16] Such is the barefaced nonsense, which Stalbaum believes Plato wrote, only because he was determined to reject the certain emendation of Hommel—which he has chosen to pass over with a sneer—ἐν ᾧ ζῇν καλεῖται, καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό. For Hommel knew, what Stalbaum did not, that καὶ is thus added after a repeated word, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 155, 258, and 307, and to the passages there quoted I could now add full thirty more. They however, who are disposed to believe that Plato, whose language is generally as clear as crystal, would render his meaning muddy by an unusual construction, will of course receive Stalbaum's note as a god-send.

[17]—[17] In lieu of ἀλλὰ νεός ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, Stephens was near the mark in proposing ἀλλοῖος ἀεὶ γενόμενος. He should have suggested ἀλλοιούμενος ἀεὶ—So too instead of supplying τὰ μὲν προσλαμβάνων, to answer to τὰ δὲ ἀπολλὺς, F. Wolf should have elicited τὰ μὲν νέ' ἀρνύμενος from γιγνόμενος; while by the aid of Ficinus' "et vetera exuit," Bast happily restored τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀπολλὺς. The word γιγνόμενος is evidently owing to the subsequent τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται

as the deity is; but by the thing that is departing and growing old, leaving another new thing, such as it was itself. By this contrivance, Socrates, said she, that which is mortal partakes of immortality, both body and all other things. [18]But that which is immortal in another way.[18] Do not then wonder that every thing[19] honours its own offspring. For this earnest attention and love follows[20] every thing for the sake of immortality.—[33.] [21]And I on hearing the discourse was amazed and said,[21] Be this so, said I,[22] thou most wise Diotima; since such is truly the case. And she, like the perfect[23] sophists, replied, Rest assured,[24] Socrates. Since, if you are willing to turn your eyes to the love of glory in mankind, you would wonder at your want of reason touching the points on which I have spoken, unless you bear in mind and consider how terribly they are affected[25] with the desire to become renowned,

[18]—[18] This, says Stalbaum, is added to limit the universality of the assertion, "and all other things." But surely Plato would never have presumed to hint at the manner in which an immortal thing is preserved and perpetuated, even if he wanted the wit to perceive that what is immortal would never require any preserving process. To avoid therefore the absurdity, which Stalbaum has admitted into his 2nd edition, although properly rejected in his first, Creuzer in Lect. Platonic, at the end of his edition of Plotinus de Pulchritud. p. 528, would read *ἀδύνατον*, which Ast and Rynders have adopted; for they did not see that Plato wrote *ἀθέμιτον δὲ ἄλλῃ*, i. e. "but unlawful in any other way."

[19] The word *πᾶν* here, and shortly afterwards *παντί*, could hardly stand without *ζῶον* or *θνητὸν*—

[20] Ficinus has "amor inest," which leads to *ἔπεστι*. The two words are interchanged in Cratylus, § 10.

[21]—[21] The words between the numerals are omitted by Sydenham, although found in the version of Ficinus.

[22] Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote *εἶπον, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ σοφωτάτη*, when he might have written *εἶπον, Εἶεν, νὴ Δί', ὦ γύναι σοφωτάτη*.

[23] Stalbaum says, that in *οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταὶ* there is a covert ridicule of the Sophists. But as Diotima was only a solitary person, she could hardly be compared to many sophists. Plato wrote either *γελοῖός τις σοφιστὴς*, or *ὁ ἀπ' Ἐλέας σοφιστὴς*, as in the Sophist, § 1, *ἐξ Ἐλέας—φιλόσοφον*.

[24] As there is nothing to which the expression "rest assured" can be applied, Plato probably wrote *Καὶ, ἦ δ' ἦ—Εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔφης εὖ, Σώκρατες*, instead of *Καὶ ἦ,—Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ—*

[25] Although *δεινῶς διάκεινται* might perhaps stand, yet *δεινῶς διακαίονται*, "terribly inflamed," would be far more forcible.

[26] And fame undying to lay up for ever.[26]

And for this they are ready to run the risk of all kinds of danger, even still more than for their children, and to expend their substance, and undergo labours of whatsoever kind, and for it to die. Since do you fancy, said she, that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or Achilles[27] have died over the body of Patroclus, or your countryman Codrus to preserve the kingdom for his children,[28] [29]had they not thought that of their virtuous deeds the remembrance would neverdying live, as it actually does for ever, which we cherish to this day?[29]—[30]Far from it, said I. But I think, that in behalf of undying virtue, and of a reputation glorious[31] as this, all men perform all deeds, and so much the more, as they are the more excellent.[30] For they have a yearning for immortality.—They then, said she, who have a yearning according to the body, turn themselves rather to women, and are in this way given to love affairs; and by child-getting procure for themselves, as they fancy, immortality and a remembrance

[26—26] As the Greek words Καὶ κλέος ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι contain a latent hexameter, I have put the translation into verse. On the peculiar use of καταθέσθαι, see Valckenaer on Herodot. vi. 73.

[27] The example of Achilles in dying for glory, is brought forward by Aristotle in his well-known hymn to Glory, of which I gave a translation in the Gentleman's Magazine, June, 1833, p. 538.

[28] Horace assigns a more noble motive in his "Codrus pro patria non timidus mori."

[29—29] Here again are some latent hexameters, portions of which Hommel was the first to detect; but he did not perceive that Plato had in mind a distich on Codrus—Ὅιετο γὰρ περὶ οὗ τεθνηκότος αἰὲν ἔσεσθαι Ἀθάνατον μνήμης ἀρετῆς, ἣν ἴσχομεν ἡμεῖς.

[30—30] All the words between the numerals are assigned correctly to Socrates by Ficinus, who saw probably that οἶμαι could not be said by Diotima, who would have spoken with more decision, as became an instructress. Ficinus, however, omits ἔφη, and so does another MS., for Plato wrote ἔφην. We find indeed οἶμαι twice a little below, but incorrectly in both places.

[31] The Greek is τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν. But εὐκλεοῦς is perfectly useless after τοσαύτης. Moreover it should be stated not that men do all things, some of which might be base in themselves, but only such as are honourable. Hence for εὐκλεοῦς, three MSS. fortunately read εὐκλεῶς, which leads to εὖ καὶ καλῶς, a formula perpetual in Plato. See the critics quoted by myself on Prom. 1067. Addend.

and happiness for the time to come.[32] [33]But they (who have a yearning) according to the soul—Are there then, said I, they who yearn in their souls?—Still more (said she) than in their bodies; for which it is fitting for the soul to yearn and to bring forth. What fitting (offspring) is this? Intellect and every other excellence.[33] Of which all poets are the generators, and such handy-craftsmen as are said to be inventive. But the greatest and most beautiful part of intellect is that, which is conversant in the well-ordering of cities and private dwellings, to which is given the name of temperance and justice. With these when any one is teeming [34]from his youth, as being divine in his soul, and when he has arrived at a mature age,[34] he longs already [35]to beget and breed;[35] [36]and he seeks, I think, even he,[36] going about, for the beautiful thing, upon which he may generate: for he never will generate on what is ugly; and thus yearning, he takes to his arms handsome bodies rather than the ugly; but if he meets with a soul beautiful and noble, and finely moulded, he ardently embraces both united; and to such a person he immediately discourses copiously on virtue, and what a virtuous man ought to be, and what pursuits he should follow; and he endeavours

[32] In the words Εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον πάντα ποριζόμενος is an evident pentameter, probably accidental.

[33]—[33] All the words between the numerals are commonly assigned to Diotima; and the whole chain of the conversation is so broken, as to defy even the critical powers of Stalbaum to unite the links. For neither he nor any one else has seen that Plato wrote ἔφην, ἦ δ' ἥ, ἦ and τίκτειν, not ἔφη, ἦ and κύειν—for κύειν could not thus follow κυῆσαι, despite the nice distinction of Stalbaum between κυῆσαι, "to have a completed conception," and κύειν, "to be in the state of a conception." But the very clever critic forgot that the idea of a completed act would be expressed by κεκυηκέναι, not κυῆσαι.

[34]—[34] Ficinus has, "ideoque divinus ætate debita imminente," as if his MS. had omitted ἐκ νέου: and just before, from his "hujusmodi natura," Fischer elicited φύσιν for ψυχὴν—Plato probably wrote both—τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὢν—

[35]—[35] Here, as in § 31, where the same phrase occurs, I would read τίκτειν τέκνα γενναῖα, instead of τίκτειν τε καὶ γενναῖν, and so too a little afterwards.

[36]—[36] The Greek is ζητεῖ δή, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος περιὼν τὸ καλόν—Ficinus has "Et idcirco passim vagatur quærunique pulchrum," omitting οἶμαι, which is ill-suited to the magisterial Diotima, and καί, which has no meaning here. Plato wrote, I suspect, ζητεῖ δὲ, δαιμονικώτατος περιὼν, or ζητεῖ δὲ, ὢν μανικώτατος.

himself to act the teacher; for laying hold, I think,[37] of a beautiful thing, and associating with it, he breeds and begets that, with which he has been yearning of old, and has both present and absent borne in recollection; and in common with the other party, he brings up what has been produced; so that such persons have a communion of feeling towards each other much greater than what arises from (other)[38] children, and a friendship more firm; inasmuch as they have a joint interest in children more lovely and more immortal.[39] Now every one would choose that such children should be born to him rather than those of a human kind. And turning his thoughts to Homer, Hesiod, and the rest of the excellent poets, he would envy[40] them for having left such an issue of their own, as to obtain for them an undying glory and remembrance. Or, if you prefer it, said she, (see) what children Lycurgus left behind him at Lacedæmon, the saviours of their country,[41] and, so to say, of the whole[42] of Greece. Amongst yourselves, too, how honoured is Solon, for his begetting the laws! and there are many[43] other men elsewhere and in many places amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians, who have shown forth many and noble deeds, and begotten every kind of virtue. And to them many holy rites[44] have

[37] Ficinus again omits *οἶμαι*. Plato probably wrote *γὰρ ἐρωμανὴς*, a word elsewhere corrupted, as I have shown in Bailey's Hermesianax, p. 79, and to the passages quoted there I could now add as many more.

[38] Ficinus has "quam mortalium filiorum parentes," which probably led Bast to *τῆς τῶν παιδοσπόρων*—If the Latin of Ficinus be a truthful version, he must have found *τῆς τῶν θνητῶν παίδων τοκέων*. But perhaps *ἄλλων* merely has dropt out before *παίδων*.

[39] This "more immortal" seems a rather strange expression. As if there were degrees in immortality. One would have expected rather "less mortal."

[40] Ast correctly suggested *ζηλοίη* for *ζηλῶν*, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend.

[41] Instead of *τῆς Λακεδαίμονος* Plato wrote *τῆς γῆς*, of which *Λακεδαίμονος* is the interpretation.

[42] The Greek is *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος*. Ficinus has "totius pœne Græciæ," which leads to *καὶ πάσης, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῆς Ἑλλάδος*. For *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* could not thus stand by itself, as I have shown in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 218, and I could now add twice as much to what I have there written.

[43] Ficinus—"aliique permulti alibi." He therefore found in his MSS. *καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἄλλοθι*.

[44] For a list of mortals worshipped as gods Ast refers to Clemens Alex-

been paid on account of such their progeny; but never to any man on account of his human offspring. [34.] In such mysteries relating to Love even you, Socrates, would perhaps be initiated.[45] But the consummation,[46] on account of which the looking-on itself exists, if a person follows the rites correctly, [47]I know well you would not complete.[47] However,

andr. Strom. i. 15, and he might have added the same Father's Cohort. p. 24, Athenagoras Legat. p. 2 and 53, ed. Ox., and Theodoret, p. 42.

[45] This was said designedly by Plato, who knew that Socrates was never initiated and never wished to be; while to rescue the character of Diotima from being a false prophetess, the "perhaps" was introduced.

[46] To understand this allusion to the Mysteries, Sydenham says that, previous to a person being perfectly initiated, three degrees were to be taken, answering, he might have observed, to the three degrees at the University and in Freemasonry, both to be traced to a common origin in the Mysteries. The first degree was called "purgation," the second "illumination," and the third "a looking-on." The consummation however did not take place until five years after the initiation. Agreeable to this gradation Diotima initiates Socrates into the mysteries of Love; where her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of the preceding speeches in this Dialogue, answers to the first step, "purgation." Her instructions as to the true doctrine of Love answer to the second step, "illumination." And the remainder of her discourse alludes to the last step, "a looking-on." But Sydenham seems to have forgotten that, as the initiation was not completed until the Neophyte had become an Ἐπόπτης, "a looker-on," Plato could not have written τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά: and still less did Stalbaum perceive that the words ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα could not have reference to what had been already said; for from the passage quoted by himself from § 35, θεώμενος—πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὰ δὲ τέλεια, ὧν ἕνεκά γε αὐτὰ τὰ ἐποπτικά ἐστιν: and so I have translated; for we thus get at the natural meaning of simple words, out of which Ficinus has made this high-flown sense—"Utrum vero ulterius procedas ac perfecta demum amatoria, quæve sublime spectant, quorum gratia hæc sunt, animadvertas utrum inquam pergere valeas necne, ignoro." According to the Scholiast on Aristoph. Βατρ. 744, in the Mysteries, the Neophyte was called in the first year, Μύστης; in the second, Ἔφορος; and in the third, Ἐπόπτης. But as Ἔφορος and Ἐπόπτης are synonymous, we must read Κερκνοφόρος, as is evident from Clemens Alex. Cohort. c. ii. 15. For κέρκνος is the name of a hawk or cock, and was the symbol of certain rites practised in the Mysteries, as may be inferred from a line in Aristophanes.

[47]—[47] The Greek is, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης. But εἰ ἂν εἴης is the extreme of barbarism. The particles εἰ ἂν are never united in prose; and if they could be, they would be followed by a subjunctive, as being synonymous with ἐάν Granting, however, the syntax to be correct, the sense is none. Stalbaum, indeed, would supply μυηθῆναι after οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης. How much easier is it to read, οὐκ, οἶδ' εὖ, οἷός τ' ἂν ἀνύσαι: as I have translated.

said she, I will tell you, and not be wanting in a readiness (to instruct you). But do you endeavour to follow me, as long as you are able. He then, said she, who would rightly arrive at this consummation, must begin when young to direct his steps to forms that are beautiful. And if, in the first place, his leader conducts him rightly, he must feel a love for one of them, and there beget conversations full of beauty In the next place, he must have a due perception that the beauty, which exists in any form whatever, is the brother to that which is in a different form. And if he must pursue[48] the beauty, which is in a species, [49]there would be a great want of understanding[49] not to consider the beauty found in all bodies as one and the same. [50]And he, who thus considers, must[50] become a lover of all beautiful forms, [51]and relax the violence (of his love) for a single form, and despise it, and hold it of no moment;[51] and afterwards consider of greater value the beauty existing in the soul, than that existing in the body; so that, if there be a person only reasonably beautiful[52] in soul, [53]and if he bears only a small flower,[53] he should be

[48] Dissatisfied, as every one must be, with the nonsensical *εἰ δεῖ διώκειν*—as if the idea of a necessity could be here introduced—even Stalbaum proposed to read *εἰ δὴ διώκει*. He should have suggested *εἰ ἴδοι διώκων*, "if he should see in his pursuit."

[49]—[49] Although *πολλὴ ἄνοια* might perhaps stand here with *ἐστὶ* understood, yet one would prefer *πολλὴ ἂν ἄνοια εἴη*—

[50]—[50] The Greek is *τοῦτο δὲ ἐννοήσαντα καταστῆναι*. Ficinus has "Et qui hoc advertit—evadere debet," from whence Stephens proposed to read *τοῦτο δὲ δεῖ ἐννοήσαντα*—He should have suggested *τοῦτο δὲ δέ*. For thus *δέον* has been lost or corrupted elsewhere through *δὲ*, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 157.

[51]—[51] Here again it is easy to see that Ficinus found in his MS. a text far superior to the present one—*ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον*: where *τοῦτο* has nothing to which it can be referred, and *καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον* is an insufferable tautology. From both these faults the Latin of Ficinus is free: "Amoris autem erga unum vehementiam hac ratione remittere, utque unius speciem parvi facere," which leads to *ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα ἔρωτός τι χαλάσαι κατὰ φρόνησιν, ἔν τι καλὸν σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον*, i. e. "to relax somewhat of the violence of love for one, and prudently to hold cheap a solitary case of beauty."

[52] The Greek is *ἐπιεικὴς ὢν τὴν ψυχήν*. But the idea of beauty could not be omitted. Plato evidently wrote *ἐπιεικῶς καλὸς*—

[53]—[53] The Greek is *καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ*. Stalbaum would expunge *ἐὰν*. He should have seen that, as *ἄνθος* could not thus stand by itself, the train of thought requires *ἐννοίας καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος*, "even a

satisfied to feel a love, and to tend with care, and to give birth to conversations of this kind, full of beauty [illegible] as will make the young better in soul; that he may, on the other hand,[54] be compelled to behold the beauty existing in the employments of life,[55] and the regulations of laws, and to see this, that all this has an affinity with itself, in order[56] that he may consider as of little value the beauty that is around the body; and after these (liberal) employments to lead him[57] to sciences[58] in order that he may see again the loveliness of science; and looking upon beauty as being now manifold, he may no longer be the slave of that which exists in one form—[59]as a domestic is contentedly in love with the beauty of a little child, or of a man, or one employment[59]—and become a

small flower of intellect." Ficinus has "quamvis forma corporis aliis quibusdam cedat;" supplying, probably, out of his own head a *lacuna* in his MS.

[54] Instead of *αὖ* one would prefer *εὖ*, "well," or *ἀεὶ*, "constantly."

[55] By *ἐπιτηδεύματα* were meant all the pursuits, bodily and mental, requisite for persons of family, fortune, and of a liberal turn of mind, and not engaged in handicraft trades. S.

[56] Ast justly objects to *ἵνα* repeated. But he did not see that, as Plato wrote *καὶ τοῦτο ἰδὼν ὅτι*, not *ἰδεῖν*—the *ἵνα* could not be omitted.

[57] As there is nothing on which *ἀγαγεῖν* can depend, Ficinus translated "ducatur." Stalbaum says that *τὸν ἡγούμενον* is to be supplied. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν*, "to have a way-leader."

[58] By sciences are meant arithmetic, geometry, music in its theory, and astronomy, all of which were requisite for the study of true philosophy. In these sciences every step is from beauty to beauty; for in every new theorem there is discovered something to attract by its intellectual charm, as the beauty of body does the eye; and thus each different science seems a different and a wider world of beauty. S.

[59]—[59] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ὥσπερ οἰκέτης ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος*. Now although domestic servants do in many countries feel a pride in the beauty of the children under their care, yet the circumstance is not of so constant occurrence, as to become the groundwork of an illustration. Correctly then did Hommel object to *οἰκέτης*, but incorrectly propose *ὁ ἱκέτης*. For Plato evidently wrote *ὁ τοκεύς*, "the begetter;" and as *ποιητὴς* was another name for a begetter, as before stated, it is equally evident that we must read *ἢ ἀνθρώπινός τις ποιητὴς ἐπιτηδεύματος ἐνός*, i. e. "or some mortal begetter of one studious pursuit," of which the inventor or professor becomes the slave; the very expression applied to Garrick by Goldsmith, who called him "the slave of his art." So too ambitious persons are said to be "the slaves of glory." Even "philosophus," according to St. Hieronym. Epist. p. 585, was "gloriæ—vile—mancipium:" by the aid of which passage, I corrected, in the Gentleman's Magazine, July 1833, p. 34, Thucyd. ii. 42, by reading *τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον δοῦλοι*

person of no mark, and of contracted notions; but turning himself to the wide sea of beauty, and contemplating the many and beautiful and magnificent discourses, he may [60](there) give birth to conceptions in unstinting[61] philosophy, until being there (in philosophy) strengthened and increased,[62] he shall behold some single science of such a kind that it is conversant with so great and beautiful a thing.[62] [35.] But now try, said she, to give me all the attention you can. Whoever then has been instructed thus far in the mysteries of Love, and has beheld in due order and correctly the things of beauty, he will, when he arrives at the consummation of the things of Love, see on a sudden some wondrous sight of natural beauty, for the sake of which all his previous labours have been undertaken. For in the first place, it exists for ever, being neither produced nor destroyed, and neither suffering increase nor decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only on this side, but ugly on that; nor only at one time, but not so at another; nor as regards one point beautiful, but as regards another ugly; nor as being beautiful in the eyes of some, but ugly in the eyes of others; nor will its beauty be a mere outward appearance, as if it were a face, or hands, or any thing else in which the body participates; nor is it any discourse or science; nor does it exist in any other being, such as an

ἢ δέους—" the slaves of glory rather than of fear;" similar to *δοῦλοι—τῶν ἀεὶ ἀτόπων*, in Thucyd. iii. 38, where Bloomfield quotes from Aristides *τῆς χρείας ἀεὶ δούλους εἶναι*, and from Gregor. Nazianz. *δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν ἀεὶ ταρόντων*: and he might have added Dionys. Hal. p. 426, who calls Philistus, *δοῦλον πλεονεξίας*.

[60] By his translation—" præclaros sermones magnificasque animi sensus "—it would seem that Stalbaum wished to read, *θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους, τίκτῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα τὰ διανοήματα*. For thus each substantive would have its fitting adjective.

[61] In lieu of *ἀφθόνῳ*, " unstinting," one MS. has *ἀφθόνως*, answering to " abunde " in Ficinus; which Ast feels disposed to adopt.

[62—62] Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote here *κατίδῃ* after *θεωρῶν* just before, or that *ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦδε* could follow *τινα ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην*, unless it be said that *κατίδῃ* means, " he may look down upon," and in that case we must take *τοιοῦδε* in a depreciating sense. For the meaning would be, " Until being there strengthened and increased, he shall look down with scorn upon such a single science as this, which is conversant about such a thing of beauty forsooth!" Stalbaum indeed fancies that by *κατίδῃ τινα ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοσαύτην* we are to understand, " he may behold the science of beauty itself." But Plato would then have written *αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην μίαν*, without *τοσαύτην*, and even without *μίαν*.

animal; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor [63]in any other part of the universe;[63] but it subsists by and with itself, and possesses a form eternally one; while all the other things are beautiful through their participating in this, in some such manner, that whereas the rest are produced and destroyed, it becomes neither greater in aught, nor less, nor is exposed to any state of suffering. And when ascending from these, through rightly loving the young, he begins to have a view of the beautiful, he will have nearly arrived at the consummation. Now this is to march (by oneself)[64] correctly to the affairs of Love, or to be led by another; beginning from the things of beauty, to keep ascending, for the sake of the beautiful itself, by making use as it were of steps, from one beautiful object to two, and from two to all; and from the beauty of bodies [65](to the beauty of soul; and from the beauty of soul) [65] to that of pursuits; from the beauty of pursuits to that of doctrines; until he arrives at length from the beauty of doctrines (generally), to that single one relating to nothing else than beauty in the abstract, [66][and he knows at last what is the beautiful itself.][66] In this state of life, if any where, dear Socrates, said the stranger-prophetess,[67] should

[63]—[63] From this translation it would seem as if Sydenham wished to read *ἔν τινι τοῦ ὅλου ἄλλῳ*—

[64] To preserve the balance of the sentence I have translated as if *αὐτὸν* had dropt out between *ἰέναι* and *ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 254.

[65]—[65] From the repetition of *τελευτῶν* after *τελευτήσῃ* it is evident that the words within brackets are an interpolation. Stalbaum indeed once felt half disposed to reject *καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων—τελευτήσῃ*, because this is the only passage in Plato where *ἔστ' ἂν* is to be found united to a subjunctive; but he was led to admit the usage from meeting with *γνῷ* shortly afterwards. He did not then perceive that the repetition of *μάθημα* suggests another objection to the genuineness of the present text; where Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἕως ἂν ἀπὸ καλῶν τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τελευτήσῃ, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα*. Here *καλῶν* has been obtained from *καὶ* read in most of the MSS. and *ἂν* in others; for in this climax the word *καλῶν* is designedly repeated, while *ἕως ἂν* is due to Stalbaum.

[66]—[66] In the Greek there seems to be here an omission of the words belonging to those included between the brackets, *ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων [ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν] ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα*. For some such words are plainly necessary to make this recapitulation agree with the account given before. S. It was from this passage that the subsequent philosophers defined Beauty as existing, 1. in the Soul; 2. in the Body; 3. in Morals; and 4. in Arts.

[67] Sydenham was the first to adopt *μαντικὴ* found in the version of Fi-

a person live, contemplating beauty in the abstract; which should he behold, it will appear to be not in a bit of gold, nor in dress, nor in beautiful boys or youths; with the sight of which you are struck, and are ready both yourself and many others, if it were possible, to look upon your beloved and live with them for ever, and to neither eat nor drink, but [68] to feast yourselves with the view,[68] and to be together.[69] What think you then, said she, would take place, if it were in the power of any person to behold beauty itself, clear as the light, pure and unmixed, but[70] not polluted with human flesh and colour, and much of other kinds of mortal trash; but be able to view the godlike[71] beautiful in its singleness of form? Think you, said she, that the life of a man would be of little account who looks thither, and beholds it with what it ought,[72] and is in its company? Perceive you not, said

cinus, as he says. But the ed. pr. omits the Latin words corresponding to the Greek, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη. They were first introduced into the corrupted copy of that version by Simon Grynæus, as Fischer has duly noticed.

[68]—[68] Instead of θεᾶσθαι, four MSS. offer θεάσασθαι, from which it is easy to elicit θέᾳ ἐστιᾶσθαι: to which I was led by Sydenham's "feasting the eyes," who saw that something was required here to answer to the preceding ἐσθίειν. On the metaphorical use of ἑστιᾶν see Ast on Phædr. p. 227, B.

[69] If θέᾳ ἑστιᾶσθαι has been correctly restored, it is evident that in ξυνεῖναι, which, like θεᾶσθαι, is perfectly superfluous after ὁρῶντες and ξυνόντες, there lies hid some word better suited to the flow of ideas. Perhaps Plato wrote ξυντιθέναι τὴν δαῖτα. For τὴν δαῖτα might easily have dropt out before τί δῆτα: while ξυντιθέναι τὴν δαῖτα would allude to the fact of both parties making a joint feast of the same kind. A similar comparison of love to a feast is found in the well-known lines of Shakspeare—

"As if increase of appetite would grow By what it fed on."

[70] Ast justly objected to ἀλλά, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend by passages not in point. Ficinus has "simplex," which leads at once to ἁπλοῦν.

[71] The Greek is αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν—But θεῖον could not be thus inserted between αὐτὸ τὸ and καλὸν—Nor do I very well understand μονοειδὲς, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it; nor could Shelley, who translates it, as Taylor would have done, "monoeidic."

[72] The Greek is in some MSS. καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ ξυνόντος αὐτῷ, in others, ᾧ δεῖ, which Ast conjectured and Stalbaum has adopted. But what is the meaning of ᾧ δεῖ, neither Ast nor Stalbaum has thought proper to explain. For most assuredly on the present occasion the idea of any necessity or fitness would be totally irrelevant. Moreover θεωμένου could not thus follow βλέποντος, nor could ἐκεῖνο and αὐτῷ be thus applied to the same thing. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato

she, that there alone will it be in the power of him, who looks upon the beautiful with the eye by which it can be seen, to beget not the shadowy show of virtue—as not coming in contact with shadowy shows—but virtue in reality, as coming in contact with a reality; and that to a person, begetting virtue in reality and bringing her up, it will happen for him to become god-beloved, and, if ever man was, immortal.—[36.] Thus, (friend) Phædrus and ye the rest here, spoke Diotima, and I am myself convinced, and being convinced, I am endeavouring to convince the rest, that no one would readily find a better assistant to human nature for the attainment of such a possession than Love. And hence I assert, that every man ought to hold Love in honour; and I do myself pay all honours to the things of Love, and cultivate them particularly, and I exhort others likewise; and both now and ever I celebrate, as far as I can, the power and the excellence of Love.[73] —Consider then, Phædrus, this speech as having been spoken in praise of Love, if you are so inclined; but if not, giving it

wrote *ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου ἀόκνου, οἷα δὴ τὸν Θ θεωμένου ὀξὺ καὶ οὐ μύοντος ἀετοῦ*, i. e. "of a man looking thitherwards without fear, as the eagle looks with a piercing eye upon the sun without blinking." The causes of error are to be traced to the corruption of *ἀόκνου*, and Θ, (i. e. *Ἥλιον*,) and *ὀξὺ*, and *μύοντος*, on which I could say or have said something in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 249, Eum. 2, Suppl. 901, and Hippias Maj. § 17 n. 5. With regard to the fact of the eagle being supposed to possess the power of looking upon the sun without being blinded, compare Ecphantus in Stobæus, p. 333, 14, *τὸ κράτιστον ἐν πτανοῖς ζῶον ἀετὸς ἀντωπὸν ἁλίῳ γενόμενον*. Themist. Or. ii. p. 61, Petar.=xx. p. 240, *συχνά γ' ἐμοῦ ἀπεπειρω, καθάπερ οἱ ἀετοὶ τῶν νεοττῶν, εἰ δύναταί μου στέγειν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τὴν αὐγλήτῆς ἀληθείας*. The same fact is mentioned by Ælian. Hist. Animal. x. 14, in the case of hawks, *Ὁρῶσιν ἱέρακες ὀρτίθων μόνοι ἀεὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀκτῖσι τοῦ ἡλίου ῥᾳδίως*. And hence Moore has used it as an illustration in his Epistle to Lord John Russell's meditated retirement from public life:

> "What thou, with thy genius, thy youth, and thy name,
> Thou born of the Russells, whose instinct to run
> The accustomed career of their sire is the same,
> As the eaglet's to soar with its eyes to the sun."

By a similar metaphor Empedocles said, *Ἀνταυγεῖ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀταρμύκτοισι προσώποις*: while Epicurus was described, probably by Ælian, quoted by Suid. in *Ἐπίκουρος—ἀμβλυώττων τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου αἴγλην δειλὸς ὤν*.

[73] This seems to be the only intelligible rendering in this place of *ἀνδρίαν*, which however I hardly think Plato wrote here, but rather *ἐνεργείαν*.

any other name, and taking it in any other sense, so call it.[74]

[37.] When Socrates had thus spoken, the rest praised the speech; but Aristophanes endeavoured to say something because Socrates had, when speaking, alluded[75] to his speech. On a sudden, however, the door of the porch was knocked at and it sent within a loud noise, so that there was heard the voice of revellers, and of a pipe-playing damsel. Upon this Agatho said to the servants, Will you not see to the matter? and if there is any acquaintance, invite him in; but if not, say that we are no longer drinking, and have already left off. Not long afterwards, the voice of Alcibiades, who was very drunk, was heard in the court, bawling very loud, and asking—Where is Agatho? and ordering (a slave) to lead him to Agatho. The flute-player, therefore, and some others of his followers, supported him towards Agatho, and he stood at the door crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, and having very many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends! Either receive as a fellow-tippler a man very drunk, or let us depart, after crowning Agatho alone, for which purpose we have come. For I was not able, said he, to come yesterday; but I am here now with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may bind them on the head of the wisest[76] and the most beautiful person. [77]If I should say so, will you laugh[77] at

[74] Instead of *ὀνόμαζε*, one would expect rather *νόμιζε*, "consider," to answer to the preceding *νόμισον*.

[75] See § 31.

[76] Although *σοφωτάτου* here seems to be supported by *σοφοῦ* in p. 174, B. § 2, yet Agatho would hardly be called *σοφώτατος* in the presence of Socrates; to whose wisdom not only had Agatho, in § 4, alluded, but an oracle had said, that he was *Ἀνδρῶν πάντων σοφώτατος*. I suspect that Plato wrote here *ἰσοθεωτάτου*, and in § 2, *ἐπ' ἰσοθέου*. For both men and women, remarkable for their beauty, were said to be equal to the gods; as Polyxena is in Hecub. 356, *Ἴση θεῇσιν*. So Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 79, "deo pulchrior."

[77] The Greek is in some MSS. *κεφαλὴν ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω, ἄρα καταγελάσεσθε*—in four others more correctly *κεφαλὴν οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω, ἐὰν εἴπω ἄρα*—which Ast has adopted; for he knew that *ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ* could not mean "ut ita dicam." Stalbaum, however, rejects *ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ* as an interpolation. Had he entered into the spirit of the dialogue, he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote *κεφαλὴν οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω, ὃν ἐὰν εἴπω Ἔρωτα, καταγελάσεσθε*, i. e. "thus bind the head of him, whom should I call Love, you will laugh at me." For thus a reason

me, as being drunk? However, although you may laugh, I well know that I am speaking the truth. But tell me immediately, shall I come in or not on these conditions? Will you drink with me or not? Thereupon all the company was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and recline on a couch, and Agatho too invited him. And he (Alcibiades) came, led by his attendants; and at the same time taking off the fillets, as if about to bind them (on Agatho), he did not see Socrates, who was before his eyes, but sate down by Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit down; and sitting down he embraced Agatho, and bound the fillet on him. Thereupon said Agatho, Slaves, unloose the sandals of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us. By all means, said Alcibiades;[78] but, who is this third person our fellow-drinker? and at the same time turning round, he beheld Socrates; and on seeing him, he started up, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? What ho Socrates? are you again sitting here in ambush against me, just as you are wont to do, and to appear suddenly, where I least expected you would be. And why are you reclining here? and[79] not with Aristophanes, or any other person who is, and wishes to be a source of merriment? But you have contrived to sit near the most beautiful of those within.[80] Then said Socrates, See, Agatho, if you can assist me; for the love of this man here is to me no trifling matter; since from the time when I fell in love with him, I am no longer permitted either to look at, or speak to, any beautiful person;

would be given for the laughter, and Agatho be called by the name applied to a beautiful boy by Martial, "Sic tu cæcus Amor;" while of his equally beautiful sister it was said, "Sic erit illa Venus."

[78] Although persons, when reclining at meals, were accustomed to take off their slippers, as shown by Gataker in Adversar. Miscell. Post. c. 19 quoted by Stalbaum, yet, to the command given by Agatho, Alcibiades could scarcely have added Πάνυ γε: although he might have said Πάνυ γε εὖ, similar to ἔχει κάλλιστα in Theocrit. Id. xv. 3, which, as remarked by Valckenaer, was a polite manner of expressing a refusal; just as we say in English, "It does very well."

[79] The Greek is ὡς, which Stalbaum renders "quippe, nam." Sydenham "and," as if he wished to read καί: and so perhaps Plato wrote. Ficinus has "potius quam apud Aristophanem—aut—"

[80] Instead of τῶν ἔνδον one would prefer τῶν συνδαίτων, answering to 'convivarum" in Ficinus.

or[81] he is, through jealousy and envy, practising strange devices, and abuses me, and scarcely keeps off his hands? See therefore that he does not do something now, but do you reconcile us; or, should he attempt to do any violence, do you assist me: for I greatly fear the madness of this man, and his strong feeling of love.—But, said Alcibiades, there shall be[82] no reconciliation between you and me. For I will by and by revenge myself upon you for this. But for the present, Agatho, said he, give me some of the fillets, that I may bind them on the wonderful head of this man, and he may not find fault with me, because I have bound the fillets on you, but not on him, who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times, upon all subjects.[83] And at the same time, taking some of the fillets, he bound them upon Socrates, and laid himself down. When he had laid himself down, he said, [38.] [84]Let things be; for you appear to me to be sober; this you must not be allowed, but you must drink;[84] for so it has been agreed. I therefore elect myself the chairman[85] until you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, let some one bring a beaker, if there is a large one;

[81] The Greek is ἢ οὐτοσὶ, where Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain ἦ. One would expect rather ἀεὶ οὑτος, παῖς ὥς, to which οὐτοσὶ πως in MS. Γ. evidently leads. For the sense is, "Like a boy, he is ever jealous."

[82] Some MSS. read οὐκ ἐστὶ, others ἔτι. Plato wrote οὐκ ἔτ' ἔσται.

[83] The Greek is ἔπειτα—ἀνέδησα. But ἔπειτα could not be thus inserted between νικῶντα and ἀνέδησα. Stalbaum was misled by the passages produced by Blomfield on Prom. Vinct. 802. He should have suggested, as I have translated, ἐς πάντα—For thus πάντας and πάντα are perpetually united, as I could prove by full twenty passages collected in my MS. notes on Poppo's Prolegom. p. 178.

[84—84] This is what has been hitherto palmed off upon the world as the very words of Plato. Ficinus has, however, "Nimium mihi sobrii, conviva, videmini," and has thus got rid of Εἶεν δὴ—a formula that could not be found in this place. We might indeed read Εἶ οὖν δὴ, where Winckelmann on Euthydem. p. 88, was the first to suggest οὖν. But Plato wrote something, I suspect, to this effect—"If then ye are indeed men, as ye seem to me, I must not permit you to be sober; but ye must now drink bumpers." In Greek, Εἰ οὖν δὴ ἄνδρες ἐστὲ—δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι—νήφειν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον ὑμῖν· νῦν δ' ἡμῖν μάλα ποτέον: where νῦν has been luckily preserved by one excellent MS., while ἀλλὰ has been changed into μάλα.

[85] On the chairman at wine-parties, see the Commentators on Horace, Od. i. 4, 17, "Quem Venus arbitrum Dicet bibendi."

of rather, there is no need; but bring hither, boy, said he, that wine cooler, which seems[86] to hold more than eight kotylæ.[87] Having filled it, he first drank it off himself; and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and stated at the same time, This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is of no avail against Socrates; for, let him drink as much as any one may command, he will not be a bit the more intoxicated.[88] Socrates then, when the boy had poured out the wine, drank it off. And Eryximachus said, What shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say nor sing over the cup, but drink really like those who are thirsty? To this Alcibiades replied, Hail, Eryximachus! thou best of men, sprung from the best and most temperate of fathers. And hail[89] thou too, said Eryximachus. But what shall we do? Whatever you may order; for you we must obey. For

> A man of physic has 'gainst many others
> A worth.[90]

Order then what you will. Hear then, said Eryximachus. Before you came in, it was determined that every one, beginning at the right hand, should in turn make a speech in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have spoken; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have been drinking, that you too should make a speech; and, when you have spoken, order

[86] This intransitive sense of *ἰδόντα* is, what no editor has remarked, a barbarism. Plato wrote *ὡς ἰδόντος*, "as for a person to see." For a similar syntax, see Kühner Gr. Gr. § 701, ed. Jelf.

[87] On the measure called "kotyla," nothing appears to be known for a certainty. It answered probably to the old English "magnum." With regard to the custom of asking, as persons were getting drunk, for tumblers, it will be sufficient to refer to Horace—"Tum calices poscit majores," and "Capaciores affer huc, puer, scyphos," and to Aristoph. Γηρυταδ. Fr. viii., Ἦν δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἑορτή· περιέφερεν δ' ἐν κύκλῳ λεπαστὴν Παῖς ταχύ, προσφέρων δ' ἡμῖν ἐνέχεεν σφόδρα κυανοβενθῆ: for so that fragment ought to be read, as it were easy to show by parallel passages.

[88] Ficinus has "nec ebrium unquam videbitis," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ μήποτ' αὐτὸ μέθυσον ἴδητε*: similar to *Σώκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν.*

[89] The Greek is *Καὶ γὰρ σύ·* where *γὰρ* is perfectly absurd. Ficinus has more correctly, "Et tu salve," which leads to *Καὶ χαῖρε σύ.* So in Eurip. Orest. 470, Ὦ χαῖρε πρέσβυ—Ὦ χαῖρε καὶ σύ: where see Porson.

[90] This is a line of Homer in Il. Δ. 514.

Socrates to do whatever you please, and he too order the person on his right hand, and so with respect to the rest. Alcibiades then said, You say well, Eryximachus; but it is not fair[91] to compare a drunken man against a sober one in their speeches. But, O happy man, does Socrates persuade you with respect to what he has just now said? Or do you know that every thing is the contrary to what he has said? For he it is, who, when I in his presence praise any one, except himself, whether god or man, will not keep his hands from me. Will you not speak fair words?[92] said Socrates. By Neptune, said Alcibiades, say nothing against this; for I will praise no other person, while you are present. Do so then, said Eryximachus; if you will, praise Socrates. How say you? rejoined Alcibiades. Does it seem good to you, Eryximachus, that I should do so? Must I fall upon[93] this man, and revenge myself before you? Ho, sir, said Socrates, what have you in mind? Will you praise me so as to make me ridiculous?[94] or what will you do? I will speak the truth. But see whether you will permit me. Nay, said Socrates, I both permit, and command you to speak the truth. [95]I will do it instantly, said Alcibiades. But however do you act thus;[95] if

[91] The Greek is *μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν*: where, according to Ast and Stalbaum, *τῶν* is to be supplied before *νηφόντων*, and *τοὺς* before *λόγους*. I have translated, *παρὰ νήφοντ' ἐν λόγοις*.

[92] Or we may translate, "Will you not hold your tongue?" For *εὐφημεῖν* has both these meanings.

[93] How Alcibiades could inquire, whether he should fall foul upon Socrates, when he had been requested, if he liked, to praise him, I cannot understand. I could have understood it, had he been told to praise or abuse, as he liked best. But in that case, Plato would have written *ἐπαίνεσον ἢ κακῶς λέγει*. For *ἢ κακῶς λέγεις* might easily have dropt out before *πῶς λέγεις*.

[94] From this bitter sneer it is evident that Socrates preferred the abuse of Alcibiades to his praise.

[95—95] The Greek is *Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ μεντοι οὑτωσὶ ποίησον*, which Ficinus thus puts into Latin, "Parebo quam libentissime, modo id assequi possim." For he did not understand the phrase *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι*: nor did Hommel see how *ποίησον* could thus follow *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι*: and though Stalbaum translates *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι* by "I will immediately make a beginning," he should have produced at least one passage, where *φθάνειν* is so used, without a participle. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato probably wrote *Οὐκ ἂν φθονοίμην ἐπαινῶν*. For *ἐπαινῶν* could have dropt out very easily before *εἰπεῖν*: while in the words *καὶ μέντοι οὑτωσὶ ποίησον* lies hid *καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτως σὺ ποίησον*

I assert any thing not true, lay hold of me while speaking if you will, and say that I am telling a falsehood; for I shall not willingly tell a lie. And do not wonder if I speak as if recollecting one thing after another; for it is not easy for a man in my state to enumerate readily, and in succession, your strange behaviour. [39.] I will then endeavour, gentlemen, to praise Socrates in this way by means of images. He indeed will perhaps imagine that I am turning him into ridicule; but the image will be for the sake of what is true, and not ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most like the figures of Silenus that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have made, holding reeds or flutes; but which, when they are opened down the middle, appear to contain within them statues[96] of the gods. And I again say, that he resembles the satyr Marsyas.[97] Now that in your outward form, Socrates, you resemble these things, even you yourself will not deny; but that you resemble them likewise in other points, hear in the next place. You are saucy in deeds; or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses to the fact. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than Marsyas? For[98] he charmed men through instruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he (charms)[99] even now, when any one plays his melodies. For what Olympus[100]

[96] Taylor refers here to the Scholia of Maximus on Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, t. ii. p. 209, where it is said that "the Greeks made statues, without hands or feet, which they called Hermæ, hollow within, but with doors: within these they placed statues of the gods whom they worshipped, but they closed them by the Hermæ externally. Hence these Hermæ appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they contained the ornaments of the gods themselves." Of these identical Scholia there is a transcript in Etymol. M. Ἁρμάριον, p. 146, 58, while, by the knowledge of this fact, we can understand Æsop, Fab. 128, and the story told by Cornelius Nepos of Hannibal saving some gold by placing it in the statue of a god.

[97] A celebrated player on the flute, of which he was said to be the inventor; and that having challenged Apollo to a trial of skill as a musician, he was beaten and flayed alive by the god. T.

[98] Instead of γε, Stalbaum says one would have expected γάρ, which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "nim." Vainly then does Stalbaum attempt to defend γε.

[99] This verb is to be got out from the preceding ἤυλει.

[100] Olympus the musician was a disciple of Marsyas. Stalbaum refers to Plato, Legg. iii. p. 677, Pseudo-Plato Minos, p. 318, B., Aristotle Polit. viii. 5, and Plutarch, t. ii. p. 1133.

played, I call the melodies of Marsyas, who taught him. Now his melodies, whether a good male flute-player plays them, or a bad female one, alone[1] cause a person to be spell-bound, and point out, through their being divine, those that stand in need[2] of the gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect alone differ from him, that you effect the very same thing by naked words without instruments. We therefore, when we hear another person, although a good speaker himself, pronouncing the speeches of others, not a single hearer, so to say, pays any regard to them; but when any one hears you, or your discourses spoken by another, although he is a wretched speaker, yet, whether a woman or a man or a lad is the auditor, we are astonished and spell-bound. I therefore, gentlemen, unless I seemed to be very much in liquor, would tell you upon oath what I have suffered by the discourses of this man, and am suffering even now. For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of the Corybantes;[3] and my tears flow forth through his discourses. I see too many others suffering in the very same way. But when I hear Pericles, and other excellent orators, I think indeed that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if I were in a servile state. But by this Marsyas here I am often so affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live, while I am in such a state. You will not, Socrates, say that this is not true. And even now I feel conscious that, were I willing to lend him my ears, I could not bear it, but should suffer in the very same way. For he would compel[4] me to confess, that, being yet very deficient, I neglect my own affairs,[5] but attend to those of the Athenians.[6] [7]By violence therefore restraining myself as to my ears,[7] I depart from him, flying, as it were, from

[1] Stalbaum says that *μόνα* means "very greatly." But in the passages he quotes *μόνος* has its usual meaning, "only."

[2] Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades, says, that the flute was used in the Mysteries, to excite the feelings of the hearers to what was divine. Such therefore, as were excited by the melody of the pipe, may be supposed to stand in need of the gods and mysteries. T.

[3] On the Corybantes, see Ruhnken in Timæus Lex. *Κορυβαντιᾶν.*

[4] So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *ἀναγκάζοι γὰρ ἄν με*, instead of *ἀναγκάζει γάρ με.*

[5] Instead of *ἔτι*, the two oldest MSS. offer *τι*, which leads to *τὰ*

[6] See Alcibiad. i. p. 259, B.

[7]—[7] The Greek is *βίᾳ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων, ἐπισχομενος τὰ*

the Syrens, lest I should sit there by him until I grew old. And towards him alone of all men, I suffer that, which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of any one. [8][But I am abashed before him alone.][8] For I feel conscious of my inability to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am (conscious) of being overcome by the honour (I receive) from the multitude. I therefore run away from and avoid him; and when I see him, I am ashamed for what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, I would gladly see him no longer amongst men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know I should be afflicted still more; so that I know not what to do with this man. And from the melodies indeed of this Satyr in such a manner both I and many others have suffered.

[40.] Hear too from me on other points, how like he is to what I have compared him, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured, that not one of you knows him; but I will lay him open, since I have begun (to speak.)[9] You see then that he is [10]disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful persons;[10] and that he is always about them and struck with them; but on the other hand, [11]he is ignorant of every thing and knows nothing how his figure is. Is not this Silenus-like?[11] For he is invested with

ὦτα. But as two excellent MSS. offer *ἐπισπώμενος* in lieu of *ἐπισχόμενος*, it is evident that the text has been tampered with. Plato wrote, I suspect, *βύων οὖν, ὅπερ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἔπασχεν ἀποσπώμενος, τὰ ὦτα*: where *βύων—τὰ ὦτα* is the splendid emendation of Abresch in Lection. Aristænet. p. 147, obtained from Hesych., *Βύων τὰ ὦτα· ἐπιφράττων*: for there is a distinct allusion to Ulysses stuffing his ears with wax to prevent his hearing the strains of the Syrens, fraught at once with delight and destruction to those who listened to them, as stated in *Od.* M. 47.

[8]—[8] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[9] Ficinus has "dicere jam incepi," as if he had found in his MS., what the sense requires, *ἠρξάμην λέγειν*.

[10]—[10] The Greek is *ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν*. But the genitive could hardly depend upon the adverb. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἔρωτί πως διακαίεται τῶν καλῶν*, "he is inflamed with the love of things beautiful." The common reading is however found in Aristænetus, i. 18.

[11]—[11] Such is the literal translation of the text, adopted by Schleiermacher, Bekker, and Stallbaum, and which others may, but I cannot understand, for it is a mere tautology to say *οὐδὲν οἶδεν*, after *ἀγνοεῖ πάντα*; besides the ignorance of his figure could be no proof that Socrates was like Silenus. The sense evidently required is, "And although he ac-

this externally like a carved Silenus; but when he is opened inwardly, with temperance how great, think you, fellow-tipplers, is he filled? Know too, that if any person is beautiful, he regards him not, but despises him to such an extent as no one would suppose; nor if he is wealthy, or possesses any other honour amongst those who are considered by the multitude as blessed; but he holds all these possessions to be nothing worth, and that we too are of no account.[12] He passes likewise the whole of life indulging in irony and jests against mankind; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether any one (of you)[13] has seen the images within; but I once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine and golden, and all-beautiful and wonderful, that I (thought)[14] I must in a short time do whatever Socrates ordained. Conceiving too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as a god-send, and a piece of wondrous good fortune for myself,

cuses himself of being ignorant of every thing, still does he know well his own figure, that it is very Silenus-like. This would be in Greek—*καὶ εἰ ἀγνοεῖν πάντα καταυδᾷ, εὖ οἶδεν ὅμως τὸ σχῆμα αὑτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸ Σειληνῶδες σφόδρα ἐστί*: which is at least more worthy of the philosopher than that found at present—*καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ Σεληνῶδες σφόδρα γε*. For by the verb *καταυδᾷ*, Alcibiades, or rather Plato himself, meant to show that Socrates accused himself wrongfully of ignorance; for by knowing his own likeness, he proved that he had practised the precept given by the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself," to which Plato has alluded in Phædr. § 8, Phileb. § 107, Charmid. § 26, and Protag. § 82.

[12] The majority of MSS. read *καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγω ὑμῖν*, and so did the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "nullius nos esse apud eum vobis assero." Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδενὸς εἶναι ἐν λόγῳ μεῖον*. Compare Theætet. p. 180, E., *ἧττον— ἢ τὸ μηδέν*: and as regards *ἐν λόγῳ*, the words of the oracle, *οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ*, quoted by Heindorf on Hipp. Maj. § 19, Stalbaum too believes the passage to be corrupt, but is unable to correct it; nor could he see that from "Fingit tamen ironicus aliter," in Ficinus, it is easy to elicit *εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ ἄλλως*—where *ἄλλως* is not "aliter," but "merely."

[13] Ficinus has alone preserved the words wanting here. For he has "si quis vestrum," which leads to *εἴ τις ὑμῶν*—

[14] Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the very word required to complete the sense. For his version is, "ut nullo modo fas existimem aliter quam Socrates præcepit, agere;" from whence it is easy to read, *ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ᾧμην*. For *ᾧμην* might easily have dropt out after *εἶναι*, while as regards the phrase *ποιητέον εἶναι ὦμην*, see my note on Politic. p. 263, C. § 7. Now that Ficinus followed here his MS. closely may be inferred from finding that he has omitted *ἐν βραχεῖ*, which is wanting in another MS. likewise.

since by gratifying Socrates it would be in my power to hear from him all that he knew. For I prided myself on my beauty marvellously. With these thoughts in my head, although I had previously been never accustomed to be in his company without an attendant, on that occasion I sent the page away and remained with him alone; for I must state the whole truth, and do you give me your attention; and if I am telling a falsehood, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was, gentlemen, alone with him alone; and I thought he would immediately converse with me in the way that lovers are wont to speak to their beloved in private; and [15] I was (highly) delighted (with the expectation).[15] Nothing however of this kind very much [16] took place; but after conversing somewhat [17] and passing the day with me as usual, he went away. Then I challenged him to contend with me in the naked exercises, and I did contend as if about to effect something by this means. He engaged therefore naked, and had a tussel frequently against me, no one being present. But why need I mention this? Nothing more took place. But when I accomplished nothing at all by this means, I determined to attack the man with all my might, nor to let him off; [18] since I had put my hand to the task.[18] But you must now [19] know what is the affair.[19] Accordingly I invited him to supper, artlessly [20] laying a plot as a lover does against his

[15]—[15] Ficinus has "qua spe valde lætabar," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι πολύ δή τι ἔχαιρον.*

[16] Instead of *μάλα*, Plato evidently wrote *μὰ Δία*, an oath, which is, I think, to be restored repeatedly in the place of *μὲν* or *μὴν δή*. In a MS. of Plutarch, which I collated thirty years ago, in the Royal Library at Brussels, the same oath has been every where omitted. It would have been good Greek to say, *οὐ μᾶλλον—οὐδ' ἕν—*

[17] Since three MSS. omit *ἄν*, Ast would read *ἄττα*. He should have suggested *τινα*. Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend *ἄν*.

[18]—[18] The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Sydenham.

[19]—[19] In lieu of *ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα*, Wyttenbach in Biblioth. Crit. i. 1, p. 50, proposed to read *ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα*. He should have suggested *ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπ' ἄϊστον ἔτι πρᾶγμα*, i. e. "I must come now to a matter never yet known." For the article *τὸ* could not be applied to a thing not as yet mentioned. Stalbaum indeed with Ast would render *ἰστέον* "we must explore." But that would be in correct Greek either *σκεπτέον* or *ἱστορητέον*. And were the meaning such as they conceive, there could be no need of exploring in a case, where Alcibiades knew all the facts, and was going to tell them.

[20] Although *ἀτέχνως* might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer *ἐντέχνως*, "artfully."

beloved. Even to this he did not quickly give ear. In time, however, he was over-persuaded. But when he came for the first time, he wished, as soon as he had supped, to go away; and I, feeling ashamed, let him go. Having laid however again a plot, after supper I had a conversation with him far into the night; and when he wished to go away, I pretended it was late, and I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a couch close to mine, and on which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. [41.] Thus far in my story it would be well to state to any one; but what is to come, you would not have heard me telling, unless, in the first place, according to the proverb,[21]

> Wine, with children, or without,
> Does a tale of truth let out;

and in the second place, it seems to me to be unjust in him who comes to praise a person, to leave in obscurity a proud deed of Socrates. Moreover, the suffering of him, who has been bitten by a viper, possesses likewise myself. For they say that the person so suffering is unwilling to tell what it is, except to those who have been bitten, as being alone about to know and to pardon him, should he dare to do and say every thing from excess of pain. [22]I say it then, having been bitten by something still

[21] In the words of the proverb, Οἶνος ἄνευ τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων ἦν ἀληθής, there lies hid an hexameter, Οἶνος ἄνευ παίδων ἄρ' ἀληθὴς καὶ μετὰ παίδων. According to the Schol. transcribed by Photius and Suidas, there were two proverbs, Οἶνος ἀλήθεια, and Οἶνος καὶ παῖδες ἀληθεῖς. From these, however, a third seems to have been formed. Respecting the proverb itself, "In vino veritas," Ast refers to the Commentators on Horace, Od. iii. 21, 15, Epist. i. 5, 16, and to Jacobs on Antholog. Gr. i. p. 314.

[22]—[22] To this inelegantly written period I trust I have restored its original beauty, by translating as if the Greek were, Λέγω οὖν δεδηγμένος ἔτι ὑπὸ του ἀλγεινοτέρου — καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν ἄν τις δηχθείη — τὴν καρδίην ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνομάσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γε λόγων, οἳ ἔχεόν τι ἐχίδνης ἀγριώτερον, νέου καὶ ψυχὴν μὴ ἀφυοῦς ὅταν λάβωνται, καὶ ποιῶσι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν —in lieu of Ἐγὼ — τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον — καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ — ὀνομάσαι πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ — οἳ ἔχονται — νέου ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ—ποιοῦσι—But, 1. τε couples nothing. 2. Although Stalbaum supposes that the idea of pain is beautifully represented by the figure of speech called Anacolouthon, yet the happy idea never occurred to Sophocles; who has never resorted to such a rhetorical artifice, while depicting the excruciating pains that Philoctetes is feigned to feel. 3. After the perfect δεδηγμένος most assuredly the aorist δηχθεὶς would not have been introduced; and if it could it would not have been united

more painful. For it is the most painful of all, by which a person can be bitten, in heart or soul, or whatever else it is meet to call it, [bitten and wounded,] namely, by discourses in philosophy; which are wont to give out something more acute than that from the viper, when they (the discourses) lay hold of a young person with a not badly-disposed soul, and cause him to do and say any thing whatever[22]. And looking, moreover, at the Phædruses, Agathos, Eryximachuses, Pausaniases, Aristodemuses, Aristophaneses.—[23]But why need I say, Socrates himself, and whoever forms the rest (of the company).[23] For all of you have partaken with me of the madness and Bacchic fury of philosophy; and on this account you shall all hear. For you will pardon what was done then, and is said now. But let the domestics, and if there is any other profane and rude person present, place upon their ears[24] gates of very great

to its synonyme πληχθείς. 4. The verb could not stand thus without its genitive, as even Rost had the sense to see. 5. Although νέον might perhaps be united to ψυχῆς, yet ἀφυοῦς would require the copulative καὶ, improperly omitted in the best MSS. Lastly, after λάβωνται, the καὶ would require ποιῶσι; for ποιοῦσι could not be united to ἔχονται. With regard to the alterations, 1. ἐγὼ and λέγω are frequently interchanged; 2. ἔχεόν τι scarcely differs from ἔχονται as regards the letters; while, as regards the sense, some allusion ought to be made to the fact of words pouring out ideas, as vipers do poison; and lastly, ψυχὴν is due to a single MS. That Ficinus did not find in his MS. what exists at present in the Greek text is clear enough; but what he did find, is not so clear. Thus much however is certain, that either πληγείς or δηχθείς was wanting in his MS., and some members of the period transposed, and not a little added. For it is to this effect—"Ego igitur (præ ceteris) astrictus vehementiori (philosophiæ) morsu, qui omnium est acerrimus, et sive cor, sive animum, sive quomodocunque id appellandum sit, saucius (cupiditate) in philosophia sermonum, qui acrius quam vipera (mordent et) occupant, si quando attigerint juvenilem animum, qui non penitus ignarus sit, commeliuntque ad quicquid tandem sit, faciendum atque dicendum (nihil intentatum relinquere statui, quo Socratem ad explendam hanc sitim mihique conjunctissimum facerem);" where to all the words between the lunes there is nothing to answer at present in the Greek text. Now that Ficinus introduced all this matter out of his own head, is scarcely credible; for he is generally content to give almost a verbal translation of the original.

[23]—[23] The Greek is now Σωκράτη δὲ αὐτὸν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι—it was originally Σωκράτη δὲ αὐτὸν τόνδε, καὶ ὅσοι εἰσὶν, ἄλλοι ἐκὼν λέγοιμ' ἄν, i. e. "and Socrates himself here, and whoever are the rest, I will tell willingly," for we shall thus complete the sentence, at present imperfect.

[24] On the Orphic verse—Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις· ὠσὶ θύρας ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι, i. e. To whom it is lawful I'll speak; place a door on your ears,

size.[25] When therefore the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had gone out, it seemed to me that I ought not to employ words of many meanings towards him, but tell him freely what was in my thoughts. And nudging him I said, Socrates, are you asleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know then on what I am determined? What is it particularly? said he. You seem to me, said I, the only lover worthy of myself; and yet you appear to feel a dread to have a recollection[26] towards me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it very silly for me not to gratify you both in this point, and in any thing else of which you may be in want, whether it be my own property, or that of my friends: for nothing is to me of greater moment than to become the best of men: and for this I think there is no person a more competent assister than yourself; and I should feel a much greater shame before the wise, in not gratifying such a man, than before the [27][many and the][27] unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner, My dear Alcibiades, you seem to be in reality a man of no common mark, if what you say concerning me happens to be true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can become better. But what boundless beauty could you see in me, and vastly superior to the fine form in yourself, if, on beholding it, you endeavour to have dealings[28] with me, and to exchange beauty for beauty. You have surely an idea of possessing more than I do; for you endeavour to obtain the truth of beautiful things instead of the reputation, and you conceive that you will in reality exchange brass for gold.[29]

ye profane, (for so I tacitly corrected at Prom. 165, the reading *Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστι· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε, βέβηλοί*. See Ruhnken at Timæus in Βέβηλοι.

[25] Why Plato should have alluded to the great size of the gates I must leave for others to explain.

[26] Others may, but I cannot, understand *μνησθῆναι*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μνηθῆναι τὰ πρὸς ἐμέ*. For that acts, similar to those here alluded to, took place in the Mysteries, is shown by Taylor in his Dissertation on the Mysteries, p. 123.

[27]—[27] The words within the brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus, as they interfere with the balance of the sentence.

[28] Such seems to be the mercantile meaning of *κοινώσασθαι*.

[29] Here is an allusion to Hom. Ἰλ. Ζ. 236,

There did Zeus, son of Kronos, take away
His wits from Glaucus; who exchanged his arms
Golden, worth hundred beeves, for brass, worth nine.

But, O blessed man, think better of it, nor let me lie hid from you, as being nothing. The power of intellectual vision begins then to see acutely, when that of the eye loses its acmé.[30] You however are still far off from this. And I, having heard him, replied, As regards myself the facts are so; of which not one has been stated otherwise than as I conceive myself. But do you counsel me in what you may consider to be best both for you and me. In this, said he, you say well: for in the time to come let us consult together, and we will do what appears to be the best for us, both with respect to these and other matters. [42.] Having thus heard and [31] spoken, and sent as it were arrows,[31] I thought that he was wounded; and I rose up, and not suffering him to speak any more, I wrapped myself round with this garment, (for it was winter,) and lying down under the old cloak of this man, I threw my arms around the truly divine and wonderful man, and lay there the whole night. And in this again, Socrates, you will not say that I am telling a falsehood. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, and jeered at, and even insulted my beauty. And yet I fancied it was something, men and judges, for judges you are, of the haughtiness of Socrates. For by the gods and goddesses, rest assured that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

[30] The same theory is promulgated, if I rightly remember, by Aristotle. Here however there is evidently some error in λήγειν ἐπιχειρῷ: which I could perhaps correct, but not without some violence to the text. Ficinus has "cum primum corporis oculus deflorescit."

[31]—[31] The Greek is καὶ εἰπων καὶ ἀφεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη. But from the imitation in Aristænetus, Epist. ii. 4, καὶ, ὥσπερ βέλη, τοὺς λόγους ἀφεῖσα, and the expression in Plato, Phileb. p. 23, βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων, it is evident that ὥσπερ βέλη could not stand thus by itself. Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ ἐπέων ὣς ἀφεὶς εὔπτερα βέλη, in allusion to the ἔπεα πτερόεντα of Homer; and the εὔπτερος (Vulg. ἄπτερος) φάτις in Agam. 267; and Τοῦτο διαμπερὲς ὡς εὔπτερον ἦκε βέλος, in Cho.; and in Plato, Theætet. p. 180, A., ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ρηματίσκια—ἀποτοξεύοντες; and in Heliodor. Æthiop. vii. p. 312, Θεαγένης, ὥσπερ βέλει, τῷ ῥήματι βληθείς. With regard to the loss or confusion of ἐπέων, it will be sufficient to refer to Prom. 766, where some MSS. read correctly μηδ' ἐπῶν προοιμίοις for μηδέ πω—To meet however the objection in εἰπὼν, which could hardly thus follow ἀκούσας, Ficinus has "objecissem," as if he has found in his MS. ἀντειπὼν: but such I do not believe was the reading there. Shakspeare too has united "words" and "daggers" in his well-known—"These words, like daggers, enter in my ears."

[32] What feelings then do you fancy I had after this,[32] on reflecting that I had been dishonoured, but yet admiring the nature, and the temperance and fortitude of this man, after I had met with a person such as I never thought I should meet with for prudence and self-control; so that I neither had it in my power to be angry with him, nor though I was deprived of intercourse with him, had I any means of attaching him to myself. For I well knew that he would be on every side more invulnerable to money, than Ajax[33] was to the sword; and that he had escaped me, at the very time when I fancied he would be caught. And thus I was reduced to my wits' ends, and went about, the slave of this man, as no one else was of any other. For not only did all this occur to me formerly, but after this likewise, during a campaign common to both of us, took place against Potidæa, and there we messed together. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed myself, but all others, in the labours of the field. But when we were left some where, and compelled, as happens in campaigns, to be greatly[34] without food, the rest were nothing to him for the power of endurance. On the other hand, at our jollifications, he was the only person who could enjoy them; for though he was generally[35] unwilling to drink, yet when forced to do so, he beat all the rest; and what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. But of this it appears to me there will be shortly a confutation. Again, with respect to his endurance in winter, for the winters there are very severe,[36] he performed wonders in other ways, and once also when the frost was most bitter,

[32]—[32] Compare Iph. A. 1162, Τίν' ἔνδον εἶς σὲ καρδίαν μ' ἔξειν δοκεῖς.

[33] This allusion to Ajax seems very strange, when the tradition was, that he had destroyed himself, as shown in the play of Sophocles. Plato wrote, I suspect, Ἀχιλλεύς, who, as being invulnerable by a sword, was killed by an arrow from the bow of Paris. The Schol. on Aj. 833, says however that he was invulnerable except under the arm-pit, through his body being covered with the lion's hide, which had belonged to Hercules; and had been perhaps a gift from that hero to Telamon, after they had conjointly taken Troy.

[34] In lieu of ὁπόταν γοῦν ἀναγκασθείημεν, where even Stalbaum cannot endure ὁπόταν joined to an optative, some MSS. read ὁπότε, while the majority omit γοῦν, and one has ἂν. Hence it is easy to read ὁπότε δ' αὖ ἄγαν—where ἄγαν is to be united to ἀσιτεῖν.

[35] Instead of τά τ' ἄλλα καί, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain, Plato evidently wrote τὰ πολλὰ γάρ, as I have translated.

[36] For Potidæa was a town on the frontiers of Thrace.

and all did not go out from their quarters, or if any did so, he clothed himself in wonderfully thick (cloaks),[37] had his feet bound and wrapped in felt and sheep-skins, Socrates went out amongst them, wearing just the same clothing as he had been previously accustomed to wear, and marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes; and the soldiers had a suspicion that he held them in contempt. [43.] And thus much on these points.

"But what this patient man did do and dare,"[38] during the campaign there, it is worth while to hear. For while he was thinking of some question from himself,[39] he stood from the dawn investigating it; and, as he did not succeed, he did not desist, but stood still investigating it. It was mid-day, and some persons perceived him, and wondering said, one to the other, that Socrates had been standing from the morning thinking upon something. At length some Ionian soldiers, when it was evening, having supped—for it was then summer—brought out their ground-litters, and partly slept in the cold and partly kept watch, whether he would stand there all night. And he did stand until the dawn appeared and the sun rose; after which he departed, having first offered a prayer to the sun.[40] And if you are willing (to hear), [41] what he was in battle, must not be passed by.[41] For it is surely just to pay him this tribute. For when the battle took place, in which the generals assigned to myself the prize of superior good conduct, no other man rescued me but he, through his being unwilling to leave me when wounded; and he preserved both my arms and myself. And I indeed at that time urged the commanders to give you, Socrates, the prize of good conduct—and for stating this, you will neither blame me, nor say that I am speaking falsely—but the generals, looking to my rank in life, and wishing to give me those rewards, you were more

[37] In *θαυμαστὰ δὴ ὅσα* there evidently lie hid *θαυμαστὰ δασέα*.

[38] This is a line of Homer in Od. Δ. 242.

[39] In lieu of *αὐτόθι*, two MSS. read *αὐτόθεν*.

[40] Perhaps it would not be difficult to show that the prayer of Socrates was subsequently published, and is still to be found in an Oriental version.

[41]—[41] In lieu of *ἐν μάχαις*, Ficinus has "In prœliis quoque qualis fuerit, non est silentio prætereundum," omitting *εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε*. He therefore found in his MS. *οἷος ἦν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οὐκ ἐατέον*: where *οὐκ ἐατέον* might easily have been lost through *τοῦτο*. But as he omits the next clause—*τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι*—perhaps he introduced the other words to fill up the sense.

eager for me to receive them than for yourself. Further still, gentlemen, it was well worth while to see Socrates when our army retreated from Delium;[42] for I happened to be present with the cavalry, but Socrates was among the heavy-armed. For when the troops were already scattered, both he and Laches retreated; and I, meeting with and seeing the two, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I would not abandon them. Here then I had a better view of Socrates than at Potidæa; for I was in less fear, because I was on horseback. In the first place then, how greatly did he surpass Laches in his being cautious; and in the next place, he seemed, according to your description, Aristophanes, to carry himself loftily,[43] and to throw his eye on one side, to survey quietly both friends and foes; and it was manifest to every one, and even to a person at a distance, that whoever presumed to touch this man, would be very vigorously repulsed. Hence both he and the other departed in safety; for scarcely any one, who thus conducts himself in war, is touched; but the pursuit is of those who turn and run away. [44.] [44] There are many other things for which a person would have it in his power to praise Socrates wondrously. But of his other pursuits, some one may perhaps speak in this way even about another person;[44] but to be like not one, either of the ancients or moderns, this is a thing worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, one might conjecture was Brasidas[45] and others: and again, that, such as Pericles was, were An-

[42] This event took place in Ol. 89, 1. See Thucyd. iv. 96.

[43] The passage of Aristophanes alluded to is in Νεφ. 361. With regard to the verb βρενθύεσθαι, it is said to be derived from βρένθος, an aquatic bird, found in marshes, and that walks with its long legs, as if on stilts. From this reference to the very play of Aristophanes where Socrates is made the constant butt of the dramatist, and from the two being thus brought together, as the common friends of Agatho, it has been fairly inferred, that either the dramatist had in reality no ill-will towards Socrates, or that the philosopher was indifferent to what he knew was only a farcical caricature.

[44]—[44] Here, as in many other places, the Latin of Ficinus differs from the Greek. His version is, "In multis quidem aliis mirifice laudari Socrates potest; sed talia sunt, ut ceteri quoque forsan nonnulli eandem laudem mereantur." From which, however, it is easy to see that he found in his MS. not ἄλλου τοιαῦτα, but ἄλλου του ταὐτά, to which ταῦτα in two MSS. plainly leads. The pursuits alluded to were, probably, his skill as a sculptor, philosopher, and poet.

[45] On Brasidas, the Spartan general, and his doings, the reader is referred to Thucydides, who has shown that he was the Nelson of his country. For, like the modern naval hero, the general of his day forced himself into notice despite the opposition of ministers at home, and died in the arms of victory.

tenor and Nestor. And there are others likewise; and the rest[46] a person might compare after the same manner. But such a strange character as is this man, both in himself and in his discourses, no one will by searching discover any man approaching near to him, either among those living now or in the olden time; unless indeed some one should compare him to no human being, but to what I have mentioned, Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to state this at first, that his discourses too are very like the Silenuses when opened. For should any one be willing to hear the discourses of Socrates, they will appear to be [47]very ridiculous at first;[47] with such nouns and verbs do they envelop externally, [48]as it were, the hide of a Satyr.[48] For he speaks of panniered asses,[49] and of copper-smiths, and leather-cutters, and tanners, and he appears to be always saying the same things upon the same subjects;[50] so that every man who has neither skill nor sense will laugh at his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and gets within them, will, in the first place, find that they alone of (all other) [51]discourses possess an internal meaning; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, and hold the most numerous[52] images of virtue, and extend to the farthest point, or rather to every thing, which

[46] The Greek is εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ ταῦτ' ἄν τις ἀπεικάζοι. But Ficinus has "sunt alii quoque, qui hoc modo conferri possunt," which leads to εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι, οὕς γε ἄλλοις—The article could not be here introduced before ἄλλους.

[47]—[47] As the oldest MSS. omit πάνυ, and one of the oldest reads λεῖοι, it is evident that the text has been corrupted, which I could easily restore; but not without writing a long and learned note.

[48]—[48] The Greek is Σατύρου ἄν τινα, where, although his six favourite MSS. omit ἄν, Stalbaum would still retain it, misled, as usual, by Hermann on Dissert. Ἄν, p. 187, who quotes there Eurip. Alcest. 181, and Aristoph. Eq. 1257, neglecting the reading οὐχὶ for οὐκ ἄν furnished by Suidas in Κλέπτης. Rückert would read αὖ, which is quite as unmeaning as Hommel's αὐτίκα, in lieu of ἄν τινα. How easy was it to suggest, Σατύρου οἵαν τινα—

[49] According to Hesychius, Καυθήλως ὄνος was μωρὸς ὄνομα. But there the learned read Καυθήλιος ὄνος, as shown by the fragment of Hermippus quoted by Schol. in Aristoph. Ὄρν. 1555. Respecting the fact here alluded to, of Socrates talking of vulgar things, and to low persons, see Ruhnken on Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 37.

[50] The same remark is made by Xenophon in M. S. iv. 416, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, says Socrates; and both these passages Cicero had perhaps in mind in Amicit. § 4., "Socrates, qui non tam hoc tum illud, ut fit in plerisque, sed idem dicebat semper." Compare too Gorg. p. 490, E., ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν—περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, applied to Socrates.

[51] The Greek is now μόνους—τῶν λόγων. It was μόνους πάντων τῶν ἄλλων, as shown by "solos aliorum omnium," in Ficinus.

[52] For καὶ πλεῖστ' one would prefer καὶ κάλλιστ', "the most beautiful."

it is fitting for him to consider, who intends to become a man at once beautiful and good. These then are the reasons, gentlemen, for which I praise Socrates; but on the other hand, for what I blame him, I have mixed up in the recital of the insults he has heaped upon me. Nor has he acted in this manner towards me alone, but also towards Charmides, the son of Glauco, Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and very many others; whom this man has deceived, as if he were their lover, when, instead of the loving, he is himself the beloved. Hence,[53] I caution you, Agatho, not to be deceived by this man; but, taught by my sufferings, to have a care, and not, according to the proverb, By suffering, like a silly person, knowledge gain.[54]

When Alcibiades had thus spoken, there was a (general)[55] laugh at his freedom of speech, because he appeared to be lovingly disposed towards Socrates; who thereupon observed, You seem to me, Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that, for the sake of which you have said all this; and, as if mentioning something of no consequence, you have cleverly placed at the end that you have said all this on this account, namely, to throw discord[56] between me and Agatho, conceiving that I ought to love you and no other person, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one else. But you have not lain hid from me; but this play of yours is plainly a Satyric one and Silenus-like. But, my dear Agatho, let not any thing occur in his favour, but do you prepare yourself so that no one may set you and me at variance. Whereupon said Agatho, You seem indeed, Socrates, to be speaking very nearly the truth, and I conjecture that he

[53] The Greek is now Ἄ δή, it was Δι᾽ Ἄ δή, as shown by "quamobrem," in Ficinus. On the loss of Δι before A see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 116, where I have by the slightest emendations rescued the character of Thucydides from the charge of writing one thing and meaning another.

[54] The proverb alluded to is in Hes. Ἐργ. 216, παθὼν δέ τι νήπιος ἔγνω.

[55] Ficinus has "risum omnibus," as if his MS. read πᾶσιν before ἐπί.

[56] In διαβάλλειν there is what is called a pregnant sense. For it means, first, to keep apart, as regards a local position, and secondly, as regards a friendly feeling. As this remark was made originally by Wyttenbach, it seems strange that Stalbaum should not have seen the superiority of the
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reading preserved in one MS. διαλάβη, and in another διαβάλῃ: where however, after κατεκλίνη, correct syntax would require διαλάβοι, according to the canon of Dawes, despite what Stalbaum may say to the contrary, misled by the subtleties of Hermann.

has been reclining between you and me, that he might keep us apart. There will not, however, occur any thing in his favour from this; for I will come and recline by you. By all means, said Socrates, come hither, and recline below me. O Zeus! said Alcibiades, how greatly again do I suffer from this man! He fancies he must surpass me in every thing; but, O wonderful man, if nothing else, suffer at least Agatho to recline between us. It is impossible, said Socrates: for as you have praised me, it is now necessary for me to praise him, reclining at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines below you, he will not surely again praise me, before he has been praised by me. Cease, then, thou happy fellow, and do not grudge my being praised by the youth; for I have a great desire to pass an encomium on him. Ho! ho! said Agatho to Alcibiades, there is no reason why I should remain here, but every reason rather that I should change my place, that I may be praised by Socrates. This is, said Alcibiades, as usual. When Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favours of the beautiful. And now observe how easily he has discovered a persuasive language, so that this youth should recline at his side. After this Agatho rose up, as if about to recline close to Socrates. But on a sudden there came very many revellers to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of some one having gone out in an opposite direction, they marched in, and threw themselves on the couches; and the whole place was filled with uproar, and no longer in any order (every one)[57] was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Whereupon Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, said Aristodemus, went away,[58] but that sleep laid hold of him;[59] and that he slept for a very long time, as the

[57] As there is nothing to which *ἀναγκάζεσθαι* can be referred, Sydenham has introduced "every one;" which has led me to suggest *πάντα πολὺν*, in lieu of *πάμπολυν*. Ficinus has merely, "nec ullus post hæc modus in bibendo servatus."

[58] Stalbaum remarks correctly, that Eryximachus and Phædrus are properly said to have gone away; for the physician was no friend of intemperance, as stated in p. 176, D. § 4, and Phædrus was, on this point especially, accustomed to follow the example of his medical friend, as he confesses in the same §.

[59] The best MSS. read *ἓ δὲ*, others *ἔαδε*, and one *ἐμὲ δὲ*, just as we find in p. 175, A. § 3, *ἐμὲ* in all the MSS., which Stephens first altered into *ἓ μὲν*. But as in Attic Greek the reciprocal pronoun is *ἑαυτὸν* or *αὑτὸν*, we must here and elsewhere look for some other remedy. Perhaps Plato wrote, *εἰς δὲ ὕπνον ἑαυτὸν λαβεῖν*, i. e. "sleep laid hold of him at the stove:" where the mention of the stove is very appropriate; for not only were the

nights were long, and rose at daybreak while the cocks were crowing; and on getting up he saw that the rest of the guests were asleep, or[60] gone; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, and drinking out of a great bowl, which they kept passing to the right hand,[61] and that Socrates was discoursing with them; but he did not recollect, said Aristodemus, what the discourse was in other respects, as he was not present at the beginning of it, and dozing; but the sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates was compelling them to admit that it was the province of the same person to know how to write comedy and tragedy, and that he, who was by art a tragic poet, was also a comic one; and that when they had been compelled (to admit) this, they began, as not very well following (the argument),[62] to doze; and that Aristophanes fell asleep the first, and when it was now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, having put them to sleep, got up and went away; and that [63]he, (Aristodemus,) as he was wont, followed; and that he (Socrates) went to the Lyceum,[63] and, having washed himself as at another time,[64] passed the rest of the day;[65] and having thus passed it till evening, he took his rest at home.

nights long, as stated shortly afterwards, but cold likewise. For the Lenæa were celebrated in January.

[60] In lieu of *καὶ* Hommel properly suggested *ἢ*. Ficinus has avoided the difficulty in *καὶ*, for the same persons were assuredly not asleep and gone, by his "partim dormiebant, partim discesserant."

[61] On the phrase *πίνειν ἐπιδέξια*, see Casaubon on Athenæus, l. p. 21, B.

[62] Stalbaum, to supply the ellipse, quotes very opportunely Euthyphr. p. 12. A., *οὐχ ἕπομαι τοῖς λεγομένοις*.

[63]—[63] As *αὐτὸς* is omitted in nearly all the MSS., Bekker thinks that Plato wrote here, as in § 4, the obsolete *ἑ*. Ficinus has "ipso, ut consueverat, comitante," which confirms *αὐτὸς*.

[64] Although *ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε* might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer *ὥσπερ ἐλινύοντα*, "like a dawdler," as having nothing to do. On the gloss or corruption of *ἐλινύειν*, Toup has written with his usual learning, sagacity, and taste, on Suid. t. ii. p. 201. In fact, if some such idea be not introduced, the subsequent *οὕτω* would be scarcely intelligible. But if *ἄλλοτε* be preserved, we must read *αὖτως*, "at leisure," for *οὕτω*.

[65] Instead of *ἀλλην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ὅλην*, as shown by his "totum." From whence Stephens edited *ὅλην*.

END OF VOL. II.